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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
li~.tl ,~ , , ::.~'I.tlll ~ L t' 
.Y f'y:.,j ~ ~,j 
': .. Allah permitteth bay' and forbiddeth riba ... " - Qur'an 2:275 
"He granteth wisdom to whom He pleaseth. And he to whom wisdom is granted receiveth indeed a 
benefit overflowing; but none will grasp the Message but men ofunderstanding"- Qur'an 2:269 
"God w1Ïl not ask us, on the Day of1udgment, what people may have said or understood, but He will ask 
us ifwe ourselves have understood His Book, and ifwe have followed its direction" - M. 'Abduh 
1.1. Objective 
This hermeneutical and juridical research project is a theological-philosophical 
investigation of a single Abrahamic scriptural injunction quoted above, which, 
exoterically mundane in manifestation but esoterically very pregnant in meaning, 
originated in the Hebrew Torah as prohibition of marb]! (lit. growth; tech. ereditor's 
gain) - and also as neshekh (lit. bite; tech. debtor's loss) - and which, with cognate 
Semitic linguistic roots for marblt and ribii, culminated in the Qur'an as outlawing 
(declaring l}ariim) the human practice of ribii (lit. unilateral growth; tech. 
usury/interest) and permitting (making l}aliil) the human practice of bay' (lit. bilateral 
exchange; tech. sale).! Theologically, the research objective is to discover in this 
scriptural injunction a univers al and etemal divine law. Philosophically, the objective is 
to extract a pioneering critical theory of normative human behavior subsumed in this 
divine law. Hermeneutically, the objective is to determine the inter-Iocking meaning, 
sc ope and rationale of the two terms, ribii and bay'. Juridically, the objective is to 
identify the definitive l}ikma (ration ale ) and' illa (ratio legis) of the injunction. 
Based primarily on Islam, this new theory of normative human behavior may be 
termed "Natural Conformism" to denote "conformity" with the divine law, which, inter 
alia, eompared to the popular translation "submission," might be a more precise 
rendering of the term "Islam" - the din al-filra (the religion ofnatureV Given its diverse 
roots and virtually unlimited scope, and constituting a comprehensive practical 
1 Q. 2:275. 
2 Q. 30: 30. 
12 
worldview of normative human behavior, this new theory could eventually qualify for 
the much sought after title of "Grand Unifying Theory" (GUT)3 that has eluded the 
academic study of religion: 
It has become clear over the past two centuries that the academic studv ofreligion has no GUT, 
that is, no Grand Unifying TheOly that brings into sharp focus all things religious. And it never 
will Every theory frames and focuses our attention on sorne things while leaving other things 
outside the frame or out of focus. Thus, religious studies is alwavs in search ol'new theories that 
might open up new ways ol' seeing and interpretingreligion. 
In recent decades, religion scholars have moved beyond their traditional disciplinary 
boundaries in search of new theoretical perspectives by which to interpret religion. Theories of 
culture, history, language, and gender that were unfamiliar to most religionists in the past are 
today reframing and refocusing how we see religion. As a result, the canon of theories and 
methods important to the academic study of religion has been dramatically transformed and 
expanded. This situation makes religious studies an exciting and vibrant academic field Yet il 
also presents religion students and teachers with signiiicant challenges. These new theories ask 
innovative questions and reveal novel possibilities for studying and interpreting religion, but they 
are onen diflicult to understand [italics and emphasis mine]4 
This work will take up this challenge by positing a comprehensive yet easy to 
understand new theory of "action" (normative behavior), Le., the nature and role of 
divine vs. human action and human conformity to it, to comprehend religion devoid of 
ritual and jargon in terms of the divine law of ribii and bay'. 
1.2. Research Issue 
Intellectually so far, the divine law of ribii and bay', revealed in all three 
Abrahamic faiths in varying detail and differing degrees of developmental potential, has 
been grossly under-utilized as it was always relegated to its limited technical meaning 
only. The formaI foray into its intrinsic broader meaning commenced with a 
hermeneutical examination,5 which concluded that the CUITent hermeneutical models of 
ribii were lacking in depth, restrictive in scope and skewed in construction as they did 
not calibrate its linguistic, prohibitory and punitive aspects. Therefore, the research 
objective, as outlined above, is to explore conceptually the Scriptural prohibition of ribii 
and the juxtapositional permission of bay' in the Abrahamic monotheistic divine law -
as manifcstcd finally in Islamic law - in such dcpth and brcadth, and using an 
appropriate methodology, that through a calibrated hermeneutical model a new critical 
theory of normative human behavior can be posited. 
, A terrn uscd by William E. Dcal and Timothy K. Beai in Thcory For RcJigious Studics(New York; London: Routledge, 2004), xi. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Azcemuddin Subhani, 'Thc Islamic Doctrine of Ribii Prohibition: A Modular Hcrrncncutical Examination" (mastcr's thcsis, 
McGiIl University, 2002). 
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Though lexically pregnant, contextually and technically the Arabie term ribiï 
(root: r.b. w.) subsumes only the age-oId concept of usury/interest, encountered as a 
moral and legal issue since antiquity, in terms of toleration, limitation or prohibition. 
Focus of writ, inquiry and action by the ancient law-code givers, rulers, philosophers, 
prophets, theologians, jurists and economists, and pointedly prohibited by the Holy 
Scriptures and the Prophets of the three great monotheist religions of the world -
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - it has not yet been explored to its full potential. 
Conventional religious and secular scholarship on this topic - very copious and 
voluminous, but more from repetition than from originality and variety - has not 
produced a conclusive theoretical consensus that is necessary, at least synchronically, 
for juridical purposes.6 Any further academic pursuit along convention al lines would, 
therefore, be futile. 
Conventionally, the ancient legal systems and philosophie al scholarship, 
employing "usury" as a simple and exclusive economic concept, limit or prohibit it on 
the grounds of justice and morality (exploitation), and naturallaw (infertility of money). 
Unlike the masterfully presented justice and morality arguments, the naturai iaw 
argument of infertility (of money) alone is capable of further development. 
Pristine Judaic, Christian and Islamic religious thought treats the prohibition of 
ribii, or of its counterparts - neshekh-marbJt/ tokos - as a scripturally strict and 
unequivocal injunction and its violation as a grave sin. The subject should, therefore, 
have been a closed chapter. Yet, after several centuries of ritual religious compliance, 
under later mounting financial pressure, secular intellectual challenge and poli tic al 
compulsions usury/interest is cUITently a "de ad" issue in the Judeo-Christian milieu, 
though for reasons entirely materialistic and capitalistic. In the Islamic milieu, on the 
other hand, after centuries of classical compliance, medieval evasion, colonial-era 
neglect, post-colonial revival and CUITent petro-dollar revolution, pristinc rcligious 
thought on ribii is being active1y re-explored and re-implemented via the increasingly 
sophisticated, wide and fast spreading Islamic banking movement. In a nutshell, the 
6 The necessity ofsynchronic consensus for juridical clarity docs not belittle thc dcsirability ofdiachronic cvolution of positive 
doctrinc to cater to newly cmcrging situations. 
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difference between these traditions is that while the medieval "Church-dollars"7 in the 
Occident eventually killed the usury prohibition almost universally, the contemporary 
"Petro-dollars" in the Orient are actively reviving the prohibition again almost 
universally. Due to this common Abrahamic heritage, this re-exploration - though only 
Islamically initiated - is nevertheless equally applicable to the older religious tradition. 
In the que st for a new common theory, this work, therefore, explores both the Judeo-
Christian and Islamic traditions in tandem to capture the sum total of the extant thought 
on the subject. This revivalist re-exploration of ribii, however, is severely hampered by 
absence of consensus on a plausible rationale (1;.ikma) of its prohibition which is not 
c1early delineated in the Abrahamic textual sources. For CUITent religious scholarship, 
this rationale is either ritual obediences (scripturally), or a consideration of a 
spiritual/moral/social/economic nature (literally and contextually). The extant 
convention al exegetical treatment of these identified rationales for prohibition is very 
exhaustive, but inexplicably, not conclusive. Not the exhaustiveness but the 
conc1usiveness of the rationale is, for this study, the point of departure from 
conventional scholarship. 
Unlike the CUITent Judeo-Christian milieu, in the Islamic milieu the ribii discourse 
still operates on both the conceptual and practical levels. On the practical plane, the 
Qur'anic concepts of ribii and bay~ though encapsulating a complete code of action for 
humankind - enunciated in this work - have historically been viewed exclusively in their 
limited technical context of"usury/interest" and "sale" respectively in the Islamic milieu 
as well. Thus, these two concepts, together with the prohibition of gharar 
(uncertainty/speculation) and maysir (gambling), are at the core of lslamic financial 
jurisprudence. While the concepts of gharar and maysir enjoy scholarly and juridical 
consensus, the concepts of ribii and bay' are engulfed in linguistic and juridical 
controversy, resulting in a multiplicity of diametrically opposed fàtiiwii (scholarly 
juridical opinions) on the subject from leading Islamic scholars and juridical academies. 
This makes the definition of, and the terminological contrast between, ribii and bay' a 
matter of not only theoretical but also practical concem. For this contrast potentially 
7 A tenu eoincd by this author to designate the aeeumulating but un-invested financial wealth of the medieval Chureh. 
8 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, The Concept ofRibii and Islamie Banking(Islamabad: Niazi Publishing House, 1995), 104. 
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guides not only the everyday financial decision-making of one-fifth of humanity today, 
but also regulates the highly creative financial engineering constantly evolving ever-
new Islamic business applications in the burgeoning, yet nascent, Islamic banking 
industry. The Qur'an9 and the lfaditliO - the unanimously agreed juridical textual 
sources for ribii and bay' injunctions - while unequivocal, explicit and focused on 
injunction, are less so, (particularly the Qur'an) on explication (bayiin) of their meaning 
and rationale. Like the importance of ritual obedience in matters of devotional 
jurisprudence (fiqh a1- 'ibaaiit), this needed but absent explication (bayiin) is of crucial 
significance in matters of transactional jurisprudence (fiqh a1-mu'iima1iit), involving 
highly creative jurisprudential activity, operating as it does at the very delicate 
religious-secular, lJariim-lJa1iil, border, as in the case of financial engineering. 
On the conceptual plane, the ribii and bay' injunctions are among the central tenets 
of Islam. Ribi-proscription and bay'-permission are divine1y textually ordained in the 
Qur'an and divinely inspired in the Sunna. Juridically, the presence of ribi voids any 
contract, and, in the absence of a theory of contract, the bay' contract functions as the 
prototype of all contracts in Islamic law. Violation of these divine injunctions is 
regarded as the grave st of sins (akbar a1-kabii'ir) Il and is threatened with consequences 
at the severe st end of the spectrum. For believers, therefore, the comprehension and 
temporal enforcement of this prohibition/permission should have been no different from 
its acceptance as a pillar of faith. However, this is not the case. What sets this tenet 
apart from the others, in the matter of enforcement, is the fact that while the injunctions 
are unequivocal on prohibition/permission, they are - inexplicably - not readily self-
explanatory. It is a case of paucity of explicit direct guidance - both Divine and 
Prophetie - on a crucial tenet. Discovery of the true meaning of the prohibited ribi and 
permitted bay', to capture the true Islamic regulatory model, has, therefore, been the 
que st of Muslim scholarship since the time of the inception and c1assical development of 
Islamic law. Yet, in spite of precision on the juridicallevel, though verging on casuistry 
and apparent superficiality, the search has failed both in method and content. The true 
meaning continues to be as elusive and the ijtihidic task as pressing as ever. Unlike the 
9 Q. 2:275-281; 3: 130; 4: 161; 30; 39. 
10 Ribaw7- commoditics l;aditfr, ineest-ribacorrcspondcnee I}adith; ribaonly in nas7'a I}adith; dates salc-purehasc I}adith. 
Il Ibn l:Iajr al-Makkl (d. 974 A.H.), al-Zawiijir fi 'I-Makkl. 
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other two foundational prohibitions of Islamic financial jurisprudence, i.e., gharar and 
maysir, this primary prohibitory foundation, Le., ribii, though unequivocal in injunction, 
is so enigmatic in interpretation that it appears to be "the supreme of all Quaestiones 
Vexatae of Islamic law."12 In spite of aIl the classical, medieval and contemporary, 
traditional and liberal scholarship - both Muslim and Orientalist - devoted to it, ribii 
prohibition has so far defied a univers al consensus not only on its definition and scope, 
but also on its rationale, its underlying cause and the commensurability of the ration ale 
with the ordained punishment. The only consensus is that ribii, whatever it means, 
covers or signifies, is unequivocally prohibited and severely punishable, though again its 
enforcement is subordinated to the doctrines of exception, needlnecessity, and 
modemity. 
Not surprisingly, given the CUITent fluidity and inconclusive state of exegesis and 
juristic extrapolation, the fundamental research questions about ribii still remain: What 
is it? My is it prohibited? And how is it so severely punishable? In other words, 
"[W]hat purpose does the Sharl'a seek to achieve through the prohibition of ribii?" 13 
The thrust ofthis questioning is both theological andjuridical. 
These interpretative obstacles sUITounding the concepts of ribii and bay' are fully 
borne out by the conclusions reached by classical, medieval and contemporary leading 
scholars of Islamic law. Historically, Caliph 'Umar b. Khattab (d. 22/644), recognizing 
the ambiguity of the main Qur'anic injunctions on ribii and the lack of their full 
Prophetic explication, advised the community to shun both ribii and rlba (doubt), the 
latter term appearing in sorne versions of the tradition as ribiJ (profit ).14 Reportedly, 
there were three issues, including ribii, on which he desired c1earer Prophetic 
injunctions. 15 
The underlying ri cher explanatory potential of this limited Sunnaic material on 
ribii was initially downplayed - though later restored - by Companion Ibn 'Abbas (d. 
68/686), who is still relied upon by sorne scholars for his distinction between the so-
12 S.E. Rayner, The Theory ofContraets in lslamic Law(London: Graham and Trotman, 1991),266. 
13 Nyazee, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 104: "The main reason for understanding the !;ikma of the prohibition of ribii is that its 
implcmentation will become casier once wc identify the main goal that has to be achieved. The determination of the purpose of 
prohibition is important not only for the initial implcmentation of the provisions of ribii, but also for later administration and 
adjudication of cascs by officiaIs and judgcs." 
14 According to the uncontested cvidence of Ibn' Abbas, report cd in Ibn Maja; al-Bukhari; also, Fat!; al-BiirT, VIII, 164 f. 
15 Ibn Kathlr, TalS/r. abr. Sheikh MuI)ammad Naslb ar-Rafii'1 (London: al-Firdous Ltd., 1999),74-75. 
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ealled Qur'anie ribii as refleeted in referenees to ribii a1- nasJ'a (ribii from delay) of the 
Jahiliya, and the Sunnaie ribii as refleeted in references to ribii a1-fàql (ribii from exeess) 
in the Prophetie iJadJth on ribawl-commodities. Ibn 'Abbas assigned a secondary 
importance and hence a weaker binding force to the latter, based on another crucial 
Prophetie iJadJth, transmitted by himself, to the effect that "ribii is in nasl'a (delay) 
1 " on y. 
The lOth century I:Ianafi jurist, al-Ja~~a~ (d.372/982), noting the divergence 
between the linguistic and technical meanings of the term "ribii," left it as an 
unelaborated (mujmaJ) term in need of explication (bayiin).16 
Famous exegete Ibn Kathlr (d.774/1373) admits that "the problem of 
understanding ribii and what may lead to it has been one of the most difficult problems 
for jurists (ah1 a1- 'ilm)." 17 
Contemporaneously, a 20th cent ury exegete Muhammad Asad, relying on Ibn 
Kathlr, regrets the absence among Islamie scholars of an absolute agreement on a 
definition of ribii, comprehensive juridically and responsive positively to all variable 
economic exigencies.18 
As noted above, 19 Susan Rayner calls ribii "the supreme of all Quaestiones 
Vexatae of Islamie law." Likewise, lawyer Nabil Saleh explains the lack of unanimity on 
the issue of ribii: 
... each school [of Islamic law] and practically every scholar has an individual view ... This has 
made the ribii issue one of the most debated in Islamic fiqh. 20 
Prof essor Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, a leading writer on Islamic financial 
jurisprudence, comments on the complexity ofthe issue of ribii: 
The topic of ribiihas been selected to elucidate the operation of these methods of interpretation 
[of the fuqahii '],both because of its complexityand importance in modem times. Indeed, the 
issue of ribiihas assumed the proportions of a challenge for the scholars of Islamic law. [italics 
mine]21 
16 Abu Bakr Al)mad ibn 'Ali al-Ja~~as al-Raz!. AfJkiim a/-Qur'iïn , 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kit ab al-'Arabî, n.d.; Constantinople: 
Mataba'a al-Awqafal-Islamiyya, 1355, 1,464-5, chap. on ribii 
17 'Imad al-Dîn Abu al-Fida' Isma'il Ibn Kathîr al-Qurayshî al-Dimashqî, Ta[~Jr a/-Qur'iïn a/- 'A?lm, 7 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 
1389/1970),1,581. 
'" Muhammad Asad, The Message of The Qur'iïn, Trans/ated and Exp/ained(Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), n. 35, 622. 
19 See n. 12, p. 17, above. 
20 Nabil Salch, Un/awfu/ Gain and Legitimate Profit Îll l~/amie Law (London: Graham & Trotman, 1992), 15. But, Hallaq, in personal 
comments on this thesis, correctly points out that this diversity of opinion is not unique to ribii and is characteristic ofmost positive 
law. 
21 Nyazee, Ribiï and l\'lamic Banking, 2. 
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Similarly, Prof essor Wae1 B. HaUaq, a leading legal historian, protests the 
ambiguity of the issue of ribii: 
Sorne properties [of ratio legis], however, do not disclose the reason. We do not know, for 
instance, why edibility should be the ratio legis for the prohibition of usury; aIl we know is that 
a11 objects possessing the property of edibility cannot be the subject of a transaction involving 
USury?2 
The above conclusion is corroborated by the Sharl'a faculties of Islamic 
universities who ho Id and teach that the 'ilal (rationes legis: occasioning factors) and 
iJikma (ration ale ) of the injunction prohibiting ribii postulated in Islamic fiqh to-date are 
aU inconcJusive.23 
FinaUy, in the first-ever library-cum-fie1d researched work on Islamic finance, 
Prof essor Frank E. Vogel, a leading expert on Islamic law, highlights the complexity and 
challenge of the issue of ribii: 
The question arises, why, if such [ribawJ} transactions meet with the approval of both parties 
(tariiç/in), are they divinely disapproved? The Qur'iin asks this very question, but in a more 
penetrating way - why is sale not like ribii?, and gives the emphatic, if obscure, answer that God 
has aIlowed the one and prohibited the other. Given the question and the response, it becomes 
morally urgent to be able to distinguish ribii trom ordina/Y trade. What sorts of "increase" or 
inequality in exchange transform lawful commercial gain into condemned usury, despite both 
parties' ready consent? In what circumstances does the desire for gain become perverted and 
corrupt? Uniortunately, the answers to these vital questions have never been easy... [italics 
mine]24 
As is corroborated by the few notable opinions quoted above, in short, 
convention al Muslim scholarship has failed even to raise, let alone answer, the question 
of how and why possible economic exploitation (in interest-bearing loans)25 and 
homogeneity, currency-value, edibility, storability, measurability and weighability (in 
iJaliil commodities exchangeY6 can be the ratio legis tilla), and injustice can be the 
rationale(iJikma) of an offence - the grave st of sins in aIl monotheistic religions - that is 
threatened with the severest of the Qur'anic punishments of evil touch of Satan, 
22 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Thcoric,~: An Introduction to SunnJ u,,'iil al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 85-8ü. 
23 Personal observation by Dr. Fahad al-Hamoudi, faculty membcr of Imam Saud Islamic University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Octobcr, 
2006. 
24 Frank E. Vogel, and Samuel L. Hayes, III, l~/amic Law and Finance: Religion, Ri~k, and Rctum (The Hague; London; 8oston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998),63. This is an extensive Iibrary and first ever field-researched work, including in-depth interviews 
with Icading Muslim scholars of financial jurisprudence from around the world, backcd by a tcam of Harvard rescarchcrs of Islamie 
law and thc extensive resourees and finaneial data base of the Harvard Islamie Finance Projeet. Frank E. Vogel is holder of the 
Custodian of Two Holy Mosques (Late King Fahad) Chair of Islamie Law at Harvard, and Samuel L. Hayes III is a Profcssor 
Emeritus of Finance at thc Harvard Business Sehool. 
25 8ased on popular exegesis of Q. 2: 279. 
26 Juridieally derived eharaeteristies ofthc commodities named in the ribawJ six-eommodities Prophetie lJadith. 
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deprivation of God's blessing (which equates to destruction and extermination), war 
from God and His Messenger, loss ofbelief, and eternal Hellfire, and which Sunnaically 
is equated with shirk (idolatry, polytheism), incest with one's own mother, and the 
destruction ofman's honor? 
In the absence of any further Scriptural revelations, Prophetie guidance and any 
conventional ijtihiidic success so far, the explication (bayiin) of the ribii and bay' 
ordinance is now clearly a prime candidate for a new ijtihiid through inspiration, 
intuition, and reason. What is needed is a focus not so much on the exoteric as on the 
esoteric aspects of the ribii and bay' concept. What has to be explored is not the 
perceived fonns and effects in terms of exploitation/injustice, as in the current 
juridical/economic scholarship, but the essence of ribii and bay: in a philosophical-
theological framework, in terms of the divinely emphasized distinction between what 
may be called the J;ariim ribawJ and the J;aliil bay'awJ modes of behavior. This work, 
therefore, based on Qur'anic and Sunnaic evidence, inspiration, intuition, and reason, 
will seek the bayiin left to posterity by al-Ja~~a~, expounding philosophical-theological 
answers to questions on 'illa and lJiJana of ribii and bay' injunctions, raised by Hallaq, 
Vogel, Rayner, and Nyazee and others contemporaneously, and by many scholars 
historically, but not answered conclusively so far. 
Essentially, the underlying problem is that the word "ribii" appears to be an 
"unclear" word. In u~iil al-fiqh Gurisprudential) methodology, "unclear" words are those 
"that do not themselves convey a clear meaning without the aid of addition al evidence 
that may be furnished by the Lawgiver Himself or by the mujtahid The three types of 
unclear words are: khatiy (obscure), mushkil (difficult), and mujmal (ambiguous, vague). 
If the inherent ambiguity is clarified by means of research and ijtihiid, the words are 
classified as khatiy(obscure) and mushkil(difficult). But when the ambiguity could only 
be removed by an explanation that is furnished by the Lawgiver, the word is classified as 
mujmaJ(ambiguous, vague)."27 The mujmalis inherently unclear and gives no indication 
as to its precise meaning. Only the Lawgiver can explain what it means. The causes of 
ambiguity are: (1) either the word is mushtarak (a homonym) (2) or the word is 
unfamiliar, or (3) the word is transferred from its literaI meaning and used as a 
27 Muhammad Alsharccf, The Code ofSeholars: Usool AI-Fiqh (Ottawa: AI-Maghrib Institutc, 2001),55. 
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[technical] term.28 Evidently, based on this third cause of ambiguity, which he expressly 
mentions in the case of ribii, al-Ja~~a~ classified ribiï as an unelaborated (mujmal) term 
in need of explication (bayiïn), as pointed out above.29 His implication is clear that the 
bayiïn (explication) can only be provided by the Lawgiver Himself. But al-Ja~~a~ goes on 
to declare that such additional explanatory Qur'anic and Sunnaic evidence is available. 
The Prophet provided extensive elaboration of the meaning intended by Allah in the 
[ribiï] verse by way of explicit commands and decisions.30 Utilizing this evidence only 
requires imaginative exploration, which will be a hallmark of this research in a marked 
departure from conventional scholarship on the issue, making it a pioneering study and 
the results a definite contribution to knowledge. 
1.3. Methodology 
Although the research content of this work is revisionist, the employed research 
methodology is traditional - linguistic, jurisprudential, philosophical and theological 
analysis. Essentially, it employs the traditional rules of u~iil al-fiqh itselfboth for critical 
evaluation of, and suggested revisions to, the fiqh (positive law) repertoire. The point of 
departure from the traditional Islamic scholarship, in method and result, however, lies in 
the application of philosophical and theological analysis to the fiqh on ribii and bay' 
apparently for the first time ever. The study seeks the defining parameters of ribii and 
bay' primarily not in the traditionally employed fields of economics, ethics and law but 
in the never yet applied fields ofphilosophy and theology. 
Central to the methodologicai approach of this work is the modern linguistic 
theory of semiology31 of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand De Saussure (1857-1913). A 
catalyst for the development of structuralism, this theory holds that linguistic meaning 
resides in the relationship between words, a notion that has impacted on many fields of 
academic inquiry including religion, literature, philosophy, anthropology, and 
psychoIogy.32 This philosophy of language is called structural linguistics after its 
28 Ibid., 58. 
29 Sec, n. 16, p. 18, above. 
30 al-Ja~~a~, AlJkiim al-Qur'iin, 1,464-5. 
31 Ferdinand De Saussure, in his posthumously published Course in General Linguisties(1916), tr. by Wade Baskin. (New York and 
London: MeGraw-HiII, 1959), quoted in William E. Deal and Timothy K. BeaI, Theory For Rc/igious Studies(New York; London: 
Routledgc,2004),19ff. 
32 This theory has aetcd as a eritical point of dcparturc in the work of influcntial twcnticth-ccntury critical thcorists such as Foucault, 
Althusser, Barthes, Lévis-Strauss, Lacan, Kristcva, and Derrida. 
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strategy for examination of language and meaning, which focuses on investigating 
structures within a system. Structuralism significantly shaped 20th century thought 
through its notion of the "linguistic turn," which holds that meaning does not exist 
outside language.33 
This new linguistic science, called "semiology" (from the Greek word for "sign" 
semeîon), or "semiotics," is the science of signs, that is, the study of the structure of 
language as a system of signification rather than the history of the development of 
language.34 The theory holds that the study of language as a system requires a 
synchronie rather than a diachronie approach. Language can only be understood in terms 
of relationship. Instead of etymology as the conveyor of meaning of a word, meaning is 
produced by a word's relationship to other word., occurring at a particuJar time, within a 
particuJar system of relationships. An illustrative example of the word "dog" is posited 
in this discourse. "The contemporary word 'dog' means something not because of its 
historical derivation from the Middle English dogge, which is in tum derived from the 
Old English docga, but rather because of the current relationship of 'dog' to other words 
like 'puppy' and 'cat'."35 A central c1aim made by this synchronie linguistic analysis is 
that words do not have inherent meaning. Instead meaning resides in reJationships of 
difference and simiJarity within a larger linguistic system - words are not units of self-
contained meaning. The theory posits that language is not natural, Le., language names 
things not because of sorne intrinsic relationship between a word and the thing named; 
instead language is conventional, Le., language names both concrete things and abstract 
ideas based on an arbitrary decision to use a certain sound to represent a certain idea.36 
The linguistic sign is fundamentally relational and the relationship between the signifier 
and the signified is arbitrary: any signifier can potentially stand for any signified. In the 
'dog' example, above, the word dog is an arbitrary designation, capable of change 
simply by cultural agreement. "There is no particular dog designated by the word, nor is 
J3 Deal and Beai, Thcory for Rc/igious Studics, 19-20. 
34 As pointcd out by Deal and Beai (Thcory for Rc/igious Studies, 20), "nineteenth-century philology employcd a diachronic 
methodology that derived from a central assumption that language could only be comprchended through a study of its historieal 
changes. Thus, if a word could be traeed baek to its origin, then the path to its present meaning could be followed." 
35 Dcal and Beai, Theory for Rc/igiou.\· Studies, 20-21. 
36 Ibid., 21. 
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there sorne inherent quality ("dogness") contained in or conveyed by the sound-image 
-1 "37 uog. 
In the system of signification, "since signs are arbitrary, the meaning of any 
particular sign is determined in terms of similarity and difference in relation to other 
signs. Thus meaning is fOunded on binary oppositions, such as dark/light, good/bad, 
inside/outside, margin/center, male/female, positive/negative, immanent/transcendent, 
life/death, scared/profane .,. [and ribiïlbay' ]. Within these binary pairs, the meaning of 
one is basically the opposite of the other. Meaning, then, is predicated on difference ... "38 
It is claimed that Saussure's theory of the structure of language has significant 
implications for the academic study of religion because religious narratives frequently 
derive meaning from binary oppositions. Here a Saussurian question arises as to whether 
the named elements (e.g., good and evil) exist prior to language or only within the 
binary relationships of terms in particular languages. This question arises due to 
perceptions of the world in terms of differing binary oppositions (e.g., good/evil vs. 
purity/impurity) among the various religious traditions.39 
While the Saussurian assertion on binary opposition of meaning is universally 
valid, the assertion that words are arbitrary designations capable of change simply by 
cultural agreement is problematic for languages of divine revelation. In a language like 
Arabie, with its claimed divine origin and revelatory use and a well laid out typically 
triliteral word-root system ("The Semitic root is one of the great miracles of man's 
language."40), the initially assigned meaning of words is not capable of change simply by 
cultural agreement. Qur'anic Arabie, like Biblical Hebrew, neither has constantly 
deve10ping arbitrary meanings nor any can be adopted by cultural agreement. The 
snapshot of word meaning captured at the time of divine revelation acquires a 
synchronie and diachronie fixity, which also flows into the vernacular of these 
languages. Binary opposition which brings meaning into sharp relief, however, is a 
Qur'anic linguistic feature extensively utilized centuries before the modern theory of 
semiology. The only clement of this modern theory that will be put into exegetical 
17 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 21-22. 
JO Ibid., 22 
40 Johannes Lohmann, "M. Heidegger's ontologieal differenee and language," in On Heidegger and Language, cd. Joseph J. 
Koeklcmans (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1972),318. 
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service in this work, therefore, is the binary opposition of meaning obtaining at the time 
of divine revelation. 
This study rests squarely on the two "from" sources (Qur'an and Sunna), and on 
only the first of the two "through" sources (qiyiis and ijmii') of Islamic legal 
methodology.41 Drawing on Qur'anic and Prophetie Sunnaic source material, the study 
applies to it linguistic, philosophie al and theological analysis to determine the defining 
characteristic and thus the rationale and the occasioning factor of ribii and bay' 
injunction. Employing the legal methodology of qiyiis (analogical extension), these 
findings further determine the parameters of, and implications for, a gamut of fiqh 
topics. 
Hermeneutical exploration of theozyrather than historical investigation of practice 
being the research objective, the methodological focus in the new theory development is 
primarily conceptual. The argumentation continues to be based entirely on intuitive 
exposition and rational evidence/analysis without any resort to non-divinely-
revealedlinspired historical and contextual evidence. The sole historiea1 reliance is on 
the divinely revealedl inspired Scriptures of the three monotheist faiths. Hence, in the 
Islamic context, the only historical evidence employed is the Qur'anic and Sunnaic 
evidence. This is not to belittle the importance of historical/contextual evidence -
inc1uding asbiib a1-nuziil, Le., the occasions or circumstances of revelation - as an 
indispensable instrument of Qur'anic narrative exegesis. But, by definition, asbiib a1-
nuzii1 concept has a local historical context and connotation. How can the discovery of 
Divine Law, univers al truths and principles per se, although sometimes aided by this 
historical context, he allowed to he constrained by it? Similarly, how can the application 
of the discovered Divine Law be allowed to be constrained by the "modem" - more 
neutrally called "contemporary" - context? Moreover, our sources for the pre-Islamic 
and early Islamic eras are at best sketchy and, then too, not entirely reliable. To 
confound the confusion further, the mode of employment of this sketchy historical 
evidence hy contemporary scholars is such that it leads not to clarity, unanimity or 
certainty but to ambiguity, multiplicity and uncertainty in interpretation. It is quite 
fashionahle for contemporary scholars to attrihute - often with self-proclaimed certitude 
41 Thc tcnns "from" and "through" sources are borrowings from Hallaq, History ofls/amie Lega/ Theories, 1. 
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and without historical verification - any number ofpractices, even self-contradictory, to 
past civilizations to suit their self-serving Hnes of argumentations and agendas. Typical 
of such declarations, relevant to this study, run along the lines: "production loans were 
very common in pre and post Islamic Arabia," and its contrary declaration "consumption 
loans were the only form of lending practiced in pre and post lslamic Arabia," etc. Any 
meaningful reliance on historical evidence, while not always helpful in conceptual 
matters, leads directly into the separate and independent issue of historiography, which 
would caU for a study in its own right. 
Starting with a philological and morphological examination of the core terms ribii 
and bay' and of the intimately related term rabb, the analysis pursues their meanings to 
logical conclusions. This is supplemented by a critical evaluation of both the extant fiqh 
repertoire and the posited new theory on the 'illa and l}ikma of the ribiilbay' injunctions, 
employing u$iil al-fiqh methodology. Finally, a philosophical-theological extrapolation 
culminates in a calibrated hermeneutical model. 
Unless prevented by the diversity of the topics, aU background material is 
presented using the chronological method which facilitates the detection of any 
diachronic developments of thought on the issues. Due to its suitability, the analytical 
method is employed for presenting the legall}adith material, the chronology of which is, 
in any case, not determinable within the twenty-three year Prophetic revelatory time 
span. The analytical method has also been employed for presenting the scriptural and 
hermeneutical models to sum up the individual sources for identifying common 
underlying processes. 
The sources selected for consideration do not exhaust the field, but still capture the 
diversity of thought on the issue. Authors and works dealing exclusively with the 
practical field of Western and lslamic banking have been omitted, except to the extent 
ofpractical topics germane to the issues oftheory. 
lA. Dissertation Scope 
Wide scope being one element of its originality, the study will, for the first time 
ever, extend the conventional exclusive financial context of the ribii discourse to the 
farthest limits sustainable by the lexical and scriptural meanings of the tcrms ribii and 
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bay~ thereby immediately elevating the discourse to philosophie al and theological 
levels, the focal point of which will be the concepts of the Creator, the creation, the 
created and the resurrected. The study's parameters will, therefore, be delimited by the 
notions of Divine singularity and human duality, divine self-subsistence and human 
interdependence, ex-nihilo creation in pairs, the significance of the Qur'anic reference to 
odd and even numbers and the number 19, the notion of worldly test of the human 
duaHty model, and the promise of the first-ever introduction of the duality model ("pure 
companions") in the Hereafter. Textual support for this extended focus as weB will come 
from the Qur'an and the lfadith. In addition to the Qur'anic and Sunnaic injunctions 
specifically on ribii and bay: constituting the juridical repertoire in chapter II, many 
Qur'anic verses cited in chapter IV, with an extra-juridical import and philosophie al-
theological orientation, support this extended and broader scope of the dissertation. 
The parameters of this inquiry will, therefore, cover important philosophie al-
theological ground in addition to the purely financial. The concepts of the unit y (aiJad) 
and the necessarily flowing self-sufficiency of the Creator,42 and the duaHty (zawj) and 
the necessarily flowing interdependence of the creation,43 together with the concept of 
creation from nothing [ex-nihilo],44 will be explored in the que st for the discovery of the 
divine law goveming human creation (the SharJ'a). This vast spectrum will be mined 
and a conception of the divine law posited in the context of the human heavenly 
creation, temporal growth and eschatological return to eternity through the 
instrumentality of the concepts of ribii (growth) and bay' (exchange),45 against the 
backdrop of the promised duality (companionship) in the Hereafter.46 In short, the scope 
and conclusions of the study are encapsulated by the Arabic terms waiJdat al-khiiliq wa 
tathniyat al-makhliiq or waiJdat al-miijid wa tathniyat al-mawjiid or waiJdat al-rabbiinlya 
wa tathniyat al-insiiniyya (aH meaning, Divine Singularity and Human DuaHty), which 
will be the defining parameter for the discovered and postulated divine law. 
The focal Arabie terms ribii and bay'have been variously translated and treated by 
the different world languages and traditions. The common feature of thesc terms - the 
42 Q. 112: 1-4. 
43 Q. 36:36; 51 :49. 
44 Q. 19:67. 
45 Q. 2:275. 
46 Q. 2:25. 
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counterparts of ribii and bay' - is their restriction of the technical meaning to the 
financial context of usury/interest and sale, in spite of an underlying broader linguistic 
meaning. Similarly, the linguistic meanings of the Arabic terms ribii and bay~ and their 
Qur'anic and juridical usage, are broader, conveying the concepts of growth and 
exchange in aIl their manifestations. Yet, like its predecessors, Islamic scholarship, both 
classical and contemporary, also has restricted its exegesis and juridical extrapolation of 
the ribii-proscription and bay'- permission to the financial context only. This constricted 
usage has caused a lack of precision in understanding the terms and prevented a 
comprehensive, conclusive and defensible exegesis of the scriptural injunctions. To bring 
out and preserve their fuller meaning, this work will, therefore, use the un-translated 
Arabic terms ribii and bay' throughout and deal with them in their broader meaning of 
growth and exchange respectively, not restricting them to the financial manifestation 
reflected by the terms usury/interest and sale respectively. 
With identification and formulation of a calibrated hermeneutical model and a new 
theory of ribii and bay' as the stated research objective, this work is a conceptual 
analysis of these Arabic terms as employed in the Qur'au and lfadith. After a thorough 
survey and cri tic al analysis of the primary and secondary sources on the subject, the 
investigation will commence, through an analysis of the underlying inherent processes, 
with a determination of the meaning (ma 'nii) and a conclusive distinguishing 
/determining characteristic (tamylzJ7 of the phenomenon of ribii and that of the 
contrasting phenomenon of bay', which sets these terms apart at the pain of Satanic 
insanity and etemal Hell Fire.48 In a departure from convention al scholarship, this 
analysis will be based not on the often ill-perceived and undocumented Arab historical 
fin anci al practices or on the technical meaning of these terms, but on the broader 
linguistic Qur'anic and Sunnaic usage supplemented by sound input from the disciplines 
of theology, philosophy, logic, accounting and finance. The resulting definition of ribii 
and bay' will dispel the prevailing "terminological confusion syndrome"49 with respect 
to such terms as ribii a1-jiihiRya, ribii a1-nasl'a, ribii a1-fàql, ribii a1-Qur'iin, and ribii a1-
47 Conventional ribii diseourse makcs frcquent referenccs to the English term "distinguishing/determining eharaeteristie" and its 
Urdu equivalents, but its Arabic compact cquivalcnt "tamy7z, " coined and utilizcd in this work pcrhaps cxclusivcly, is not 
cncountered in the Iitcraturc as a tcchnical tcrm, as the othcr associated terms 'illa and lJikma arc. 
48 Q. 2:275. 
49 An expression eoined by Hallaq in his "Introduction", lslamic Law and Society, 2 (1996), \36. 
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Sunna, and will determine the scope of application of these two terms beyond the 
conventionally restricted financial sphere, dispelling what might be called, to coin a new 
expression, the "application confusion syndrome." 
This determination of the distinguishing/defining characteristics of riba and bay' 
will identify the rationale (J;ilana) of the injunction (J;ulan) of ribi-proscription and 
bay'-permission for humankind, fully commensurate with the Qur'anically-ordained 
non-J;add punishment of Satanic insanity and eternal Hellfire,50 and war from Allah and 
His Messenger,51 and with the juridically-imposed ta 'zJr punishment of imprisonment 
and eventual death.52 This rationale (J;ikma) will be commensurate also with the Sunnaic 
equivalences between ribiiand shirk(idolatry), ribiiand incest (with one's own mother), 
and ribii and destruction ofman's honor. 
The determination of the distinguishing characteristic (tamylz) and identification 
of the rationale (J;ilana) will act to derive the ratio legis (illa), Le., the efficient cause, 
or "occasioning factor,"53 of the injunction (J;ulan). 
The application of the defined ratio legis (illa) through the analogical method of 
qiyiis will in turn delineate the scope of the concepts of ribii and bay', extending them 
beyond the financial manifestation to all spheres ofhuman activity. 
This exposition will also evaluate the permissibility of ribiibased on requirements 
of need/necessity (J;iijalqariira), location: enemy vs. Islamic territory (dar al-J;arb vs. dar 
al-Islam), and modernity. 
This congruence of meaning, distinguishing characteristic, rationale, efficient 
cause, application, and punishment will yield a calibrated hermeneutical model through a 
new theory of ribii and bay', which in tum, inter alia, will clarify the Islamic dogma, 
pinpoint the Islamic Sharl'a, adjust the u~iil al-fiqh, supplement the fiqh repertoire, fine-
tune the Islamic commercial law and justify the J;udiid punishments in Islamic criminal 
law. 
50 Q. 2:275. 
51 Q. 2:279. 
52 Minority opinion of Ibn' Abbas, l:Iasan al-Ba~r1 and Ibn Sirin. 
53 A translation of 'i/la posited by Bernard Weiss in his, Thc Search for God~s' Law: IS'lamie JurisprudclJce ilJ thc WritilJgs ofSayfal-
D11J al-Amidi(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,1992). 
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1.5. Thesis 
Briefly, the thesis is that the scripturally indicated meaning and scope of the term 
ribii is much broader than the popular technical connotation of usury/interest, the single 
defining characteristic that squarely distinguishes ribii from bay' is still undiscovered, 
the rationale of the strict proscription of ribii is far graver than the popularly posited 
concepts of injustice and exploitation, and the ration ale of the permission of bay' is 
much more meaningful than the popularly posited mundane and ill-argued rationale of 
risk/profit sharing. A further key premise is that the Qur'anic prescription of bay' and 
proscription of ribii represents a univers al divine law of normative human behavior much 
broader than the contextual color accorded it in convention al exegesis and jurisprudence. 
Thus, this thesis argues that conventional scholarship - both Traditionalist and Liberal-
has not grappled conclusively with the question of ribii [and bay'l- "the supreme of all 
Quaestiones Vexatae of Islamic law."54 This inconclusiveness stems from a forced 
restrictive financial interpretation of these two terms with complete disregard of the 
inherent comprehensively applicable processes underlying these concepts. The resulting 
theories of ribii have produced hermeneutical models which are at best skewed, 
hampering consensus on the injunction and on its implementation. 
It will further be argued that the development of a new theory of ribii and bay', 
reflecting their defining characteristics, not swayed by the contextual, illusive, self-
contradictory and undocumented historical Arab Jahiliya financial practices, is a 
desideratum. This study, through a calibrated hermeneutical model, posits such a new 
theory of ribii and bay', as the divinely ordained diametrically opposed paths. 
1.6. Thesis Questions 
The overall the sis question is simply what is ribii and its coverage, why is it 
strictly prohibited, how is it so severely punishable, and what is bay' and why is it only 
permitted, not commanded? Within this parameter, answers will specifically be sought 
for what is the: 
• Ma 'nii (meaning) of ribii and bay' that removes the prevailing "terminological 
confusion syndrome" 
54 A tcrm borrowcd [rom Rayncr, ThcO/y ofContracts in l~/amic Law, 266. 
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• Tamyiz 55 (distinguishingldetermining characteristic) of ribii and bay'that sets the 
two terms apart at the pain of Satanic insanity and eternal HeU Fire 
• lfikma (rationale) of ribii -prohibition, and bay'- permission, commensurate with 
the ordained non-lJadd punishment of Satanic insanity, eternal HeU Fire, war from 
AŒih and His Messenger, and with the ta 'zir punishment of imprisonment and 
eventual death (minority opinion), and with the Sunnaic equivalence between ribii 
and shirk(idolatry) and with incest (with one's own mother) and loss ofman's honor 
• 'l11a (ratio legis)- operative modes covering the types of growth (creation) 
• Scope of riba-prohibition and bay'- permission beyond the conventionally restricted 
financial sphere 
• Comprehensive juridical definitions of the terms ribii and bay' 
• Application criteria to differentiate ribawi and bay'awitransactions 
1. 7. Study Organization 
After the introductory material in chapter l - setting forth the objective, nature, 
sc ope and methodology of the study - chapter II will investigate and evaluate the 
contributions towards new theory development from the relevant available sources, Le., 
linguistics, scriptural text, prophetie guidance, exegetical expositions, and 
philosophie al, legal and other scholarly formulations. Each source will be examined at 
least in terms of both the Judeo-Christian and Islamic perspectives. Examination of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition will highlight the birth, evolution and eventual death of the 
usury prohibition. Extending into the second phase of the monotheist discourse on 
usury, this chapter will critically survey the extant literature on the Islamic concepts of 
ribii and bay', scanning the lexie on, Arabic grammar, Qur'an, lJadlth, fiqh, tafSir, sira, 
tiirikh and falsafa, highlighting the re-enforcement, expansion, evasion, hibernation, and 
eventual revival of the prohibition. The underlying theme is to show that the prohibition 
is not just an exclusive Islamic phenomena but a common Abrahamic heritage with 
centuries old deep origins and roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Wide as the survey is, the focus for analytical purposes will, however, not be as 
much on what has been said as on what has not been said. Significantly, this approach 
55 Sec n. 47, p. 27, abovc, for this coined technical usage. 
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will facilitate the development and presentation of a new philosophical-theological 
theory of normative behavior/action in chapter IV, in preparation for which, chapter III 
will critique the derived juridical and the hermeneutical Traditionalist and Liberal 
models, and summarize the Qur'anic and Sunnaic mode1 of ribii and bay' as the 
foundation of the new model. Chapter IV will develop this new calibrated hermeneutical 
model in support of the new theory of normative behavior encapsulated in the concepts 
of ribii and bay'. Finally, chapter V will explore the extrapolations and implications of 
the new theory and chapter VI will present the conclusions. 
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CHAPTERII 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AL SOURCES 
The new critical theory being posited here has roots in the disciplines of 
linguistics, script ure, prophetic guidance, philosophy and theology, in addition to logic, 
accounting and finance. But these rich, albeit somewhat sketchy, sources have not been 
explored to their full potential by exegetes, jurists and hermeneuts in their usury/ ribii 
discourse. This chapter surveys these sources, both for what has been explored and, more 
importantly, for what has not been explored, in the search for a comprehensive theory. 
11.1. Linguistic Foundations 
For this research, linguistics is the first productive source and tool as it fumishes 
the very foundation for the edifice of the new theory, not only through the linguistic 
theory of semiotics elaborated in chapter l, but also through specific world linguistic 
traditions surveyed hereunder. 
II.1.i. Usury/Interest in Lexicon 
Ancient and modem languages provide a rich underlying mosaic of meaning for 
their different terms employed to denote usury/interest. However, the linguistic usage 
and any theory development remained universally confined to the terms' specifically 
technical financial connotation of usage charge and the underlying broader common 
concept of "growth" and even "reproduction" has invariably been neglected -
inexcusably and at great intellectual cost. For instance, the Sumerians used the same 
word, mas, primarily for calves and secondarily for interest.56 Likewise, the Egyptian 
linguistic usage apparently developed its word for interest, ms, from the verb "to give 
birth," msp7 Similarly, the Greek term for usury/interest is tokos, which means 
"offspring."58 Yet, in spite of this common theme of "reproduction" underlying these 
terms for usury/interest, there is no evidence of an ancient comprehensive theory of 
growth beyond the orphan financial theory of usury. 
On the other hand, the Sanskrit/Hindi equivalent term for interest is biyiij, 
meaning "increase," while the Hindu legal term for usury, also found in early Buddhist 
56 G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles (cd.), The Baby/onian Law.\·(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), l, 174. 
57 Fritz Heichclheim, An Ancient Economie HistOly, trans. Joyee Stevens (Leiden: Sijthoff, 195R), 1,105. 
SR Aristot1c, The Po/itie.\; trans. T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-prcsentcd Trevor J. Saunders, (London: Pcnguin Books, 1992), R7. 
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lit erat ure, is similarly vraddhi.59 A profound reflection on this concept of increase 
through interest-taking is provided by a famous Indian writer through his fictional 
character Margayya (lit. "the one who showed the way"), the money-lender: 
His function ... is to mediate between their [his clients] primeval darkness and the mvsticallight 
flowing from the modem conception of interest. Money is the greatest factor in life and the most 
ill-used ... People don't know how to tend it, how to man ure il, how to water it, how to make it 
60[' l' '] grow... . lta lCS mIlle 
ln an Aristotelian mode ofthought, the narrative goes on to profoundly reflect: 
There was probably no other pers on in the whole country who had meditated so much on the 
question of interest. Margayya's mind was full of it. Night and day he sat and brooded over it. 
The more he thought of it the more it seemed to him the greatest wonder of creation. It combined 
in it the mvsterv ol'birth and multiplication. Otherwise how could you account for the fact that 
a hundred rupees [Indian currency] in a savings bank became one hundred and twenty in course of 
time? It was something like the ripening ol' com. EveIY rupee contained in it seed ol' another 
rupee and that seed in it another seed and so on and on to infinitv. It was something like the 
firmament, endless stars and within each star an endless firmament and within each one fùrther 
endless .. .It bordered on mystic perception. It gave him the feeling of being part of an infinite 
existence. But Margayya was racked with the feeling that these sublime thoughtswere coming to 
him in a totally wrong setting.61 [Italics and underlining mine] 
The themes of increase and reproduction, as in other milieus, are pro minent here 
also. But, more importantly, these passages bring out most succinctly the themes of self-
emanation, self-generation and in finit y associated with the financial concept of interest 
and with the broader concept of ribii. However, these ri ch themes have simply been 
neglected so far and thus inexcusably squandered. 
Similarly, PersianlUrdu usage has some interesting but as yet unexplored parallels. 
The translated term for "interest" in Persian originally, later borrowed in Urdu, is siid 
which literally means "profit."62 The Arabic term ribii also is translated as siid, though 
these terms are not complete equivalents. Very significantly, however, Arabic also has 
the linguistic root s. w.d., (pron. sud), whence the PersianlUrdu term sud may have been 
derived, but whose meaning is neither "interest" nor "profit" but rather the same as rabb: 
master, he ad, chief, sovereign, lord, overlord.63 This important similarity of meaning 
between Arabic terms siid and rabb has, however, not ev en been detected, let alone 
utilized, by the scholarship so far. Thus, siid (Persian/Urdu) technically refers only to a 
59 Cambridge History oflndia, I, 218. 
60 R.K. Narayan, The Financial Expert (New York: Time Incorporated, 1966; Copyright 1953 Michigan University Press), viii. 
61 Ibid., 130-131. 
62 Fazlur Rahman, 'Ribii and Interest', !.~/amie Studies: Joumal orthe Centrallnstitute of Islamie Re.\'earch, Karachi, 3 (March 1964), 
1-43, 1. 
6' Hans Wehr, Arabie-English Dietionary: The Hans Wehr Dietionary of Modem Written Arabie. cd. lM. Cowan. (Ithaca, NY: 
Spoken Language Services Inc.1994), 513. 
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stipulated financial increase that, in turn, is only a part of ribii (Arabic), which has a 
much wider (technical) connotation of sale/purchase as well where there is no element of 
credit.64 Siid also does have the connotation ofbeing "beneficial," implying the concept 
of "growth," but the concept of "reproduction," as in other milieus, is conspicuous by its 
total absence. Still, even the available rich underlying meanings have not been 
developed further in the service of a comprehensive theory. 
As against these ri ch but under-utilized reservoirs of meaning, the English 
linguistic usage ofusury and interest in the Western context, 65 being very matter-of-fact 
and devoid of deeper linguistic connotations, is a source not of theory formulation but 
sometimes of confusion, having undergone a crucial historical transformation, clarity 
about which is essential for a productive analysis of the discourse. Originating in the 
Middle Ages, the current distinction between usury and interest hinges on the notion of 
exorbitance of the charge. Today exorbitant charge constitutes usury, which is 
prohibited, while non-exorbitant charge qualifies as interest, which is permitted. Prior to 
this historical transformation, however, the distinction between usury and interest 
hinged on the notion of intrinsic nature ofthe charge. Usage charge (usury) of any kind 
was prohibited, and only compensation for default on maturity (interest) was permitted. 
Accordingly, the original English usage treated usury (from the Latin us us 
meaning "use") as a "payment for the use of a thing," making it synonymous with the 
current notion of "interest" of any kind. The Nynweger capitulary of 806 CE gives the 
first medieval definition of usury as: "where more is asked than is given."66 By contrast, 
"interest" originally meant an addition al payment in the form of a fine that the lender 
was allowed to collect from the debtor if the bargain was not kept by delaying payment, 
which could inflict serious loss. This fine, the paena canventianalis, was often as high as 
the amount of the original debt, and represented "that which is between" (Latin 
interesse) the present position of the credit or and what it would have been had the 
bargain been kept and the loan repaid on the fixed date. Hence the name "interest" from 
the Roman "interesse" - "that which is between." But the paena, incidentally a solution 
64 Mufti Mohammad Shafi, Mas 'ala' Siid (Urdu), The Issue oflnterest. trans., Anwar A. Meenai. (Karachi: Darullshat, 1997), 13. 
65 Arthur Bimie, The History and Ethics oflnterest (Glasgow: William Hodge & Company, 1952), 3, 7. 
66 Paul Mills, "Interest in Intcrest: The Old Testament Ban on Interest and ils Implications for Today", (Jubilee Centre Publications 
Ltd., 1993), Il, quoted in Bucklcy, Theological Examination, 84. 
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milder than imprisonment or even slavery for the defaulting debtor, was not in itself 
strictly a case of interest, since it was vindictive - it puni shed negligent or fraudulent 
default. However, it was a step nearer to a later acknowledgement of delay in repayment 
as an entitlement to interest charges. Nevertheless, the concept and the term "interest" 
are derived from Roman law, where ''interest is never thought of as payment on a Joan; it 
is the 'difference' to be made up to a party injured by the failure of another to execute 
his obligations. Interest is purely compensatory, and it is accidentally and extrinsically 
associated with a loan." 67 
This legal and licit concept of ''interesse''was, however, historically utilized as an 
exception to or evasion (stratagem: in Arabic lJJJa) from the prohibition against usury. 
Reportedly, loans were initially contracted lawfully without any usury. But to evade the 
prohibition of usury, the initial term was kept to a very short duration with a mutual 
covert understanding that the loan would be "defaulted" upon this short maturity, and 
thereupon the additional payment, interesse, would be lawfully demanded and 
transacted, thus in effèct converting the so-called interesse into a payment on a Joan. 
Incidentally, this practice has very significant parallels with the reported Israelite 
practice and pre-Islamic JiihiTIya lending practice that are not commented upon in the 
scholarship. 
As to the source of the Israelite parallel, it has been suggested that the "Leviticus 
text [on interest] may refer to one of the circumventions of the law, which Israelite 
legislation considered usury in dis guise, such as the common ruse of contracting for a 
very short-term loan without interest, but with a penalty for not repaying on time."68 
As to the source of the pre-Islamic Jiihiliya parallel, it is reported extensively in 
Muslim sources that ribi(interest) was charged by the Arabs not on the initial but only 
on the extended term of the loan upon default. 
Very significantly, these parallels indicate that not only the Israelites but also the 
Arabs of the Jahiliya age, were aware of and complied with the prohibition of usury; 
they only charged compensation (interesse) for the loss emerging (damnum emergens) 
from the initial default. They did not charge for use of money for the agreed initial term 
67 Buckley, Thcological Examination, 99-100. 
6R Rev. Robert P. Maloncy, "The Background for the Early Christian Teaching on Usury." (Doctor of Sacrcd Theology diss., School 
ofSacrcd Thcology, Catholic University of America, 1969),69-70, relying on Baba Mczi'a, V, 1 f. 
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of the loan. The reported "doubling and redoubling," mentioned in the Arabic sources as 
standard Jahiliya practice, came only upon default at the end of the initial agreed 
maturity, and only for extension of the allowed period ofrepayment (interesse: interest). 
Was the Jahiliya initial loan also a stratagem (i}JJa) or a truly charitable act? This 
question will be dilated in II.8.iv, below. 
The Roman legal concept of ''interesse'' led, in the medieval period, to the 
development and scholastic approval of the concept of compensation for damnum 
emergens, the "loss emerging" from failure by the debtor to repay on the stipulated date 
and the consequent compulsion for the lender himself to borrow at a higher rate of 
interest. Another concept emerging therefrom, which won scholastic approval and which 
finally aIlowed compensation in the form of interest from the beginning of the original 
loan, was lucrum cessans - "by handing money over to another the lender deprived 
himself of the gain he might have made in various ways." In spite of this scholastic 
approval, St. Thomas Aquinas, himself a scholastic and a theologian, disapproved of 
Jucrum cessans as a basis of c1aim on the grounds of a future gain being too hypothetical 
- "selling what did not exist and, in aIl probability, might never exist."69 This stand by 
St. Thomas on the hypothetical nature of future gain (by the credit or) has a striking 
similarity to the dec1aration by al-Raz! pronouncing future gain (in his case, by the 
debtor) as ?annJ1o (resting on mere assumption, presumptive, supposed, hypotheticaF1). 
The medieval and later English usage, accordingly, treats usury as synonymous 
with excessive interest only, and by extension, interest as non-excessive interest only. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines interest as "the money paid for the use of money 
lent or for the forbearance of a debt according to a fixed ratio," and usury as "the 
practice of charging, taking, or contracting to receive, excessive or illegal rates of 
interest for money on loan." Thus usury in modem parlance refers to a rate of interest 
greater than that which the law or public opinion permits, as also corroborated by 
Bentham's definition ofusury.72 
69 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 101. 
70 Fakhr al-Dln Mul)ammad ibn 'Umar al-Razl, MafiïtllJ al-Ghayb (Istanbul: al-Malba'a al-AmÎra, 1 ~91), Il,531. 
71 Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictionaty, 682. 
72 "1 know ofbut two dcfinitions that can possibly bc given of usury: onc is, the taking of a greater interest than the law allows of ... 
the other is thc taking of a greatcr intcrcst than it is usual for men to give and take." But the distinction is "a question of semantics 
because, at whatever stage of the historic devclopment of the teaching on usury, both concepts imply a payment above the principal, 
36 
The English linguistic usage - both original and subsequent is thus purely 
pragmatic and completely devoid of any deeper meaning; by this token, while not 
productive, it is not guilty of the charge ofintellectual squandering ofits own. 
More fertile ground for theoretical development is initiated in the monotheist 
milieu by the Hebrew language, which - as the first Semitic usage - has two Biblical 
terms for interest. But even this fertile meaning is sacrificed on the altar of technical 
meaning. The first, neshekh, literally meaning bite or sting, has been confined to its 
technical connotation of painfulness to the debtof. 73 The second, even more meaningful, 
tarblt or marblt (cognate of the Arabic term ribii, with a common root r.b. w.), literally 
meaning growth or increase, has been confined technically to denoting the gain on the 
creditor's side,74 and which in later Hebrew becomes ribbit. Various further contextual 
meanings have been assigned to these two terms, induding "advance interest versus 
accrued interest"75 and "accumulating interest versus fixed amount of interest," and 
"interest from the standpoint of the debtor (bite or decrease = neshekh) versus interest 
from the standpoint of the credit or (increase = tarblt or marblt)." But again, the ri cher 
connotation of growth has been buried in the financial jargon. 
Very crucially for the new theory, however, the Hebrew meaning of interest is not 
usury in the modem sense of the term, that is, excessive interest, but aH, even minimal, 
interest. There is no difference in law between various rates of interest as all interest is 
prohibited,76 and in discussing Jewish law the words "interest" and "usury" may be used 
indiscriminately.77 As Hughes puts it: "The Hebrew term further inc1udes gain, whether 
from the loan ofmoney or goods or property of any kind. In the Mosaic Law, conditions 
of gain for the loan of money or goods were rigorously prohibited."78 
In the Judaic context, then, the Hebrew terms for usury/interest, Le., neshekh and 
tarblt or marblt, have the stated technical meaning of negative and positive increase, 
whether one reeOh'llizes il as ajust compensation for lime or lost revenue or unjust profit on a loan.", quotcd in Bucklcy, Thcological 
Examination,7. 
73 Ex.22:24; Dt.23:20. 
74 Additionally in Lev.25 :36-3 7. 
75 Rabbi Nathan (160-190 A.D.) in Siphre on Deutcronomy, XX"', 21, 263: "The commandment has bcen formulatcd to show that 
there is a type of interest which precedes and a type which follows. How? A man is seeking to borrow from someone and he sends 
him a present saying, "". so that you may !end to me." That is interest which precedes. A man has borrowcd from someone and 
sends him small coins and a present, saying, " ... for your inactive money which 1 have." That is interest which follows." 
76 Encyc/opaedia Judaica- CD ROM ed., (Judaiea Multimedia (Israel) Ltd.). s.v. "Usury" by Haim Hermann Cohn. 
77 The Jcwish Eneyclopedia, xii (New York; London: Funk and Wagnclls Co., 1905),388. 
78 Thomas Patrick Hughes, A DictionalYofll'lam (Lahore: Premier Book Housc, Reprint 1989),544. 
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and as cognates of the Arabie term ribii, they also have the unstated meanings associated 
with ribii, as will be posited in this work. But this wider spectrum of meaning has been 
strangulated by both Jewish and Islamic scholarship to this day, as shown by their utter 
failure to develop a comprehensive theory. 
Finally, the Syriac linguistic term for interest, rebitha/9 bears a striking 
resemblance to the Hebraic term tarbIt/marbIt, and accordingly attracts the same 
criticism for its under-utilization. 
II.l.ii. Ribi and Bay' in the Lexicon 
Providing the as yet unexplored framework for comprehensive theory 
deve1opment, Islamic legal prescriptions, although still concentrating on interest/usury, 
are, very helpfully, in the broader context of ribi, which not only signifies "growth" but 
also has deeper theological meaning and connotations that will be expounded in this 
work. Very significantly, however, there are additional specifie Arabie terms, denoting 
the "inerement/return," that are the exact equivalent of the English terms "interest" and 
"usury." One of these is ''lii'ida, '' or "na!'," meaning "use, usefulness, avail, bene fit , 
advantage, profit, utility, worth; interest; good, welfare; interest (on money)." 
Accordingly, fii'ida basI!a means simple interest, and fii'ida murakkaba compound 
interest, while mu 'adda/ a/- fii'ida means the rate of interest.so Another term is "ribl}," 
whieh means: "gain, profit; benefit; interest (on money); proceeds, returns, revenues; and 
dividends."SI Aecordingly, rib/} basI!, also, means simple interest, and rib/} murakkab, 
also, compound interest.S2 These three words, ''lii'ida, '' "naF, " and "rib/}, " therefore, 
mean the "product" of a certain "process" that however remains un-named. 
These lexical meanings have serious conceptual implications. The ribi-prohibitory 
Qur'anie verses do not employ these Arabie equivalents of interest/usury. The Qur'an 
has e1sewhere used the derivatives of the word "naF" at least 39 times,S3 and that of 
"rib/} "once,S4 which establishes that these words are of the Qur'anic Arabie, and not just 
of the Modern Standard Arabie. Now, had the intention of the Lawgiver been to prohibit 
79 Used in a sermon by the Syrian Monophysite Bishop Jacob of Saroug (c. 451-521 AD), in Abbe Martin, trans. and ed., in 
Zcitsehrill der deutsehen morgenlandisehe Gesell,'ehall, 1875, pp. 107-147, quoted in Maxime Rodinson, l,-Jam and Capi! ali,m, 239. 
Rn Rïi~l al-Ba'albakl, AI-Mawrid: A Modem Arabic-English Dictionary (Bcirut: Dar al-'Ilm li'I-Malayln,2001), 809. 
RI Hans Wehr, Arabie-Englùh Dictionary, 371. 
82 Ibid. 
83 For cxamp1c, sce Q. 87:9 (nalà'at); 22:33 (maniifi'u). 
84 Q. 2:16 (làmii rabihat tijiiratuhum). 
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interest/usury only and exclusively, any one of these words could have been employed 
for greater precision and clarity. But the Qur'an instead employs a different word 
altogether, written as ribawii and pronounced as ribii, in aIl the ribii-prohibitory verses. 
This word ribawii, however, refers to the process of growth, and not to its product, i.e., 
the growth itself, because in Q. 2:275 it has been juxtaposed with the term bay' 
(exchange), which has the exclusive reference to a process, and not to any of its 
products. This usage has two implications. Firstly, as shown above, the words "fii'ida, " 
"naF, "and "ribJ; "have the meaning of "product" of an un-named "process." That as yet 
un-named process is, therefore, ribawii. This means that the Qur'an is prohibiting a 
particular process of growth, ribawii, and not just the growth itself, i.e., "ribJ;." 
Secondly, this being the case, this neutral process of growth, ribawii, underlies not just 
financial growth but aH forms of growth. Rendering the aIl-inclusive Arabic term ribawii 
(ribii) exclusively as interest/usury is, therefore, highly problematic. 
ConventionaIly, the term "ribii" has the linguistic meaning of "excess," and the 
assigned technical meaning of "usury/interest." The term "bay'" has the linguistic 
meaning of "exchange," and the assigned technical meaning of "sale." The tradition al 
juristic ribii discourse confines itselfto these assigned technical meanings. 
This juridical usage raises an important methodological question: What is the 
appropriate usage - linguistic or technical - for juristic purposes? for fresh exegetical 
purposes? The answer depends partly on: What is a technical term? At what stage of its 
evolution and development does a general term acquire the status of a technical term? 85 
The distinction is not always c1ear-cut, but a general definition is: "When a term is 
consistently used to represent a constant extensional class or a fixed process it can be 
taken as a technical term."86 
Consistent historical usage being the distinguishing factor between general and 
technical meanings, it is obvious that the technical meaning is relevant for juridical 
purposes, and the generallinguistic meaning relevant for fresh exegetical purposes, when 
the original intention of the Lawgiver is being attempted to be discovered. 
85 C. H. M. Versteegh, Arabie Grammar and Qur'anie Exegesis in Early Islam (Leiden; New York; Kiiln: E.J. Brill, 1993), 1. 
8" Jonathan Owens, Early Arabie Grammatical TheO/y: Heterogeneity and Standardization (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 
1990), Il ff. 
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The morphological construction and lexical meaning of the Arabic terms ribii and 
bay' are crucial to the comprehension of the various connotations of the terms and their 
Qur'anic/Sunnaic usage, which will aide theory development. 
Il.l.iLa. Morphology of Ribii and Bay' 
The morphology ofthese two terms requires detailed examination, firstly, to bring 
home their richer lexical connotations in addition to their commonly recognized 
technical meanings, and secondly - more importantly - because linguistic analysis is a 
principal methodology of this work, which will also similarly and comparatively 
examine the cognate term rabb. 
II.l.iLaa. Morphology of Ribii87 
The linguistic root of the Arabic term ribii is r.b. W.,88 which, grammaticaIly, is a 
defective root,89 the third sub-class of the weak verbs, due to the presence of the weak 
long vowel was the third radical. Of the total fifteen verbal forms of Arabic language, 
this root appears only in the first five Forms,90 which mean (Form 1) to grow, (Form II) 
to make or let grow, (Form III) to practice usury, (Form IV) to make grow, and (Form V) 
to be raised. Very surprisingly but significantly for this the sis, the verbal Form III, which 
specifically means "to practice usury," is not employed in the Qur'an at aIl, either as 
verb (riibii), active/passive participle (muriibin/muriiban), or verbal noun (muriibiitun), in 
any of the ribii-prohibitory verses. Only the derived noun of the root r.b. W., ribii 
(indefinite) and al-ribii (definite), finds expression in the Qur'an, suggesting very openly 
that the Qur'anic reference is to the broader meaning of the term. But in the lexicon this 
derived noun has arbitrarily been assigned a lexical meaning synonymous with its 
technical meaning of interest, usurious int ere st , and usury, without any elaboration.91 
The Qur'an employs the indefinite noun, ribii, only once in 30:39. According to 
convention al Muslim scholarship (though not unanimous and less weighty), even here 
the term ribii refers to gift and not to usury. The Qur'an employs only the definitc noun, 
87 For complete morphology of ribii, sec Appendix 1 (a). 
RR Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictionmy, 374. 
89 Defective root is thc third sub-c\ass ofthc wcak c\ass ofroots/vcrbs that includc (1) assimilatcd root/vcrb, with thc wcak Icttcr y 
or was thc first radical, (2) hollow root/Yerb, with the wcak letter yor wa~ the middlc radical, and (3) dcfcetivc root/vcrb, with the 
weak Ictter yor was thc final radical. 
90 Thc grammatical analysis has grcatly bencfited from the help ofearl SharifEI-Tobgui. 
91 Hans Wehr, Arabic-Engli.l'h Dictionmy, 375. 
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al-ribii, in aIl the other riba:-prohibitory verses,92 where it is always written as al-ribawii, 
but pronounced as al-ribii as above. This is because the alphabet waw in al-ribawii serves 
only as a seat for the subsequent alphabet alifmaqsura and has no morphological value. 
A parallel written construction is to be found in the case of two important Qur'anic 
terms, $alii[t], written as $aliit or as $alawiit but pronounced alike as $alii[t], and zakii[t], 
written as zakiit or as zakawiitbut pronounced alike as zakii[tj 
The adjective of this noun, ribawl, meaning usurious,93 has not been used in any of 
the Qur'anic ribii-prohibitory verses, and as best as could be ascertained, anywhere else 
in the Qur'an. It is more commonly associated with the six-commodities iJadith. 
II.l.ii.ab. Morphology of Bay' 94 
The linguistic root of the Arabic term bay' is b.y. '., which, grammaticaIly, is a 
hollow root,95 the second sub-class of the weak verbs, because of the presence of the 
weak long vowel X as the middle radical. 
This root appears in only six of the total fifteen verbal forms of Arabic,96 which 
mean (Form I) to seIl, (Form III) to make a contract, to pay homage, to acknowledge as 
sovereign or leader, pledge allegiance, (Form IV) to offer for sale, (Form VI) to agree on 
the terms of a sale, conclude a bargain [deal], (Form VII) to be sold, be for sale, and 
(Form VIII) to buy, to purchase. But very crucially for this study, aIl these verbal forms 
are transitive, with both an active and passive participle - an agent acting on another 
agent. This theme will be developed in chapter IV, below. 
II.l.iLb. Lexical Definitions of Ribii and Bay' 
Both ribii and bay' have received considerable lexical coverage. But except for Ibn 
Man?ur and Edward Lane, as will be seen below, none of the lexicologists offer any help 
whatsoever in the development of a comprehensive theory of ribii. 
92 Q. 2:275, 276, 278, 279, 3:130, and 4:161. 
93 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dictioflfuy, 375. 
94 For eomplete morphology of bay', see Appendix 1 (e). 
95 Hollow root is the second sub-c1ass ofthe weak c1ass ofroots/verbs which consists of (1) assimilated mot/verb. with thc wcak 
lctter yor was the first radical, (2) hollow mot/verb, with the weak lctter yor was the middle radical, and (3) defectivc mot/verh. 
with the weak lctter yor was the final radical. 
96 The grammatical analysis has greatly benefitcd from the help of Fahad al-l;Iamoudi. 
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Il.l.iLba. Lexical Definition of Ribii 
Ribii has been variously defined,97 as detailed in Appendix 2, according to the 
perspective of the linguist, as "excess,"98 "benefit" and ''liyiif'' (cement ),99 "manifestation 
of growth,"IOO "an excess in a homogenous exchange without a counter-value" and 
"neshekh: gain from loan of money, goods, or property of any kind,"101 "danism" (from 
the Greek daneisma meaning a loan;lo2 Arabie: "loans with fii1;ish [excessive] ribii'')/03 
"slightest addition" and "an addition obtained in a particuJar manner in buying, selling, 
lending or giving."104 
This last characterization of ribii as an addition obtained in a particuJar manner, in 
fact, holds the key to the enigma of ribii. Lane posits but does not pursue this thought 
any further; it will be shown below (chapter IV) that crucial to correct and precise 
understanding of ribii is not the result of the transaction (e.g. interest/usury) but the 
particuJar mannerofthe transaction. 
II.l.iLbb. Lexical Definition of Bay' 
In spite of the diverse morphologie al connotations of bay' as sale, contract, 
homage, pledge of allegiance and even purchase, the usual translation and lexical 
definition of bay' is sale. But in the Islamic legal discourse, the noun bay' is rendered 
very broadly as "exchange," including even marri age. In the absence of a theory of 
contracts in the Islamic legal tradition, the bay' contract is the prototype of aIl 
contracts, including the marriage contract. This broader meaning has been propounded 
thus: 
[In Islamic law] this term covers ail commutative contracts, that is, contracts in which there is an 
exchange of two counter-values. In other words, ownership in one counter-value is passed to the 
other party in lieu of another counter-value. In this wider sense, the term ijira (hire), for ex ample, 
is included in the meaning of bay', because it is the exchange ofbenefits from the rented property 
for rent, or it is the exchange ofwages for services rendered. Hire is often referred to by jurists as 
the sale of benefits arising periodically. Somel05 go to the extent of considering the marriage 
97 Ibn Faris did not cvcn fecl the nced to define ribii sinec in his opinion "ribiiin wealth (miil) is well-known": Ibn Faris al-Qazwlnl, 
Mujmal al-Lugha, l, 417. 
98 Ibn Man?ur, HI'an al-'Arab, XIV, 304-7; Murtaqa al-Zubaydi, Tiij al-'Ariis, X, 142-144, quoting linguist Zajjaj;; Abu Man~ur al-
Azhar!, Tahdh7b al-Lugha, XV, 473 ; Raghib al-Isfahani, al-Mutradiit fi Gharb al-Qur'an, 185-7. 
99 Ibn Manzur, Li~an al- 'Arab, IX, 273, 
100 lawhari '(d, 393A.H.), al-$alJiil; al-JawharJ, VI, 3349 ; Ibn Man?Ur Afriq! (d.711 A.H,), Lisan al- 'Arab li'l-AriiqJ, III, 4, 
101 Hughes, Dietion81yoflslam, 544, 
102 E, Cobhan Brcwcr, Dietionary of Phrase & Fable (1898), 329-330, 
103 Harith Sulayman Faruqi, Faruqi's Law Dictionary - Arabie Englil'h (Tripoli: Libyan Publishing House, 1962). 
104 Edward W. Lane, Arabic-English Lcxicon (London: William and Norgate, 1863), 
105 Abu Bakr MuI)ammad ibn Ab1 Sahl al-Sarakhs1, Kitiib al-Mabsiit, 30 vols, (Cairo: Maçba'at al-Sa'ïidah, 1324-31/1906-13, Reprint 
Karachi, 1987), XIII, 109, 
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contract as sorne kind of sale insofar as it amounts to handing over ownership in benefits (tamlik 
al-maniE') in exchange for dower. 106 
The Shorter EncycJopaedia of/siam states, in part that "bai' [sic] originally means 
the clasping of hands as the indication of the conclusion of an agreement."107 This 
clasping of hands is the visual representation of bay' in chapter IV below, and is of 
crucial importance for this thesis. According to Ibn Man?ur, bay' is literally a 
transaction (both sale and purchase), but in legal terminology it means mubiidala or 
muqiibala, barter, or an exchange of commodities. It is a pre-agreed contract of exchange 
with the mutual consent of the parties involved. In both senses of the word an element of 
contract or agreement ($afqa, mubiiya'a, mu'iihada) enters into the meaning, when the 
purchaser strikes his hand on that of the seller to signify offer and acceptance (Jjiib and 
qabiil).108 
al-Marghinanl (d. 593/1197) elaborates this notion of bay'thus: 
The contract of bay' takes effect (yan 'aqidu) with the offer and acceptance (of a thing): this is 
signified by the two words of the past tense, as one of thern (Le. the seller) says: '1 sold; 'the 
other (i.e. the purchaser) says: '1 bought.' This is because bay' (sale and purchase) creates the 
possibility of possessing and disposing (ta~arruf) of the thing bought.109 
This lexical exposition of bay~ as will be se en below, is very productive for the 
development of the new theory of ribii and bay'. 
11.2. Scriptural Structure 
Revealed script ure on the topic of ribii and bay~ stretching over several milieus 
and millennia, culminating and perfecting in the Qur' an, furnishes the very basic 
framework for the new critical theory. 
As against the diverse Eastern religions, the three Western monothcist faiths of 
Abrahamic origin - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - display an organic unit y which is 
conspicuously reflected, among others, in the concept of usury - neshekh/marbJt in 
Hebrew, tokos in Greek and ribii in Arabic - which is treated as the greatest of sins in 
the pristine forms of aH three religions. However, the specific prohibitory paradigms and 
106 Nyazcc, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 42. 
107 Thc Shortcr Encyclopacdia oflç/am, s.v. bai', 56. 
108 Ibn ManzUr, Lisiin, VIII, 23. 
109 al-Marghinanl, aJ-Hidiiya (Karachi: Qur'an Ma4al, n.d.), Ill, 18. 
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the permissible alternatives have been differently treated in each of these faiths, which, 
together with sorne of the diverse Eastern traditions, are examined below: 
II.2.i. Hindu and Buddhist Teachings 
Reflecting the antiquity and geographical spread of the notion, prohibition of 
usury is to be found in the pristine teachings ofHinduism and Buddhism: 
Among the oldest known references to usury are to be found in ancient Indian religious 
manuscripts and Jain provides an excellent summary of these ... 110 The earliest such record 
derives from the Vedic texts of Ancient India (2000-1400 BC) in which the 'usurer' (ku'iidin) is 
mentioned several times and interpreted as any lender at interest. More frequent and detailed 
references to interest payment are to be found in the later Sutra texts (700-100 BC), as weIl as 
the Buddhist Jatakas (600-400 BC). It is during this latter period that the first sentiments of 
contempt for usury are expressed. For example, Vasishtha, a weU known Hindu law-maker of 
that time, made a special law which forbade the higher castes of Brahmanas (priests) and 
Kshatrivas (warriors) from being usurers or lenders at interest. Also, in the Jatakas, usury is 
referred to in a demeaning manner: 'hypocritical ascetics are accused of practicing it.' By the 
second century, however, usury had become a more relative term, as is implied in the Laws of 
Manu of that time: 'Stipulated interest beyond the legal rate being against (the law), cannot be 
recovered: they caU that a usurious way (of lending). ,Ill This dilution of the concept of usury 
seems to have continued through the remaining course of Indian history so that today, while it is 
still condemned in principle, usury refers only to interest charged above the prevailing sociaUy 
accepted range and is no longer prohibited or controlled in any significant way.ll2 
The ancient Hindu legal rule - Damdopat - strictly limited interest to the full 
amount of the loan ["doubling and re-doubling?"], while the ancient Indian law-giver 
Manu is reported to have fixed a ceiling on the interest rate. 113 It is reported that the 
ancient Chinese religion also forbade usury.1I4 
However, the HinduiBuddhist paradigm on usury clearly cornes across as financial 
rather than comprehensive, as a limitation rather than a full prohibition, and as a moral 
rather than a philosophical-theological model, which may be characterized as lacking 
both the "vertical depth" and "horizontal spread," features that will be expounded in 
II.2.iii below as necessary for a full-fledged theory. 
II.2.ii. Zoroastrian Teachings 
Like the Semitic religions, Zoroastrianism also regarded us ury as among the 
worst, if not the worst, of sins, as borne out by the passage: 
110 L.e. Jain, lndigenous Banking in lndia (London: MeMillan & Co., 1929). 
III Ibid., 3-10. 
112Waync A.M. Visser and Alastair Melntosh "A Short Review of the Historieal Critique of Usury" 
(www.alastairemcintosh.comlarticlcsI1998usury.htm). 2. 
113 The Law.~ of Manu, translated by G. Bilhler in the Saered Books ofthe East (1886). 
114 AltafGauhar, Translations tram the Quran (Lahore: Sang-c-Meel Publications, 1989), 128-129. 
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[3.] 41. 'The Religion of Mazda indeed, 0 Spitama Zarathushtra! takes away from him who 
makes confession of it the bonds of his sin; it takes away (the sin of) breach of trust [Doubtfùl}. 
[From the commentary it appears that draosha must have meant a different sort ofrobbery: ('He 
knows that it is forbidden to steal, but he fancies that robbing the rÏch to give to the poor is a 
pious deed. 'J], it takes away (the sin of) murdering one of the faithful; it takes away (the sin of) 
deeds for which there is no atonement; it takes away the worst sin ofusurv, it takes away any sin 
that may be sinned. [underlining and italics mine] .ll5 
This teaching on usury does have the theological connotations of sin, but beyond 
that, again like Hinduism and Buddhism, it does not display any "vertical depth" or 
"horizontal spread," features that will be expounded in II.2.iii, below, as necessary for a 
full-fledged theory. 
II.2.iii. Old Testament Prescriptions 
Among the most relevant, the oidest revelatory primary source for this thesis is the 
Old Testament, which contains the first divinely ordained monotheistic prohibitory 
paradigm of neshekh/marblt (ribii = usury). Based on these Scriptural injunctions,ll6 "a 
continuous Judeo-Christian tradition from about 1000 B. C. to 1450 A. D. said that 
usury was sinful."l17 Unlike the New Testament, the Old Testament is directly 
prohibitory about usury. The Biblical (Torah) prohibition, through decisive Mosaic 
injunctions,ll8 is put in perspective by the Qur'an in 4:161, by referring to the prohibition 
of ribii for the Jews and to their violation of it at the pain of grievous punishment. 119 
Additionally, there are Biblical wisdom literature texts which straightforwardly reaffirm 
the prohibition of interest. 120 The Torah texts are crucial, not just for the Israelite 
prohibition of interest taking, but for the Christian teaching on usury as weIl, as they 
were relied upon explicitly by the Church Fathers and the Councils. 
These injunctions manifest the historical flexibility of ancient Near-Eastem law. 
The prohibitions are concrete, not universal. They allow differing cases to be posed and 
further questions to be asked. Sorne cases explicate the prohibition: neither money, nor 
115 The Zend Avesta, Fargard 3.41; Vendidad: Book of Law, trans., James Darmesteter (from Sacred Books of the East, Ameriean 
Edition, 1898), www.csscnc.com/Mysticism/Zoroastrianism.html. 
116 Detailed in Appendix II (a). 
117 Maloncy, Background, 1. 
118 Exodus 22:24, Dcutcronomy 23:20-21, and Leviticus 25:35-38. 
119 As indicated in Biblical texts and later in the Qur'an (4:161), in spite of the e\car prohibition, usury was rampant in practice in 
Israel. This Scriptural description is also supported by archaeological evidencc which gives instances of loans at interest among Jcws 
(Maloney, Background, 76-78). The Elephantine papyri include two loan eontraets (456 B.C.) at 60% interest compoundcd 
(anatocism) (A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri orthe j'h Century B.C (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 29ff; papyrus # 10 and II) and the 
Tebtunis papyri include onc contract (174 B.e.) (B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt and J.G. Smyly, cd., The Tebtuni~ Papyri (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1910-38), Ill, 1,318-19;# 818), in ail ofwhich one Jew takes interest from another. 
120 Psalms 15:1-5, Ezekiel 18:5-\3 and Ezekiel22: 11-12. 
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food, nor anything else;121 neither from your fellow Israelite,122 nor from the ger.123 
Another case limits the prohibition: you may take interest from the nokri.124 Still other 
questions rernain unasked: what of the Israelite rnerchant who borrows to finance 
business ventures? What of the rich who borrow to invest?125 
However, the Biblical universalistic toned reference to incest along with interese26 
is very significant and parallels the riba-incest equivalence iJadith ascribed to Prophet 
Mu4ammad - a relationship further analyzed below. 
The Biblical juxtaposition of "increase" and "usury" is significant in that the word 
"increase" here directly connotes the later Qur'anic term '"ribii." Moreover, the Qur'anic 
connotation of ribii as "self-creating" is also brought out by the Biblical book of Genesis 
which speaks of "making in own kind, " "its seed in it," "by their kind," and "in His 
image,"127 terms which, however, have not been utilized in the exegetical repertoire on 
usury either in Judeo-Christian or Islamic scholarship, due perhaps to an absence of 
direct cross-reference between these texts and the usury texts. Whatever the reason, it is 
obvious that this scholarly oversight has been very damaging for comprehensive theory 
development. 
Due to the concreteness and generally non-univers al character of the relevant 
Biblical injunctions, an Old Testament legal theory of usury is not directly discernable. 
The only obvious feature is the ration ale behind the prohibition: prevention of hostility 
and of exploitation and oppression of the po or, promotion of philanthropy and charity 
among brethren, and the concepts of brotherhood and chosen community. The interest-
prohibiting verses of the Torah "stress the importance of the concept of "relation al 
responsibilities," whether econornic or social, that the srnall group engenders with regard 
to its sense of community."128 This concept of "re1ational responsibilities" has a close 
link to the philosophical-theological concepts to be developed in this thesis. 
Three features of the Old Testament usury discourse stand out from this review. 
Firstly, the discourse is limited only to the financial application of the term, in spite of 
121 Dt. 23:20-21. 
122 Ex. 22:24. 
123 Lev. 25:35. 
124 Dt. 23:20-21. 
125 Maloncy, Background, 51-52. 
126 ln Ez. 22: 11-12 
127 Gcncsis 1: Il, 12, 21, 24,25 and 26. 
128 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 7. 
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the wider lexical connotation of "growth" in the equivalent Hebraic term marblt (a 
cognate of the Arabie ribii). Secondly, the explicit biblical references to us ury, and the 
exegesis thereon, are in tenns of its extrinsic effects and not its intrinsic characteristic. 
This approach to the usury discourse may be described as an absence ofboth "horizontal 
spread" and "vertical depth." The intrinsic characteristic analysis is precIuded by the 
absence of the exegetical use of the Genesis verses on self-creation ("tram its own 
kind''j, quoted above,129 from the usury discourse. This desideratum prevents a full-
fledged philosophical-theological treatment of the subject in the Judaic discourse, which 
is limited to only random and oblique pointers. For example, a theological explanation 
for usury prohibition - idolatry - is only hinted at in the following excerpt: 
The law-code was reformulated into a covenant-code ... the teaching on usury moved from the 
concept expressed in Leviticus and Exodus of not exploiting the po or within their own 
community to the Deuteronomic teaching which allowed for 'exploitation' of the st ranger, and 
upon which 'horns of dilemma' the Christian Church wrestled for many centuries. According to 
R. Brinker, for example, the guiding principle of Deuteronomy was ... the protection of the 
people from the threat of Canauite idolatœ 130 
Thirdly, the Old Testament only prohibits usury. Unlike the Qur'an, it neither 
prescribes nor even suggests a positive alternative (bay' in the Qur'an) to neshekh. This, 
as will be argued below (chapter V), is a feature of the completeness or otherwise of the 
relative Script ures. 
Astonishingly, in the Old Testament although usury is treated as a sin, it is not 
armed with any specifie punishments. This absence prevents the realization of the full 
gravit y ofthe offence and thereby hampers comprehensive theory development. 
Further cIues to a theological ration ale for usury prohibition (its association with 
idolatry) are provided - albeit without full theory development - in the later rabbinical 
literature, as will be seen below. 
II.2.iv. New Testament Recommendations 
The Greek term used in the New Testament for usury/interest, as noted above,13I is 
tokos, which means "offspring." Significantly, it is in consonance with the earlier 
Hebraic/Judaic term marb;t and the later Arabic/lslamic term ribii. 
129 Sec n. 127, p. 46, abovc. 
110 R. Brinkcr, The Influence ofSanetuarics in Barly l;'Tae/(1946), quotcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 14. 
111 Sec n. 58, p. 32, abovc. 
47 
Notwithstanding this similarity of meaning, not being a law code, the New 
Testament does not contain a detailed financial code ofbehavior. 132 "The teaching in the 
New Testament script ures on usurious lending is couched in more idealistic and 
universalistic terms in the light of loving not only one's friends but equally one's 
neighbor and enemy."133 Later Church teachings on usury, therefore, relied on the Old 
Testament prescriptions. 
The New Testament mentions interest only in the two accounts of the parable of 
the talents. 134 The parable simply incorporates the common Graeco-Roman practice of 
receiving interest, without any statement either for or against its morality.135 But the 
practice of receiving interest is, nevertheless, castigated in the parable as reaping where 
one has not sown and gathering where one did not scatter. 
Despite the above cited136 Judeo-Christian tradition from about 1000 B. C. to 1450 
A. D. that regarded usury as sinful, today the morality of interest-taking is a dead issue 
for Christians,137 largely because, in spite of this long historical tradition, a single 
scholastic theory concerning usury remained absent, and the revised theory approved all 
the basic credit mechanisms of the capitalist society.138 
A review of the Biblical injunctions shows that while the Old Testament prohibits 
usury, the New Testament instead recommends its converse, Le., charity, or more 
specifically, disinterested charity in lending, even when there is no hope of repayment. 139 
Followers are urged by Jesus not to turn away from those who wish to borrow140 - a 
teaching in line with the Old Testament. 141 In this recommendation, the New Testament 
teaching widens the scope of the Old Testament teaching in two ways. Firstly, the 
qualification for a loan is widened from needto borrow, in Dt. 15:8, to want to borrow, 
m Paul S. MiIIs, "Should Intcrest Exist'?" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1994), 14. 
m Bueklcy, Thcologieal Examination, 81. 
134 ln Mt. 25:27 and Lk. 19:23. 
L15 A Van den Born and L. Hartman, "Loans," Encyclopedie Dietionary of the Bible, cd. L. Hartman (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 
1361-62. 
136 Sec n. 117, p. 45. 
m Maloney, Background, 1. 
138 Ibid., 2: "The primary rcason for considering usury as sinful was its condemnation by the teaching authority of the Church. Over 
the ccnturies theologians marshaled arguments to support that condemnation. But the laek of a unificd theory Icd to clear 
inconsistencies in practice .... Gradually ... from 1450 to 1750 [A. O.] thc intcrprctation of the prohibition changcd radically. The 
revised theory approved ail the basic eredit mechanisms ofthe capitalist society"; sec also, John T. Noonan, The Seholastic Analysiç 
of Usury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
lJ9 Lk. 6:34-35. 
140 Mt. 5 :42. 
141 Dt. 15:3ff. 
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in Mt. 5:42. Secondly, the emphasis is universally broadened from lending only to 
"brothers" (Dt. 23: 19) to lending to anyone, including one's enemies, and at the same 
time expecting nothing in return (Lk. 6:34-35).142 This exhortation to disinterested 
charity in lending is, however, the focus of much exegetical dispute among the Fathers 
as to the exact interpretation of the text, which nevertheless is silent on the morality of 
usury.143 
The positive nature of the teachings of Jesus on lending and usury, the absence of 
any judgment on the morality ofusury, and the lack of punitive measures for indulgence 
in usury render it impossible ta derive a unified theory of usury directly and exclusively 
from the New Testament. This usury paradigm may, therefore, be characterized as 
lacking both "vertical depth" and "horizontal spread." 
II.2.v. Qur'8nic Injunctions 
In a significant move, the Qur'an confirms the Torah (Old Testament) prescriptions 
on usury that were binding on the Jews and, by extension, the Christians, and expands 
them as a fuller paradigm of total human behavior. l44 The Qur'an thus, comparatively 
speaking, makes a very positive and focused contribution to the ribii discourse and to 
new critical theory development, both linguistically and scripturally. But the full 
potential of this rich source material has not so far been realized in the scholarship. 
Linguistically, the Qur'an employs not only various derivatives from the root 
r.b. w. in different rich shades of meaning, but also the genesis of what has come to be 
known as the modern theory of semiotics: the theory of binary opposition of meaning. 
Significantly, it employs binary opposition not only for ribiilbay',t45 but, 
characteristically, also for a host of other topics, making the so-called modern theory of 
semiotics a full-fledged Qur'anic classicallinguistic theory.146 
Scripturally, the ribii discourse in the Qur'an is very focused and pungent. It drops 
the negative Torah reference to the Hebrew neshekh (bite), focuses exclusively on the 
142 Paul Mills, Interest in Interest, quoted in Buckley, Theological Examination , 75. 
143 Lk. 6:34-35: "If you lend to those from whom you hope to reeeive, what credit is that to you'! Even sinners !end to 
sinners, to reeeive as mueh again. But love your enemies, do good, and Icnd, expeeting nothing in retum [or altcrnatc 
disputcd version: 'ncvcr dcspairing'j", quoted in Maloney, Background, 137-138. 
144 Q. 4:16l. 
145 Q. 2:275. 
146 For cxamp\c, al-?iihir wa 'l-biiPn (Q.57:4), al-awwal wa 'l-iikhir(Q. 57:3), .tulii' wa ghuriib (Q. 20: 130), lJaqq wa biiril (Q. 13: 17), 
nafa' wa fjarar (Q. 6:71), al-ryiil wa 'I-nisii' (Q. 4: 176), al-Iayl wa al-nahiir (Q. 2: 164), lJaliil wa h{lriim (Q. 3:50). 
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positive concept of growth in the Arabie ribii (Hebrew marblt), legitimizes bay' as the 
first-ever positive alternative to ribii, makes the failure to discern the binary opposition 
of ribii and bay' gravely punishable, and legislates the first-ever graphie punishments and 
past accountability for the sin of ribii. 
II.2.v.a. Linguistic Contribution of the Qur'an 
R.B. W - the root of the term ribii(or ar-ribawii and riban, as used in the Qur'an), 
among others - appears twenty times in different verses of the Qur'an in different 
grammatical forms (noun, verb, adverb). Of these occurrences, ten are nouns (eight in a 
financial and two in a physical context), eight are verbs, and two are adverbs. Eleven of 
these occurrences are in ribii prohibitory verses, and nine in six verses expounding other 
meanings of ribii, as detailed in II.2.v.aa, below. 
B. y. '. - the root of the term bay'- appears, as an indefinite noun bay' (bargain) 
in Q. 2:254, 9: 111 and 14:31, and particularly in 24:37 where bay' (unspecified 
connotation) is specifically distinguished from tijiira (trade), and as the definite noun al-
bay' (unspecified connotation) in juxtaposition with ribii, twice in Q. 2:275 and once in 
juxtaposition with "remembrance of Allah" in Q. 62:9. 
II.2.v.aa. Ribi-Expounding Qur'8.nic Verses 
Six sets of explanatory Qur'anic verses hold the interpretational key to the enigma 
of ribi. 147 These verses ernploy the fOot r.b. w. in different rich shades of rneaning, aU 
denoting "excess," not in a pejorative sense of impropriety or impermissibility, but 
simply in the neutral or even positive sense of increase or growth, such as rabwatin 
(height: hillock),148 riibiyan (rising: foam),149 arbii (exceeding, being more numerous: 
nation),150 rabbayiinJ and nurabbika (bringing up, raising: a child),l5l rabat (swelling: 
earth),152 and riibiyatan (overpowering: grip ).153 
A contemporary writer on Islamic finance, Saeed, simply conc1udes "[T]hese 
usages appear to have one rneaning in cornrnon, that of 'increase,' in a qualitative or 
147 Prcsentcd in full in Appcndix 3. 
14. Q. 2:265; 23:50. 
149 Q. 13:17. 
150 Q. 16: 92. 
151 Q. 17:24; 26:18. 
152 Q. 22:5; 41 :39. 
153 Q. 69:\0. 
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quantitative sense."IS4 What has not, however, been discovered, or even investigated by 
Saeed or by others - including Fazlur Rahman who commented on ie55 - is the very 
crucial distinguishing characteristic of this "increase," underlying these Qur' anic usages, 
that holds the key to new theory development and that will be identified and developed 
further in the conc1uding phase of this thesis. At this introductory stage, it may suffice 
to critically note the contents of one of the verses, cited above, which refers to the rising 
foam (zabadan riibiyan) and which is pregnant with deeper meaning: 
He sends down water (rain) from the sky, and the valleys flow according to their measure, but the 
flood bears awav the foam that mounts up (riibiyan) to the surface - and (also) trom that (ore) 
which thevheat in the lire in order to make omaments or utensils, rises a foam like unto if, thus 
does Allah (by parables) show forth truth and falsehood. Then, as for the fàam it passes awav as 
scum upon the banks, while {hat which is for the good ofmankind remains in the earth. Thus 
Alliih sets forth parables [for the truth and falsehood, Le. belief and disbelief]. - Q. 13: 17 
By talking about the passing away of the foam (ribawl phenomenon) and the 
remaining in the earth of what is good for mankind (botanical bay'awl phenomenon), 
and by "showing forth of truth and falsehood," this verse is alluding to the passing away 
of ribii (falsehood for mankind), and the continuation of bay' (truth for mankind). There 
could not be a better parable to show the Divine Law of prohibition of ribii and 
permission of bay' enunciated in Q. 2:275, discussed in II.2.v.ba., below. 
n.2.v.ab. Bay'-Expounding Qur'arnc Verses 
As shown above, the root, b. y. '., appears in six Qur'anic verses. 156 Surprisingly, 
notwithstanding the lexical meaning and popular exegetical translations, the derived 
noun bay' has not heen used in its strict commercial sense of "sale" in any of these 
verses. The verse which sets the term bay' squarely apart from any commercial 
transaction states: 
Men whom neither tiiira nor il!!x' [tijiratun wa-lii bay'un} diverts from the remembrance of 
Allah, nor from establishing al-~aliitnor from giving al-zakiit .... 157 
Popular translations of the Qur' anic expression "tijiiratun wa-lii bay'un" inc1ude: 
"neither trade nor sale,"ls8 "neither traffic nor merchandise,"IS9 "neither worldly 
154 Abdullah Saccd, l~/amic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition ofRibi and its Contemporary Interpretation. (Lcidcn: 
E.J. Brill), 1996. , 20. 
155 Rahman, Riba, 1. 
156 Q. 2:254; 2:275; 9: 111; 14:31; 24:37; 62:9. 
157 Q. 24:37 
158 Dr. Taqi-ud-Din AI-Hillili and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Interpretation of The Meanings of The Noblc Qur'in in The Bng/MI 
Language(Riyadh: Darussalam Publishcrs and Distributors, 1996),505. 
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commerce nor striving after gain: lit., bargaining, or selling or buying and selling,"160 
"business or commerce,"161 "neither trade nor traffic,"162 "trade and commerce or buying 
and selling,"163 "trade or business,"164 "neither merchandise nor sale,"165 and "neither 
merchandizing nor selling."166 Imprecise as sorne of these translations are, the point that 
aIl of them are missing is that if tijiira means - as it does - "trade," and if bay' means 
"sale"-as most translators posit- then logically sale is synonymous, albeit quantitatively 
and partially, with trade. Given this relationship, why would the Qur'an put out two 
synonymous terms in juxtaposition with each other by the use of the negative term wa-lii 
(neither/nor) which is reserved for contrasting terms which are at least different in 
degree if not altogether antonyms? The unavoidable implication is that the Qur'anic 
usage of the term bay'does not refer to commercial sale: it refers to the broader meaning 
of "bilateral action" or "intercourse." What the verse is saying is that neither 
commercial/economic intercourse (tijiira: trade) - essential for daily nutritional needs -
nor other intercourse, e.g., sexual, cultural, social, and political etc. - essential for other 
human needs - prevents these men from remembrance of AŒih, ~aliït and zakiït. This 
rendering is comprehensive and much more meaningful than the popular translations, 
above. Therefore, it can be concluded that at least the Qur'anic meaning of bay' is 
bilateral action (intercourse). 
Similarly, Q. 2:254 deploys the term bay' in juxtaposition with khulla (friendship) 
and shata'a (intercession) on the Day of Judgment. Rendering bay' here as "sale" is 
completely out of context; rendering it as "intercourse" goes harmoniously with the 
other two terms. 
Likewise, Q. 14:31 employs the term bay'in the same context as Q. 2:254, thereby 
rendering it as bilateral action. 
Q. 62:9 invites believers to the Friday prayer and remembrance of Allah upon 
hearing the caU (adhiïn) by giving up bay'. It is obvious that the hindrance to a response 
159 Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'iin: Text, Translation and Commentary(Brentwood, Maryland: Amana Corp, 19X3), 909. 
1"0 Asad, The Message orThe Qur'iin, 542. 
161 Muhammad Baqir Behbiidi and Colin Turner, The Quran: A New Interpretation (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997),212. 
1"2 Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, The Qur'an: Arabie Text with a New Translation (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1997),343. 
1'" Ahmed Ali, al-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993),302. 
164 Rashad Khalifa, Quran: The Final Scripture (Tucson, AZ: Islamic Productions, 19X 1), 241. 
165 Marmaduke Pickthall, Holy Quran (Karachi; Lahore; Rawalpindi: Taj Company Ltd., n.d.), 350. 
166 George Sale, The Koriin (London: Frcdcrick Warnc and Co. Ltd., n.d.), 349. 
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is not only commercial intercourse but aIl forms of intercourse. Therefore, the rneaning 
of bay' is bilateral action here as weIl. 
The opposition al juxtaposition of bay' (J;aliil) with ribii (J;ariim), and the grievous 
punishrnent for the Jahiliya atternpt at establishing their synonyrnity, in Q. 2:275, also 
accord weIl with the rendering of bay' as bilateral action when its opposite ribii signifies 
unilateral action. 
Finally, Q. 9: 111 uses the derivatives of the noun bay' in relation to believers not 
in the narrow sense of "sale" but more of "exchange." Translators have also rendered 
these derivatives as contract, bargain, trade and exchange - terrns which are doser in 
rneaning to bilateral action. 
The Qur'anic rneaning of bay' rnay, therefore, be rendered with confidence as 
bilateral action - a concept very crucial to the new theory proposed here. 
n.2.v.b. Scriptural Contribution of the Qur'an. 
The scriptural contribution of the Qur'an covering the legislative and punitive 
aspects of ribii and its binary opposition to bay' is contained in seven verses presented 
in Appendix 4 and explored below for their salient features. 
n.2.v.ba. Riba:.Prohibitory and Bay'- Permitting Qur'amc Verses 
As indicated above,167 of the twenty occurrences of the root r.b. w. in the Qur'an, 
eleven occurrences are in the ribii- prohibitory verses. Verbal-form expression of the root 
is yurblin Q. 2:276 (once) and yarbii in Q. 30:39 (twice). Noun-form expression of the 
root is ar-ribawii (al-ribii) thrice in Q. 2:275, and once each in 2:276, 2:278, 3: 130, and 
4:161. However, in Q. 30:39, the noun-form expression is a unique riban, which was 
commented upon by several early commentators and by sorne lexicographers. A 
conternporary writer surns up the issue of these Qur'anic two different usages of the 
noun, ar-ribawa and riban, thus: 
Several early commentators on the Qur'an contended that the meaning of rihii in this verse [rihan 
in Q. 30: 39] was 'gift.' Based on this interpretation, sorne lexicographers like Azhar! (d. 
370/980) 168 and Ibn Man~iïr (d. 711/1311) 169 stated that there were two forrns of ribii, one 
prohibited and the other lawful. According to Ibn Man~iïr, this verse170 refers to 'lawful' ribi. He 
167 Sec Il. 2. v. a., p. 50, abovc. 
168 al-Azhari, Tahdh7b al-Lugha, XV, 273. 
169 Ibn Man~iir, Lisiin, XIV, 304. 
170 Q. 30:39. 
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explained it by saying that lawful ribii is "giving a person something in anticipation of getting 
something better at a later time.,,171 The interpretation of ribii as 'gift' is rather problematic. All 
usages of the term ribiiin the Qur'an appear to have the same meaning, that is, a charge imposcd 
on a needy debtor due to his inability to repaya debt on time. The term ribii in the sense of gift 
does not appear to have been used in pre-Islamic or post-Islamic times. Neither Azharl nor Ibn 
Man~ur provide any examples of such a usage. It could, therefore, be argued that the concept of a 
lawful ribii and an unlawful ribii was most probably a later invention due to the difficulty the 
commentators had in interpreting the rather unusual wording of the verse (30:39) in which the 
term is used .... 172 
In the above analysis, what the lexieographers Azhar! and Ibn Man?ur, as also the 
eontemporary writer Abdullah Saeed, have missed is an important injunetion of the 
Qur'an. The term riban in Q. 30:39 may weIl have the meaning of "gift," although no 
historieal evidenee has been addueed for it. But the analogieal extension of this possible 
meaning to eonclude that there are two forms of ribii, one prohibited and the other 
lawful, and that lawful ribii is "giving a person something in anticipation of getting 
something better at a later time," is utterly untenable in the light of this clear Qur'anie 
prohibition: 
• And give not a thing in order to have more - Q. 74:6 
This verse alone, which surprisingly has not been relied upon by participants in the 
ribii discourse, is sufficient to preclude ev en the possibility of there being any lawful ribii 
in the sense of "giving something in anticipation of getting more." Moreover, Q. 30:39 
itself says that what you give from riban [even if it means "gift"] to increase the wealth 
of others has no increase with Allah. So how can this ribii (so-called "gift") be 
sanctioned as lawful ribii? 
The above quoted verse "And give not a thing in order to have more" (Q. 74:6) has 
a very important further legal significance. It is generally held that the Qur'an provides a 
basis only for the prohibition of ribii aJ-nasJ'a (ribii of delay) and that it is the /fadith 
alone that provides a basis for the prohibition of ribii aJ-facjJ (ribii of exeess), Le., excess 
in a homogenous exehange. But the words of the above verse also clearly prohibit any 
exeess in sueh an exehange. The Arabie word used in the verse for the prohibition is 
tastakthiru, whieh eonveys the meaning of exeess in homogeneity. Thus, eontrary to 
171 Ibn Man~iir, Lisan. XIV, 304. 
172 Saccd, Islamic Banking, 21. 
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general belief, the prohibition of ribii a1-faq1likewise has a clear Qur'anic basis, which 
surprisingly has not been recognized in exegetical and juridical scholarship. 
The conventionally recognized seven ribii-prohibitory verses spread over four 
chapters (suwar; sing.: sura) of the QUr'an173 have been commented upon thoroughly by 
exegetes, jurists and other scholars. To avoid repetition, only issues germane to the new 
theory development are examined here. 
In Q. 30:39, ribii is portrayed as simply disapproved, but not actually prohibited. 
Hinting at a prohibition rationale, ribii is contrasted with zakiit for denial of God's 
blessing. In fact, as discussed above, 174 there is even exegetical disagreemene75 on 
whether here riba me ans "gift," as no punishment has been provided for it,l76 or whether 
it means usury/interest as elsewhere.177 Obviously, this verse, not a prohibitory command 
(amr), and not in an imperative mode, is a positive statement, but much more than an 
expression of simple disapproval or denial of God's blessing. Deeper reflection shows it 
to be an expression of a fundamental divine law. The first verse on ribii not only 
chronologically but also thematically, it pioneeringly spells out ribii as a process of 
apparent but not rea1 increase and lays down the fundamental princip le that human 
ribawi action is against divine law. Human and Divine perceptions of increase are 
different. 
Man has to navigate two relationships - one with the Creator and the other with 
His Creation - which are found in the juristic repertoire as Fiqh a1- 'Ibiidiit, 
encompassing the Rights of Allah (lfuquq Alliih) and Fiqh a1- Mu'iima1iit encompassing 
the Rights of His Servants (lfuquq a1- 'Ibiidj. This verse seemingly regulates the first 
relationship - Rights of Allah - by indicating that human ribawl action is against divine 
law: the prescribed human conduct is not ribawl action of acquisition (self-emanation) 
but zakawl action of disposition (self-annihilation). Thus the ribiilzakiit contrast govems 
the Man-God re1ationship. The attribute of riba is for God, the attribute of zakat for 
man. How riba and zakat lead to self-emanation and self-annihilation, respective1y, will 
173 See Surat al-Baqara (#2:275,276,278,279), /1/- 'Jmrin (#3:130), al-Ni,'i(#4: 161) and al-Rum (#30:39). 
174 Sec pp. 54-55, above. 
175 This controversy, however, is gerrnane not for the issue of the prohibition itself but only for its historieity deterrnination i.e., 
wh ether the prohibition proccss is of Meeean or Medinan origin. 
176 Vicw attributcd to Ibn 'Abbas, Mujiihid, Zahhak, Qatada, Ukrimah, Muhammad b. Ka'b, al-Qurzi and Shu'b1. 
177 View attributed to l:Iasan al-Ba~r1, Suddl, Aalüsl and Nishapur1. 
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be expounded below (chapter IV). The second relationship for man to navigate - the 
Man-Man relationship - is govemed by the ribiilbay' contrast,178 and by the ribiil~adaqa 
contrast,179 where ribi(self-emanation= increase) is prohibited (lJarim), bay' (exchange: 
maintenance of status-quo through equalization of exchanged values in fair exchange = 
equality) is permitted (lJalil), and ~adaqa (self-annihilation = decrease) is encouraged 
(mandiib). 
In Q.3: 130, ribii is for the first time unequivocally prohibited, where the verb 
tii'kulii (devour) is qualified by the adverbial expression aç/'iifan muç/i'afatan, popularly 
translated as "doubled and redoubled."180 However, as a glitch meticulously observed by 
Hallaq,18I the translation of a(j'ifàn as "doubled" is not accurate. Firstly, being a lJil 
(adverbial) expression, "doubling" is more precise. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
adverbial term aç/'ifàn is in the plural case (sing.: ç/i'f; pl.: aç/'iif). Therefore, the precise 
meaning is a recurring doubling process, not in one but in sever al - not consecutive but 
parallel - instances. The reference is not to the freguency of doubling but to the 
multiplicity of doubling. The accurate translation would, therefore, be "multiple 
doubling." The frequency of "doubling" is covered by the second term muç/ii'afàtan, 
which has correctly been rendered as "redoubling." Could the use of aç/'iifàn in this 
verse, then, refer not to one but sever al instances (types) ofribii, and thus support the 
Prophetie alJiidith ascribing several abwiib (chapters)182 to it, sorne of which constitute 
the findings ofthis research? 
The "doubling and redoubling" is considered in the sources to be a Meccan 
Quraysh ribii practice, which, it is argue d, was being envied by the Muslims, after their 
defeat at the battle of UlJud, as the financial cause of Quraysh military superiority. In 
order to ward off this temptation, this practice is being prohibited for Muslims' own 
welfare. Here al-ribii is he Id to mean a specifie usury practice, and the prohibition 
rationale is stated to be true welfare and success. In fact, the Liberal hermeneuts mainly 
178 In Q. 2:275. 
179 In Q. 2:276. 
180 The first tenn aç/'iifàn is rendered by Yusuf Ali, Muhsin Khan and Ahmed Ali as "doublcd," and by Pickthall, Asad and Colin 
Turner as "doubling." The whoIe expression aç/'iifan mucjii'afatan is rendered by Rashad Khalifa as "compounded manifold," by 
Zafrulla Khan as "multiplying," and by Hans Wehr as "many times, a hundred-fold." 
181 ln a comment on this dissertation. 
182 These al}iidJth presented in Appendix 5 typieally use a specifie number, Iike 70, 72 or 73, to designate the types of ribii. It must be 
noted that this usage is merely metaphorical and the intention is to refer to multiplicity rather than to a specifie number, which will 
be reflected in this work as weil. 
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rely on the specificity of this verse to argue that the prohibited ribii subsumes only 
excessive or compound interest and not benign simple interest. The sources thus relate 
this verse to one characterization of "recurring doubling" (financial ribii) but ignore the 
"multiple doubling" inherent in the meaning of the expression (leading to other 
characterizations of ribii). The "doubling and redoubling" may exoterically refer to the 
Arab usury practice, but more significantly it refers esoterically to "continuity" and 
hence, by extension, to "eternity." 
Commanding believers to abstain from ribii, this verse links belief (lmiin) to the 
prohibition of ribii. Now, the most structural and fundamental element ofIslamic belief 
being the existence and absolute unit y of AŒih, this verse apparently suggests that 
human indulgence in ribii somehow strikes at this very belief, either by denying His 
existence, or by considering more than one entity as a god, or by considering that certain 
attributes of Allah are shared by other entities. This fundamental point will be 
expounded below (chapter IV). 
By linking ribii's prohibition with fear of Allah (taqwii), success (fàliiiJ) and belief 
(lman), this verse clearly raises the level of the ribii discourse above and beyond the 
economic level, as will be elaborated below (chapter IV). 
In Q.4:161, grave punishment for ribii, referred to for the first time 
chronologically, though specifically for the Jews, applies to the Muslims as well, not 
directly but by implication. Taking ribii and devouring of wealth are cited in this verse 
as two distinct Jewish practices, both of which are equated with rejection of faith, and 
he Id grievously punishable, without any explicit causal link between the two practices. 
Hence rejection of faith appears to be the implied rationale for the prohibition. 
The verse Q. 2:275 presents a comprehensive and final prohibition of ribii and 
permission of bay<. As already noted above,183 its late revelation, not enabling the 
Prophet to expound it before his death, reportedly prompted Caliph 'Umar to advise the 
community, in the absence of Prophetie exposition, to shun both ribii (usury/interest) 
and rlba (doubt). In another version of this iJadIth, the latter term reads ribiJ (profit). 
This verse links indulgence in ribii to the Satanic strike of insanity upon 
Resurrection: the word "stand" (yuqJmiin) has unanimously been rendered by exegetes 
183 Sec nn. 14 and 15, p. 17, abovc. 
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and translators as referring to standing up on the Day of Resurrection. The question, 
then, is what this insanity is? It cannot be the temporal insanity "stemming from the 
excess of greed of the usurer," as propounded by many exegetes, because, firstly, excess 
of greed in usurers is only an unsupported presumption without empirical evidence and it 
does not apply to all categories of ribiï, and, secondly, it does not necessarily lead to 
insanity. Today's, like yesterday's, bankers are anything but insane. This association of 
insanity with excessive greed of the usurer is an unsuccessful exegetical attempt at 
establishing an economic rationale (i}ikma) for the prohibition of ribii. Excessive greed 
is, therefore, not one of the only two plausible explanations ofthis insanity. Temporally, 
it could refer to the intra-active cannibalistic process of insanity being evidenced 
contemporaneously in animaIs (cows) in the forrn of Bovine Spongiforrn Encephalopathy 
(BSE) disease, commonly called Mad Cow Disease, and in humans in the form of its 
variant, Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), as will be postulated be10w (chapter IV). In 
other-worldly terrns, this insanity could refer to a re-play of the insanity which Satan, as 
per the Qur'iin, initially displayed in trying to frustrate God's plan for creation of 
humans in pairs from dust in a duality mode1 (bay'awJ) to operate along side the 
heavenly singularity mode1 (ribawJ).184 The Satanic insanity specifically consisted of the 
Satan persuading Eve and, through her, Adam to eat from the only prohibited tree in the 
Garden of Eden, the Tree of Etemity (shajarat a1-khu1d),185 which constituted the first 
case ofindulgence in ribii -the foundational ribii. This theme is pursued in IV.5., be1ow. 
This Satanic insanity in man upon resurrection is further attributed by this verse to 
man's failure to distinguish between ribii (with intransitive verbal expression) and bay' 
(with transitive verbal expression) by regarding the two as similar. This demonstrates 
that the distinction between the two processes of ribii and bay'has a crucial significance 
and consequences overflowing in the Hereafter. 
Through the juxtaposition of ribii and bay', this verse completes the govemance of 
the second loop of human relationships, i.e., the Man-Man relationship reflected in Fiqh 
al-Mu'iima1iit encompassing the Rights of Servants of God (lfuquq a1- 'Ibiid). The first 
loop of human relationships, i.e., the Man-God re1ationship, reflected in Fiqh a1- 'Ibiidiit 
1R4 Q. 20:116. 
1R5 Q. 20:120. 
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and encompassing the Rights of Allah (lfuqiîq Alliih), was covered by Q. 30:39, above. 
Here, in the Man-Man relationship, as aIready explained above,186 ribii (self-emanation) 
is being prohibited (J;ariim), bay' (exchange: maintenance of status-quo through 
equalization of exchanged values in fair exehange) is being permitted (J;aliil), and, in the 
next verse Q. 2:276, $adaqa (self-annihilation) is being encouraged (mandiîb). 
This verse raises the crucial question of what sets ribii apart from bay'. What 
makes ribii proscribed (l;ariim) and bay' permitted (l;aliil)? And above aIl, what is it that 
attracts Satanic insanity for confusing the two terms with one another? Is it simply a 
laek of commercial knowledge, or something graver to be equated with Satanic insanity 
and punished with etemal HeU Fire? These questions will be taekled below (chapter IV). 
The popular English rendering "shall be pardoned for the past"187 or "not be 
puni shed for the past"188 for the original Arabie expression "làlahu mii salalà" in this 
verse raises a translation problem which leads to a contradiction in terms. Either of 
these two translations conflicts with the next part of the verse which has unanimously 
and appropriately been translated as "their case is for Allah to judge" (wa amruhu ilii 
Alliihi). Now, if Allah has already dec1ared pardon or no punishment for the past, as 
rendered above, then what else remains on this score to be judged by Allah? The literaI, 
and in this case appropriate, meaning of the Arabie expression "làlahu mii salalà, "aiso 
adopted by Asad/89 is simply "for them is what is in the past," Le., contextually, they 
can retain their ribawl gains of the past; they will not be asked to retum those gains. But 
their case is not closed and will still be judged for the past by Allah, and, by implication, 
they could still otherwise be punished. This stipulation of accountability and possible 
punishment for the past actions is a unique feature of the sin of ribii. No other human 
action, not even kuiI(unbelief), attracts accountability and punishment for the past. One 
is responsible for his actions only after a Revelation, and his acceptance thereof, and not 
before it. The past is automatically condoned in the case of all other sins. But the 
attaehment of responsibility for past, present, and future actions in the case of ribii, by 
itself, is sufficient to demonstrate the seriousness of this offence in the eyes of AŒih, 
186 Scc pp. 55-56, above. 
187 Sec, e.g., Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur'iin, 112. 
188 Sec, c.g., al-Hiliili and Muhsin Khan, The Noble Qur'iin, 98. 
189 Asad, The Message of The Qur'iin, 62. 
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not matched in any other temporal offence. This aspect of ribii not only sets it apart 
from aH other major sins, but also raises its level beyond a straight economic crime. 
However, a pro minent contemporary exegete Mawdlirn surprisingly whittles down the 
importance of this past accountability back to an economic level by asserting that the 
punishment for past ribawi gains will depend upon how the sum is disposed off - either 
on oneself (punishable) or on collective welfare (pardonable). 
Notably, unlike zakiit and $adaqa which are repeatedly commanded and exhorted 
throughout the Qur'an, bay' is simply declared permitted (J;aliil) and neither commanded 
(fanJ) nor even exhorted, leaving adherence to it up to the free will of man. As will be 
expounded below (chapter IV), human adoption of a bay'awl mode of conduct is the test 
which man has to take using his free will while on earth. Had this mode of conduct been 
commanded like zakiit and $adaqa or $aliit and $aum (fasting), it would not have 
remained a matter for the exercise of human free will and the temporal test would have 
lost its meaning and purpose. 
As already pointed out, Q. 2:275 c1early and at length contrasts ribii with bay', 
lin king the failure to distinguish between the two terms with an act of Satanic insanity. 
The chronologically earlier verse, Q. 30:39, contrasts ribii with zakiit, while the later 
verse, Q. 2:276, contrasts ribii with $adaqa. In the face of these c1early speHed out 
juxtapositions, the assertion of Fazlur Rahman, an influential Modernist Pakistani 
scholar, denying the opposition of ribii and bay' is surprising: 
According to the Qur'an, the opposite of riba [sic] is not bay' (trade) but ~adaqa (charity). The 
prevailing confusion about the problem, we submit, was due to riba [sic] and bay' being 
considered opposed to each other. The result was that juristic hair-splitting was substituted for 
the moral importance attaching to the prohibition of riba [sic]. 190 
Regrettably, having utterly failed to see the philosophical significancc of the 
terms, in his enthusiasm to prove a moot point, Fazlur Rahman is completely ignoring 
the contents ofQ. 2:275. He correctly declares the opposite of ribiito be $adaqa, but that 
is in Q. 2:276, and he ignores the fact that the opposite of dbii is zakiit in Q. 30:39. 
Furthermore, he correctly asserts that this juxtaposition of ribii with ~adaqa (and zakiit) 
underlies the moral importance attaching to the prohibition of ribii. But he misses the 
important point that this moral importance governs the first loop of human relationship 
100 Rahman, Riba, 31. 
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with AŒih, Le., Fiqh a1- '/biidiit encompassing the Rights of Allah (lfuqiiq Alliih). The 
second loop of human relationship reflected in Fiqh a1-Mu'iima1iit encompassing the 
Rights of Servants of God (lfuqiiq a1- '/biid), is governed by the ribii and bay' 
juxtaposition which lays down the ground rules for temporal dealings. $adaqa and zakiit 
are moral obligations: these can be the underlying but not the goveming codes of Fiqh 
a1-Mu'iima1iit. Fazlur Rahman is again correct in asserting that juridical hair-splitting 
ensued and caused much confusion, but his reasons for this undesirable development are 
not valid. luridical hair-splitting occurred not simply because of ribii-bay' juxtaposition, 
as he asserts, but because of a mere exoteric perception of the defining characteristics of 
ribii and bay' (economic connotation of the two terms), at the cost of the appropriate 
exegetically pregnant esoteric perception of the distinguishing characteristics 
(philosophical connotation of the two terms), as will be expounded below (chapter IV). 
Q. 2:276 re-emphasizes the first loop of the human relationship with AŒih, Le., 
Fiqh a1- '/biidiit, encompassing the Rights of AŒih (lfuqiiq Alliih) by juxtaposing ~adaqa 
with ribii which has already been juxtaposed with zakiit in Q. 30:39. $adaqa and zakiit 
are apparently used here interchangeably, both denoting "giving" or "annihilation" 
(fanii'). 
The English renderings "ungrateful" and "wicked" for the original Arabic "ku11a 
kaffiirin" and "athlmin," respectively, though commonly adopted and part of the lexical 
meaning, are not satisfactory. For it is difficult to see what connection ribii has with 
ungratefulness and wickedness. The other lexical layer of meaning of these two Arabic 
terms, i.e., "unbeliever, infidel, atheist," and "sinner," respectively, are more appropriate 
because they are congruent with the meanings of previous ribii verses, more to the 
context and exegetically more productive. 
Q. 2:278 with a more emphatic reiteration of the link of ribii with unbelief further 
elevates the ribii discourse. 
Q.2:279, exegetically very rich in content, is the key to deciphering the ration ale 
(l;ikma) of ribii -prohibition. The English rendering "unjustly" relates to the expression 
"ta?Jimiina" in the Arabic original. This concept of ?u1m has been interpreted in at least 
three different ways. Firstly, a moral interpretation leads most exegetes, even nowadays, 
to take this to mean "exploitation of the poor." EI-Gamal, however, aptly points out that 
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"Islarnic scholars have long debunked the explanation of the prohibition of ribi solely on 
the basis of its exploitative nature,"191 relying on al-Nawaw1 (d. 676/1278) who had 
debunked "exploitation" of the poor as the prohibitory ration ale on the grounds that it 
could equally weIl apply to what he regards as legitirnate profit generation. 192 Secondly, 
an econornic interpretation of the concept, equates ?ulm with ghubn fiilJish (excessive 
injustice/criminal fraudl93) where justice means "equality or proportionality of the 
transaction" as expounded by the Malik1 jurist, Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198).194 Yet Ibn 
Rushd did not look into the occasioning factor for this condition of "equality in 
transaction," which is "similarity" and which has a philosophical-theological 
significance in the ribi lJikma search, as will be explained below (chapter IV). Thirdly, a 
legal interpretation of the concept of ?ulm equates it with "transgression" - the 
stepping into the forbidden territory, i.e., the sanctuary (lJimi) of someone else. This 
interpretation is supported by the wordings of the verse itself when it threatens war 
from Allah and His Messenger for not giving up all outstanding ribii. After all, the 
triggering factor of war is transgression. Further direct support for this interpretation is 
from another verse where ',?ilimiîn" can only be rendered as "transgressors": 
And We said: Oh Adam! Dwell you and your wife [pair] in the Paradise and eat both of you 
freely with pleasure and delight, of things therein as wherever you will, but come not near this 
tree [Tree ofEtemity: shajarat al-khuldin Q. 20: 120], or you both will be of the {!jjlimiin. 195 
Obviously, by eating of the prohibited Tree, Adam and Eve could not have been 
indulging in "exploitation of the poor" and "excessive injustice (ghubn flilJish)," nor 
could they have "oppressed" God; they could only have "transgressed" God, i.e., 
transgressed in the divine sphere of eternity. 
Finally, the Qur'an directly supports this meaning of ?ulm as transgression when it 
declares: 
• And whoever transgresses the limits ordained by Alliih, then such are the {!jjlimiin. 196 
• Verily joining others [in worship] with Alliih is a great {!ulm indeed.197 
191 EI-Gamal, A Basic Guide ta Cantempar;uy ls/amie Banking and Finance (Houston: ISNA, 2000), 2, n.l. 
192 al-Nawawl, (continuation by al-Subkl), al-M;ifmii' Sharl} al-Muhadhdhab(Cairo: Dar I~ya al-Turath al-'Arabl, 1995), IX, 390-404 
("fàr' fi madhiihib a/- 'u/ama' fi bayan 'il/at al-riba fi a/- 'ainas a/-arba'a"). 
193 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dietian;uy, 779. 
194 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihiiyat al-Muqta,~id (Bcirut: Dar al-Ma'rifat, 1997), III, 183-184. 
195 Q. 2: 35. 
196 Q. 2:229. 
197 Q. 31:13. 
62 
Moreover, the Qur'anjuxtaposes kuiT(unbelief) with ?ulm: 
• And it is the disbelievers who are the {:iilimiïn. 198 
Further, the Qur'an juxtaposes Iman (belief) with ?ulm (shirk) thus: 
• It is those who believe and confuse not their belief with {:ulm, for them there is security and 
they are the guided.199 
Leernhuise concludes that "?ulm, at least in Q. 6:82, became equated with 
shirk."20o Similarly, quoting a J;adith from Abu Dharr Ghifiïr1, al-Nawawl explains that 
the highest level and the most extreme form of ?ulm is al-shirk or associating partners 
with Allah.201 
Therefore, when Q. 2:279 speaks of Iii ta?limuna wa-lii tu?lamuna, the ?ulm is 
referring not to "oppression" (of God) but to "transgression." God is in effect telling 
man "do not transgress in My domain [ribiiJ and l (God) will not transgress in your 
(man's) domain by ensuring that you receive your capital (là lakum ru 'us amwiilikum). 
This theme will be developed below (chapter IV). 
In this verse the English rendering "capital sums" relates to the expression "ru 'us 
amwiilikuni' of the Arabie original, in accordance with the lexical meaning. Through 
this expression, this verse stipulates that in a transaction of homogeneity the only 
human entitlement is the capital (base) and any increase is prohibited. This injunction 
provides the juristic justification for the làtwii that aIl interest in any form is prohibited. 
In addition to this financial application, this injunction can also be extrapolated to cover 
any situation of a base and any increment or continuation thereof, as done in chapter IV. 
In summary, in this set of verses, in a tone of comprehensiveness and finality, al-
ribii is contrasted with al-~adaqiit in terms of loss of A1Iah's blessing, and more to the 
point, as an expression of a fundamental divine law. Additionally, in a foundation-
building revelation, al-ribii is contrasted repeatedly with al-bay' in terms of strict denial 
of their mutual similarity, and prohibited, with specifie punishment of Satanic insanity 
and eternal Hell-Fire for treating the two practices as similar. Furthermore, punishment 
of war from God is ordained for violation of the prohibition, implying the occurrence of 
198 Q. 2:254. 
199 Q. 6:82. 
200 Fred Leernhuis, "Origins and Early Devcloprnent ofTat:~Îr Tradition" in Andrew Rippin, Approaehe.\· to the history of'the 
interpretation orthe Qur'an (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
201 AI-NawawÎ, fJadithno. 24. 
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transgression. The restriction of human returns to the bases (ru 'us amwiilikum) rules out 
any increment or continuity of homogeneity. The meaning of the term al-ribii is not 
specified directly; only implied through contrast with al-$adaqiit and al-bay'. The 
rationale for the prohibition is not spelled out; it is only implied to be rejection ofbelief, 
and further implied through provision of severe punishment in the Hereafter. Working 
with these Qur'anic givens, and aided otherwise, the new critical theory will be posited. 
II.3. Prophetie Blueprint 
This is a very fertile source for the ribii theory deve10pment and will be explored in 
the context of the three Abrahamic faiths. 
II.3.i. Judeo-Christian Prophetie Guidance 
Unlike the Islamic tradition, there is no separate l}adith genre in the Judeo-
Christian tradition. The prophetic contribution is already incorporated in the Old and the 
New Testaments (II.2.iii. and II.2.iv, above) and will be utilized accordingly. 
II.3.ii. Islamic Prophetie Guidance 
The Prophetic Sunna (l}adith) encapsulating the sayings, actions and tacit 
approvals of the Prophet is very rich source material for the new theory deve1opment, 
but it requires deep reflection and has unfortunate1y only been cursorily handled by the 
exegetes and jurists. 
The prohibition of ribii and permission of bay' is both Qur'anic and Sunnaic. In 
addition to the Qur'anic verses that are taken by many scholars, without full 
justification, to be the basis for the prohibition of ribii al-nasJ'a alone, there are a number 
of Prophetic al}iidith dealing with the extension, e1aboration and prohibition of ribii 
which are taken by them, again without full justification, as the basis for the prohibition 
of ribii al-facjl alone. The famous and often-quoted afJiidith which served as the source-
mat eri al for the application of analogy (qiyiis) in the deve10pment of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) on ribii and bay' are given in Appendix 5. As for their authenticity, 
these traditions have been reported as marfu' (elevated in rank) from a large number of 
Companions.202 These traditions are very productive for new theory deve10pment in 
202 Ineluding the four Khulafii' Riühidiin, Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, and 'An, and others ineluding 'Ubadah ibn al-~amit, Abu 
Sa'id al-Khudr1, Abu Hurayrah, Sa'd ibn Ab1 Waqqâs, 'Abd Allah ibn 'Umar, Fa<)alah ibn 'Ubayd, Abu Bakrah, Abli al-Darda', Abli 
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several ways. They: 
1. Herald the close of the Jahiliya and the dawn of the Islamic non-ribawJ era, 
through annulling aIl ribii al-jiihiIlya, as late as the Prophet's Farewell 
Pilgrimage, thus speaking to the late formulation and implementation ofthe final 
injunctions on ribii, which lays heavy responsibility on later exegetes; 
2. Lay down the universality of the application of ribii -prohibition by applying it 
to the Christians (ofNajran), in addition to the Jews already; 
3. Point out the actual ribawJpractices of Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians; 
4. Underscore the gravit y of the sin of ribii by designating it as the fourth of the 
seven great destructive sins (al-kabii'ir); 
5. Elevate the ribii discourse to a higher theological and philosophie al level, by 
spelling out the gravit y of the sin of ribiithrough: 
o associating ribii with shirk (naming partners with Allah) - a notion not 
even spotted, let alone explored by conventional scholarship: 
'Abd Allïih Ibn Masud has reported that the Prophet said: "Ribii has over seventy 
kinds and shirk(associating partners with Allïih) is like (as bad as) that." -Reported 
by al-Bazzar, with the same transmitters as those of the $aJ.JJfJ. in Ibn Maja with 
sound isniid203 
o associating ribii with adultery and incest with one's own mother at its 
lowest manifestation, using an exoterically biologie al and seemingly 
moral - but an esoterically philosophie al - metaphor: 
From Abu Hurayrah: The Prophet said: "Ribiihas seventy segments, the least serious 
being equivalent to a man committing adultery with his own mother." [Incest]204 
o associating ribii with attack on the honor of a M uslim; 
6. Specify the denial of temporal and heavenly blessings for indulgence in ribii,' 
7. Graphically describe the punishment for the sin of ribii; 
8. Spell out the temporal curse (Allah's wrath) for ribii- indulgence; 
9. Bring out the eschatological implications of ribii; 
10. Clearly express condemnation of and curse on the practice of ribii (both taking 
and giving); 
Usayd al-Sii'idi, Ruwayfah ibn Thiibit, Buraydah and othcrs, mentioned in Nyazcc, Ribii and lçlamic Banking, 128. 
203 Mu,snaf 'Abd al-Razziiq, VIII, 315; Masnad al-Bazziir with referencc to Kashf al-Asriir, 1, 64, chapter of al-shirk, lJadlth no. 91; 
Sunan Ibn Mifja, Kitiib al- Tijiiriit, Biib al-taghfi? fi al-ribii, IJadlth no. 2275. 
204 Ibn Maja, Kitiib al- Tijiiriit, Biib al-taghfi? fi al-ribii. 
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Il. Extend the culpability for the sin ta aH participants of the ribii contract- the 
taker, the giver, the recorder, the two witnesses; 
12. Lay down ribawl injunctions on homogeneity, equality and instantaneity, in 
what are generally referred to as the different versions of ribawl-commodities 
lJadIth, naming six cornrnodities (go Id, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt). For 
homogeneity and equality, various versions of these alJiidIth use different 
expressions like "mithlun bi mithlin" (like for like), "sawii'un bi sawii'in" (equal 
for equal), "'aynun bi "aynin" (same for same), and, in Abu Yusufs version, 
"waznun bi waznin" (weight for weight) and "kaylun bi kaylin" (measure for 
measure). These alJiidIth provide the tools and the instruments for the 
philosophical-theological exposition of ribii and bay~ containing the most 
profound wisdom and the most comprehensive esoteric exposition of ribii. But 
these afJiidIth only became the basis of the doctrine of ribii discussed in Islamic 
law (for mechanical analogous extrapolation),2°5 and were not utilized by the 
scholarship to extract the deeper philosophical-theologicallayers of meaning and 
rationale. 
From 'Ubadah ibn a~-~amit, who said, "The Messenger of Allah said, 'Gold for gold, silver for 
silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, fike for fike, in equaf 
weights, from hand to hand ffthese species diffel; then, sell as you like, as long as it is from hand to 
hand.' " 206 
"The Messenger of Allah said, 'Gold for go Id, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for 
barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, from hand to hand. He who gives in excess or 
acquires an excess has charged ribii; the person giving and acquiring have the same liability 
[guilt] in this." 207 
13. Pro vide (in the Baml-and Khaybar-dates alJiidIth) a clear distinction between 
ribii and bay" and an explication of the ribawl-cornrnodities fJadIth. These 
alJiidIth also directly refute the position of many scholars who maintain that 
the opposite of ribii is not bay~ but ~adaqa.208 These alJiidIth explicitly 
demonstrate that in matters of mu "iimaliit, the prescribed alternative to, or the 
opposite of, ribii is bay"; in matters of "ibiidiit, the antithesis of ribii (growth or 
205 Saccd, Islamic Banking, 31-34. 
206 $ai}JfJ Muslim, Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib al-,~arfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan ;also in Tirmidhl; aH;an'anl, Subul al-
Saliim SharIJ Buliigh al-Mariim, lll, 72. 
207 $ai}JJ; Muslim, Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib al-,;'arfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan. 
20. Sec, C.g., Rahman, Riba, 31. 
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self-emanation) is indeed $adaqa (diminution or self-annihilation). Moreover, 
from an application st andpoint , these alJiidith appear to sanction what has in 
later juridical literature been dubbed, apparently incorrectly, as the lJJla 
(stratagem) of "double sale." These ai}iidith provide a mechanism to achieve an 
ultimate indirect exchange (not a sale) ofhomogeneity (dates for dates) through 
two direct exchanges (actual sales/purchases) of heterogeneity (dates for money, 
and money for dates): 
Narrated Abu Sa'id al-Khudr1: Once BilaI brought Bami (a superior kind of) dates to the 
Prophet and the Prophet asked him, "From where have you brought these?" BilaI replied, "1 had 
sorne inferior kind of dates and exchanged two $iï's of it for one $iï' of Bami-dates, in order to 
give it to the Prophet to eat." Thereupon the Prophet said, "Beware! Beware! This is definitely 
ribiï (usury)! This is definitely ribiï (usury)! Don't do so, but ifyou want to buy (a superior kind 
of dates) sell the inferior kind of dates for rnoney and then, buy the superior kind of dates with 
that rnoney." 209 
Abu Sa'id al-Khudr1 and Abu Hurayrah reported that the Messenger of Allah appointed 
someone to colle ct revenue from Khaybar. He brought him dates of high quality [janibj. The 
Messenger of Allah said, "Are all the dates of Khaybar like this?" He replied, "By Allah, no. 0 
Messenger of Allah, we get a $iï' of these in exchange for two $iï' s (of our dates) and two $iï' s 
in exchange for three. "The Messenger of Allah said, "Do not do this, but sell the mixed dates 
for dirhams, and then buy the good quality dates [janib}with the dirhams. "210 
14. Clearly convey the important concept that delay (nasJ'a) results in ribii, and 
require in st ant aneit y of the transaction. The concept of delay is further 
developed in two best known traditions ofUsama and al-Barra' ibn 'Azib which 
stipulate that all ribii is included in or restricted to ribii al-nasJ'a and that true 
ribii is found when there is a delayed settlement. These traditions, howcver, do 
not explain just how delay causes true ribii; this question will be tackled below 
(chapter IV); 
15. Fine tune the indirect incidence of ribii, such as the dust of ribii, gifts or favors; 
16. Foretell the univers al spread of ribii, which mankind is experiencing today, but 
witnessing conspicuously only in the financial domain; 
17. Recognize (in Companion alJiidlth attributed to Caliph 'Umar) the ambiguity of 
the ribii provisions. In one version of the above alJiidith, the word ribiJ (profit) 
replaces rJba (doubt). While the word rlba, more popularly rendered as raib (both 
meaning, doubt), extends the sc ope of application of ribii-proscription beyond the 
209 $af}Jf} BukharJ, III, f:ladithno. 506; Muslim, $af}Jf}. Kitab af-Musaqat, Bab af-la'ami mithfan bi mithlin, III,4X. 
2lO Bukhiirl, Kitab af-Buyii~ Bab idha arada bay'a tamrin bi tamrin khayrun minhu. 
67 
certain to the doubtful cases as well, the term ribiJ (profit), if an authentic part of 
this tradition, raises a serious question about the legitimacy of the notion of 
profit in Islamic law, which will be explored below (chapter V) from an 
accounting and philosophie al perspective. 
18. Define ribii, by implication, as an "excess" in an ex change of homogeneity, and 
as "delay" in exchanges ofboth homogeneity and heterogeneity; 
19. Pre scribe bay' as the permissible alternative to the prohibited ribiiin matters of 
mu'iimaiiit (transactions). 
What the legalf;adith material does not do, however, is clearly spell out the 'ilia 
and the f;ikma of the ribii-bay' injunctions, much less expound these concepts. The 'ilia 
of ribii's proscription is only hinted at (e.g., homogeneity and delay). But the 'ilia of 
permission of bay' is not even hinted at. Bay' is simply designated the defauit mode of 
human behavior. To add further complexity, the f;ikma of the injunctions on ribii and 
bay' is, as it were, a divine secret to be reflected upon by mankind. The legal f;adith 
material, as the Qur'an itself, is only suggestive but completely silent on it, leaving the 
arduous task for intuitive exposition. 
This legalf;adith raw material and the Qur'anic raw material are, nevertheless, the 
foundation on which and from which the structure of the Qur'anic/Sunnaic calibrated 
hermeneutical model of ribii will be explored and constructed in this work through the 
search for the 'illa and the iJikma of the inj unction in the form of a new theory. 
II.3.iLa. Ribii-Bay' in SIra / Tiiiikh Works 
The stated sc ope ofthis work prec1udes a fulliength examination of the diachronie 
development of adherence to the ribii-bay' injunctions in Islamic history. However, a 
sample from the early historiographie al works is presented in Appendix 6, which, inter 
alia, supports the Prophetie f;adith material on the subject and underscores the unique 
position of the concept of ribiiin Islamic faith and practice. 
Sirat Rasiii Alliih by Ibn Is4aq (d. 150/767) contains sorne purely exegetical 
sections (e.g. SIra III, 112-28 on Q. 3:121-179). This exegesis confines itselfto a kind 
oflexical paraphrase found in the early commentaries.211 
211 Ycrsteegh, Arabie Grammar and Qur'anie Excgcsi~, 71. 
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Additionally, the express prohibition of ribiiis contained in several pacts/letters of 
the Prophet with/to various tribes, such as the pacts with tribe of Juhayna,212 with the 
Christians of Najran213 and with the Thaqlf tribe (Ta'if),214 and the letter to 'Amr Ibn 
M'abad al-luhan1.215 
The prohibition of ribii and its centrality to Islam cornes out c1early from these 
Prophetie documents, but, as appropriate to the genre, no light is shed on the ration ale of 
the prohibition. 
II.4. Punitive Chisel 
Although neshekh/ribii is c1assed as the greatest of the sins in aH three pristine 
Abrahamic faiths, the Bible does not prescribe any punishments for it. It is only in Islam 
that ribii attracts a set of Qur'anic punishments and Sunnaic sin-associations which are 
firstly unique and secondly apparently extreme. They are unique because they have not 
been prescribed for any other sin. They are apparently extreme because they are at the 
extreme end of the punitive spectrum, which by no stretch of the imagination is 
compatible with the sin of ribi-indulgence seen only as an economic/financial act. These 
unique and harsh punishments act, metaphorically, as a chisel to fashion and polish the 
theoretical construct. These punishments in fact are the key to unlocking the new theory 
of ribii. They are the greatest indicators of the full import of the new theory. 
II.4.i. Qur'arnc Non-lfadd Admonition 
The punishments for indulgence in ribii, as ordained in the Qur'an and summarized 
by al-Sarakhsl, are not of the lJudiid category and inc1ude:216 Evil touch of the Devil 
which equates to epilepsy,217 Deprivation of Allah's blessing which equates to 
destruction and extermination,218 War from Allah and His Messenger,219 Loss of belief 
(kuft) 220 and Eternal Hellfire. 221 
212 Ibn Sa'd, Kitiib al-Tabaqiit al-KabIr, III, 24-25, 27, as translatcd in Sultan Ahmad Qurcshi, Letter.. oftiie Holy ProplIet, (Lahore: 
Muslim Educational Trust, n.d.), 43. 
213 Al]mad ibn Yal]ya Balîîdhurl, FutulJ a/-Bu/dan, 1, 64-65, as translatcd in Qurcshi, Letters orthe Ho/y Prophet, 50. 
214 Abiï 'Ubayd, Kitiib a/-Amwiil, 19,92, as translatcd in Qurcshi, Letters orthe Holy Prophct, 53. 
215 Ibn Sa'd, Kitiib a/- Tabaqiit al-KabJr, III, 24-25, as translated in Qureshi, Letfers oftiie Holy ProplIet, 118. 
216 al-Sarakhsl, a/-Mabsii,t. 
217 Q. 2:275. 
218 Q. 2:276. 
219 Q. 2:279. 
220 Q. 2:276. 
221 Q. 2:275. 
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What al-Sarakhsi does not notice is that the Qur'an - very uniquely for any sin -
also institutes past accountability for the sin of ribii,222 while, however, not explicitly 
associating it with the unforgivable sin of shirk (idolatry). A possible explanation why 
these punishments are not of the l;udiidcategory will be posited in chapter V. 
II.4.ii. Ta 'zlr Punishments 
According to a tiny minority juristic opinion, the ta 'zJr punishments for ribii 
inc1ude: initial dissuasion, subsequent imprisonment and eventual death.223 Again, even 
this minority-opined punishment of death is unique and severe in that no other 
"economic crime" attracts it. It c1early suggests a deeper but yet unexplored 
significance. 
II.4.iii. Sunnaic Admonition 
The Sunnaic admonition of ribii, contained in four different a1;.iidith cited above, 
while very grave and graphie, is loaded with unexplored meanings and raises the ribii 
discourse beyond the apparent moral to its ultimate unscaled theological heights: 
• Equivalence of ribii with idolatry (shirk); 
• Equivalence of ribii with adultery (zinii'); 
• Equivalence of ribawith incest (zina' al-ma/Jarim 224)with one's own mother; 
• Equivalence of ribiiwith loss of Muslim's honor. 
These Sunnaic admonitions fully complement the grave Qur'anic and ta'zJr 
punishments and, taken together, provide a perfect chisel to fashion the new theory on 
ribii. 
II.4.iv. Uniqueness of AdmonitionslPunishments 
'Abd al-Ra1}man al-Jazlr1 elaborates the punishments for the severely prohibited 
(nahyan mughall~an) riba thus: 
222 Ibid. 
[Ribiij is far removed from Islam and is in discord with its basic philosophy in torm as weil as 
meaning .... This is the Book of God which has prohibited ribi vehemently and has reprimanded 
the taker so severely that it makes those who believe in their Lord and dread His punishment 
tremble with fear. Can any reprimand be harsher than God equating the takers of ribii with those 
223 Opinion ofibn 'Abbas, l;Iasan al-Ba~ri, Ibn Sirin and Rabi' ibn Anas related in al-Ja~~a~'s commcntary on Q. 2:27R, 1,471 ff. 
Imprisonment of seller ofliquor and indulger of ribii is also stipulatcd by the Fatiiwii 'A/amglrJ, Il, 169. 
224 al-Ba'albakl, A/-Mawrid: Arabic-Eng/i,;-h Dictionary, 609. 
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who have risen in revoit against Him and are at war with Him and His Prophet? What will be the 
state of that feeble human being who fights with the Almighty and Overpowering God, Whom 
nothing on earth or in Heaven can frustrate. There is no doubt that by resorting to ribii such a 
person has adopted the course of self-destruction and deprivation. 225 
Crucial to the interpretation of ribiï is the fact that the Qur'anic and Sunnaic 
punishments/admonitions have not been pronounced for any other cardinal sin. If ribiï is 
an economic crime (exploitative but nevertheless mutually consented transfer of 
wealth), as generally believed, then there are more serious economic crimes like theft 
(transfer of wealth by stealth) and robbery (transfer of wealth by force Imurder). But 
theft (act of stealth) and robbery (act of force) do not attract as grave a punishment as 
ribiï (act of consent) does. If ribiïis a moral crime against humanity (injustice), as is also 
generally advocated, then there are more serious moral crimes like murder. But again 
murder does not attract the same range and severity of punishment as ribii does. 
Moreover, the sin of ribii is unique in attracting accountability for the past.226 Above aIl, 
the Sunnaic equivalence of ribii with idolatry (shirk) c1early raises the stakes, and thus 
drastically changes the very perception of ribii from the economic and moral to the 
theological realm. 
II.5. Exegetical Excavation 
The genre of exegesis (Arabie: tafSJr) should have offered the greatest promise of 
deciphering the divine Scripture on the prohibition of usury for the deve10pment of a 
comprehensive theory. However, both the Judeo-Christian and Islamic monumental 
exegetical production has utterly failed to develop a plausible theory of ribii. Except for 
sorne instances in the ludaic rabbinical literature, the exegesis of usury/ribiï verses is 
woefully perfunctory, lacking any philosophical-theological depth. As will be seen 
be1ow, only the ludaic rabbinical exegesis reaches theological heights, though still short 
of a full-fledged theory, while the Christian exegetical effort simply ho vers around moral 
and legal perspectives (barring one metaphorical theological reference), and the Islarnic 
exegetical output is suffocated by an overt concern with the contextual (JahiIiya) and 
narrow thematical (economic) perspectives. 
225 'Abd al-RaI)man al-Jazlrl, a/-Fiqh 'a/a a/-Madhiihib a/-Arba'a(Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijariyya al-Kubra, n.d.), 6th cd. Il, 245-8. 
226 Q. 2:275. 
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IL5.i. Early Rabbinical T eachings 227 
The initial Old Testament and other Biblical injunctions - concrete and lacking 
universality - were explored for meaning and guidance in the early rabbinical literature 
and in the process the usury discourse was raised to new theological heights, albeit still 
without a full-fledged theory. This early rabbinicalliterature, 228 however, fully supports 
the new theory of ribibeing developed in this thesis. 
The early Jewish thinking is reflected in the Palestinian Talmud (5 th c.) and the 
Babylonian Talmud (ih c.) whose legislation, contemporary with early Christianity, 
surpassed the Old Testamene9 in forbidding not just usury but - very significantly -
even what looked like usury,230 and in increasing the severity ofBiblical prohibitions.231 
Echoing past convention al philosophical wisdom reflected in concepts such as 
"money bred /Tom money as their calves are /Tom cattle, "rabbinical thought regarded 
positive morality, justice, sterility of money and self-creation of interest as the 
prohibition rationales. But in a far-reaching move, fully support ive of the new theory, 
the usury ("increase") prohibition was extended to coyer far more than the taking of 
interest and came to distinguish four main types of "increase" (= Hebrew marbJ!; Arabie 
ribi) in the Talmud and the medieval Jewish codes:232 (1) fixed increase: ordinary 
transaction where interest on money is paid directly on a loan (in violation of the 
express command of Scripture, known as "Increase under the Mosaic Law"); (2) "the 
mere du st of increase": sorne indirect form of interest in bargain or sale, even if more or 
less gratuitous; also anything given by a borrower in anticipation of a 10an (known as 
"Rabbinical Increase"); (3) "the semblance of increase": interest paid out of gratitude 
for a past loan or out of the desire to induce a future one; and (4) increase payable by 
means other than money, including many disparate cases, such as, when a borrower 
227This scction on carly rabbinical teachings, detailcd in Appendix Il (b), draws hcavily and libcrally on thc work of M aloncy 
(Maloncy, Background, 113-135) which incorporatcs original rcscarch. 
228 The carly Jcwish rabbinical sources for usury discoursc includc Philo (e. 30 B.C.- 45 A.D.) and Josephus, the Mishna and 
Tosephta, the Sipphra on Lcviticus, the Siphre on Numbcrs and Dcuteronomy, and the Mckiltha on Exodus. 
229 Maloncy, Background, 1 13ff. 
2JO Baba Mezi 'a, V, Iff. 
231 One rabbinical practice of rabbi Gamalicl II (90-130 A.D.) cven involvcd "negativc intercst", Lc., taking losscs on loans by 
accepting rcimbursement at whichever priee level was lower, that ofthe time oflcnding or ofrcpayment, rcportcd in S. W. Baron, A 
Social and Rcfigious HistOly ofthc Jcws, 9 vols. (New York: Columbia Univcrsity Press, 1960), Il, 250; also Baba Mczi 'a, V, 8. 
This is a historical evidence ofncgative indcxing ofloans for inflation, an issuc much dcbatcd inconclusivcly in contcmporary 
Islamie finance circlcs. 
m Codc of Maimonides (l2'h c.); Turim Code of Jacob ben Asher (1248-1340); Code of Joscph Caro, thc Shulchan Arukh (1 6th c.). 
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honors his creditor by allowing him to perform sorne religious dut y in connection with 
synagogue worship.233 
The complicated cornrnentaries of the rabbis on Baba Me~i'a, through the use of 
casuistry, further reflne the meaning ofusury, beyond the text of the Mishna. Only a full 
reading of the Gemara can adequately show the intricacies of usury discussed within 
Judaism.234 But regrettably this "micro" analysis did not lead to a "macro" theory. 
The Tosephta to Baba Me#'a deals extensively with the broadened concept of 
usury, by forbidding not just interest-taking but also what looks like, though may not be, 
usury.235 The former was known as ribbit ke~u~ah (interest proper), and the latter as avak 
ribbit (dust of interest).236 Baba Bathra further illustrates the extension of the 
understanding, and subtle use, of the usury principle in a quotation,237 in which 
considering the whole period of the contract as one long day for wage settlement has an 
oblique similarity with the concept of "unit y of session" (itfilJiid al-majlis) in Islamic 
law. Continuing with the broadened concept of usury, Baba ~amma applies it to sales 
transactions, as stated by the Gemara, which later came to be known as bay' al-salam in 
Islamic law.238 
The rabbinic thought adds not only breadth, as seen above, but also theological 
depth to the usury discourse. The Mishna 239 spells out the notion and scope of guilt in 
usurious transactions as transgression and invoking the fear of God.240 The Gemara in the 
Jerusalem Talmud 241 points out the blindness of the usurer who hires a notary and 
witnesses to attest to his sin,242 and the Mekiltha on Exodus condernns aIl participants in 
usury and denies the usurer any "share in divinity": "He who lends on interest ... has no 
share in Him who decreed against taking interest."243 
These passages have a striking resemblanee to the later Islamie Prophetie 
traditions that also similarly condernn an the participants - the taker, giver, guarantor, 
233 Maloney, Background, n. 125, 117; 1. Abelson, "Usury (1ewish)", Eneyelopedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 557. 
234 The Talmud(London: Soneino Press, 1935), Nezikin Il: Baba Me;;:i'a, V, 361 ff. 
235 Tosephta to Baba Me;;:i'a, IV, 3. 
236 Eneyclopaedia Judaica- CD-ROM Edition. cf. Usury. 
237 Baba Bathra, 86b-87a. 
238 Baba ~amma, l03a: "Advancc payment at present priees may be made for the future delivery of products, but no advance payment 
at present may be made if the value oftbe products will subsequcntly be paid in actual money in lieu ofthem." 
239 Mishna is one of the two constit ucnt parts of the Talmud. The other is Gcmara. 
240 Baba Mez j'a V II 
241 Ibid., V, i Id.' ' . 
242 Maloncy, Background, 121. 
243 R. Meir in Mekiltha on Exodus, XXII, 24. 
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witnesses, and scribe - in a usurious transaction. They also raise the usury discourse to a 
theologicallevel, which, however, in a strange contradiction, is downgraded elsewhere 
by the absence of absoluteness of the prohibition244 which accommodated rabbinical 
exceptions to the law ofusury on the ration ale of charity.245 
Nevertheless, the rabbinical prohibition against usury, though not absolute, is 
certainly very grave. Raising the discourse to theological heights, usury is made 
equivalent to denying God. The Gemara of Babylonian Talmud quotes Rabbi Jose (130-
160 A.D. ):246 
Come and see the blindness of the man who lends at interest: ... if sorne one gets together 
witnesses, a notary and ink, and writes and signs (a contract), he denies the God of1srael.247 
Similarly, the Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud declares interest-taking as denial 
of Yahweh: 248 
Come and see the blindness of those who lend at interest: if anyone calls another an idolater, an 
incestuous man or a murderer, the other seeks vengeance on his life; but doesn't one who hired a 
notary and witness and tells them to attest (a usurious contract) den V the Place? This brings out 
that evervone who lends at interest denies the Principle [of divine authority].249 
Maloney explains that these two texts, read with the Gemara on Sanhedrin 250 and 
the Tosephta to Aboda Zara/51 bring out the extreme gravit y assigned by the rabbis to 
the sin of usury: 
A Jew was permitted to violate the ordinances of the Torah if he were threatened with death, but 
he was forbidden to do so in cases of idolatry, immorality and bloodshed. The text given above 
from the Jerusalem Talmud alludes to the se three special cases and connects usury with idolatry, 
the most serious of sins. So grave was the prohibition of idolatry that it was regarded as "equal in 
weight to the whole Torah."252 To drive home their general teaching on idolatry the rabbis 
formed practical regulations which aimed at lessening the likelihood that Jews would be 
contaminated with pagan practices. To the modem reader their measures might seem extreme, 
but they worked from the principle that prevention was better than cure. A book like Aboda Zara 
gives flesh to this princip le through multiple minute regulations. The Gemara expresses its 
working philosophy with an aphorism:253 "Keep off, we say to the Nazirite; go round the vineyard 
and come not near to it." Just as the Nazirite could avoid the fruit of the vine by avoiding the 
vineyard itself, so also could the Jew be preserved from idolatry by being preserved from any 
idolatrous object. The Tosephta to Aboda Zara applies this principle to usury by forbidding 
244 Maloncy, Background, 124. 
245 Tosephta to Baba MC:fi'a, V, 15. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 472). 
246 Maloncy, Background, 125. 
247 Baba Mq j '8" 71 a. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 461). 
24' Maloncy, Background, 125. 
249 Gemara of Jeru.l'aJcm Talmud, Baba Mq i'a, V, Il d (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 462). 
250 Sanhcdrin, 74a. 
251 Toscphta to Aboda Zara, I, 10. 
252 Sanhcdrin. 74a; Horayoth, Sa. 
m Aboda Zara, 58b. 
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business dealings that involved any money that had formerly been gained from USury?54 The 
connection of usury to idolatry makes rabbinical efforts to avoid even what looked like usury 
much more understandable.255 
In addition to equating usury with idolatry, these rabbinical texts bring out two 
important concepts. They permit scriptural exemptions on the doctrine of dire necessity, 
but not in the case of idolatry which is identified with usury. They utilize the notion, 
also discussed in the later ribii discourse, of avoiding transgression against the protected 
boundaries (1;.imii) of God. 
These texts clearly raise the usury discourse to theological heights by equating 
usury with denial of God and with idolatry. But they do not explain what the 
occasioning factor for the equivalence between usury and idolatry is? The denial of 
"Place" and "Princip le" referred to in Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud cited above256 
requires further elaboration in the ludaic context which is beyond the present scope of 
this work. The usury prohibition rationale, short of being explicitly posited and 
explained as idolatry, was instead posited as the prohibition of shedding of blood 
(savagery)/57 and the promotion of bond of brotherhood and charity towards the poor/58 
but not justice either in the Old Testament or in the rabbinic literature. 
Interestingly, in spite of the gravit y of the sin ofusury (equivalence with idolatry), 
the Torah lacks any temporal or other-worldly punishments for the sin on an individual 
level. It is only on a community level that the rabbis connected, among other things, 
usury prohibition with Israel's covenant with Yahweh: the "exodus" as punishment for 
indulgence in, and the "retum" on the condition of avoidance of, usury. The Gemara of 
Sukkah and the Siphra on Leviticus draw this conclusion: 
The homes of the Israelites have been delivered to the empire because of ... those who lend 
money on usury ... 259 
1 have brought you out of Egypt on the condition that you accept the commandments on usury. 
Whoever professes them professes the exodus from Egypt, and vice-versa?60 
The explanation is that the prohibition of interest being of a charitable nature, it 
was only a moral transgression and its violation was not treated as a criminal offense to 
254 Toscphta to AbodaZara, 1,10-11. 
255 Maloney, Background, 125-126. 
256 See n. 247, p. 74, abovc. 
257 Tcmurah, 6b. 
258 Maloncy, Background, 130. 
259 Sukkah, 29 a, b. 
26() Siphrc on LcYiticus, XXV, 38. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 46). 
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which any penal sanctions attached. Only in the prophesies of Ezekiel did usury come to 
be identified with the gravest of crimes in the context oflarceny, adultery, homicide and 
other such "abominations" that are worthy of death (Ez. 18:11-13). The threat of death 
for usury was later interpreted as the divine sanction against irrecoverable and 
illegitimate self-enrichment (BM 61b).261 Furthermore, interest-taking moneylenders are 
likened to apostates who deny God (Tosef., BM 6: 17) and to shedders of blood (BM 
61b) and they have no share in the world to come (Mekh. Sb-Y 22:24).262 
This rabbinical usury discourse, though it treats of the extrinsic effects of usury, 
also investigates its intrinsic characteristic. Further, by extending the concept from 
"usury" to also "what looks like usury," very subtly it generalizes the scope beyond the 
financial. Thus, the Jewish rabbinical usury paradigm may be characterized as the first 
one possessing both vertical depth and horizontal spread, and very productive for, but 
still short of, a fuIl-fledged theory. 
II.5.ii. Patristic Teachings - Church Fathers/Christian Theologians 263 
In developing their teachings on usury, the early Church Fathers faced two 
problems: the lack of specific guidance in the New Testament on the taking of interest 
and the tackling of what appeared to them a "Deuteronomic double-standard" that 
aIlowed lews to take interest from the other but not from the brother. But what is 
lacking in the New Testament has, however, been more than made up for by the Church 
Fathers based on the teachings of the Old Testament and the notion of incompatibility 
of usury with Christian love. The essence of the early Church Fathers' teaching was 
severe disapproval of usury, influenced in certain cases by classical Greek thought as 
weIl. 
In an attempt to show the harmony between the ludaic Law and the Gospel, the 
new law is not seen as abolishing the old, but as surpassing it: the prohibition of usury 
remains and is expanded - not even to seek the principal from the one who is in need. 
261 Encyclopacdia ludaica- CD-ROM Edition .s.v. Usury. 
262 Ibid. 
263 This scction on thc teachings ofChurch Fathers, dctailed in Appendix 12 (a), also draws heavily and Iibcrally on the doctoral 
disscrtation of Rev. Robert P. Maloney (Maloney, Background, 136-179) which ineorporates original rcscarch on the work of 
Clement of A1exandria of the Greek Church (c. 150-215 A.D.), Tertullian (c. 155-220 A.D.), Apollonius (dates unccrtain: an 
Asian bishop), St. Cyprian (e. 200-258 A.D.), Commodianus, Lactantius, St. Athanasius (e. 295-373 A.D.), Cyril ofJerusalem (e. 
315-387 A.D.), Hilary of Poitiers (e. 315-e.367 A.D.), Basil the Great (330-379 A.D.), Gregory of Nazianzen (330-389 A.D.), 
Gregory ofNyssa (335-394 A.D.), St. Ambrose (339-397 A.D.), St. John Chrysostom (344'1-407 A.D.), St. Jerome (344-420 
A.D.), St. Augustine (350-430 A.D.), Lco the Great (390'1-461 A.D.), and Jacob ofSaroug (c. 451-521 A.D.). 
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The Old Testament (Ez. 18:8) is se en as prohibiting interest in order to prepare people 
for the habit of losing the principal itself (Lk. 6:34).264 This bears a striking resemblance 
to the later Qur'anic exhortation in Q.2:280 to grant facilitating extension and even 
charitable remis sion to the needy debtor. 
Treating Mosaic Law as the source for aIl the moral teachings of the Greeks, the 
rationale of usury prohibition is regarded as eternal happiness, generosity, fellowship, 
piety, liberality, justice and humanity.265 
Condemnation of usury as immoral finds support not only in the Script ure (Old 
Testament), but also in its incompatibility with Christian love as expressed in poetic 
thought, in the homilies of the Fathers, 266 castigating the usurer, attacking usury and 
cataloging the prescription to be followed by the man who sincerely seeks God and 
strives after truth. 267 
Conforming to the special precept of not lending at interest brings the reward of 
dwelling with the Lord in His eternal tabernacle, whereas its violation excludes man 
from etemal life.268 In the first-ever reference of its kind in Judeo-Christian tradition, 
usury is treated as a diabolical action along with intemperance and avarice.269 This is a 
close parallel to the later Qur'anic categorization of usury (ribii) indulgence as "Satanic 
insanity" (Q. 2:275). Both the ri ch and the poor are dissuaded from borrowing, positing 
"freedom from care" as the rationale.270 Echoing Aristotle, Basil states271 that usury 
must be called tokos (offspring) because of aIl the evils it engenders. But other offspring 
grow only until they reach maturity, whereas usury never ceases to grow, bringing with 
it ever-increasing sorrow.272 This declaration is very significant as it points, for the first 
time in the Judeo-Christian tradition, to the "eternity" of usury. It does not, however, 
elaborate how this eternity cornes about and operates and what theological significance 
264 Maloney, Background, 140-141. 
265 Ibid., 138-139. 
''''' Ibid., 143. 
267 Lactantius, Epitome, 64 (Maloney transI.) (after 314 A. D.): "Hc will not steal nor will he evcn covet another's goods. He will not 
give mone~ at usury (for this is to make a profit from the ill-fortune of others), nOf will he turn down anyone whom ncccssity forces 
to borrow. 
268 Maloney, Background, 145. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Basil in Homilia ii, 3: "Arc you rich? Do not borrow. Arc you poor? Do not borrow. Ifyou arc prospcring, you havc no necd of a 
loan; if you have nothing, you will not rcpay the loan. Do not give your Iife ovcr to regret, lest at sorne tirne you may esteem as 
happy the days before the loan. Let us, the poor, surpass the rich in this one thing, narnely, freedom from carc." 
271 Homilia ii, 3. 
272 Maloney, Background, 148. 
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it has. This theme will be developed in the Islamic context below (chapter IV). Us ury is 
denounced in words reminiscent of Aristotle and the New Testament (Mt. 25:27 and Lk. 
19:23): 
Another man defiles the earth with usury and interest, gathering where he did not sow and 
harvesting where he did not plant - reaping his gain not from the earth, but from the need of the 
pOOr.
273 
Even more significantly, usury is deemed to result from an "evil union" unknown 
to nature which has the power to make sterile things bear fruit, even though nature itself 
has made only animate things fecund: 
But you, copper and gold, things that cannot usually bring forth fruit, do not seek to have 
~., . 274 
ol1spnng. 
This line of argumentation, based on the essentially Aristotelian concept of the 
sterility of money, was revived a millennium later to support the already long-standing 
prohibition on usury.275 But what is unexplored so far is the concept of "evil union 
unknown to nature which has the power to make sterile things bear fruit." This only 
hints at the concepts that will be explored below (chapter IV). 
Interest-loans not just to the poor but to the rich,276 and not only exorbitant interest 
but even that allowed by civillaw, are condemned.211 The credit or is equated with a thief 
and robber: both take away what belongs to others, whether men calI that robbery or 
interest-taking or anything else.278 The sacred script ure forbids the taking of any surplus 
over and above capital, no matter what pretence at legality is made.279 This is a perfect 
parallei to the later Qur'anic stipulation of ''lakum ru 'us amwiilikum"(you are entitled 
to your principal).280 "Interest-taking was legal a11 through the patristic period, but 
Gregory, like other Fathers, maintained that Old Testament law had not been destroyed, 
but fulfi11ed. No matter what the laws of the empire might say, the law of God still 
forbade usury. "281 
273 Gregory Nazianzen in Oratio xvi, 18 (Maloncy trans!.). 
274 Gregory ofNyssa in Contra Usurarios (Maloncy trans!.). quotcd in Maloncy, Background, 150. 
275 Noonan, Scho/astic Ana/ysù, 56. 
276 Gregory ofNyssa in Homilia iv in Ecclcsiastcn and Ep. Ad Lctoium. 
277 Ibid., in Ep. Ad Lctoium. 
278 Ibid., in Homilia iv in Ecclcsiastcn and Ep. Ad Lctoium. 
279 Ibid., in Ep. Ad Lctoium. 
'"0 Q. 2: 279. 
2Rl Maloney, Background, 153. 
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Very significantly, usurers were denounced as "a breed of vipers that gnaw the 
womb that bears them."282 This is a very pointed reference to the incestuous process of 
"attempted self-creation" (an agent, short of being able to act on itself, acting on the 
agent who created him in the first place). A close parallel is to be found in the later 
Islamic Prophetie lJadith which equates ribi(usury) with incest with one's own mother 
- a crucial theme for this thesis. 
Usury practice is condemned as contrary to divine positive law and as against 
nature.283 Like Aristotle, the theme of tokos (offspring) is utilized for usury-generation 
and its rapid generation is compared to the birth of hares.284 But, it is not elaborated 
what is the "divine positive law" and "nature" that are violated by the practice of usury. 
This theme will be developed below (chapter IV). 
A generosity which goes beyond the law is exhorted.285 The legal centesima 
(percent age rate )286 as weIl as the illegal anatocism (compound interest) are 
condemned:287 
The first of the month arrives, the capital brings forth its hundredth; each month cornes, interest 
is bom, ev il oflspring of evil parents. This is the generation of vipers. The hundredth has 
developed; it is demande d, it is not paid; it is applied to the principal. .. And therefore it begins to 
be no longer interest, but principal, that is to say, not a hundredth of interest, but interest on a 
hundredth. 
The Deuteronomy permission to take interest from enemies (nokrj: foreigner) is 
admitted as applicable even in the Christian era. Interest-taking is seen as clearly 
allowed in cases where warfare is justifiable. "Where there is right of war, there is also 
right of usury."288 This Christian position is similar to the later Islamic fiqh ruling of 
Imam Abiî I:Ianlfa289 and, later, Shah' Abdul' Azlz,290 which permitted interest-taking in 
the dir al-lJarb (enemy territory). 
The scriptural prohibition is seen as flowing from the evils inherent in the 
practice, thus dealing with the immanent values that the usury prohibition seeks to 
282 By Gregory and Basil. 
283 Ambrose, De Orticii~, III, 3. 
284 Maloney, Background, 161. 
285 Ibid., De Tabia, 9, 10. 
286 Ibid., 34, 40, 42, 50. 
287 Ibid., 42, 45. 
288 Nelson, U~U/y !Tom Tribal Brathcrhood ta UnivcrsalOthcrhaad, 4. 
289 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsii!, XIV, 56, Bib al-,I'arffi diir al-l}8rb. 
290 Mushir-ul-Haq, "Shah 'Abd al-'Azlz al-Dihlawl and his Times", Hamdard l.l'Iamicu~, VII, No.l, 78. 
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safeguard.291 But this necessarily raises the perennial question: what if these values are 
not at stake in a transaction? This question demolishes the inherent evil theory of usury. 
This assertion runs contrary to the thesis of this work, which ho Ids that the scriptural 
prohibition flows not from any evil inherent in usury but from the innate inapplicability 
of usury (ribii) to designed human conduct. 
A progression is seen in the laws prohibiting usury: the Old Testament (Lev. 25:35 
and Dt. 23:20-21) forbade interest only among the brethren; in the Prophets (Ez. 18:8) 
aIl interest-taking is prohibited; the New Testament takes another step by stipulating: 
"Lend to those from whom you can expect nothing in return" (Lk. 6:34). Thus, the 
Deuteronomic prohibition had been universalized by the Prophets and the New 
Testament, as Christians had been enjoined to treat everyone as "brother."292 
The univers al prohibition of usury is affirmed.293 The usurer will be received into 
the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: he is excluded from the 
kingdom ofheaven.294 This is the first ever reference, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, to 
a punishment of eternal hellfire for the usurer, later articulated repeatedly in the Qur'an, 
and the second reference to the equivalence of usury with a devilish act, again 
articulated pointedly in the Qur'an. Usury is temporally placed in the category of crime, 
c1assifying it as theft under the seventh commandment.295 
Leo the Great in his famous letter, Nec hoc quoque/96 emphasizes that Christ 
came to fulfill the Law, not to destroy it; matters, among them usury prohibition, that 
are in harmony with both Testaments, therefore, remain unchanged. He underlines the 
gravit y of the sin ofusury by dec1aring that usury, no matter what its results might be, is 
sinful. He dec1ares usury taking, by laymen, as seeking a shameful gain (turpe lucrum).297 
On the rationale for usury prohibition, the Fathers' teaching was not a mere 
narrow reading of Scripture; rather, it was shaped by their collective Christian 
291 St. John Chrysostom. 
292 St. .Jerome, quotcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examinalion, 83. 
293 Augustine, Ennarationes in Ps. xxxvi, senno 3, 6. 
294 Ibid., De Baptismo contra Donatistas, 4, 9. 
295 St. Augustine, quoted in BuekIey, TheoIogieaI Examination, 83. 
296 Nec hoc quoque, trans. by c.L. Fc\toe, in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, cd. by P. Schaff and H. Wace (New York: The 
Christian Literature Co., 1895), v, XII, 3-4. Nec hoc quoque is Leo the Great's famous letter, the single most important document of 
the early Church on us ury, and is the clearest general prohibition enunciated by suprcmc other-worldly authority bcforc 1179, whcn 
the Third Lateran Couneil (canon 25) deelared that usury was condemned by both Testaments, and exeommunieated and denied 
Christian burial to manifest usurers. The letter Nec hoc quoque fonns the cornerstonc of latcr usury legislation including othcr-
worldly and seeular state legislation for Charlemagne's empire. 
297 Noonan, Seho/astie Ana/y~L~, 15. 
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conscience which abhorred the exploitation of the defenseless and less fortunate, thus 
treating the practice of usury not as an economic but as a moral question.298 The 
Christian conscience was finely sensitive to the obligation of charity. Wealth was the 
gift of God and men were but stewards: dispensatores not possessores.299 
But in an oblique reference to the connection between paganism and usury as a 
possible rationale for its prohibition, Jacob of Saroug (c. 451-521), the Syrian 
Monophysite Bishop, in an interesting sermon in Syriac, states: 
Satan was lamenting the collapse of his authority as a result of the recent disappearance of 
paganism. In order to recover his power, he is going to make use of fending al inleresl (rebitha): 
priests and monks will indulge in this practice, and it will be their undoing. Once they have 
begun it, their orthodoxy, their cult of the true God, will matter little. '1 do not mind', exclaims 
the Devil, 'if the priest uses the interest he draws from his money to buy an axe with which to 
smash the temples of the gods! The love of gold is a greater idol than any idol of a god ... It is 
worth as much to me as aU those idols put together. They have cast down the idols, but they will 
never cast down the coins that we shall put in their place ... " 300 
This is the solitary instance - although purely metaphorical - of raising the usury 
discourse to theological heights in Christian thought. But again it falls short of a full-
fledged theory. 
As summed up by Maloney, two practical questions, critical for the development 
of thought on usury, arise in patristic times, but neither receives a satisfactory answer: 
first, why Deuteronomy allowed interest-taking from foreigners, and second, what is the 
morality of taking interest from a person who profits from the loan. Both these 
questions at root ask about the immanent values which the usury prohibition seeks to 
protect and inquire about situations where those values might not be at stake: 
But in answering these two questions, Ambrose and Jerome limited themselves to exegeting the 
transcendent precept as it appeared in Deuteronomy and Ezekiel respectively. In so doing they 
bypassed the question of immanent values and as a result failed to grapple with the problem: 
what if those values are not at stake in given instances? This problem, like aU unanswered ones, 
will arise again in the course of later history to demand a satisfactory response. 301 
Such a response, as part of a new theory, will be attempted below (chapter IV), but 
the very absence of this response in patristic teachings even at a social and moral level, 
29R Buckley, Theological Examination, 83. 
299 Encyclopacdia ofRcligion and Ethic.\·, XII, 550. 
300 Trans. and cd., Abbc Martin, in Zcitschrift dcrdcutschcn morgcnlandische Gcscllçchaft. 1875, pp. 107-147, quotcd in Maximc 
Rodinson, Mam and Capitaliçm, 239. 
301 Maloncy, Background, 179. 
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leaving the theological investigation aside, testifies to the impossibility of developing a 
coherent theory of usury based exclusively on those teachings. 
II.5.iii. Medieval Church Teachings 302 
Several points of proximity exist between early Western medieval economy and 
the Islamic financial system: the explicit ethical nature of both systems; the closeness of 
detailed paraUels; identical practices; sorne evidence of common origins; the outright 
prohibition of usury by both, with later permission of a return from a genuine risk-
sharing partnership; the justification of prohibition in both on the distinction between 
the fungible and the non-fungible; and the rejection by both of "time" as a justification 
for interest p ayment. 303 However, in spite of this parallel and proximate early 
development, the two financial systems today are headed in opposite directions. While 
the medieval Islamic financial system, after the suppressing colonial interlude, is 
reviving again, the contemporary Western thought on the issue, as correctly pointed out 
by Buckley, has deviated completely from the princip le by removing itself far from its 
own tradition, thus causing the gap between Western and Islamic banking systems 
today. Buckley concludes that "it is in the light of this apparent contradiction, or volte-
Mee, in Western theological thought that the medieval teaching on the concept of us ury 
raises important issues to be addressed in the West today ... "304 
The source of influence for the medieval thought, as Buckley points out, was the 
combined weight of several authorities - the Old Testament universally applicable text 
of Psalm 15, Fathers' writings against usury, and earlier conciliar condemnation of 
clerical usurers. The medieval thought, contrary to sorne assertions, was not founded 
upon the doctrine of Aristotle, as Aristotle was not "re-discovered" in the West until the 
twe1fth century, and by that time the medieval position was weU established. Moreover, 
Buckley conc1udes that most scholastic authorities were rnotivated by theological 
considerations and the scholastic theory of usury and economic conditions of the time 
had only an indirect causal connection. FinaUy, Buckley shows that the usury 
302 These tcaehings, detailcd in Appendix 12 (h), extraeted from the work of Susan L. Buekley in her doctoral dissertation on the 
theologieal aspects of usury (Buckley, Theological Examination) cover thc work of St. Anselm ofLucca, Hugh of St. Victor, 
Peter Comcster, Peter Lombard, The Second Latcran Council, Gratian (1159), Pope Alexander III (1159-11 XI). and Popc Urban 
1I1 (lIX5-IIX7) 
303 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, X5-86. 
304 Ibid.,86. 
82 
prohibition was not related to the Church's own interests; on the contrary, given the 
immense but idle financial resources of the Church, there was ample temptation for the 
Church, in their own interest, to allow usury. But instead the medieval Church convicted 
its own clerics for the sin ofusury.30s The source of alliater developments on the concept 
of usury was the authority of the actual Church, rather than a biblical text by itself, or 
Aristotle's teaching, or economic conditions.306 It is, therefore, conceivable that the 
more pressing financial interests of the 1ater Church, rather than contributing to the 
usury ban, may have instead contributed to the later relaxations and ultimate complete 
reversaI of the us ury prohibition - the vo1te-fàce in Western theoIogicaI thought. 
Usury, which was synonymous with interest until the early 1 i h century, was 
classified as theft under the seventh commandment, making it ineligible to be given as 
charity.307 Furthermore, usury was for the first time universaHy and explicitly decreed as 
prohibited for aH, without, however, explicitly declaring justice to be the rationale.308 A 
legal form of prohibition of usury, defined as "whatever is demanded beyond the 
principal," was given definitive shape in 1159.309 The obligation of restitution was 
emphasized; otherwise usury was no more than theft.310 In the first extension of the 
usury prohibition from loan transactions to sales transactions, credit sales at a higher 
price than cash sales were declared to be usury.311 This conceptual extension, in 
Christian thought, seems to have occurred rather late, as it had aIready been made in 
Islamic thought as far back as 632 CE in the Prophetie six-commodities iJadlth. Usury 
was not considered as admissible even for worthy causes, because usury is a crime 
detested by both Testaments. Therefore, usury is not merely a simple other-worldly rule, 
though it is not yet regarded as against naturallaw.312 In 1179, usury was declared by the 
Church as condemned by both Testaments, while "manifest usurers' were 
excommunicated and denied Christian burial and the reception of offerings made by 
305 Ibid., 86-88. 
306 Noonan, Scho/astic Ana/y~i~, 14. 
307 By St. Ansehn of Lueea (quoting St. Augustine), in an influential precedent, followed by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Comester and 
Peter Lombard and Ivo of Chartres, quoted in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 88. 
30R The Second Lateran Council, with absolute authority of an 'infalliblc' ceumcnical council, quoted in Bucklcy, Thcologieal 
Examination, 88. 
309 ln a collection of canons of Gratian which formcd part ofthc Church law til! thc new Code in 1917. 
310 Buckley, Thcologieal Examination, 89; Noonan, Scho/astic Analysis, 19. 
311 By Pope Alexander III (1159-1181 A.D.), quotcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 89. 
312 Ibid. 
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them prohibited.313 For the first time in the entire tradition, a specifie command of 
Christ is authoritatively interpreted by a Pope as prohibiting usury. "Luke 6:35 will 
stand, effectively unquestioned, as an absolute divine prohibition of gain from a loan 
until questioned by Dominic Soto in the sixteenth century ... Whether it [the gain from a 
loan] has been stipulated or not, the lender is guilty of 'mortal usury' because this is 
prohibited by Luke 6:35." 314 This biblical text (Luke 6:35) and its papal use became the 
basis of the contention of scholastic writers that intention to gain constitutes usury315 -
a concept identical to the Islamic notion of tafiïçlul (excess) constituting ribii al-fàçll 
The medieval Church teachings on usury, though motivated by theological 
considerations, did not even rise to the theological peaks attained earlier litera11y by 
rabbinical teachings and figuratively by patristic teachings (association of usury with 
idolatry and paganism). These prohibitory teachings, though adding breadth by 
expanding the scope, do not add any intensity of depth to the discourse. 
II.5.iv. Medieval Scholastic Theory 
The medieval scholastics - though the acknowledged intellectual and moral 
leaders of a11 of Europe for several hundred years,316 and their usury analysis the outcome 
of theology, economics and law - still could not present a unified usury theory. Their 
discourse, confined to "justice" as the usury-prohibition rationale, could not ev en match 
the theological heights attained earlier by rabbinical and patristic thought. Operating on 
a non-theologicallevel' for three centuries they "engaged in an idealistic effort to frame 
the intellectual and moral conditions under which credit might justly be extended."317 
They treated usury as a pressing problem and argued against it, distinguishing it from 
lawful profit. Their theoretical structure, however, lacked consistency but encouraged 
risk-sharing investment and charity to the poor. Their modellacked simplicity, neat and 
consistent logical pattern, a single lesson and a univers al prescription.318 The foundations 
and applications of their model are contradictorily treated either as multiple, Le., 
m Buckley, Theological Examination, 89, quoting Third Lateran Couneil under Pope Alexander III. 
314 Lukc 6:35 intcrprctcd by Popc Urban III (1185-1187), quotcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 90. 
315 Bucklcy, Theological Examination, 90. 
316 Individual scholastic writcrs include William of Auxerc- the deacon of Beauvais (1160-1229 A.D.), Pope Innocent IV (r. 1250-
1261 A.D.), Cardinal Hostiensis (appointed 1261 A.D.), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.), Prof essor Burudian of the University 
of Paris (d. 1358 A.D.), theologian Giles of Lessines, theologian Scot us, thcologian Astesanus, and Scottish thcologian John Major or 
Muir (l6th c.), as dctailed in Appcndix 12 (c). 
317 Bucklcy, Theological Examination, 90. 
318 Ibid. 90-91. 
84 
theological, economic and legal,319 or as single, i.e., neither economics nor law but 
theology - a natural-Iaw analysis ofusury, 320 but still devoid oftheological depth. 
It has been argued that theology dominated reason in the rational development of 
the scholastic theory of usury, for "does not the Church decide a priori what the 
scholastics must then prove a posteriori?" Buckley admits that, being theologians or 
canonists, the scholastics could not go against the positive determinations of the 
Church, which sometimes involved resorting to flimsy and even fatuous arguments to 
support "rationally" what they knew they were hound by authority to believe. Yet, the 
medieval period did produce "a sound analysis of usury and a valid, if narrow and 
technical, case against it ... and [also] the theory of legitimate interest and alternative 
methods of credit." She further maintains that "the rules of the Church were more often 
the result, rather than the cause, of the scholastics' reasoning, and the usury analysis 
developed not only from a study of the sources of revelation, as would a purely 
theological analysis, but also from a consideration of the demands of natural justice in 
concrete economic circumstances."321 
On an individual level, five contributive arguments were advanced in the usury 
discussion: the conflict of usury with natural law; the intrinsic evil of usury; the 
distinction between the absolute and conditional voluntariness of the debtor; a general 
rule for detection of frauds against the usury laws; and a new argument on the sinfulness 
of selling time. These arguments became incorporated in the general medieval teaching 
on usury.322 
In an individu al revolutionary departure from the tradition of the past two 
centuries, the old "justice arguments" on usury were ignored completely, and entirely 
319 Noonan, Seholastic Analysi,\; 407: "It is c1ear that almost ail the historieal errors about the seholastie analysis of usury theory 
arise from a single failure: a failure to eonsider the theory broadly enough, to take into aceount cither the multiple eharaeter of its 
foundations, theological, economic and legal, or the multiple aspects it presented in practicc ... " 
320 Buekley, Theologieal Examination, 91: 'The seholasties were primarily disciples of the Roman law; cconomies in their vicw wa~ 
always seeondary. Neither eeonomics nor law, however, is at the origin of the seholastic theoIY - original/y and primari/y it is a 
theologieal ereatioll. That usury is a sin was the dogma of the Catholic Chureh. ft was because it was part or the content or 
Christian revclation that thc prohibition of usury became the objeet of detailed, rational exploration; therefore, throughout the 
seholastie treatment of it other-worldly authority plays a dominant role. It is the effort of the seholastic writers to cxplain, to 
exp and, and to apply the positivc teaehing of the Chureh whieh results in the natural-Iaw analysis of usury. They do not rely on 
authority, or revelation, or Roman law alone, but they makc a detcrrnined cffort to rest their case against us ury on the nature of man 
and the nature of things in themselves, whilst at the same time they try to deterrnine what forrns of credit arc nat urally lawful and 
just - a point whieh is often negleeted." 
321 Ibid. 
322 MiIIs, Interest in Interest, 15, quoting William of Auxere (1160-1229), the deacon of Beauvais, probably the most influential 
seholastie writer on usury before St. Thomas Aquinas, and among the first pioneering theologians treating usury from the perspective 
ofnaturallaw. 
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new individual arguments were developed to show that usury is a social evil, resulting in 
famine, poverty and greed.323 
Elsewhere, the familiar argument against usury was reaffirmed - albeit an 
incorrect one - that, in a loan transaction, the ownership of the loan passes to the 
debtor; hence there is no justification for usage charge on it. But for the first time a case 
of lucrum cessans was unmistakably and fully approved wherein, as stated above, by 
handing money over to another the lender deprived himself of the gain he might have 
made, and was, therefore, entitled to compensation from the beginning of the original 
loan, with the proviso that the merchant's principal motive must be a charitable one and 
the permission was not for habituallending.324 "For the first time the honest business 
man is given lawful reason for charging beyond the principal even though his debtor is 
in no way at fault. This authoritative canonist's recognition of pure lucrum cessans, 
however much restricted in its practical conditions, is of the greatest importance."325 
This admission of lucrum cessans - compensation for forgone profits - is a 
legitimate, yet merely utilitarian, approach to the question of usury that completely 
ignores the intrinsic process of growth underlying usury and its theological implications, 
which will be explored in this thesis. 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), holding a special place in the development of 
the usury theory because of his pre-eminence as a theologian and the intrinsic weight of 
his arguments, expanded upon the thought of Aristotle on usury. But due to an 
inaccuracy in the translation of Aristotle's Politics- the Greek term for retail trade was 
rendered by the translator as "campsoria" which specifically means money-changing -
Aristotle's case against usury, which rests on his case against a11 trade, is accepted by 
St. Thomas as simply a case against money trade, Le., making money from money.326 
The first and principal argument of St. Thomas against usury is the Roman law 
point that, in a mutuum (loan), ownership is absolutely transferred to the debtor - not 
merely a case of possessio but of dominium. 327 For him, "the process of exchange had the 
quality of a sale, and to sell an article and then charge for the use of it was unjust." He 
323 By Pope Innocent IV (r.1250-1261). an eminent canonist. 
324 By Cardinal Hostiensis (a canonist appoint cd 1261). 
325 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 101. 
326 Ibid., 95-96. 
327 Hastings, Encyc/opacdia, 551. 
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takes from Aristotle a "utility" argument from naturallaw against usury, and presents it 
as his second argument, treating money as a fixed value measure: 
AH other things from themselves have sorne utility; not so, however, money. But it [money] is 
the measure of utility of other things, as is clear according to the Philosopher in the Bthics V:9. 
And therefore the use of money does not have the measure of its utility from this money itself, 
but from the things which are measured by money, according to the different persons who 
exchange money for goods. Whence to receive more money for less seems nothing other than to 
diversify the measure in giving and receiving, which manifestly contains iniquity.328 
The major argument of St. Thomas against usury goes beyond the "money as 
measure" to "money as consumptible" argument: 
In those things whose use is their consumption, the use is not other than the thing itself; whence 
to whomever is conceded the use of such things, is conceded the ownership of those things, and 
conversely. When, therefore, someone lends money under this agreement that the money be 
integrally restored to him, and further for the use of the money wishes to have a definite priee, it 
is manifest that he sells separately the use of the money and the very substance of money. The 
use of money, however, as it is said, is not other than its substance: whence either he seHs that 
which is not, or he sells the same thing twice, to wit, the money itself, whose use is its 
consumption; and this is manifestly against the nature ofnaturaljustice.329 
The final argument of St. Thomas against usury is based on "metaphysical rather 
than legal grounds. It is the real distinction between accidentaI and essential change 
which forms the foundation of his reasoning."330 He argues that, through use, an item 
like a house might undergo accidentaI change, but money undergoes essential change. 
The use and substance of money are the same - an essential change. The use and 
substance of money cannot be sold separately. In itself, therefore, the loan of money did 
not justify a charge for its use. 
Thus it has to be said that St. Thomas Aquinas, the great theologian, relies on an 
argument from metaphysics rather than theology for his case against usury: he does not 
posit any divine law argument for the prohibition. 
Usury was also regarded as an evil " ... because the usurer seeks avariciously what 
has no finite limits. This places its results outside of nature."33l This is a very significant 
statement on the infinity of the process and its naturallaw implications, but it falls short 
of connecting in finit y with divinity and divine law. 
m Noonan, Seholastic Analy.~is, 52. 
329 st. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia - Quaestiones disputate de Malo vol. xiii (cd. P. Marc and S.E. Frette. Paris, 1871-1880). Q. 
13, art. 4e, cited in Noonan, SehoJastic Analysis, 54. 
HO Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 99. 
331 Burudian (d. 1358), a professor at the University of Paris. 
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Moral superiority was accorded to lucrum cessans by distinguishing usury, a profit 
for the loan itself, from compensation for the profits forgone by the lender, while the 
licitness of the complicated triple contract was upheld, which eventually became the 
paradigm for licit financialloans. 332 
Commenting on the transformation by the scholastics of the concept of interest 
from its original version of compensation upon and for default (interesse) to the new 
version of compensation From the start of a loan for forgone bene fit (lucrum cessans), 
Buckley concludes: 
The acceptance of 'interest' so far has only involved fault on the part of the debtor ... Did the 
original law concept of interesse, as the 'difference' due to failure to fulfill an obligation, 
prohibit the admission of such payment without any failure on the part of the debtor? The right 
to interest ... where the debtor was at fault ... was the original conception of interest. The 
scholastics would have to take a huge step to admit that interest might be due from the start of a 
loan. To do this seemed to many ofthem to abandon the foundation for the usury prohibition, the 
normal gratuitousness of a loan, and it was certainly to go weIl beyond the Roman notion of 
interesse. But the leap was finally taken.333 
It might be added, to what Buckley has said above, that with this scholastic 
rationalization of interest came to an end any search for the ration ale of its Scriptural 
prohibition, while the Church revised its teaching on usury because conscientious 
Christians were involved in financing. This seais the fate of the Scholastic theory as a 
contributor to a comprehensive theory of the divine prohibition of ribiifor humankind. 
IL5.v. Medieval Non-Scholastic "New Theory" 334 
The Scholastic usury theory, imperfect as it was, received a fatal blow from the 
Reformation and Protestantism, which brought about an overthrow of the yoke of 
authority and the casting off of the binding strict ures on usury. "The Reformers were no 
longer bound by the canon law, although they were still bound by a vigorous tradition of 
Christian opposition to usury."335 While Martin Luther did allow the charging of rent on 
land and interest to compensate for actuailoss (damnum emergens and lucrum cessans), 
provided the charge was moderate and was not against the poor/36 on the other hand, 
332 By John Major, or Mair, (16'h c.), a Scottish theologian, regarded as the last distinguished scholastic and known for his casuistry, 
quotcd in BuckJcy, Theological Examination, 119-122. 
m Buckley, Theological Examination, 100. 
'34 Main proponents are Martin Luther, John Calvin (1509-1564), Charlcs du Moulin (Molinacus) (1500-1566), a distinguishcd 
French lawyer, Claude Saumaisc (Salmasius) (I5R8-1653), a Calvinist c1assicist, and Scipio Maffci (1 Rlh c.), a Vcroncsc count and a 
Catholic writcr, as dctailcd in Appcndix 12 (d) .. 
m Buckley, Thcological Examination, 127. 
J36 Ibid. 
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John Calvin (1509-1564), the most notable Protestant contributor to a new theory of 
usury, unintentionally opened the flood gates in favor of usury. "Calvin deals with 
usurie as the apothecaire doth with poison," wrote Roger Fenton. Calvin abandoned the 
detailed scholastic analysis and re-defined usury by proposing one general princip le of 
the "Golden Rule": usury is sinful only if it hurts one's neighbor. As Buckley puts it: 
Biting usury ... will always be condemned by God's law; but a mode st profit on a loan under any 
circumstances is by no means forbidden. The only arguments against taking profit on a loan are 
drawn from Scripture. Of these, Calvin maintains that Luke 6:35 had been twisted from its 
original sense. It merely commands generous lending to the po or. Jesus merely wished to correct 
the vicious custom of the world whereby men readily lent to the rich who could pay back, and 
not to the poor. Deut. 23:19 was political. The passages in the Old Testament are to be 
interpreted as requiring only the observance of charity and equitytoward the poor, or, ifthey are 
to be interpreted more strictly, they still may be considered only as positive political law 
appropriate for the Jewish economy, but no longer binding today.337 
Calvin has only contempt for Aristotle's argument of sterility of money: when 
money buys a field, from which is yielded a yearly revenue, money then bears money. 
Interest also proceeds from money as naturally as rent from a field or house.338 
Even in this purely economic argument, devoid of any theological content, here 
Calvin is completely glossing over the fact that, in his money-field-money example, 
money is not bearing directly from sterile money; it is bearing from a fertile field. This 
is not a case of an agent (money) acting upon its own species (money), where growth is 
termed neshekh or ribii and not allowed by divine law. Instead, this is a case of an agent 
acting upon an agent of a diffèrent species: money upon field and field upon money, 
where growth is termed bay' and allowed by divine law. Again, in his equating of 
interest with rent, the glaring flaw is that when interest proceeds from money, it is a 
case of a divinely prohibited process: money acting upon money. But wh en rent 
proceeds from a field or a house, it is a case of a divinely permitted process: field or 
house acting upon money. Interest and rent, therefore, cannot be equated. The obvious 
difficulty for Calvin is that this stark theological contrast of an agent acting upon itse1f 
(ribii) vs. an agent aeting upon a different agent (bay') is laid out only in the Qur'an (2: 
275), not in the Old or the New Testament. And further unfortunately for him, although 
337 Ibid., 127-128 citing Jean Calvin, Consi/ia De Ususrisin Opera, X, cols. 248-249. 
338 Ibid., 128. 
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the Qur'an was first rendered into Latin in 1143 AD.,339 but printed only in 1543 
AD.,340 the first English translation, by Alexander ROSS,341 appeared only in 1649 AD. -
too late for Calvin who died in 1564. 
Going even beyond this economic argument, flawed as it was, Charles du Moulin 
(Molinaeus) (1500-1566), a distinguished French lawyer, was the first Catholic writer to 
urge the licitness of moderate usury, meticulously demolishing the old arguments of the 
canonists, although without opposing the Church itself.342 The hardiest ever defense of 
usury, however, came in 1630 from Claude Saumaise (Salmasius) (1588-1653), a 
Calvinist c1assicist, whose position is summarized by Buckley thus: 
His general position is that selling the use of money is a business like any other business. If it is 
lieit to make money with things bought with money, why is it not !icit to make money from 
money? The seller of bread is not asked whether he sells to a pOOf man or a rich man, why should 
the usurer? ... The question to be asked was: Is there any law against usury? Salmasius argues 
that in the Bible it is true that Jews were forbidden to take usury from any other Jew, poor or 
rich. But its prohibition was poli(icaI, and given chiefly because Jews were united in a blood 
brotherhood After the destruction of the Jewish state, argues Salmasius, it no longer held. As for 
the gospel, Jesus Christ means to teach nothing of civil polit Y Of economic transactions. The only 
other-worldly law against usury that Salmasius knows of is the papal law, and why should 
anyone obey the Pope? In Salmasius, ail religious scruple against usury is brushed aside, and the 
secular law alone sets a !imit to profits."343 
On the other hand, Scipio Maffei (18th c.), a Veronese count and a Catholic writer, 
was able to expound the Calvinist theory of the licitness of moderate usury without his 
orthodoxy being challenged. Again, as Buckley puts it: 
His main theses had ail been stated before in Calvin, Mo!inaeus, and Salmasius: the Old 
Testament prohibited usury only from the poor; the New Testament simply required one to be 
charitable in a general way; the Fathers and Councils only condemned excessive usury; the only 
uSury condemned by any law is usury that hurts one's neighbor; money is not sterile but the 
instrument of business, and therefore fruitful; loans at interest are necessary for commerce; and 
the State not only tolerates, but actively enforces, loans at usury; usury is already permitted by 
the personal census [an obligation to pay an annual return from a fruitful property - imperfectly 
translated into English as 'annuity'], the triple contract [three different permitted contracts with 
three different persons: a contract of partnership; a contract of insurance against loss of capital; 
and a contract of in surance against fluctuation of profit], and lucrum cessans [compensation for 
forgone profits], which are understood broadly to include the loss of ail future investment 
opportunity. The natural law argument, Maffei asserts, is that ownership passes in a loan, but he 
denies that this happens. The lender is still the owner because he can still bequeath or donate the 
value of the loan. Ile alienates only the physical quantity, not the value of the money.,,344 
339 By an Englishman, Robert of Retina and Hennann of Dalmatia on the initiative of Petrus Venerabilis, the Abbot of Cluh'lly, as 
eited in George Sale, The Korin, v. 
340 By T. Bibliander in BascI, as cited in George Sale, The Korin, v. 
341 From an earlier French translation by André du Ryer, as cited in George Sale, The Korin, v. 
J42 Buckley, Thcological Examination,132. 
34J Ibid., 132-133. 
344 Noonan, Seholastic Analysis, 373, cited in Buckley, Thcological Examination,133. 
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'Therefore, if the lender is still the owner, he can collect rent, as any owner does on property 
given to another for use.,,345 
Here Maffei is correct in rejecting the natural law argument and in asserting that 
in a loan the ownership does not pass. But what both Maffei and Buckley are missing is 
the crucial point that, as explained above346 in connection with Calvin, rent (interest 
money) on lent money is a divinely prohibited process (Qur'anic ribi; Biblical marbJt) 
and therefore illicit, while rent (rent money) on any other lent property is a divinely 
permitted process (unfortunately for them, only Qur'anic bay') and therefore licit. 
Needless to say, the medieval non-Scholastic "New Theory" of permission of 
moderate usury is of no help for a theory of its prohibition. More significantly, their pro-
usury arguments are not even designed, much less able, to counter any of the 
philosophical-theological anti-usury arguments being presented in this thesis. 
II.5.vi. Muslim Tafslron Ribi and Bay' 
The Qur'anic injunctions on ribi and bay' received extensive coverage in the tafsk 
(exegesis) lit erat ure. The 1;i/ana (ration ale) of these injunctions could have been weIl 
handled by this genre of Islamic studies. However, the utility of this discourse for 
analytical purposes depends on the particular genre of tafsJr adopted and the extent to 
which the requirements of the genre have been meticulously met by the exegete. As will 
be seen below, based on these criteria, the Muslim talSk of ribii by classical, medieval 
and contemporary exegetes does not even come close to sorne theological heights 
achieved by the earlier exegetical traditions both literally and figuratively. 
II.5.vi.a. Classical/Medieval Tafslr 
Historically, the classical/medieval tafsJr typically did not deal with one topic 
exclusively, but with almost every aspect of the text of the Qur'iin in varying degrees, 
with the main motive to investigate its applicability to religious and social practices 
under the aegis of ta'wJl Here, typical criticism against somebody's view of the text 
would read: "you have applied this verse incorrectly to a given situation" ('Abd ar-
Razzaq, Mu~annaf IX, 242) or "you have applied the Book of God otherwise than it was 
345 Bucklcy. Thcological Examination.133. 
346 Sec p. 89, above. 
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intended" ('Abd ar-Razûiq, MU$annaf VII, 209).347 This demonstrates that the concem 
of the early exegetes was not so much with the rationale as with the application of the 
Qur'anic injunctions. 
However, a distinction between tafsJr as the result of the transmission of 
authoritative witnesses conceming the interpretation of the Qur'an, and ta 'wJl as the 
result of research and expertise is drawn by al-Maturldi (d. 333/944). Combining the 
Qur'anic meaning of ta'wJlin the phrase "ta'wJl al-aJ;iidJth"(Q. 12:21), this distinction 
prompted a semantic shift, whereby ta'wJJ exclusively signified Qur'anic allegorical 
interpretation. Never used by the early commentators in this sense, the meaning of 
"allegorical interpretation, hidden sense" is nevertheless foreshadowed in the 
introduction to Muqatil's TafsJr, where he quotes Ibn' Abbas as saying "the Qur'an has 
four aspects: tafsJr, which the scholars know, 'arabiyya, which the Arabs know, lJaJiiJ 
wa-lJaram, the knowledge of which is indispensable to the people, and ta 'wll, which 
only God knows," implying that tafsJr is what is known at the human leve1 and ta 'wJl 
what is known at the divine leve1 only. (Muqatil, TafsJr, I. 27).348 "According to a similar 
notion, tafsJr applies to passages with one interpretation and ta 'wll to those with 
multiple aspects."349 On the other hand, Ibn 'Abbas is also quoted in the same 
introduction as saying "leam the ta 'wJlbefore other people will come who will interpret 
it according to the wrong ta'wJJ" (TafsJr, I. 26, lOf.), and Muqatil himself says 
"whosoever recites the Qur'an without knowing its ta'wJlis illiterate in it."350 
This further demonstrates that the actual concem of the early exegetes was more 
with narrative exegesis on a historiographical leve1 than with allegorical exegesis on a 
symbolical one. Moreover on the analytical leve1, "the linguistic aspect of exegesis was 
almost absent in the early commentaries."351 
With this theoretical background, the following sections explore the various genres 
of tafsJrfor their contribution to a comprehensive theory of ribii and bay'. 
347 V crstccgh, Arabie Grammar and Qur'iinie Excgesis, 64. 
34Rlbid. 
349 Encyclopacdia of Religion, ed. Mireea Eliade, XIV, 236. 
350 Vcrstccgh, Arabie Grammar and Qur'iinic Excgcsi~, 64. 
351 Ibid., 95. 
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II.5.vi.aa. Prophetie TafsIr 
Unique to Islam, Prophet Mu1).ammad (d. 10/632) himself is the first and the 
greatest practical exegete of the Qur'an, bequeathing what may be called Tafslr aJ-nabJ. 
The Prophet provides a potentially very ri ch interpretation of the Qur'anic prohibition of 
ribii and permission of bay' through his various a1;.iidith: ribii-shirk, rib.iincest, ribawl-
commodities, Baml-dates, Khaybar-dates and ribii-in-nasl'a. These Prophetic 
pronouncements are pointers to unparalleled philosophical peaks, by explicitly 
juxtaposing homogeneity and heterogeneity, and to unparalleled theological peaks, by 
explicitly juxtaposing idolatry with ribii. The later exegetical problem, however, is that 
these rich Prophetic indicators have either been ignored altogether or taken merely at 
their face value by the exegetes without extracting their deeper hidden meanings. These 
a1;.iiditH52 will be extensively utilized in the construction of this thesis and the 
development of the new theory. 
Apart from this unique Islamic genre, there are five sequential categories of tafslr: 
narrative (aggadic), legal (halakhic), textual (masoretic), allegorical and rhetorical,353 
whose contribution to the ribii discourse is evaluated below: 
II.5.vi.ab. Narrative TafsIr 
Exemplified by Muqatil ibn Sulayman (d. 150/767)/54 it is the least productive 
genre, but unfortunately the one most commonly employed. It is concemed with the 
explanation of the Qur'anic narratio. Its main feature is the creation of an edifying 
narrative. As the Encyclopaedia of Religion puts it: 
Hs central concem is "adding detail to otherwise sketchy script ure and answering the rather 
mundane questions which the curious mind will raise when confronted by a contextless scriptural 
passage. In fact, the actual narrative seems to be of prime importance; the text of the script ure 
remains undemeath the story itself, often subordinated in order to construct a smoothly flowing 
narrative. ... The identification of the participants and the precise question being asked [in 
response to which a verse is believed to have been revealed], provided in a marvelously naïve and 
therefore entertaining manner, are specified. The overall interpretation of the verse becomes clear 
through this supplying of contextual mat eri al. 355 
Even ignoring this rather harsh and somewhat polemical critique, this genre has 
limited analytical utility. By employing it, the ribii and bay' verses are simply explained 
352 Cited in II.3.ii, above and present cd in full in Appendix 5, below. 
m John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies: Sources and Method\' of Scriptural Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
354 Muqatil ibn Sulayman, Ta[~lr al-Qur'iin. 
355 The Encyc!opaedia of Religion, cd. Mircea Eliade. (New York: Macmillan, 1987), XIV, 236-44. 
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either in terms of the asbiïb al-nuzul (occasions of revelation) - the historie event, tribes 
or individuals involved - or in terms of the perceived historical financial and commercial 
practices of the Arabs (e.g., doubling redoubling ribiï), or simply in conjunction with the 
ordained punishments. None of this is conducive to analysis. The narrative genre is 
various and voluminous356 but not productive for the real 'illa and J;ikma of ribiï and bay' 
injunctions. An illustration of this interpretational shortcoming is provided by the 
representative excerpts detailed in Appendix 7. Only some important issues raised by 
these exegetes are examined below: 
Tabar1 interprets "the touch of Satan" in Q. 2:275 as "madness."357 This 
interpretation is accepted by aIl commentators and lexicographers/58 but not developed 
for the practical implications that will be posited in this thesis. 
al-Zamakhshar1 (d. 528/1144), the Persian-Arab exegete, who se commentary 
otherwise contains a quintessence of Mu'tazalite doctrine, nevertheless does not offer 
any analytical insights on the question of ribii beyond semantics. He dweIls on the 
aIleged analogical equivalence of ribii and bay' and its nullifieation by an explieit 
statement (na~~), but without defining their distinetion.359 
Ibn Kathlr (d. 774/1373), following the classical/medieval methodological 
tradition of tafsJr of the Qur'an by the Qur'an and by the lfadIth (taB,Jr bil-ma 'th ur: 
interpretation by tradition), does not delve into the inner meanings of the Qur'anie 
verses or the aJ;iidIth themselves. Thus, his TafsJr does not offer any insights into the 
divine injunetions and their rationale (J;ikma) over and above the literaI word of the 
Qur'an and the lfadith, whieh itselfneeds deciphering in the first place. Rather, he even 
356 The narrative cxegetes include 'Abd Allah Ibn' Abbas (d. 68/686) with a personal title of Tarjuman al-Qur'an, Zayd b. Aslam (d. 
130/747), Ibrahim al-Nakha"i (d. 95/713), Muslim b. Yasar (d. 101/719), Mujahid b. Jabr (d. 104/722), Qa~~ak (d. 105/724), al-I:lasan 
al-Ba~rî (d. 110/728), Qatada b. Di'ama al-Saddusî (d. 117/735), Ibn Shihab al-ZuhrÎ (d. 124/742), Suddi (d. 127/745), Abu I-I:lasan 
Muqatil ibn Sulayman al-Balkhî (d. 150/767), Abu 'I-I:lajjaj Mujahid b. Jabr (d. 104/722), Abü 'Abdallah Sufyan ibn Sa'îd al-
Thawrl (d. 161/778), Abii Naqr Mul)ammad ibn as-Sii'ib al-Kalbl (d. 146/763), Zayd ibn 'An (d. 122/740), Abii Bakr 'Abd ar-
Razzaq ibn Hammam al-San'anî (d. 211/827), Ma'mar ibn Rashid (d. 153/770 ?), Abü Ja'far Mul)ammad ibn Jarîr a(-TabarÎ (d. 
310/923), al-Matudd1 (d. 333/944), Abu 'I-Qasim M~mud ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhsharî (d. 528/1144), and Ibn Kathîr (d. 774/1373). 
The works of the following exegetes could not be consultcd duc to non-accessibility: 
(1) Zayd ibn 'Ali (d. 122/740), has an excgctical work which is unpublishcd but preservcd in two or threc manuscripts under the title 
Tat:~Jr Ghaiib a/-Qur'iill (cf. Sezgin 1967:556). (2) Abu Bakr 'Abd ar-Razzaq ibn Hammam a~-Sananî (d. 2111827), at-TatsJr. Ms. 
Cairo, Dar al-Kutub, no. 242 tatslr. (3) Ma'mar ibn Rashid (d. 153/770?), unpublished, but preserved in at least two manuscripts in 
the reccnsion of Abu Bakr 'Abd ar-Razzaq ibn Hammam a~-Sananî (d. 211/827), who according to Sezgin (1967: 99, 290) may be 
rcgardcd as co-author ofthc commcntary. 
357 al-Tabarî fiimi' VI 8-12 
358 Mahmoud M. A~ou;', Th~ Qur'iiI1811d its /Iltcrprctcrs; 2 vols. (Albany: Statc University of New York Press, 1984),1,273. 
359 Jar Allah Abî al-Qasim Ma~müd ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhsharî, a/-Kashshiif 'ail I:faqii'jq Ghawiimùj a/- Tallzl/ wa buyiill a/-aqiiwl/ fi 
wlljiih a/-ta'wH (Riyadh: Maktabat al-'Ubaykan, 1998),1,319-323, as translated in Helmut Gl1tjc, The Qur'iill Alld /ts Exegesi,; 
translated and cdited by Alford T. Welch (Oxford: One World Publications, 1996; Reprint 2000),193-194. 
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discourages any search for the J;iJana in the characteristic classical/medieval style: 
(" ... [Alliih] is All-Knower, All-Wise, no one can reverse His Judgrnent, and He cannot 
be questioned about His acts, but they will be questioned about theirs. He knows the 
true nature ofthings and what is useful for His slaves, and He guides them to it; He also 
forbids them what is harmful to them ... ") [italics and underlining mine].360 
But in a display of intellectual honesty, Ibn Kathlr observes "that the problem of 
understanding usury and what may lead to it has been one of the most difficult problems 
for juristS."361 
II.5.vLac. Legal TafsIr 
This genre, again with a focal point in Muqatil,362 is concemed with the 
prescriptions and regulations of the Qur'an as revelation, and the prime indicator of the 
genre is topical arrangement of material. This legalistic presentation is again not 
productive for analytical purposes. 
Muqatil, following the requirements of the genre, has dealt with, among others, the 
legal topic of ribii as a separate category. But the text of the tafslr follows the narrative 
genre in line with the classical/medieval tradition. The ribii-prohibitory verses are 
explained with the help of each other in the context of JahiIiya financial practice.363 This 
exegesis offers no clues to the 'ilia and J;iJana of the prohibition. 
IL5.vLad. Textual TafsIr 
With the earliest work being that of the philologist al-Farra' (d. 207/822),364 this 
genre is concemed with the lexicon of script ure, especially with its variae iectiones 
(variant readings) and its grammar. In fact, grammatical explanations could prove to be 
a valuable key for analysis. But al-Farra' has commented only on the Surat ai-Baqara 
and Surat ai-Rum verses on ribii.365 Departing from the genre, his comments on Q. 2:275 
and 2:278 offer a contextual (tribal practice) and sabab al-nuziïl (occasion of revelation) 
explanation, without any variant reading and grammatical analysis. Howcvcr, for Q. 
360 Ibn Kathlr, Taf5oJr, abridgcd by Shcikh Mul)ammad Naslb ar-Rafii'i (London: al-Firdous Ud., 1999), 74-75. 
361 'Imad al-Dln Ab! al-Fida' Isma'il Ibn Kath1r al-Quraysh1 al-Dimashq1, Tal!ilr al-Qur'iin al- 'Aflm, 7 vols. (Bcirut: Dar al-Fikr, 
1389/1970),1,581. 
362 Muqatil ibn Sulaymiïn, Kitiib Tafslr al-Khams Ml'at iiya min al-Qur'iin, cd. Isaiah Goldfeld, Bar-Ilan University (Shifaram: al-
Mashriq Press, 1980), bascd on British Library MS. Or. 63333. 
363 Ibid., 139-140. 
364 Ab1 Zakariya' Ya1)ya bin Zayad a1-Farra', Ma 'iinl al-Qur'an (Beirut: Dar al-Surur, 1988). 
365 Ibid., Ma 'anJ al-Qur'iin. cd. by Mul)ammad 'Ali an-Najjar . 3 vols. (Cairo: ad-Dar al-Mi~riyya, 1955-72), 182. 
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30:39 he gives both variant readings of one word (livarbuwa in 'A~im, A'mash and 
Ya1}.ya b. Waththab; vs. litarbuwa in Ahl al-I:Iijaz, both ofwhich he regards as correct), 
and limited grammatical variation therefrom, which at any rate does not contribute to 
analytical enterprise. 
II.5.vi.ae. Allegorieal Tafsir 
This genre is concerned with the interpretation of the text on a symbolical level. 
This expediency of allegorical interpretation provided ex post facto support for dissident 
opinion in Islam. Exemplar of this genre is ~üfi tafslr, supported through a 
terminologie al differentiation of the ~iihir as historia, "literaI," and the biiPn as 
allegoria, "symbolic."366 This genre could have been the most productive for an 
analytical and philosophical-theological interpretation. But even the most widely known 
Süfi exegete, the Andalusian Mu4yl al-Dln ibn 'ArabI (d. 638/1240) disappointingly 
does not offer any allegorical explanation of ribii.367 
II.5.vi.af. Rhetorieal Tafslr 
Concerned as it is with the style of the text and i'iiiz al-Qur'iin, this genre is not 
relevant for analytical purposes here. 
II.5.vi.b. Contemporary Tafsir 
The question of ribii has received varied coverage in contemporary exegesis, but 
mostly in the historical,368 moral,369 social,370 economic371 and legap12 contexts, to the 
utter exclusion of the philosophical-theological perspective. Hence, like its predecessor 
genres, contemporary tafsk is also not productive for theoretical development. Even the 
most profound ribii-shirk equivalence lJadith, though reproduced only once,373 goes 
without comment in contemporary sources. The profound riba:.incest equivalence lJadith 
366 EneycJopaedia of Religion, cd. Mircca Eliade, XIV, 236-44. 
367 Sec Mu~yl al-Dln ibn 'Arabi, TalSlr Ibn al- 'ArabI. 
H,' Aecording to Qatada, MujaJlid (as report cd in Ibn Jarir, Ill, 62), Abu Bakr al-Ja~~a~ (his research in his A{lkwl1 al-Qur'iill, 1), and 
Imam Razl (his research in his TalSJr KabJr, II, 351), ail quoted by Mawdüd1 in his Siid, 150-151. 
369 Abu\ Kalam Azad, The TaJjumiin al-Qur'iin. cd. and rendered into English by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif. 2 vols. (Bombay; Calcutta; 
New Delhi; Madras; Lucknow; London; New York: Asia Publishing House, \965), II, 131 ff. 
370 Israr Ahmad, Isliim ka Ma'iishJ Ni?am. [in Urdu] (Lahore: Markazi Anjuman Khuddam al-Quran, 19X5), 22. 
371 Sayyid Abul A'ia Mawdüd1, Ta/hJm al-Qur'iin. English version, Toward~ Understanding the Qur'iin. trans. and cd. Zafar Ishaq 
Ansari. (Leicester: The Islamie Foundation, 1988),1, n. 315, 213; and his, Siid (Interest) [in Urdu]. (Lahore: Islamie Publications 
Private Ud., 1989). 
372 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Tafl,·Jr Qur'iin (Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, 1995), 237. 
373 Mufti Mul)ammad Shafi and Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani. trans., Anwar Ahmed Meenai, The 1.I·suc orJntercst. Karachi: Darul 
Ishat, 1997. 
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is explained away as a mere condemnation of a social evil.374 Elsewhere, ribii is 
inconsequentially equated with lack of fellow-feeling, selfishness, greed, exploitation, 
tyranny, and concentration of wealth in a few hands, and the discourse "dweUs on the 
evils ofusury."375 But, the Qur'an no where caUs ribii an evil; it dec1ares it to be lJariim 376 
(forbidden, out of bounds, sacred, sacrosanct, inviolable, or tabo0377). Rendering lJariim 
as evil will have many untenable implications. In a novel unsubstantiated medical 
approach, apparently foHowing al-Sarakhsl, "yatakhabbaluhu ash-shaYliinu min al-
massi," in Q. 2:275, is rendered as epilepsy"which the superstitious Arabs regarded as 
the touch of Satan."378 This rendering of the phrase is taking liberties both with the text 
and the context: the text does not support the word "epilepsy," and the context does not 
quote any historiographical authority in support. Moreover, while the Qur'anic text of 
2:275 attributes this Satanic phenomenon pointedly to wrongly equating ribii with bay', 
popular exegeses of the verse attribute this Satanic phenomenon directly to "oppressive 
exploitation of the weak," without any explicit textual basis for such rendering. It thus 
appears that even the conventional "exploitation rationale" for riba-prohibition is 
textually unsupported. 
In a surprisingly dramatic distortion of thought, the swelling/expanding of the 
earth, the rising of the foam, the exceeding of one nation over another, and the 
overpowering grip of God - aH very natural divine phenomena dweHed upon in the 
Qur'an - are described by one translator/commentator as unnatural and artificial, 
"beyond the natural or original size!" These natural processes are not only termed 
unnatural and artificial, but are also equated with the unnatural act of lending money at 
interest to increase one's capital through others' wealth (Q. 30:39).379 Aristotle had very 
correctly only argued the [humanly created] "money breeding money" as unnatural, Le., 
against "natural law." But this modem exegesis is very perilously branding even the 
aforementioned divine acts of ribii as an "unnatural or artificial increase." 
374 Israr Ahmad, l;'iiim kii Ma'iishl Ni?iim. [in Urdu], 22. 
375 Azad, TaJjumiin al-Qur'iin. II, 131 ff. 
376 Q. 2: 275. 
377 Wchr, Dictiofltuy, 201. 
378 Ibid., II, 132. 
379 Ahmcd Ali, AI-Qur'iin, 50. 
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Drawing on its another contemporarylexical meaning of "asthma," ribais deemed, 
by the same commentator, to suffocate a person's freedom of action and independence 
and result in oppression. Nevertheless, contrarily, the necessity of interpreting ribii in its 
pre-Quranic sense is highlighted: 
The Arabic of the Qur'an is pre-Quranic in its etymological and historical perspectives," resulting 
in translation problems, even when rendering Quranic Arabic into modern Arabic [leading to 
what has been explained below as "terminological confusion syndrome"]. Today, in the clash of 
Islamic thought and Western practice, the word is deemed to have become polemical, mainly 
through translation corruption, just as the original and former Biblical usage of "us ury," the exact 
equivalent of riba in English, as "interest of any kind on money lent," has been changed, by 
accident or design, to mean "iniquitous or illegal interest on a loan, (Chambers 1901 ed. ).380 
The crime of usury, before Reformation, consisted in the taking of any interest for the use of 
money; and now in taking higher rate of interest than is authorized by law.381 
An innovative but unsubstantiated attempt at an "exegeticaUy-led" reading of the 
Qur'an ascribes sophistryto usury, renders "yaqiïmiïn" as rising from their place in the 
market, treats Satanic insanity as being rolled in the dust and the mud, associates usury 
with burden, lack of good fortune, ungratefulness, oppression, and only apparent good-
naturedness/82 caUs abstinence a retum to God's law 383 and attainment of salvation/84 
and renders "wa-ma ataytum" as "that which you entrust to commercialorganizations, 
companies and banks. "385 It is difficult to see where the textual support lies for these 
innovative attribut es of ribii. It appears to be more of a flight of imagination than an 
insight of exploration. 
On the legal plane, noting an early juristic agreement on definition of riba as 
interest of any kind or motivation, a unanimously agreed definition of ribii giving new 
dimensions and a fresh economic meaning is being sought by exegetes, in order to coyer 
all conceivable legal situations and positively respond to all the exigencies of social and 
technological development and variable economic environment of every successive 
Muslim generation.386 The "logical connection" of usury [ribaJ with charity is however 
naively posited only in the moral context, without exploring the metaphysical 
380 Ibid. 
381 Altaf Gauhar, Translations tram the Quran (Lahore: Sang-c-Mccl Publications, 1989), 128- 1 29. 
382 BehbüÜi and Turner, The Quran, 26. 
38J Ibid .. 
384 Ibid., 36. 
3R5 Ibid., 244. 
3R6 Asad, Message orThe Qur'iin, n. 35, 622-623. 
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implications.387 Based on the premise that the ancient and modern" 'uJamii'" treated 
usury mainly on the basis of economic conditions existing at the rise of Islam, a new 
definition of usury is sought which would include profiteering of all kinds, but exclude 
economic credit, the creature of modern banking and finance. 388 The similarity of a race 
of usurious idlers, cruel blood-suckers, and worthless fellows, who do not know their 
own good, with madmen is described as an "apt simile."389 On the other hand, charity, 
Le., "giving," is raised from an economic and moral to a theological perspective by 
defining it as "the giving of ourselves and of our substance in the cause of God and 
God's truth ... "390 Only partially responding to this definition, and departing from the 
traditionalist stance, an expanded economic definition is posited of ribii as "any increase 
sought through illegaJ means, such as usury, bribery, profiteering, ffauduJent trading etc. 
[including] economie seJfishness and many kinds of sharp practices, individual, national, 
international... [notwithstanding] the spacious phraseology of high finance or City 
jargon."391 In a virtual economic treatise in interpretation of the ribii-bay' injunctions, 
closing the doors on theoretical development, it is contended that since "ar-ribawii"was 
the name of a partieular type of excess [financial] that was widely known in pre-Islamie 
Arabia, it has not been elaborated in the Qur'an, whieh suffie es to say that Allah has 
declared it to be lJariim and is to be given Up.392 Several forms of interest transactions at 
fixed rates (skipping variable rates), contentiously in vogue and designated as ribiiby the 
Arabs at the time of the revelation of the Qur' an, are posited as the intended coverage of 
the Qur'anic injunction. These are reported to include credit sale with fixed maturity and 
with stipulation of priee increase for further time extension/93 loan with stipulation of 
specified excess repayment within given maturity,394 and loan with fixed maturity at 
fixed interest rate with stipulation of higher interest rate for default and extension upon 
387 Ibid., n. 262, 61. 
388 Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur'an, n. 324, Ill. 
189 Ibid., n. 325, III. 
390 Ibid., n. 450-451, 156. 
391 Ibid., n. 3552, 1062. 
392 Mawdudl, Sud, 150. 
393According to Qatiida, quotcd by Mawdudl in his SUd, 150. 
394According to Mujahid, report cd in Ibn Jarlr, Ill, 62, and aeeording to the researeh of Abu Bakr al-Ja~~as, in his Al;kiim al-Qur'an, l, 
quotcd by Mawdudl in his SUd, 151. 
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maturity.395 The textual indicator to coyer aIl these claimed historical practices under the 
prohibition is, however, not specified. 
A specifie but prominent case of lexicallicense in translating Q. 2:275 renders the 
Arabie "yaqiïmiïn" as "behave," despite the fact that its standard lexical meaning is 
"stand," and "yatakhabbatuhu" as "insane," equating it with "majniïn" (possessed by 
the jinn), whereas its standard lexical meaning is "struck, hit."396 But the ribii-bay' 
distinction, and absence of its cognition by the Kuffiir at the peril of Satanic insanity, is 
posited in this exegesis in the limited and incongruous context of "profit" accruing on 
investment in commercial enterprises on the one hand and "interest" as profit accruing 
on loaned money on the other,397 thereby completely and irresponsibly ignoring the 
inherent distinguishing characteristics of ribii and bay'. While positing the standard 
lexical meaning of the root r.b. w. as "excess," "growth," "increase" and "rising," ribii is 
inexplicably defined very restrictively and even contradictorily as: "ribi is from this 
same root and its connotation is 'excess in wealth' and 'addition to principal'; the Holy 
Qur'an uses the word ribii to denote interest."398 On the juridical level, some exegetes, 
surprisingly but in Hne with Urdu language usage, repeatedly employ the term Wla to 
mean iJilana. The neo-Revivalists discuss the issue of ?ulm (injustice) in ribii, but do not 
definitively agree on it as the raison d'être (iJilana) of the prohibition, or on its absence 
as a license for interest transactions.399 The Qur'anic unparalleled drastic punishment for 
the sin of ribii, and the graphie Sunnaic comparison with incest with one's own mother is 
recognized,400 yet no attempt is made to reconcile meaningfully the gravit y of this sin 
and the threatened punishment with the stated moral/economic iJilana of the prohibition. 
In a very pregnant but unelaborated reference, the exegete Mawdlidi declares that, 
while initially only the Qur'anic prohibition of usurious dealings in loans (ribi al-nasl'a) 
was within the prohibition boundaries (iJudiïd) or sanctuary (iJimii) of Allah, the Prophet 
later established preventive measures around this /Jimii of Allah by the condemnation 
of aIl participants of the interest-bearing loan transaction and by the prohibition of ribii 
395 Aeeording to the researeh of Imam Razl, in his Tafiù Kab7r, II, 351, quotcd by Mawdiidî in his Siid, 151. 
396 Mawdiidi, Taihlm al-Qur'iin. Towards Understanding the Qur'an. trans. and cd. Ansari, 1, n. 316, 213. 
397 Ibid., 1, n. 317, 214. 
39H Ibid., SUd, 147, 149. 
399 Ibid., "Prohibition ofinterest in Islam" al-Islam, June 1986,6-8. 
400 Ibid., 157. 
100 
al-fàqJ401 This reference to the lJ.imii of AŒih cornes very close to theological 
interpretation but stops short of full exposition: What is it that puts ribii in the lJ.imii of 
Allah? What is that triggering factor, the distinguisher of ribii from bay', the lack of 
knowledge ofwhich attracts the punitive measure of Satanic strike and eternal Hell-Fire 
in Q. 2:275? This ribii al-fàql-the protective wall around the lJ.imii of Allah - is defined 
by him as the prohibited "excess in an exchange of similar genus in an instantaneous 
transaction. "402 However, this definition is only partial, and therefore misleading, 
because excess in an exchange of similar genus is prohibited in delayed transactions as 
weI1.403 Moreover, the rationale behind the prohibition of ribii al-fàcjl is ascribed to its 
being "the prompter to exaction of excess and the promoter ofthat mentalityin humans 
which ultimately leads to usury generation."404 However, it is not elaborated what that 
human mentality is. Put differently: What is that occasioning factor in ribii which 
renders it lJ.ariim and sets it apart from bay' which is lJ.aliil? 
A fiqh postulate exempts animaIs from the prohibition of excess in exchanges of 
similar genus (ribii al-facjl). But, ignoring the philosophical connotations, the reason for 
this exemption is posited as purely economic: the wide disparity in value and price of 
animaIs of the same genus permits their unequal exchange.405 The fundamentai concept 
of homogeneity and heterogeneity is alluded to, but again its philosophie al implications 
are not explained. 
The permissibility of excess in exchanges of different genus with the requirement 
of in st ant aneit y is again explained in purely economic terms: excess in instantaneous 
exchanges of different genus is bound to be the result of CUITent market priees; but 
excess in such delayed transactions runs the risk of being tainted with ribii due to the 
inability of accurately forecasting future market priees.406 This is sound economic 
reasoning for prohibiting delayed settlement of transactions, but it falls short of a 
metaphysical argument for the requirement of instantaneity. More importantly, this 
401 Ibid 164-166 
402 Ibid:' . 
403 As per the ribawl eommoditics lJadith, which is the text source for ribii al-fà(p , and is rclied upon by Mawlana Mawdiïdi also, 
equality and instanlaneity arc the conditions for the permissibility of cxchange of similar gcnus. Thcrcforc, an cxeess in an cxchangc 
of similar gcnus in a dclaycd transaction also givcs risc 10 the prohibited ribii al-fal/I. 
404 Mawdiïdi, Sïid, 164-166. 
4051bid 181 
406 Ibid:: 177: 
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economic argument also does not explain why excess is prohibited in exchanges of 
homogeneity and permitted in exchanges ofheterogeneity. 
Sorne scholars, including Mawdiidi,407 treat the Qur'anic contrast between ribii 
(iJariim) and bay' (iJaliil), as one between "ribii" from a loan transaction and "profit" 
from a sale transaction, and thereby conclude the Qur'anic prohibition of all interest. 
While this conclusion is valid, the underlying premise is seriously questionable. One 
critic, Saeed, disputing the Qur'anic contrast as being between ribii and profit, posits it 
to be between ribii and $adaqa, firstly because the Qur'an does not go on to exhort bay' 
but merely states its lawfulness, and secondly because the next verse immediately 
contrasts ribii and $adaqa, as does another where the term zakiit appears to be 
synonymous with $adaqa.408 Saeed relies on the exegete Raz! (d.606/1209)409 and on 
Fazlur Rahman (d.1988) for confirmation of this contrast. Fazlur Rahman states that 
"according to the Qur'an, the opposite of riba [sic] is not bay' but $adaqa."410 The 
serious implications of this opinion are analyzed below in a detailed examination of his 
work. Reverting to Mawdiidi and Saeed, it is notable that apart from the exegetical 
question of what is the real Qur'anic contrast, the very derivation of the concept of 
profit from the concept of bay', directly by Mawdiidi and indirectly by Saeed, is at best 
problematic. As will be explained in detail in chapter V, bay' (sale or exchange) per se 
does not generate a profit/(loss), for the determination of which, the sale has to be 
measured against an earlier purchase, using a single common measuring medium. Put 
differently, homogeneity of the transacting medium is essential for profit/(loss) 
determination. This condition makes profit/(loss) absolutely dependent, if not on a direct 
exchange of homogeneity, at least on a comparison of homogeneity. In either case, 
profit/(loss)-generation is a process where one agent acts upon or is compared with itself 
(same genus). But a sale, by a rational definition, is an exchange of one commodity for 
money or for another commodity (different genus). Therefore, sale is a process where 
two different agents act on each other. Thus profit/(loss)-generation (homogenous agent 
process) and sale (heterogeneous agent process) are diametrically opposed to each other. 
407 Ibid., 82-5. 
408 Saecd, /s/amie Banking, 25. 
409 Razl, Tat:~lr, VII, 90. 
410 Rahman, Riba, 31. 
102 
In rebuttal of MawdüdÎ and Saeed, it may, t here fore, be asked: How can two 
diametricaUy opposed processes be synonymous with, or lead to, each other? 
The mujmal (unelaborated) character of the copious J;adlth material is posited and 
regarded as the source of classificational uncertainty and juristic differences in the 
determination of ribawl commodities and their ratio legis. 411 Yet, excavation of the rich 
explanatory potential of at least the ribawI-commodities J;adlth - the key to deciphering 
aU the unknowns in the ribii issue - is not even attempted. It is only admitted that 
commercial, financial and economic laws in our ancient fiqh books now require much 
updating. The dispute is not over the need but over the method of this renewal and 
revision - whether it should be the Liberal or the Traditionalist approach. Islamic law is 
not a static law, but what is alterable are the derived laws and not the underlying 
universallegal principles that are based on divine knowledge ofhuman nature and reality 
of things. Yet Mawdum argues that in Islamic law, based both on revealed texts and 
fiqh, there is ample provision for softening the strictness of injunctions according to 
circumstances and necessity, and hence - unlike Sanhurl- offers somewhat watered-
down concessions in the case of ribii, viz.: 
• There can be compulsion in paying interest but not in taking interest. 
• Every necessity does not qualify as compulsion for obtaining interest-bearing loans. 
• Even in case of dire necessity, interest-bearing loan can be obtained only in required 
amount and only on condition ofprompt repayment upon ability to repay. 
But, for MuftI Muhammad Shafi'(d. 1976) - the former Grand Mufti of Pakistan-
the difference between ribii and bay' is one of divine command, the former totaUy 
declared J;ariim and the latter J;aliil Hermeneutically very important, he requires 
correspondence between the crime and its punishment, but his position is still shy of full 
theological peak. For him, the correspondence is only (1) between the crime of "Satanic 
greedy behavior" of usurers on this earth and the punishment of the Satanic state into 
which they will be resurrected; and (2) between the crime of disbeHef (kufT) of denying 
the divinely ordained rib~bay' polarity and opposing the ribi-prohibition and the 
411 Mawdüdi, Siid, 178-179. 
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punishment of eternal Hellfire and threatened war from Allah. He thus does not raise the 
sin of ribii above the level of disbelief (kufT). 412 
Nevertheless, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
lowers even further the level of the discourse to a moral stance, accusing modern banks 
of "eating the bones and flesh" of the poor borrowers and "drinking their sweat and 
blood" under the umbrella of the interest-based system.413 He declares the intrinsic 
incompatibility of ribii and Islam, but only denounces ribii for clashing with mankind's 
ethics, belief and worldview, for being an economic evil and, in spite of appearances to 
the contrary, for interfering with the balanced growth of man. He rightly concludes that 
Allah would not have prohibited any thing if it were essential for human growth, and 
that no evil thing can ever be essential for human life.414 But branding ribii as an evil, 
whereas Allah brands it as iJariim, he is perilously oblivious of the consequences of 
equating evil and 1;ariim. What is the character of the masjid al-1;ariim?Ofthe month of 
MuiJarram al-fjariim? Of the muiJarram widows of the Holy Prophet? Of the muiJarram 
closed family circuit? 
To sum up, in a very highly critical, yet very apt, attack on medieval and 
contemporary exegetes over the centuries for missing the exact message and plain 
simplicity of the Qur'an due to their intellectual environment, which bred "a graduaI 
decadence in the quality of the Muslim mind," a contemporary exegete declares: 
" ... When the commentators found that they could not rise to the heights of the Qur'anic 
thought, they strove to bring it down to the level of their own mind."415 In other words, 
after sporadic promising philosophie al forays, contemporary exegesis reverts back to the 
conventional wisdom on the subject which does not contribute to a philosophie al-
theological theory of ribii. 
II.6. Philosophical Speculation 
While the terrn ribii has been examined from the exoteric morphological, lexical, 
and particularly contextual, historical, and juridical angles, no attention appears to have 
been focused by the scholars on its esoteric, intrinsic philosophical meaning, the search 
412 Muftî Mu4ammad Shafi, Ma'iirifal-Qur'iin (Karachi: Idara al-Ma'arif1969), l, 585-622. 
411 Sayyid Qutb, Tail;Jr Ayat al-Riba (Dar al-Bujlüth al-'llmiyya, n.d.), 12. 
414 Ibid., Fi ?iJiil al-Qur'iin (Urdu) (Lahore: Islami Aeadcmy, n.d.), 70. 
415 Azad, Tarjwniin al-Qur'iin, II. 2, ix-x. 
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for which is at the heart of the whole ijtihiidic question. A very crucial question remains 
unanswered, even unraised. What is the esoteric distinguishing characteristic of the 
Arabic term that makes its lexical meaning of growth so crucial for the doctrine of its 
prohibition? The successful quest for this intrinsic meaning and distinguishing 
characteristic will constitute a scholarly landmark. 
II.6.i. Secular Philosophy 
The only significant, strictly philosophical input in the usury discourse is the 
Greek theory of "sterility of money" posited by Aristotle and its later demolition by 
Calvin. 
II.6.i.a. Greek Thought 416 
The legitimacy of interest-taking on loans (daneismos) was recognized and the 
princip le of unrestricted liberty on interest rates prevailed throughout Greek history.417 
Nevertheless, opposition to usury, among other sources, came from the condemnatory 
discourse ofthe greatest of the philosophers, Plato and Aristotle.418 
The most influential ancient philosophical discourse comprises the clear-cut 
condemnation by Greek philosophers ofusury/interest. Both Plato (c.429-347 B.C.) and 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.t9condemned and outlawed the practice of usury/interest on 
loans. Their rationale for the condemnation was the unnaturalness of usury. Plato 
regarded money as barren,42o and, therefore, he outlawed profit on Ioans: 
No one shaH ... lend at interest, since it is permissible for the borrower to refuse entirely to pay 
back either interest or principal. 421 
For Plato the rationaie for outlawing interest was promotion of mutuai 
cooperation and curbing selfishness and strife among citizens, and establishment of an 
order where good was the supreme value. Thus, Plato's contribution to the usury issue is 
"surprisingly slight, his condemnation being based on the c1ass conflict it might 
engender, rather than on any deeper philosophical foundation, concemed as he was with 
416 This section also draws heavily and liberally on the original rcsearch work in Maloncy, Background, 81-98. 
417 E. Caillcmar and F. Baudry, "Foenus," Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques ct Romaine.;; Il, 1215 ; G. Glotz, Ancien! Greeee a! 
Work(New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926),242; A. Bernard, "Usure (1. La formation de la doctrine ecclésiastique sur l'usure)," DTC, 
XV, 2319-2320. 
418 Maloncy, Background, 84-85. 
419 The First Mastcr oflatcr Islamic philosophcrs. 
420 Plato, Leges, XI, 921d. 
421 Ibid., V, 742 (Locb transl.). 
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an account of the ideal social structure and the origins of the city, then identical with 
the state."422 
Aristotle condemned usury/interest in a clear and reasoned manner in his 
philosophical discourse: 
Of the two sorts of money-making, one, as 1 have just said, is a part of household management, 
the other is retai! trade: the former necessary and honorable, the latter a kind of exchange which 
is justly censored; for it is unnatural and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most 
hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes gain out of money itselt~ and not 
from the natural use ofit. For money was intended to be used in ex change, but not to increase at 
interest. And this term usury (tokos) [offspring], which means the birth ofmoney from money, is 
applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all 
modes of making money this is the most unnatural. 423 
In this passage, Aristotle touches on sorne very crucial concepts. Firstly, he 
regards profit from trading ("men gaining from one another") as unnatural, and usury as 
the most hated and most unnatural form of it because it "makes gain out of money 
itself," Le., growth out of an agent acting upon itself, which, although not stated by him, 
results in self-emanation. The science of Economies and Accounting inform us that 
trading profit may be realized from bilateral exchanges (two different agents acting 
upon each other) but the measurement of profit is a unilateral process to the extent that 
growth (profit) can be measured only through comparison of similar agents. He could, 
and perhaps should, have censored profit on the grounds of unilateralism just as he did 
usury. Yet his declaration of trading profit as unnatural is based on moral grounds only 
("men gaining from one another"), and not on the philosophical ground of unilateralism. 
This point of moral argumentation is further corroborated by the fact that, as against 
unbridled profit as an end, he appears to believe in money-making only for need 
fulfillment. For him, wealth was simply a means to an end ofbetter living a morallife; it 
should not be acquired more or less than the end requires. 
Secondly, his censure of usury is based on the philosophical grounds of 
unilateralism when he touches on the concept of gain from exchange of similarity ("birth 
of money from money" and "the offspring resembling the parent"). Here Aristotle is 
talking about the very core of unilateralism, where not only an agent is acting on itself, 
but is also producing similar growth. This concept is the central point of the ribawl-
422 Eric Roll, A HistOly ofEconomic Thought (Faber and Faber Ltd, 193R), Fourth Edition, 1973,27-31. 
423 Aristot1e, Politica, J, 10, 125R a- b (Jowett trans!.). 
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commodities iJadlth in the later Islamic legal repertoire and one of the main themes of 
this study. 
In this Aristotelian discourse, the contextual meaning of the term usury is a gain 
from money itself, and in line with this meaning, the application is financial/economic, 
although the literaI meaning of the term usury as offspring (tokos) is suggestive of a 
possible broader practical application of the term which is absent in Aristotle, but which 
will he explored below (chapter IV). Moreover, as pointed out above,424 the Aristotelian 
rationale for the condernnation of usury is natural law: for hi m, unilateralism is simply 
unnatural. He does not posit any theological ration ale against unilateralism, which will 
be done in this work. 
Even so, being only a philosophical edict without a supporting Divine ordinance or 
State legislation, the Aristotelian usury discourse is only a moral exhortation without 
any religious punishments or civil penalties. In the face of a widely held recognition of 
interest-bearing loans as an integral part of Athenian economic life, the voices of the 
great philosophers went largely unheard. 
The seeds of a hermeneutical imbalance are, however, clearly evident ev en in this 
moral/philosophical discourse. It starts with a meaning of usury as a broad concept of 
offspring (tokos), but narrows it down to the practice of making money from money 
alone - a financial application only - and again uses a broadly applicable argument of 
unilateralism, to label the interest generating process as unnatural. 
There is a more serious interpretational problem connected with the Aristotelian 
usury paradigm. Aristotle bases his argument against usury, as shown above, exclusively 
on the notion of unilateralism being against natural law. He does not talk about the 
"infertility of money." On the contrary, he talks about the "fertility" of money ("birth of 
money from money" and "the offspring resembling the parent") which does take place, 
but is against naturallaw. Yet, his commentators were to hold that Aristotle censured 
usury on the grounds of sterility of money. Gregory of Nyssa (335-394A.D.) was to 
descrihe usury (the hirth of money from money) as an "evil union unknown to nature" 
424 Scc pp. 106-107, abovc. 
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having the power to make sterile things bear fruit, even though nature itself has made 
only animate things fecund.425 
This line of argumentation of the commentators relies only on a physical, tangible 
and limited notion of "sterility," operative in the usury process, but not utilized by 
Aristotle himself, to the utter exclusion of a more abstract, intangible and univers al 
notion of "unilateralism," also operative in the usury process and utilized by Aristotle, as 
shown above. This "animation argument" of the commentators, denies the power to 
reproduce or even attempt to reproduce to inanimate objects and, without any further 
qualifications, allows it to animate objects, regardless of the mode of reproduction, even 
if incestuous. However, the "unilateralism argument," subscribed by Aristotle and to be 
further developed in this the sis, below, denies the power to reproduce and even attempt 
to reproduce to both inanimate and animate objects and even to concepts, if the mode of 
reproduction is unilateral, Le., an agent is acting upon itself. This is the very essence of 
the Islamic foundational notion of tawlJld - the absolute unit y and singularity of God, 
the Self-Sufficient Who neither begets nor was begotten.426 Only this theological point 
sets the Islamic paradigm of usury (ribii) apart from the Aristotelian usury model which 
is based on the rationale ofnaturallaw. 
On a theologicallevel, Aristotle, in his famous expression, speaks of the Unmoved 
Mover as "Thought thinking itself." 427 "The plain meaning of this is that God is the 
object ofhis own thinking."428 As Aristotle puts it in his Metaphysics, "it is by thinking 
of itself [sic] that God knows and controls an things." Aristotle rejects the notion that 
God might think of something other than itself [sic] precisely because this would 
diminish God's power.429 This theological exposition is the most succinct expression of 
the thesis ofthis work as will be elaborated in chapter IV. 
In another philosophical metaphor, the publicly condemned Greek lending practice 
ofloan discounting is equated with "birth before conception": 
They say lhat hares al one and the same time givc birth to one litter, suek1c another, and 
conceive again; but the loans of these barbarous rascals give birth to interest before conception; 
425 Maloncy, Background, 150. 
426 Q. 112:1-3. 
427 AristotIc, Metaphysic .• ; 1072bI9. 
428 The EneycJopcdia of Philosophy, cditor in chicf Paul Edwards (Ncw York: Macmillan Publishing Co., [ne. & Thc Frce Press, 
1967),1, 161. 
429 Aristotlc, Metaphysic,.; 1072bI9. 
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for while they are giving they immediately demand payment, while they lay money down they 
take it up, and they lend what they receive for money lent.430 
The Greek usury paradigm, above, again limits the discourse to the financial 
context only; however, it - particularly the Aristotelian discourse - analyzes not the 
extrinsic effect but the intrinsic characteristic of usury. It may, therefore, be 
characterized as the first mode1 with vertical depth but still without horizontal spread of 
analysis. 
II.6.i.b. Roman Thought 431 
The Roman attitude towards usury was similar to that of the Greeks: loans at 
interest were regarded by both as a fact of life. But the effects differed: for the Greeks 
interest was a promoter of general prosperity, while for Rome it was a harbinger of 
misery and revolt.432 Yet in the Roman literature, the legitimacy of interest-taking was 
rarely questioned; only the greedy usurer was criticized. However, Seneca, in De 
Beneficiis(VII, 10,3), does disapprove ofusury, labeling it an unnatural fonn ofhuman 
greed, without, however, developing the argument.433 Additionally, "he considered usury 
also to be morally wrong because it involved paying for time."434 
Devoid of any philosophical content, however, Roman thought on usury is not 
conducive to theory development. 
II.6.i.c. Later Western Thought 
A review of Western thought indicates that, other than the Aristotelian theory of 
sterility of money, there was no subsequent strictly philosophical input in the usury 
discourse, which essentially remained an economic or at best a religious precept debated 
by the economists and the theologians. 
Aristotle's theory ofsterility ofmoney did act as a source for the later Islamic and 
other Western religo-philosophical thought on usury. But, in the Christian milieu, even 
the force and potential of this Aristotelian theory was whittled down by Calvin, who 
refuted it with his theory of "transvaluation of values." He legitimized usury without 
430 Plutarch (c. 46 AD. - aftcr 120 AD.), Moralia, cd. G.N. Bcmardakis (Leipzig: Teubncr, 1888-96), 829 (Locb trans!.). 
431 This scction also draws hcavily and liberally on the original rcscarch work in Maloncy, Background, 81-98. 
432 Maloney, Background, 98, quoting Tacitus's (e. 55 AD. - after 115 AD.) Anna1c,\; VI, 22. 
433 Ibid., 99. 
434 Bucklcy, Thcologieal Examination, 81. 
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impairing the vitality either of the universalism or the fratemalism of the Christian 
ethic, by exhorting that the Mosaic and Gospel rules be interpreted in the light of the 
individual conscience, the equity of the Golden Rule, and the requirements of public 
utility.435 For whatever its philosophical value, Bertrand Russell (d. 1970) was to state: 
"Throughout the Middle Ages the law ofnature was he Id to condemn usury."436 
II.6.ii. Islamic Fa/safa 
Likewise, even a review of Islamic thought fails to unveil any significant 
philosophical input in the ribii discourse, which continues to operate largely at the 
economic and religious leve1, in spite of the much deeper and wider connotation of the 
term ribii as compared to usury. Perhaps, the only exception would be the lego-
philosophical contribution of Ibn ijazm (d. 456/1 063-4): 437 
Unlike bay', ribii implies that money or a commodity is loaned or exchanged for self:genera{jng 
or self-expanding value, which is not a form of just sale because the increment over the 
exchanged or loaned commodity or principal capital does not bring in return any equivalent 
counter-value to the borrower. For him, this growth or increase (fàql) of money or commodity 
through loans (as well as in sales and exchanges in the broad sense) is illegal and inequitable. In a 
bay', i.e., exchange of equal values, there is a purchase and sale, i.e., a permissible equal 
exchange, a jus! and lawful economic ac{jvitv, a fàir transaction, since something is exchanged 
for something, an equal value for an equal value, as money for goods, or sirnply, goods for goods. 
But in money-Iending capital, which is given on loan for an increase [ribiiJ , there is no such 
legitirnate or moral relationship mediating, except that capital is loaned for an increase in il. It is 
the capacitv of monev to increase its own value, without the lawful econornic activity of just sale 
or exchange. This is the point which the Qur'an 80 clearly makes when it refutes the theory of 
rnoneylenders who contend that ribii is similar to bay', i.e., it is a form of sale of its own nature, 
it has the power to create an increase in monev; as an offSpring is conceived, a child is born, a 
tree bears fruit, so monev generates monev. If one tells the moneylender that this is ribii, an 
unjustified profit, the latter justifies it by his claim that the increase over capital in a certain 
course of time is because of the time factor; that is, the increase is the compensation for the tirne 
during which the moneylender parts with his capita1.438 
This discourse touches on the very crucial concepts of "self-generation and self-
expansion" inherent in ribii, but only from a moral, ethical, legal and economic 
perspective. It does not explore the concepts for their aH-important theological 
implications - the main argument of this work. 
The only other recurring references in Islamic philosophy of relevance for this 
thesis are to the concepts of ex-nihilo creation, self-subsistence, self-emanation, and 
435 Nelson, fdea of Umry, 73-82. 
436 Bertrand Russell, HMOIy of Westem Philosophy (New York; Simon and Sehuster, e. 1945), 601. 
mlbn f:lazm, al-MulJallii, VIII, 351. Sec also Abü 'Ali ibn al-f:lasan al-Tabrasl (d. 547 AH), Majma' al-Bayiin fi Tat.;Iral-Qur'iill 
(Tehran: Kitab Firushi-e-Islamiyya, 1379 AH), Il, 389. 
438 Ziaul Haquc, Riba: The Moral Ecollomy of U~ury, [l1terest and Profit, 12. 
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eternity, either on their own or in relation to other subjects. But, these concepts have not 
been associated so far with the ribii discourse, and will be applied for the first time in 
this thesis. 
II. 7. Contemporary Exploration 
The contemporary usury discourse may be neatly divided between Western and 
Islamic milieus. 
II.7.i. Western Milieu 
Contemporary Western thought,439 by being either neutral or even outright opposed 
to any prohibition of interest, is not helpful in the development of a theory of its 
theological prohibition. Western economic thought ofthe 17th and 18th centuries did not 
contribute to the theological perspective on usury. It approached the question purely in 
terms of economic theory, quantum of desirable interest rate and its state regulation.44o 
Even the religious thought turned the tide against usury prohibition. Repeal of even the 
legallimit on usury and the abandonment of the old Christian prohibition ofusury and of 
the scholastic theory were recommended. Money-lending was regarded as a trade like 
any other and price control as inapplicable as much to money as to any other 
commodity. The law against usury was termed "foolish and ancient," and considered to 
be sourced in: a Christian opposition to temporal prosperity; an anti-Semitic distrust of 
Jewish methods; an ignorant reverence for Aristotle's maxim of barrenness of money; 
and a worldly love of present pleasure and hatred for the abstemious lender.441 "These 
four motives combined to set in motion the whole formidable machinery against usury, 
vestiges of which still plague Britain today. Bentham dismisses aU scruples against 
usury: usurers are men as honest as other tradesmen."442 Even the Roman Catholic Roly 
Office, "in a series of decisions rendered between 1822 and 1836, ended aU doubts and 
practical difficulties by publicly decreeing that interest allowed by law may be taken by 
439 Dctailcd in Appcndix \3 (a). 
440 Promincnt contributions arc from: William Petty, Politiea/ Arithmctick(1690); Sir William Petty's Quantu/umcumquc 
Conccming Moncy (1695); John Locke, Somc Considcrations ofthe Consequences of the Lowcring offntcrc.çt and Rai.çing the Valuc 
of Moncy (169 1); Dudley North, Discourses upon Tradc (1691); David Hume, Offntcrcst(1752) and Adam Smith, Thc Wcalth of 
Nations (1776). 
441 Jeremy Bentham, DcfcnccofU5lIIY 1818, in Economie Writing.,; cd. W. Stark, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1952),9-13; 53; 
96-\06. 
442 Buckley, Thcological Examination, 136. 
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everyone."443 However, the theoretical controversy surrounding these decisions is 
summed up by Noonan thus: 
The licitness of the rent of money as a fruitful good, at least in production loans, is asserted ... 
The biblical and conciliar prohibitions of usury are explained as prohibitions only of excessive 
usury and Calvin, Molinaeus, and Maffei become the new authorities. The scholastic defenders of 
the new theory assert that only in its terms can the general permission to take interest be 
understood and modem commerce be justified. On the other hand, the champions of the old 
theory reassert the familiar arguments against aH usury, pointing out that the general permission 
to take interest can be understood as an extension of the title of /ucrum cessans, and need involve 
no abandonment of the old principles.444 
The point that is being missed here is that, regardless of how it is being justified, 
either through the new theory or through the title of Jucrum cessans, interest 
nevertheless remains a process of money directly generating money - an intrinsic quality 
which attracts its divine prohibition for humankind. 
In the nineteenth century, "competent scholastic theologians were rare, and great 
scholastic theologians were non-existent. Consequently, no commanding figure arose to 
defend the old theory, although ... it [old theory] was still generally accepted. But facile 
and persuasive writers were urging its abandonment and the acceptance, in greater or 
lesser degree, of the theory of Calvin and Maffei."445 It was asserted that no dogma of 
the Church was at risk by allowing moderate profit on loans to businessmen and the 
rich. Through an extensive review of papal, conciliar, patristic, and scholastic teaching 
on usury, it was concluded that the only dogma on usury, which ever existed, was the 
evil nature of excessive or oppressive profit on a loan. The medieval scholastic position 
was called "transient and local opinion" incapable of being elevated above the rank of 
positive law, and was ascribed to the economic conditions of the time, to the tyranny of 
Aristotle, and to the ignorance of the Fathers.446 
The theses of Molinaeus and Maffei were presented, most originally, in terms of 
money's "applicability," by which was meant both the power ofbeing able to use money 
and its actual use. This applicability was separate from money itself and may always be 
charged for. A worker cannot be asked to work for nothing simply because he is idle. 
Similarly, nor can a lender with idle funds be asked to surrender their applicability free 
441 Ibid., 13 7. 
444 Noonan, Seho/astie Ana/ysi;; 377, citcd in Buckley, Theological Examination, 137. 
445 BuckIcy, Theological Examination, 137. 
446 William César (Cardinal de la Luzerne), Dis.w:rtations sur le prêt-de-commerce (1822), quoted in Buckley, Theological 
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of charge. 447 Again, this most original argument of selling the "applicability" of money 
and not money itself, nevertheless, ignores the fact that in the absence of an intervening 
commodity the sale process still remains an exchange of money for more money - an 
inherent "self-emanation" which attracts divine prohibition. 
This new theory of legitimate interest was justified by linking the fruitfulness or 
sterility of money to the underlying economy: unlike the present economy where money 
is fruit fuI, in the static medieval economy, the feudal and guild systems, war, theft, and 
trade barriers made investment and capital accumulation difficult, rendering money 
immobile and sterile. It was he Id that law, particularly on usury, does not remain 
"abstractly motionless," but develops with economic change. As the economic structure 
of Europe changed and money became capable of fruit fuI employment, the Church 
altered the law to meet the new conditions, broadening the exceptions into general 
permission and allowing the taking of interest. The only dogmatic principle, which 
remains unaltered though applied differently in different conditions, is the sinfulness of 
exploiting one's neighbor. The early scholastic theory was criticized for its abstract 
legalistic approach which ignored the economic significance and the moral essence of 
the usury law. The proper theoretical approach, set out in this new theory, is to abandon 
the legal technicalities of contracts and titles and adopt one general moral principle that 
no contract should injure an impoverished neighbor.448 The arguments in defense of the 
licitness of rent of money as a fruitful good are multi-pronged: there is no scriptural or 
natural reason to contradict this new approach; biblical disapproval is only of 
exploitation of the poor; there is absence of justification, in the old scholastic theory, of 
the advantageous present-day economic operations; the transference of ownership in a 
loan is a determination of positive, not natural, law; and money is no longer st erile. 449 
On the other hand, the old theory was defended on the grounds that the 
consumptibility of money, not its productivity, is the essence of the old theory. The 
modem practice of interest is not the rent of money but the universal claiming of lucrum 
cessans, which legalizes interest. In spite of change in practice with economic change, 
447 Mark Mastrofini (a member of the papal court in Rome), Discussion sur l'usure (1828), quoted in Buekley, Theological 
Examination, 138. 
448 F. X. Funk (mid_19th c. German theologian), Zins und Wuchcr trans. and cited in Noonan, Scholastic Al1alysis, 386. 
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the scholastic principles - a part ofCatholic doctrine - remain unchangeable and equally 
good in their new application.450 
In a syncretistic defense of usury doctrine, it was held that money in this age was 
virtually fecund (new the ory) and could be rented at a profit because of the lender's 
univers al suffering of Jucrum cessans (old theory).451 Another defense of interest-taking 
similarly appealed equally to Jucrum cessans and the fecundity of money. 452 
The new Codex juris canonici of 1917, replacing aIl earlier collections of canon 
law and becoming the sole statute book of the universal Church, took the final formaI 
step in the acceptance of generai interest-taking by combining all responses, decrees and 
bulls of the oid canon law into a single rule:4s3 
If a fungible thing is given someone, and later something of the same kind and amount is to be 
returned, no profit can be taken on the ground of this contract; but in lending a fungible thing it 
is not itself illicit to contract for payment of the profit allocated by law, unless it is c1ear that this 
is excessive, or even for a higher profit, if a just and adequate title be present.454 
The diachronie development of the Christian attitude towards usury since its 
inception has been very aptly summarized by Visser and McIntosh: 
Despite its Judaic roots, the critique of usury was most fervently taken up as a cause by the 
institutions of the Christian Church where debate prevailed with great intensity for well over a 
thousand years. The Old Testament decrees were resurrected and a New Testament reference to 
usury added to fuel the case. Building on the authority of the se texts, the Roman Catholic 
Church had by the fourth century AD prohibited the taking of interest by the clergy; a rule which 
they extended in the fifth cent ury to the laity. In the eight century under Charlemagne, they 
pressed further and dec1ared usury to be a general criminal offence. This anti-usury movement 
continued to gain momentum during the early Middle Ages and perhaps reached its zenith in 
1311 when Pope Clement V made the ban on usury absolute and dec1ared all secular legislation in 
its favour null and void.455 
Increasingly thereafter, and despite numerous subsequent prohibitions by Popes and civil 
legislators, loopholes in the law and contradictions in the Church's arguments were found and 
along with the growing tide of commercialization, the pro-usury counter-movement began to 
grow. The rise of Protestantism and its pro-capitalist influence is also associated with this 
change,456 but it should be noted that both Luther and Calvin expressed sorne reservations about 
the practice of usury despite their belief that it could not be universally condemned. Calvin, for 
instance, enumerated seven crucial instances in which interest remained "sinfu1," but these have 
been generally ignored and his stance taken as a wholesa1e sanctioning of interest.457 
As a result of aH these influences, sometimes around 1620, according to theologian Ruston, 
"usury passed from being an offence against public morality which a Christian government was 
450 Cardinal Ernest Joseph Van Roey (carly 20th c. Belgian theologian), De justo auetario ex eontraetu crediti (Louvain, 1903),226, 
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expected to suppress to being a matter of private conscience [and] a new generation of Christian 
moralists redefined usury as excessive interest.,,458 
This position has remained pervasive through to present-day thinking in the Church, as 
indicative views of the Church of Scotland suggest when it declares in its study report on the 
ethics of investment and banking: "We accept that the practice of charging interest for business 
and personalloans is not, in itself, incompatible with Christian ethics. What is more difficult to 
determine is whether the interest rate charged is fair or excessive."459 
Similarly, it is illustrative that, in contrast to the clear moral injunction against usury still 
expressed by the Church in Pope Leo XIII's 1891 Rerum Novarum as "voracious usury ... an evil 
condemned frequently by the Church but nevertheless still practiced in deceptive ways by 
avaricious men," Pope John Paul II's 1989 Sollicitude Rei Socialis lacks any explicit mention of 
usury except the vaguest implication by way of acknowledging the Third World Debt crisis.460 
The Christian perspective on the usury issue at the beginning of the 20th century 
has been summed up by Buckley as syncretistic: "the usury rule, sapped of its vitality in 
modern economic conditions, is not abandoned, but so limited in the likelihood of its 
applicability that profit on credit transactions is made the norm, and usury the 
exceptional case of unjust extraction." 461 The canonist doctrine, as Roll points out, was 
steadily weakened with commercial expansion and finally faced with complete collapse 
ofits power to regulate economic life.462 Buckley further elaborates this point: 
After the Reformation, the Church was no longer able to stand in the way of the growth of 
commercial capitalism, and whether Protestant and Puritan doctrines were themselves conducive 
to the development of the capitalist spirit is an area of discourse, already much debated ... What 
is important is that the harmony between Church dogma and feudal society, between theological 
and economic thought, responsible for the all-embracing quality of the Canon Law, came to an 
end with the decline of feudal society. This harmony had enabled the institutionalized Church, 
with its spiritual and secular power, to claim the right to order the whole of human relations and 
conduct on this earth as well as to provide the precepts which would lead to spiritual salvation.463 
Neverthe1ess, as Roll maintains: 
Canonist thought was essentially an ideology, in economic matters it was an illusory 
representation of reality. It was successful so long as the conflicts of reality had not become very 
acute. With the sharpening of these conflicts, the antithetical elements in this ideology were 
seized upon by the contending parties, and the original universal character was lost ... A 
separation was effected by which religious dogma ceased to represent an analysis of existing 
society as weIl as a code of conduct ... Though attempts were again to be made to introduce 
ethical elements into the main stream of economic thought, it remains henceforth independent of 
religion. The foundation for a secular science of economy was laid.464 
458 R. Ruston, "Docs It Matter What Wc Do With Our Moncy'?", Priests and People, May 1993, 171-77. 
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Buckley shows that "with the acceptance of the modem day understanding of 
usury as an exorbitant rate of interest and interest itself accepted into the fabric of 
economic life, the usury debate has evolved into the issue of how to incorporate the 
principles of low-cost credit and debt finance, and the concept of justice, into the 
structure of poverty stricken communities and societies of the disadvantaged." This is 
the essence of the contemporary Christian discourse on usury. But, she admits, "this is 
not to deny, however, the possibilities for the existence of an interest-free banking 
system according to theological principles [Islamic Banking]." She analyses in detail 
"how the practical application of the 'usury' issue, as it is now perceived, has been 
employed by social Christianity within the previous one hundred years in Great Britain, 
particularly in terms of 'associationism' [co-operative enterprises] and co-operative 
banking methodology," and posits the question: "where do we go from here?"465 
The logical step forward from the social Christian "associationism" and co-
operative banking is the theologicaiisiamic banking. 
Buckley herself further posits the question: 
If the concept of 'usury' as exorbitant interest is so readily accepted in the West now, and the use 
of interest as a legal entity is built into the law, is there any banking or economic system which 
could implement the Judaic and early Christian notion of interest-free loans with a view to a 
fairer redistribution of wealth, or wealth creation, and help for the poor? Can, for example, the 
ethical teaching in respect of usury of another great monotheistic religion - Islam - provide a 
paradigm for the rest of the world to adopt as we approach the twenty-first century with its 
concept ofisiamic Banking facilities?466 
The answer, for EI-Gamal, is that it not only can, but it already has: 
1 don't believe in a separate Islamic economy. Western capitalism evolved out of Islamic 
principles. [Buckley believes out of Jewish principles]. UK common law evolved out of Sharl'a 
law from the Mediterranean European legal system. The framework is very much Islamic at heart 
although there is may be not the same discipline as with Islamic law.467 
Furthermore, as pointed out by El-Gamal, "it is not surprising in the light of [the] 
clear prohibition of interest in Judaism and [early] Christianity to leam that the first 
interest-free bank in documented history was established prior to the life of Prophet 
465 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 145. 
466 Ibid., 154. 
467 Mahmoud A. EI-Gamal, (http://www.ruf.rice.edwclgamal/files/islamic.html). 
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Mul].ammad (pbuh). The first interest-free (Islamic?) bank Agibi Bank was established 
c.700 B.C. in Babylonia, and functioned exclusively on an equity basis."468 
This, then, leads into an examination of the Islamic teachings on the Qur'anic 
juxtaposed concepts of ribi (lit. excess) and bay' (lit. exchange), but, with the rejoinder 
to Buckley that, as will be argued below, the Islamic paradigm is not just ethical, but 
foremost, metaphysical, philosophical and theological, and with its affinity to divine 
and human nature, it is fully capable of becoming not just the univers al economic 
paradigm but also the univers al total human conduct paradigm. 
II.7.iL Islamic Milieu 
In the Islamic milieu contemporary, scholarly contribution on the ribi discourse 
has come both from Muslim and Orientalist sources. 
II. 7 .iLa. Contemporary Muslim Contribution469 
Contemporary Muslim ribi discourse, like its classical/medieval counterpart, does 
not contribute to a comprehensive theory development due mainly to its merely exoteric 
research approach. Fazlur Rahman characterizes the general quality of contemporary 
scholarship thus: "the intellectual output of the Muslim scholars from the fourteenth 
century onward could be characterized generally as ponderous and repetitive, unoriginal, 
pedantic, and superficial."470 Ironically, however, his own contribution to the ribi 
discourse does not match his intellectual prowess as an outstanding contemporary 
Muslim philosopher. Hallaq correctly brands his ribii discourse as a "reformist agenda 
devoid of any philosophic content."471 
In the modern discourse, only moral, economic, perceived historical and linguistic 
arguments are posited for the prohibition of ribii, to the utter neglect of the 
philosophical-theological dimensions. For instance, the prefixing of the article "al" to 
the term ribii in Q. 2:275-280 is taken by Rashld Riqa to indicate knowledge and 
familiarity, and thus to argue for ribiï al-jiïhillya as the only prohibition.472 Emphasizing 
468 S. Baron, A Socia! and Re/igious History of the Jcw.\' (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), cited in, Mahmoud A. El-
Gamal, "Can Islamie Banking Survive? A Miero-evolutionary Perspective" (http://www.rufrice.edurelgamaIlfiles/islamic.html). 5. 
469 Detailed presentation in Appendix 13 (b). 
470 Fazlur Rahman, Il'/am and Modemity: Transfonnation of an ln/effectua! Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1982),45. 
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the moral aspects, the Islamic "legal form" of ribii is relegated by al-Najjar, al-Namir 
and Fazlur Rahman to a secondary position, arguing the raison d'être for the prohibition 
to be "injustice," 473 as a translation - albeit inaccurate - of the Qur'anic usage, ?ulm. 
But if this concept of ?ulm is viewed in its more appropriate meaning of "transgression," 
the whole scenario changes from a moral to a theological one and an entirely new 
rationale (lJikma) of prohibition emerges, as will be demonstrated in chapter IV. It is 
contended by Fazlur Rahman that the absence of an early Meccan condemnation of ribii 
would have been contrary to the "wisdom of the Qur'an," whose only expression is 
claimed in economic and moral contexts.474 Accordingly, the prohibition is deemed 
restricted to "usury" and not inclusive of "interest," Le., a charge equal to or more, but 
not less, than the princip al. 475 The Egyptian civil code also adopts this position.476 This 
discussion, based on the alien concepts of usury and interest in relation to ribii, is at best 
confusing because ribii stands for any increase and not just an increase above a 
threshold. Altematively, an attempt is made to justify interest charge, though 
indefensibly, as indexation of a loan to compensate for the monetary loss through 
decline in the purchasing power of money in an inflationary economy.477 This 
compensatory indexation issue, the subject of extensive debate, is relevant only for ribii-
prohibition in its narrow economic context. When viewed in its broadest context of 
philosophical-theological rationale, the whole issue of indexation fizzles out. 
Definitionally, ribii is recognized by Fazlur Rahman in its literaI and lexical 
meaning of "excess"478 in an its Qur'anic manifestations,479 but this ri ch mosaic of 
meaning is not developed any further, and its examination is restricted to the technical 
meaning of the term in its fin anci al context only. Additionally contributing to 
definitional inaccuracy, in a pioneering reference, Q. 74:6 "wa-lii tamnun tastakthir" (do 
not favour anybody in the hope that he will retum you more to cause your wealth to 
increase) is cited by Shafi and Usmani to posit that "riban" in Q. 30:39 means "gif!" 
m Sa'îd al-Najjar, 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Namir and Fazlur Rahman, quoted in Saeed, l~lamic Banking, 41. 
474 Rahman, Riba, 3. 
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and not "ribii. "480 The point being missed is that this verse (Q. 74:6) is juridieaUy a clear 
Qur'anie source of prohibition of ribii aJ-fàcjl, whose prohibition is generaUy erroneously 
regarded as only Sunnaieally-soureed. Also missed is the point that this verse is 
philosophieally a prohibition of self-emanation. Contributing unwittingly to the on-
going "terminological confusion syndrome," Fazlur Rahman classifies ribii into "two 
distinct categories" - with the claimed support of "all the fuqahii'" - namely (1) ribii 
prohibited by the Qur'an, "ribii al-Qur'an" and (2) extension of the Qur'anie ribii to 
different forms of exehange/transaetions, "ribii aJ-J;adIth " or "ribii aJ- fàcjJ (excess). "481 
More gravely, in utter negleet of the intrinsie meaning/eonnotations of the term, 
ribiiis branded by Shafi and Usmani as an evil,482 or by Fazlur Rahman as "an eeonomie 
evil."483 Qur'anic and J;adith material, objectively viewed, shows that, while the human 
practice of ribii is not accorded divine favor and is proscribed, it is nowhere branded as 
an evil per se, let alone specifieally as an economic evil. It is true that the Qur'anic and 
Sunnaie legal injunetions on ribii are placed in an exoteric economic setting, but the 
esoteric implications of these injunctions go far beyond. The only possible connotation 
of evil in connection with ribii cornes in the ribi-incest equivalence J;adIth. But ev en this 
iJadith has more of a neutral philosophical connotation rather than a pejorative moral 
connotation of evil. In a more flagrant case of negleet, a Prophetie iJadIth, reported by 
Ibn Maja, establishing a paraUel between seventy-two types of ribii and shirk (idolatry) 
is pioneeringly included by Shafi and Usmani in an attached list of a/JiidIth on ribii, but 
not commented upon at aU either by these particular scholars484 or by others so far. 
Classifying the ribii-prohibitory verses as (1) central: Q. 3:130, (2) prologue: Q. 
30:39, and (3) epilogue: Q. 2:275 ff.,485 the 'illa of ribii-prohibition is contended by 
Fazlur Rahman to be explicitly mentioned in this "central and fundamental" verse Q. 
3:130 as its "beeoming doubled and redoubled."486 Supporting evidenee is cited from two 
early commentators, Mujahid and Zayd b. Aslam, who are reported by al-Tabar1 to have 
equated doubling and redoubling ribii with ribii al-Jiihiliya, which, it is claimed, the 
480 Mufti Mohammad Shafi, and Mufti Mohammad Taqi Usmani, trans. Anwar Ahmcd Mccnai, The J.~.mc of Intercst. (Karachi: Darul 
Ishaat, 1997). 
481 Rahman, Riba, 2. 
482 Shafi and Usmani, J.~.me of fnterest. 
483 Rahman, Riba, 3. 
484 Shafi and Usmani, Issue of Interes[. 
485 Rahman, Riba, 5. 
486 Ibid., 6. 
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Qur'an was targeting. But this contention denies any universality to the ribii-
proscription by taking a very restrictive and pure1y contextual, and even rather shaUow, 
approach to an issue that has very deep philosophical and theological connotations of a 
univers al import. In a very innovative - albeit naïve - answer to the question of why 
the posited Qur'anic restricted co ver age of atrocious ribii al-jiihi/Jya was extended 
historically to aU interest, it is contended by Fazlur Rahman that "aH types of interest 
[usurious or mild] were a part of the ribii system which was by nature exorbitantly 
usurious and had to be banned as a whole, without any exceptions, thus banning milder 
interest as weIl." This prohibition of the ribi-system's constituent mild interest, it is 
argued, does not coyer modem bank interest which is a separate kind of system: 487 
Many well-meaning Muslims with virtuous consciences sincerely believe that the Qur'an has 
banned aIl bank interest for aIl times, in woeful disregard ofwhat riba [sic] was historically, why 
the Qur'an denounced it as a gross and cruel fonu of exploitation and banned it, and what the 
function ofbank interest [is] today.488 
In this analysis of pre-Islamic ribii, by expanding a constituent part to the status of 
a fuU-fledged system, an exception is being advocated, which the Qur'an itself did not 
make. The foUowing Qur'anic verses should be sufficient to deny this human exception: 
Say, have you seen what Allah has sent down to you from provisions and you have made of it 
unlawful and lawful. Say, has Allah penuitted you or do you invent a lie against Allah?- Q. 10:59 
And say not conceming that which your tongues put forth falsely: "This is lawful and this is 
forbidden," so as to invent lies against Allah. Verily those who invent lies against Allah will 
never prosper. - Q. 16: 116 
In a reformist, virtuaUy evasive stance, Fazlur Rahman "prophesizes" that "in a 
truly Isiamic order, if and when established, there will not be any need for bank-interest 
or the present banking system, and thus the issue of ribii will disappear, but any 
premature abolition ofbank-interest wouid be suicidaI for the economy."489 On the other 
hand, dismissing the Liberal thought on permissibility of modem day commercial and 
business bank interest as apologetic, in a wishful and premature conclusion, a complete 
consensus of aU five schools of fiqh and of Islamic economists is posited by Uzair on the 
complete prohibition of interest in aU forms, of aU kinds, and for aU purposes.49O 
487 Ibid., 7. 
488 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities", in Alford T. WeIch and Pierre Caehia (cds.), Islam: Pa,;'t Influcncc and 
Prcscnt Challcngc(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979),326, 
489 Ibid" 41 , 
490 Muhammad Uzair, "Impact ofIntcrest Frcc Banking," Joumalof/slamie Banking and Financc, Autumn 1984, pp, 39-50,40, 
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Theoretically, Chapra regards ribii as a prominent source of unjustified advantage, 
literally meaning increase, addition, expansion or growth, but narrowed down to the 
economic connotation only. He admits that not every increase or growth is prohibited in 
Islam, but the prohibiting criteria is not identified, merely contending that in ribii a1-
nasl'a the prohibition criteria is "the predetennined positiveness of the retum," and in 
ribii al-fàql the requirement of equality in exchanges of homogeneity is to ensure 
"justice and fair play in spot transactions." 491 
This assertion about the prohibition of the predetermined positiveness of the 
retum is not tenable on grounds of the permissibility of rent, which also has the 
distinctive characteristic of predetennined positiveness of the retum. And the assertion 
about the requirement of equality in exchanges of homogeneity is based on a very literaI 
and seemingly apparent meaning of the six-commodities 1;adfth, without realizing that 
this 1;adfth, rather than requiring exchange of homogeneity with condition of equality 
and instantaneity, is in fact positive1y discouragingsuch an exchange ofhomogeneity by 
making it completely meaningless for the transacting parties by requiring equality and 
instantaneity in homogeneity. This requirement is not intended primarily to ensure 
justice and fair play in spot transactions, but to prevent man from the prohibited domain 
of exchanges of homogeneity (ribii) and confine him to his permitted do main of 
exchanges of heterogeneity and instantaneity (bay': "when the commodities differ, 
exchange them as you wish, provided the exchange is instantaneous"). 
On a positive note, the unsuitability and inadequacy of the traditional 
interpretation of ribii is highlighted and argument made by Saeed "for approaching the 
issues of banking and finance on the basis of ijtihiid not taq/Jd" 492 Specifically, the 
contention of scholars like Mawdüru that the Qur'anic contrast in 2:275 is between ribii 
and profit arising out of a sale transaction is rejected altogether on two grounds. Firstly, 
"the Qur'an does not go on to exhort trade (bay'), but merely states its lawfulness," and, 
secondly, the very next "verse, Q. 2:276, contrasts ribii and ~adaqa, as the Qur'an does 
previously in verse 30:39, where the term zakiit appears to be synonymous with 
491 Chapra, Just Monetary System, 55-59. 
492 Saccd, lI"lamic Banking, 3. 
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$adaqa."493 Exegete Raz! is cited in support of this contrast.494 The important question 
why the Qur'an does not command bay' but simply declares it lawful, and whether the 
contrast of ribiï is with bay' or with $adaqa, will be treated below (chapter IV). 
Citing the vast difference between the modem and the pre-Islamic debtor, in terms 
of borrowers' regular incomes and borrower protection laws, the ration ale (lJikma) of 
ribi-prohibition is posited by Saeed to be the protection of the economically and 
socially disadvantaged in the community.495 Treating the Qur'anic prohibition as moral 
and humanitarian, but not legalistic, it is argued that the Qur'an basically prohibited 
exploitation of the needs of a person in financial difficulty, rather than an "increase" 
accruing to the credit or in a loan transaction as SUCh.496 This view is in complete 
disregard of the linguistic meaning of ribiï as excess and the implied Qur' anic reference 
to a particular distinguishing characteristic of that excess that will be posited in chapter 
IV. It is further argued that the juristic invention and widespread use by Muslims of 
lJiyal (stratagems) was resorted to in order to enable borrowing and lending for non-
humanitarian purposes in any form at any rate and in any circumstances.497 There may be 
a point in the argument that these stratagems had rendered the traditional interpretation 
of ribii almost obsolete. But as far as the essence of the Qur'anic injunction itself is 
concemed, the so-called stratagems (lJiyal) may in fact have served to implement rather 
than thwart the Qur'anic injunction, as will be shown in chapter V, below. 
But, while on the one hand complaining about the historical use of lJiyal to soften 
the prohibition, on the other, in a move that makes the ribiï-prohibition completely 
subjective and flexible, based on the posited but rather inaccurate translation of "?ulm" 
as "injustice," it is argued that the prohibition rationale/criterion is "injustice" and not 
"increase" per se, implying thereby that a "just" transaction of interest is permitted and 
an "unjust" transaction even without interest is prohibited. Saeed specifically states: 
The point to be made here is that it is the circumstances of a particular transaction, the parties 
to such a transaction, the relative power of the parties vis-à-vis each other as well as the 
economic and social environment within which the transaction takes place, which should 
determine whether a particular transaction should be prohibited as riba [SiC].498 
493 Ibid., 25. 
494 Razi, TafSJr, VII, 90. 
495 Saccd, JsJamic Banking, 29. 
496 Ibid., 142. 
497 Ibid., 142-143. 
49R Ibid., 146. 
122 
Firstly, the suggested approach to ribi-determination is unworkable because the 
attachment of so many provisos to the injunction, many of which are not quantifiable 
and highly subjective, would render any consensus on the presence of ribi in any given 
situation more difficult than at present - virtually impossible. Secondly, the ration ale of 
injustice (exploitation) has long since been debunked by al-Nawawl on grounds ofbeing 
equally extendable to profit which he regards as legitimate. Thirdly, the Qur'anic 
prohibition of ribi is absolute and unconditional. The Qur'anic prohibitory verses state: 
"Allah has prohibited ribi!" These verses do not state "Allah has prohibited ribii, if ... " 
Such unconditional injunction cannot have a conditional rationale that may or may not 
exist in an situations. Fourthly, and most importantly, the advocated moral perspective 
is not the governing principle behind the ribii- prohibition. The governing theological 
perspective and the derived rationale (l}iJana) therefrom, render the above suggested 
rationale and aIl the provisos meaningless and irrelevant, taking the discourse out of the 
attempted power relationship into a conformity relationship. 
At the juridical level, a lack both of perception and of precision prevails. The 
l}iJana is identified as ?uim (linguistic, but not strictly Qur'anic, meaning of "injustice") 
and the 'ilia as "financial excess," both of which are not balanced against the severity of 
the Qur'anic punishment for violation. Simply the gravit y of the sin and the severity of 
punishment are noted but without explaining the underlying reason for the gravit y and 
severity. Nor is it shown how does the identified 'illa of "excess" in a loan lead to the 
identified iJikma - a flouting of the requirement of u$iil al-fiqh. Instead a lengthy 
discourse is offered, mostly quoting Western economists, on the nature of money and 
the perceived evil effects ofinterest on the global economy. 499 
Furthermore, in influential literature on Islamic Economies, the portrayal by 
Khurshid Ahmad500 of nasl'a as one "kind" and of fagi as "other aspects of ribi"is very 
problematic and greatly hinders the true comprehension of the concepts. Verifiably, 
both the Qur'an and the Sunna are prohibiting ribii, period - explicit mention of ribii al-
499 Justice Taqi Usmani, rctircdjudgc of the Sharî'a Appcllate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Vice Chainnan of the Fiqh 
Academy ofOIC, Jeddah, and a Shar1'a Advisor to many financial institutions intemationally, in his 250-page judgment in Sharî'a 
Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Judgment on Ribii, December 23, 1999 (Islamabad: Advanced Legal Studies 
Institute.www.nyazee.com .. 2000), 429, 433-452. 
500 Khurshid Ahmad, Pakistan Senator, Na'ib Am1r ofthe Jama'at Islam1, Pakistan, founder of the Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 
England, and one of the nine 'Makers' in John L Esposito and John O. VolI, Makers ofContcmporary Islam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), in his Towardç The Monctary and Fiscal System of/sIam (Islamabad: Institutc ofPolicy Studies, 1981), 13. 
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nasJ'a and ribii al-façll is absent from both sources. The Qur'an does appear to point 
towards nasJ'a in what apparently is only a contextual usage of the term ribii in 2:279, 
with reference to entitlement to capital sums, and in 3: 130, with reference to its 
doubling and redoubling. These are, at best, only indirect references to nasJ'a (delay). In 
fact, there is instead a more direct reference to façll(excess) in both these verses - excess 
over capital sums (Q. 2:279) and excess through doubling and redoubling (Q. 3:130). 
Given this, how can it be claimed that the Qur'anic co ver age is directly of nasJ'a? 
Notwithstanding this, the Qur'anic usage of the term ribii is very abstract and 
unelaborated in all the prohibitory verses. The Sunna, through the ribawJ-commodities 
i}adJth, is simply elaborating the Qur'an by showing through concrete example that both 
nasJ'a and façll are operative in ribii; the Sunna is not emphasizing "other aspects of ribii 
generally termed ribii al-fàçll." It might be argued that the Qur'anic reference is to the 
JahiIiya lending practice, which like any other lending, involved nasJ'a (delay). But, 
obviously that JahiIiya lending practice also involved façll(excess). In fact, nasJ'a (delay) 
and fàçll(excess) both operate in ribii in varying permutations: nasJ'a only; façllonly; or 
nasJ'a and façll both. It is therefore not correct to label nasl'a as exclusively Qur'anic 
and façll as exclusively Sunnaic. As aptly put by Nyazee: 
Ribii al-fàçll and ribii al-nasJ'ah are prohibited by the Qur'an, just as they are prohibited by the 
Sunnah. In fact, ribii of the Qur'an and ribii of the Sunnah are exactly the same. The Sunnah is 
merely acting as a commentary.501 
In a departure from conventional scholarship, Abdulkader Thomas associates ribii 
with shirk on grounds of granting money a self-propelled or intrinsic value gain based 
merely on passage of time without any God-given merits, without effort and without 
requiring God in order to achieve it.502 He does not, however, develop this premise any 
further. But elsewhere, rather inconsistently he caUs ribii a social disease - an illness 
infecting man's relations with man and with God.503 
It can only be concluded from the above review that, mired in controversy, 
polemics and shallowness of discourse, contemporary Muslim scholarship on riba is on 
the whole a hindrance rather than a help for theoretical purposes. 
501 Nyazcc, Ribii and 1.;'1amie Banking, 27. 
502 Abdulkader Thomas, "What is ribiï'?" in Abdulkadcr Thomas, cd., Inferesf in ll'lamie Economies (London; Ncw York: Routlcdgc, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2006),127. 
503 Ibid., Amcrican Journal Islamic Finance, www.ajif.org, section on CV of Abdulkadcr Thomas. 
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II.7.iLb. Orientalist Contribution 
The post-colonial Orientalist scholarship has dealt with the Islamic notion of ribiï 
in references which are only scattered, rather rudimentary, and even contradictory and 
non-cohesive. In spite of sharp, penetrating insights elsewhere, the Orientalists have not 
probed the rationale of one of the defining prohibitions in Islam - prohibition of ribiï - in 
any depth or breadth. 
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) recognizes ribiï as an abuse connected 
with trading practices.504 Contradictorily, D. S. Margoliouth (1858-1940) regards its 
prohibition both in Islam and in medieval Church as injurious to the economy.505 Even 
so, Hurgronje sees the ribiï -prohibition exclusively in its economic connotation, with no 
reference to the moral, philosophical or theological perspectives. On the other hand, 
Henri Lammens (1862-1937) does refer to the "severity" of the prohibition,506 but 
without either investigating its rationale in Islam or lin king it to the earlier similar 
prohibitions in Judaism and early Christianity. Instead, he points to the escape routes 
from this "severity" invented by Muslimjurists in the form of J;iya1507 Similarly, Richard 
Bell (b. 1876) does not delve into the ration ale of ribâ=-prohibition beyond stating that Q. 
2:276 is a "dissuasion from taking usury because of its moral consequences at the 
J udgment. "508 
Joseph Schacht (1902-1969) refers to the Qur'anic recognition of ribiï as a practice 
of unbelievers and to the demand for its abandonment as a test of belief. 509 But he 
points to what he caUs "an ignorance of the correct interpretation" of the Qur'anic 
prohibition in the traditions, borne out by what he labels as a tendentious tradition that 
the Prophet could not expound the ribii verses before his death. He regards the ribawl-
commodities J;adith as expressing the view that later became authoritative. He notes 
that in the implementation of this J;adith, "particularly conscientious people went even 
further in their limitation of ribii than the generality ... Still stricter was the view that 
504 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronjc, l~/am. (Der lI-Jam, in Lehrbueh der Rcligionsgesehichte, 4th cd., cd. A. Bertholet and E. Lehmann, 
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1925, i, 648-756; transI. 1. Schacht), in Scleeted Works orc. Snouek Hurgronje, cd. G.H. 
Bousquet and J. Schaeht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), pp. 1-108,21. 
505 D. S. Margoliouth, Mohammed(London; Glasgow: Blackie & Sons Limited, 1939),83. 
506 H. Lammcns, trans., Sir E. Dcnison Ross, l~/am: BcJiefs and Institutions (London: Mcthucn & Co. Ltd, 1929),63. 
507 Ibid., 64. 
508 Richard Bell, A Commentary on the Qur'iin, cd. by C. Edmund Bosworth and M.E.J. Richardson, (Manchcstcr: University of 
Manchester, 1991),1,58. 
509 Joscph Schacht, Shorter Eneyclopaedia ons/am, 471-472. 
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the exchange of even the same quantities of the same thing ... was ribii." These views 
are in conformity with the interpretation in this work that this iJadith is in fact 
prohibiting the exchange ofhomogeneity. 
Schacht notes that, in Islam, ribii is one of the gravest sins, the least of its many 
forms being as bad as incest. But in spite of this and the severe punishments prescribed, 
tradition foresees that ribii will prevail. Schacht makes no attempt to interpret the ribii-
prohibition or to look into the rationale (lJiJana) of the injunction. He admits, "the inner 
significance of decrees of the divine law naturally cannot be understood by the mind of 
man." Schacht does not offer a coherent or unified theory of ribii. He simply makes a 
distinction between the original Qur'anic injunction and the later development of 
doctrine. He states that the relevant passages of the Qur'an were directed against "the 
CUITent practice of Mecca," which he deems to be "adding the accumulated interest to 
the capital which was to be repaid at a fixed term, and in doubling the debt every time 
the debtor asked for and received an extension of the term." 
Incidentally, Schacht's account of Meccan practice is at odds with that of Tabar1 
(no accumulated interest for the initial term)SIO and also even with the contradictory 
account of al-Ja~~a~ (accumulated interest for the initial term, but no doubling 
thereafter).511 But, he adds, the ancient schools of law, by a common development of 
doctrine but with differences over details, extendedthe law of "usury" to aIl exchanges, 
with not only immediate delivery of the two lots, but also absolute equality in quantity 
if of the same species, which he calls a "sweeping IUle." The Meccans, however, kept 
more cIosely to the original circumstances of the Koranic prohibition and held that there 
could be no "usury" unless there was a time-lag in the transaction.Sl2 They had therefore 
no objection to the exchange of one dinar for two, or of one dirham for two (why the 
exchange?), if both lots were delivered immediately, and only objected to it if the 
delivery of one of the lots was to be postponed.513 
While justifiably emphasizing the role of "delay" (nasJ'a) in riba-generation, 
Schacht presents, but abstains from comment on, what is c1early a very naïve description 
510 Tabar1 Jiïmi' IV 59 
511 ~I-Ja~~~~, A/Jkan: al-Qur'in, l, 465. 
512 Shafi'i, Kitiïb lkhtiliïfal-Hamth, 241 f. 
513 Joseph Sehaeht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1950), 251. 
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of an alleged historical practice and its underlying human motivation. Who in his right 
senses would even consider, let alone conclude, an exchange of one dinar (or dirham) for 
two of the same instantaneously? These descriptions are pure concoctions to support a 
shallow and misplaced interpretation of the ribawJ-commodities J;adIth and have made a 
complete mockery of the profound truths underlying the Qur'anic and Sunnaic 
injunctions on ribi. 
For N. 1. Coulson,514 the "so-called legal matter of the Qur'an consists mainly of 
broad and general propositions," including the particular and "more peculiarly Islamic 
precept" of usury (ribii) which is simply declared to be forbidden (JJariim) without giving 
any "indication of the legal incident of the practice." Jurisprudentially, later "usury was 
a purely civil matter, the transaction being a type of invalid or unenforceable contract." 
Referring to the absence in the Qur'an of temporal punishment for us ury, he makes the 
categorical assertion that " ... the primary purpose of the Qur' an is to regulate not the 
relationship of man with his fellows but his relationship with his Creator."515 As will be 
clearer below (chapter IV), this statement is not only at odds with the basic Qur'anic 
ribiiinjunction (Q. 2:275), which categorically declares ribii as J;ariim, Le., the regulator 
of man-Creator relationship and bay' as J;aliil, Le., the regulator of man-fellow 
relationship, but Coulson, citing Schacht, seems to contradict himself by declaring: "the 
prohibition of usury was, of course, an anti-Jewish measure in part,"516 Le., a regulator of 
man-fellow relationship. Further, this declaration reduces ribii injunction to a purely 
temporal political level, depriving it of any philosophical-theological content. On a 
technical level, Coulson gives a definitional twist to ribii by associating it with 
gambling: 
... Qur'anic prohibition of gambling had become merged with the prohibition of dbii to give the 
latter a much wider import than simple usury or interest on capital loans. It was now interpreted 
to cover any form of profit or gain which was unearned, in the sense that it resulted from chance, 
and which could not be precisely calculated in advance by the contracting parties.517 
514 N.J. Coulson, A Histo/y ofls/amie Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964; Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. 
Ltd. First Indian reprint, 1997). 
515 Ibid., 11-12. 
516 Ibid., n. 3, 17. 
517 Ibid., 38-39. 
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This association of ribii with chance is contrary to the convention al understanding 
where ribii is associated with certainty and its diametrically opposed bay' with 
uncertainty(chance, risk). 
Finally, while admitting the extremely rigorous development of Qur'anic principles 
in the doctrine of ribiiby the nascent Muslim jurisprudence, Coulson questions the very 
authenticity ofthis jurisprudence by declaring: 
And ultimately these accretions of juristic interpretation had aU come to be artificiaUy expressed, 
particularly through the growth of Traditions, as manifestations of the divine commando As has 
so often been suggested in recent times, it must be the primary task of modern jurisprudence to 
ascertain the precise limits of the original core of divine revelation. 518 
Similarly, Coulson ascribes the development of the ribii doctrine to the rigid 
interpretation ofthe Qur'anic norms by the doctrinaire group: 
[The se interpretations] resulted in the rule that the barter of certain commodities - gold, silver 
and staple foodstuffs - against a commodity of the same species was only permissible when the 
offerings on both sides were exactly equal in weight or quantity and when delivery on both sides 
was immediate. Early Medinan doctrine had aUowed the exchange of go Id ore against a smaUer 
weight of gold coinage, the difference covering the cost of minting. But to the doctrinaire group 
this constituted ribii and was therefore prohibited. This approach naturally resulted in the law of 
the doctrinaire group assuming a highly negative character, in essence if not in form, to the 
degree that it lost touch with practical needs and circumstances. It is difficult to see any point or 
purpose in a transaction where 'Umar takes 20 lb. of Zayd's wheat in exchange for 20 lb. of his 
own wheat in the same session.519 
Coulson is right about the meaninglessness of this transaction of equality, 
homogeneity and instantaneity. But here, both the doctrinaire group and Coulson display 
a very superficial understanding of the authentic Prophetic ribawl-commodities J;.adith. 
The simple question is how and why the Prophet could have ordered such a transaction? 
What they are missing, as explained below fully,520 is that this J;.adith is not orderingthis 
equal and instantaneous exchange ofhomogeneity, but rather prohibitingthis exchange, 
not by a direct negative command of "do not do this," but by the indirect positive 
command of making the exchange meaningless and purposeless. While Coulson does 
refer to the divergent madhiihib 'fIaI (effective causes) behind the ribii injunction,521 he 
makes no attempt to look into its J;.iJana (rationale). 
518 Ibid., 224. 
519 Ibid., 41-42. 
520 Sec p. 247, bclow. 
521 Ibid., 79. 
128 
Montgomery Watt, in a historical analysis of the doctrine, deals with ribii in a 
conventional but rather contradictory manner. In a long excerpt522 he contradicts himself 
twice. First, using Schacht and Richard Bell as addition al support, he categoricaUy 
asserts that the ribii-prohibition was directed not against the rich merchants at Mecca, 
but "primarily against the Jews" at Medina where "the prohibition was first made." But 
towards the end of the passage he, contradictingly, talks of "Qur'iiniccriticisms of the 
pagan Meccans' attitude to money." Second, he does refer to the Prophet's last sermon 
at Mecca (where aU usury [ribiiJ was declared to be illegal), yet in the same passage he 
declares that the Prophet had no intention of hindering legitimate trade or of 
revolutionizing the financial practices of Mecca. Watt recognizes much historie al 
obscurity and both practical and theoretical discussion on the meaning and application 
of ribii. He seems to provide a historical basis for the contemporary LiberaIs' argument 
that the Qur' anic prohibition of ribii is directed against interest on consumption loans 
and not on production loans. Accordingly, for him, the prohibition ration ale is mutual 
help among the brotherhood ofbelievers. 
Bernard Weiss equates ribii with "unlawful gain" in the sense of denial of the 
princip le of just exchange, which he dec1ares to be fundamental to Muslim juristic 
thinking about contracts, and notes a moralistic bent of the jurists in this discourse. He 
ascribes to ribii a meaning somewhat broader than the usual translation as usury by 
including in it increase in every exchange of homogeneity with delay. He reads behind 
the juristic scruples surrounding the development of the 'ilal ("decisive characteristics"), 
a ribii-prohibition rationale of preservation of human well-being and property and 
prevention of exploitation. Yet he declares ribii to be c1early vital to, and widely 
practiced in, commercial life in medieval Islam through the juristically condoned "lJlla" 
of double-sale (bay'afin fi bay'a), "which accomplished the same result as ribii without 
actually constituting ribii from a strictly technical point ofview." He cites Schacht523 to 
the effect that the ribii transaction was thus replaced with two separate transactions, 
each in itself perfectly permissible, the combination of which produced the same result 
522 Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956),296-298. 
52J Schacht, Introduction, 79. 
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as the forbidden transaction.524 Coulson also makes the same point with an elaborate 
illustration.525 
The crucial point being missed by Weiss, Schacht and Coulson is that the 
Prophetie authentic BamJ.·dates iJadith fully corroborates this business arrangement. 
Instead of a direct exchange of homogeneity resulting in an excess, a sale and a purchase 
(both exchanges of heterogeneity) is being prescribed here to achieve the same end 
result, but with a different method. This being an authentic Prophetie IJamth, it cannot 
be a IJJla (legal stratagem). It is c1ear, therefore, that the object of the prohibition is not 
the end result but the underlying method of the transaction(s). The subtle point, 
invariably ignored, is that ribii refers to homogenous excess generation, and not to the 
generated excess per se, although as a technical term it has acquired the latter meaning 
rather imprecisely. In Q. 2:275, having been juxtaposed against bay~ which is 
indisputably a process, ribii is also a process, not its product. Had ribii referred to the 
product (interest), its Qur'anic juxtaposition would have been against ribIJ (profit), the 
product of the processof bay·. 
For J. N. D. Anderson, ribii, which is commonly translated as "usury," basically 
means any fixed rate of interest.526 Contradictorily, Coulson caUs the ribii doctrine 
basically a prohibition ofusury, extended rigorously and systematically by the jurists to 
cover interest.527 Anderson then adds an ethical perspective by calling ribii or interest a 
"pejorative term." 528 He regards the complete prohibition of fixed rates of interest as a 
rigid interpretation of the classical doctrine, and an intolerable restriction on trade "for 
merchants throughout the whole Muslim world."529 With this perception, he confines the 
scope, and thus the rationale, of ribii to "exploitation of a brother Muslim's time of 
need," exempting therefrom "modest rates of fixed interest," which, in line with the 
contemporary Saudi Arabian rationalization, he would prefer to label as "commission" 
or "payment for services rendered."530 He does, however, raise an important yet-unraised 
question of methodology about the comparative "basic authority" and "equal univers al 
524 Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit ofl~lamic Law (Athens, Georgia; London: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), 161 f. 
525 N.J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in l~/amic Jurisprudence (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 87-88. 
526 J. N. D. Anderson, Law Rcform in the Muslim World (London: The Athlone Press, 1976). n. 22, 194. 
527 Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions; 69-70. 
528 Anderson, Law Reform, 100. 
529 Ibid., 10. 
530 Ibid., 194. 
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and permanent applicability" of the ribi-prohibitory Qur'anic verses. The only answer is 
that an Qur'anic injunctions, even when contextual in nature for ease of comprehension, 
have a univers al and permanent import. The divine revelation does not provide any scale 
to measure the comparative basic authority of the divine injunctions. He further sees the 
same reservations about authority, universality and permanent applicability in the 
Prophetic Sunna, which is further complicated by the question of authenticity and 
variance.531 Again, the only response can be that the development of law from the 
primary sources of the Qur'an and the Sunna cannot proceed without ground rules, 
which are the equal authority of the entire Qur'an and the authority and authenticity of 
an traditions inc1uded in one of the six ~aiJJiJ collections of iJadith. 
The above survey of input ofOrientalist and Muslim scholarship shows the sketchy 
and inconclusive nature of the contemporary discourse on the ribi paradigm, which 
again is not conducive to theory development. 
II.8. Legal Extrapolation 
Legal contribution to the usury discourse, although one of the oldest, is 
nevertheless the least productive for theory development. It is essentially a paradigm of 
limitation and promulgation, and even when of prohibition, not of exposition. It limits 
and even prohibits usury, but, conforming to the typical characteristics of the genre, 
does not formally indicate why - the question that is at the root of this thesis. 
II.8.i. Ancient Law Codes 
In the developed secular juristic cultures of the ancient world, excepting Israel, and 
also later, the practice of usury is permitted, but varying limits are placed on the 
maximum legally charge able rate. The prohibition is limiting in nature; it applies only 
after a certain point. The meaning of the term is "charge for the use of money," and 
hence the application of the concept is accordingly only financial/economic. The 
underlying ration ale of the limitation of the practice is the concern of the ruler/State for 
the welfare of the po Of. The consequence of any violation, therefore, is civil law 
penalties. 
53l Ibid., 178. 
131 
The ancient so-called Law Codes incorporating this model of limiting the 
maximum chargeable rate of usury, in varying forms and measures, are summarized in 
Appendix 10 (a).532 The Laws of Eshnunna (c. 1925 B.C.), however, are the first extant 
legal source dealing directly with loans at interest. They begin a four thousand year 
history of legislation on interest-taking.533 The most complete extant treatment of loans 
at interest is the Code of Hammurabi (1728-1686 B. C.). Significantly, in this Code, 
interest was thought of as "offspring." Harnrnurabi and later legislators, in a striking 
parallel to the later Islamic requirement in Q. 2:282 were very cautious about the 
formalities of loan contracts and the honest keeping of records. The Code stipulated that 
a man who lends without drawing up a written contract or without calling in witnesses 
has no legal right to the capital or the interest. The Code also deals with the abusive 
practice of anatocism, taking of interest on interest (compound interest). 534 
A review of ancient Near-Eastem practice reveals that in more than eighty percent 
of the temple loans in ancient Babylonia, the god of justice Samas takes on the role of 
credit or par excellence by contributing to the standardization of interest rates, making 
the "interest of Samas " a frequent phrase in loan texts.535 "The temple loans allowing 
the poor to repay whenever they had the money, instead of insisting on a definite date" 
536 echoes the Iater Islamic recornrnendation of qan! iJasan (open-maturity loan). 
The ancient Law Codes lack a deductive consistency. They contain few general 
rules, no abstract definitions, and no strictly logical plan. There are repetitions, lacunae, 
and even contradictions. Maloney sketches the ancient Near-Eastem legal practice, 
(which bears a striking parallel to the typical Islamic legal system), as follows: 
Ancient Near-Eastem law is therefore not so much a science as an art, enabling the jurist to 
resolve practical daily problems. He does not deduce his conclusions from abstract principles or 
appeal to precedents in judge-made law. Rather, the code sets before him concrete hypotheses 
taken from reality and indicative of a solution. The jurist discems which circumstances are the 
same, which are different, which have a bearing on the solution of the case, which do not. Then 
he makes a decision. This legal method, in which a constant factor (e.g., a fugitive slave) is 
examined in successive cases with varying circumstances, is evident not just in the codes 
mentioned above, but also in ana ittisu [a series of a seri bal sehool-book text preserved in the 
532 As quoted in George Mendenhall, Law and Co venant in Israel and the Aneicnt Near East (Pittsburgh: Biblieal Colloquium, 1955), 
9, these aneient Law Codes, limiting the usury rate, are the Ur-Nammu Code (e. 2050 s.e.), the Code of Eshnunna (e. 1925 s.e.), 
the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (e. 1860 B.C.), the Code of Hammurabi (e. 1700 S.C.), the Hittite Code (e. 1450 B.e.), the Assyrian Code (e. 
1350 B.e.), and the Covenant Code (e. 1000 s.e.). 
533 Maloney, Baekground,14, 16. 
534 Ibid.,20, 23-24. 
535 Ibid., 35. 
536 Ibid., 36. 
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library of Ashurbanipal] where lists of circumstances modifying cases are provided for students. 
For the jurist using the method, the legal prescriptions are exemplars. The general rules which 
inspired them remain implicit in the more or less large number of cases and decisions given in a 
code.537 
In the face of this legal method and the interest-rate-limiting character of the 
ancient law codes, it is futile to look for a coherent ancient Near-Eastern legal theory of 
usury, beyond the stated usury prohibition rationale of "welfare of the po or" and the clue 
to an unstated philosophie al rationale in the Code of Harnrnurabi ("offspring"), whieh 
will be further explored in chapter IV. 
II.8.ii. Greek/Roman Legal Regulations 
As detailed in Appendix 10 (b), with two Roman exceptions, in spite of the 
philosophical discourse, the Greek and Roman legal framework did not recognize usury 
prohibition as a precept of divine law and hence viewed it merely as a rate limiting 
mechanism. 
Greek civil law did neither prohibit usury nor impose maximum rates.538 On the 
other hand, the beginning of Roman legal involvement in the usury problem was a 
political and social issue.539 The first legal intervention on usury occurred through the 
famous Twelve Tablets (Leges Duodecim Tabularum), c. 451- 449 B.C., which are the 
foundation for the whole fabric of Roman Law, and which represented a codification and 
promulgation at the behest of the plebeians of what had forrnerly been customary law 
administered and interpreted by the patricians. These interventions continued in a 
checkered fashion as rate limiting only until the Lex Genucia (342 B.C.), which 
prohibited usury altogether. However, the law fit in poorly with the conditions of the 
time, and was "honored more in the breach than in the keeping. The law-maker had 
tried, and failed, to eliminate what was already a necessary part of the Roman 
economy. "540 
Finally, in the Christian era, legal compliance with, but later abrogation of, other-
worldly prohibition of usury as part of oriental imperial law carne about. Basil the 
Macedonian (867-886) repudiated and banned interest-taking for any reason whatsoever 
537 Ibid 46 
538T.w:'Ta;lor and J.W. Evans, "Islamie Banking and the Prohibition ofUsury in Western Economie Thought," Nat. West Quarterly, 
Nov., 1987,16, quoted in Buckley, Thcological Examination, 82. 
5]9 Maloncy, Background, 100. 
540 Ibid., 103; P. Louis, Ancient Rome at Work, trans. E. Wareing, (New York: Barnes and Noblc, 1965),87. 
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as unworthy of a Christian state because it was prohibited by divine law. But Basil's 
decree caused such havoc that his successor, Leo the Wise (886-911), abrogated it (with 
great delieaey) and set the maximum rate of interest at 4%: 
Certainly it would be excellent and salutary if the human race, being conformed to the laws of 
the Holy Spirit, had no need for human regulations. Nevertheless as it is not granted to a11 to be 
raised up to the heights of the Holy Spirit and to hear the echo of the divine law, but actually 
there are very few who arrive there through the practice ofvirtue, we ought to be quite happy if 
men at least live comfortably to human laws. The judgment of the Holy Spirit condemns in an 
absolute fashion what is ca11ed interest on loans of money, and knowing that, the Emperor of 
etemal memory, our father, decided to forbid, by a special measure, the receiving ofinterest. But 
that prohibition became, because of extreme poverty, a cause, not of betterment, as was the 
legislator' s aim, but of perversion ... 
Leo concluded: Without wanting to condemn the law in itself'(something which would not 
please God), granted (as 1 have said) that hwnan nature cannot attain the sublimity of'the law, 
we abrogate this enactment which was too perf'ect, and we permit, on the contrary, a retum to 
the practice of loans of money at interest, as the ancient legislators had authorized. 541 
It is informative to note from this passage - a theological construct - that the 
other-worldly prohibition of usury was at least recognized, both in promulgation and in 
abrogation, as an attempt to eonform to divine law whieh was "too perfeet" and who se 
echoes were not audible to aIl, who could not be raised up to the "heights of the Holy 
Spirit," as mentioned in the citation above. 
As is obvious from the above presentation, Greek/Roman thought and legislation 
on usury was mainly what might be termed as a rate limiting paradigm without any 
attempt at a well-rounded theory of prohibition, beyond the theological recognition, by 
Basil the Macedonian and Leo the Wise, of the prohibition as the divine law. To this 
extent, then, the Roman usury paradigm may be characterized as possessing "vertical 
depth," but, being a financial paradigm only, stilliacking "horizontal spread." 
II.8.iii. Earlier Conciliar Legislation 542 
As the Church developed in power, - especially after the conversion of the 
Emperor Constantine in 311 CE - antagonism against usurious lending gradually 
hardened into prohibition within the canons of the early church councils.543 At first it 
de ait only with clerics, who, as guardians of other-worldly property, may have had 
541 Leo the Wise, Novcllac, 83, translated by Maloney in his, Background, n. 110, 112-113. 
542 This section also draws hcavily and libcrally on the doctoral dissertation of Rcv. Robert P. Maloncy (Maloncy, Background, 180-
203) for its original research. 
543 Couneil of Elvira (306); Couneil of Arles (314); First General Couneil ofNieaea (325: in its seventeenth canon); Couneil of 
Carthage (348: the carlicst African council from which a collection of canons survive, in its thirtccnth canon); Council of Laodicca 
(4th e.: in its fourth eannon); Sixth Couneil of Carthage (401); Rabbula, the bishop of Edessa (412-435); Council of Tours (461); and 
Council of Aix-la-Chapelle (789) under Charlemagne (742-814), as dctailed in Appendix 12 (e). 
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practical difficulties and temptations.544 Therefore, as pointed out by Maloney, 
concurrent with the Fathers' battle against the recurrent problem of usury, the local and 
provincial church authorities as well as the general Council of Nicaea issued several 
authoritative pronouncements condemning usury. This other-worldly legislation 
prohibited what civil legislation allowed, both in east and west. But in spite of severe 
threatened penalties, both clerics and laymen sought profit from loans, ignoring the 
prohibitions in these earliest conciliar other-worldly pronouncements. 
These religious "Church" initiatives ultimately found secular "State" backing. As 
pointed out by Buckley: 
The Christian teaching found expression, for the first time in history, in the secuJar legislation of 
the State. Citing Nicaea, 'Nec hoc quoque', the Apostolic Canons, and the 'Iaw of the folk', the 
capitularies of Charlemagne forbade usury to everyone. That the State should ban usury for lait y, 
as weil as clergy, is an important event. Rere in the formative age of medieval civilization the 
rule with regard to usury is acknowledged by the secular power as obligatory on ail Christians. 
From this time on both Church and State press the fight against USury.545 
Tracing the further historical developments, Buckley continues:546 
Several times the Roly Roman Empire renews the basic prohibition ... The Church also continues 
the battle by me ans of Episcopal capitularies, for example, the Paris Synod of 829 showed a 
wider use of biblical authorities, and the Synod of Pavia in 850 took the sharpest methods yet 
against lay usurers. In 889 an Episcopal capitulary contained the first legislation referring to 
usury taken by means of a contract.547 Similar sanctions were invoked against usurers in England 
by the Council of Northumberland, Alfred the Great (849-899), and Edward the Confessor (1004-
1066).548 
Evaluating the historical developments of the period from 750 to 1050 CE, which 
is regarded by Noonan as primitive, Buckley549 cites the positive developments of this 
era as: (1) enactment by the Holy Roman Empire of the usury prohibition as the law of 
the land; (2) local legislation against usury by bishops; (3) collection of biblical texts 
against usury; (4) rejection of the defense that the usurer is entitled to a reward for 
helping the borrower productively; and (5) papal condemnation of usury applicable to 
laymen. Of the negative developments, Buckley cites: (1) lack of papacy sponsorship of 
generallegislation on usury; (2) bare definition of usury; (3) non-recognition of usury as 
a sin against justice; (4) maintaining of the generic category of usury as turpe lucrum 
544 Buckley, Thcological Examination, 83. 
545 Ibid., 84. 
546 Ibid., 84-85. 
547 Noonan, Scho/astic Ana/ysi;; 16. 
548 Mills, InlcTcsl in InlcTcsl, Il. 
549 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 85. 
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(shameful gain); and (5) denunciation of the sin of usury more as a form of avarice or 
uncharitableness. Around 1050 CE, she maintains, the Christian teaching on usury enters 
a second stage of development with the advent of the Scholastic analysis of usury in the 
medieval period. 
The Christian teaching on usury, in its conciliar form, has been summarized by 
Maloney thus: 550 
(1) A continuous string of councils in both east and west condemned usury. 
(2) The councils considered usury grave sin and often imposed severe penalties 
(excommunication and deposition) on violators of the prohibition. 
(3) Even in the earliest conciliar legislation usury was condemned for both clerics 
and laymen. 
(4) Councils used sacred script ure, especially Ps. 15:5, to support the condemnation, 
viewing usury as contrary to the law and the prophets. 
(5) Conciliar legislation was not merely preventative, nor was it particularly 
successful- usury was common among both clerics and laymen. 
As is clear from the above presentation, the conciliar legislation merely legislated 
against a sin; it neither went into the question of the ratio legis nor of the ration ale of 
the prohibition. Therefore, Christian conciliar legislation alone cannot be of any help in 
the deve10pment of a comprehensive theory ofusury. 
In fact, the entire Judeo-Christian tradition on usury prohibition did not feel the 
need to go into the question of ratio legis. Unlike the Islamic prohibition apparently 
applicable to money and initially to six specifically named commodities, the Judeo-
Christian prohibition applied ab initia to everything physical - money, produce, 
anything else. There was, therefore, no need felt for analogical extension of the 
prohibition on physical items and hence no apparent use for a ratio legis. Gnly the 
Islamic legal repertoire is brimming with copious discussions on ratio legis tilla). 
However, for aH the monotheistic religious traditions - Judaism, Christianity, Islam -
the identification of the ratio legis of the usury (marbJt, ribiï) prohibition is essential 
because the theological prohibition extends beyond physical objects to concepts, 
attitudes and practices as well, which have not been identified so far and which 
550 Maloncy, Background, 20\-203. 
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obviously cannot be identified without an operative ratio legis. This task will be 
attempted in this work in chapter IV. 
II.8.iv. Arab 18hillya Regime 
The pre-Islamic Arab Jahillya regime, governed by tribal customary law, had no 
intellectual contribution to the ribii discourse. Moreover, their only literary production, 
highly eloquent oral poetry, had no place for a mundane topic such as ribii. They were 
reportedly only practitioners of ribii. Yet, being the direct audience of the divine 
revelation through Prophet Mu4ammad, their perceived financial practices - whatever 
their actual historical content - became a focal point of the asbiib al-nuziïl of the ribii-
prohibitory verses of the Qur'an, and came to acquire the technical designation of ribii 
al-jiihi/lya in Islamic fiqh and tafslrworks. Muslim exegetical and juridical endeavor on 
ribii, therefore, came to rely heavily on these perceived pre-Islamic Arab Jahillya 
financial practices that warrant an examination. 
Whether or not the immediate target of the Qur'anic injunctions on ribii was the 
localized Jahillya context or a more generalized univers al context depends on what was 
the social and commercial status ofpre-Islamic Mecca and the role of ribiiin it. Was the 
social and commercial atmosphere of Mecca conducive to widespread practice of usury? 
Was usury a standard personal and business financial practice, or was it an instrument of 
coercion and exploitation of the po or by the rich? The question of the social and 
commercial status of Mecca is the subject of intense debate between the traditionalist 
(mainly Muslim) and revisionary sources (mainly Orient alist , e.g., Patricia Crone), 
which place the city variously between one extreme of a mature financial and trading 
center with widespread practice of ribiiboth for consumption and production loans, and 
another extreme of a town ofno significance at aU, except the sanctuary. Neither case is 
supported by reliable historical evidence. 
The Muslim sources focus on Ta'if, the home of the Thaqlf tribe, and on Mecca, 
the home of the Quraysh and its branch Banu Mughlra tribe, as two mature commercial 
and financial centers. Significant portion of the population of Ta'if is believed to have 
been Jews who, upon expulsion from Yemen and Yathrib, had reportedly settled there 
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for business purposes.551 Belonging to the Thaqlf tribe, their main business was ribawl 
transactions.552 For sorne of them, this was the exclusive business.553 Ribii being thus 
ingrained in their economic life, the Roly Prophet had stipulated in the Ta'if Peace 
Treaty not only its complete abolition for future dealings,554 but also the giving up of all 
present ribii claims.555 The ribawl dealings of the Thaqlf, both in cash and in kind, were 
not confined ta the inhabitants of Ta'if but also extended to the trading population of 
Mecca as well, with Banu Mughlra being their permanent clients.556 It is even believed 
that the Quranic verse 2:278 ("Be afraid of Allah and give up what remains of ribii ... ") 
was revealed in response to the dispute between the Thaqlf and the Banu Mughlra over 
payment of a large amount of outstanding ribii after acceptance of Islam.557 Debt 
recovery, both in cash and in kind, involved doubling of the principal and interest upon 
initial defaulCS58 However, it is not clear how the doubled and re-doubled debt was 
ultimately settled, when even the initial debt was incapable of settlement. The sources 
are not in agreement on the ultimate shape of the loan disposition and the consequences 
of final default. In view of this technical incompleteness of the reports, it appears that 
these "historical" descriptions have been tendentiously invented and tailored only to the 
extent necessary to provide a sabab al-nuziïl for the "doubling and re-doubling" ribii 
verse ofthe Qur'an.559 
Mecca, on the other hand, devoid of agriculture, forests, mineraIs and 
manufacturing, is said to have been forced into trading as a means of livelihood, 560 thus 
becoming a principal trading center. 561 The institutions of the sanctuary and pilgrimage, 
the 'Ukii? siïq, khama and iyliifcontributed to this role.562 This trading city gradually 
acquired the status of a banking and financial clearing center with the growth of the 
necessary institutions and traditions.563 This had made ribawl dealings commonplace in 
551 A~mad ibn YaI)yii Baliidhurl, Futii!} al-Buldiin. (Cairo, 1932),67. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Abu l;Iayyan M~ammad ibn Yusuf al- Andulisl, al-BalJar al-Mu!}l! fi Tafi..Jr al-Qur'an (al-Riyii<): Maktabah wa-Ma!iibi' al-Na~r 
al-l,Iadithah, 19l1'!), 1, 33.5. 
554 Baliidhurl, Futii!} al-Buldan, 67. 
555 Jaliil al-Dln Suyut1, al-Durr al-Manthiir(Bayrut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 197'1),1,336; Tabarl, Tafi,'lr, III, 66. 
556 Tabarl, Tafi,ir, IV, 55. 
557 ibid., 1Il, 66. 
558 Ibid. 
559 Q. 3:130. 
560 Tabarl, Tiirlkh, 1602. 
561 Philip Khuri Hitti, HistoryofthcArabs (London: Macmillan, 1937), 104. 
562 Muhammad Hamidullah, 'Ahad Nabawl main Niziim Hukmranl, 236-239. 
563 Shortcr Encyclopacdia ofl~/am, s.v. Mecca, 36sff. . 
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Mecca. Schacht, quoting Lammens,564 subscribes to the view that "transactions with a 
fixed time limit and payment of interest as weIl as speculations of aU kinds formed an 
essential element in the highly developed trading system of Mecca."565 For the Meccans, 
ribawl business was like a commercial business, and, like bay~ was a means of 
exchange.566 The Quraysh had highly developed their ribawl business, which was not 
confined to their own tribe but extended to other tribes of the f.lijaz. 'Abbas ibn aI-
MuHalib and Khalid ibn Walid had, before the prohibition, operated a ribawJlending 
business covering both Mecca and Ta'if, lending particularly to Banu 'Umru ibn 
'Umayr, a branch of the Banu 'Awf.567 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, a wealthy trader, aiso 
operated a ribawJ1ending business.568 Tabar! reports that the evil of ribii had become so 
common in pre-Islamic times that the Quraysh had to be warned by their elders against 
using any ribii earnings in rebuilding the Ka 'ba shrine in c. 605 CE. 569 Abu Wahb ibn 
'Amr ibn 'A'idh, an uncle of the Prophet's father, warned them: "0 people of the 
Quraysh, do not put into its foundations anything which is not pure or permissible, do 
not fill into it anything earned either by a prostitute, or through a transaction involving 
ribii, or anything which has been taken wrongfully after defrauding any person of his 
right or due."570 This report alludes that, even in the pre-Islamic age, ribii was treated as 
an abomination but still practiced widely. 
The sources also describe in detail the forms and kinds of ribii prevalent in the 
Jahiliya, which arose out of loans or credit sales. In loans, money was advanced for an 
agreed period in exchange for a stipulated increase,571 sometimes in quality, sometimes 
in quantity,572 the rate of which was mutually agreed by the parties, according to the 
amount and period of the 10an,573 and the payment of which was either in monthly 
installments,574 or in lump sum upon maturity.575 In case of default at maturity, under the 
lump sum payment method, the principal and interest was doubled and the repayment 
564 P. H. Lammcns, La Mecque. a la veille de l'hégire, 1924, 139 sqq., 155 sqq., 213 sq. 
5(>5 ShoIter ffncyclopacdia of/sIam, s.v. Riba, 471 ff. 
566 Tabar1, Tafl,·Jr, III, 66. 
567 ibid. 
568 Tabar1 TirJkh 1753 
569 Ibid., [1[, 1136: . 
570 Ibn Hisham, SJra, 1, 210-212. 
571 al-Ja~~a~ al-Raz1, Al;kiim al-Qur'iin, l, 551, 552, 554. 
572 Sharl; al-Miiwa!!aby Shah Wall Allah Dihlaw!, l, 356. 
573 al-Ja~~a~ al-Raz1, Al;kiim al-Qur'iin,l, 551. 
574 Raz!, Tafs/r al-KabJr, Il, 371. 
575 Tabar1, TafsJr, III, 62. 
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period extended;576 under the installment payment method, the amount of the installment 
was increased and the repayment period extended.577 In credit sales, the time ofpayment 
of the price together with the interest rate was stipulated. In case of default at maturity, 
the time was further extended against increase in the interest.578 
The extensive citations, above, from respected Muslim sources, unhesitatingly 
attest to the presence and differing forms of ribiiin the Jahiliya age. But it is not certain 
as to whether these descriptions reflect history as it actually was, or are mere theoretical 
extrapolations in the service of agendas. These "historical" accounts raise two 
conceptual problems. Firstly, there is a problem of authenticity. The most quoted 
authority, Tabar1, was writing almost three centuries after the formaI close of the 
Jâhiliya age. In the absence of any written historical records of the Jahiliya, what were 
his sources for the detailed description of the financial practices of the period? In the 
case of Prophetie pronouncements, actions and events, there is at least the 
historiographical assurance afforded by the highly deve10ped science of fJadith - the 
matn and isniid authentication. But, in the case of pre-Islamic history, there is no matn 
and isniid authentication. What, then, is the reliability of the reports concerning Jahiliya 
practices, particularly the financial ones? 
Secondly, there is a problem of consistency. As seen above, various Arab tribes 
(e.g. Thaqlf and Banu Mughlra) and individuals (e.g., 'Abbas ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and 
'Uthman ibn' Affan) from Mecca and Ta'if are reported to have been big usurers, but, 
surprisingly, no accounts of exploitation of the debtor at the hands of these credit or 
tribes and individuals are mentioned even in the Muslim sources which otherwise posit 
that the Jâhiliya ribii practice was inherently exploitative and was the sabab al-nuziilof 
the riba~prohibition. These sources translate the term ?ulm, used in the ribi-prohibitory 
verse Q. 2: 279, as injustice and exploitation and treat it as the rationale for the 
prohibition, yet no historical accounts of widespread injustice or exploitation from the 
practice of ribii are to be found. 
576 Ibid., IV, 55. 
577 Raz), TafJ;Jr al-Kab7r, Il, 371. 
578 Tabar), Ta[~7r, III, 62. 
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The sources only mention that the defaulting debtors were sold into slavery. 
Bukharl has cited traditions showing that, in early Islam, prisoners of war and defaulting 
debtors were tied and bound in mosques. Shurayh used to order that debtors be 
imprisoned and confined together with prisoners of war in mosques.579 But the later 
jurists differed as to whether they were to be imprisoned. Ibn I:Iazm, the Malilà jurist, 
opposed the I:Ianafite fuqahii', who held that such debtors must be imprisoned. However, 
Abiï Bakr al-Ja~~a~ holds that a defaulting debtor must be imprisoned for two or three 
months. If he still does not pay but can afford to pay, he is thrown into prison 
indefinitely until he pays - but ifhe is in financial straits, he is released.580 
Far removed from readily available Scriptural revelation and immediate Prophetie 
guidance, except the mn al-iJanlf which was not an elaborate religious code, and in 
complete unfamiliarity with, indeed absence of, any centralized regulation, the JahiIiya 
society at the advent of Islam was govemed by tribal customary law in aU domains 
including the financial. Paucity of elaborate and authentic sources on these early 
historical periods, however, prevents an accurate and reliable reconstruction of the exact 
financial practices of the period, as shown above. In spite of this handicap, one 
conclusion is possible: there was no religious or secular regulation of financial dealings, 
including interest rates. Admittedly, as seen above, there are Muslim sources that claim 
to de scribe the financial practices of the times. But the question as to what were the 
credit and interest rate practices of the time has not been satisfactorily answered. These 
sources are generally inadequate and often ev en contradictory. A comparison of the 
formulations of the JabiIiya financial practices by the early exegetes and jurists, below, 
illustrates this point. 
Tabar! (d. 310/923), dilating on the meaning of the term ribii as used in verse Q. 
3: 130, explains the JahiIiya lending practice: 
Do not consume ribii after having professed Islam as you have been consuming it before Islam. 
The way pre-Islamic Arabs used to consume ribii was that one of them would have a debt 
repayable on a specifie date. When that date came the creditor would demand repayment trom 
the debtor. The latter would say, 'Defer the repayment of my debt; 1 will add to your wealth.' 
This is the ribiiwhich was doubled and redoubled.581 
579 Bukharl. $a&I&. kitab al-~alat, bab al-aslr wa-al-gharim yurbat fi al-masjid. Sec also Malik, Muwa!.ta '. 11, 67~-6~0; Tabarl, Jami' 
al-Baya n, VI, 33-34. 
580 al-Ja~~a~, AlJkiim al-Qur'in, l, 474ff. 
581 Abii Ja'far Mui)ammad ibn Jarlr at-Tabarl, Jiimi' al-Bayin fi Ta 'wJI Ayat al-Qur'an. 3,,1 cd. 30 vols. (Cairo: Mu~tafiî al-Bab1 al-
f:lalab1, 1963; Dar al-Ma'arif, n.d.), IV, 59. 
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Elaborating the above report, but omitting the reference to doubling and 
redoubling of ribii, Tabar1 further states: 
God has forbidden ribii which is the amount that was increased for the capital owner because of 
his extension of maturity for his debtor, and deferment of repayment of the debt.582 
The practice of doubling and redoubling of ribii in the pre-Islamic period (JahilIya) 
as described by the son of Zayd b. Aslam (d. 136/754)583 is quoted by Tabar1: 
Ribii in the pre-Islamic period consisted of the doubling and redoubling [of money or 
commodities], and in the age [of the cattle]. At maturity, the credit or would say to the debtor, 
'Will you pay me, or increase [the debt]? If the debtor had anything, he would pay. Otherwise, 
the age of the cattle [to be repaid] would be increased ... If the debt was money or a commodity, 
the debt would be doubled to be paid in one year, and even then, if the debtor could not pay, it 
would be doubled again: one hundred in one year would become two hundred. If that was not 
paid, the debt would increase to four hundred. Each year the debt would be doubled.584 
There is an inconsistency in the lending practice relating to cattle and 
money/cornrnodity as described in the above report. In case of default at maturity, while 
the age of cattle would be increased (by how much at first default and subsequent 
defaults?), the amount of money/cornrnodity debt would be doubled, and later, 
redoubled Why is the doubling mIe not applicable in case of cattle? 
The effect of this doubling and redoubling of ribii would be that "a small amount 
[of debt] could consume aU the wealth of the debtor," as pointed out by Zamakhshar1 (d. 
538/1144),585 by "repeated increases," as pointed out by Baygawp86 
The above quoted reports do not indicate whether the debts referred to were the 
result ofloans or credit sales. However, Ibn al-'Arabl (d. 543/1148), in his commentary 
on the Qur'an, confines his description of the debt to credit sales alone, to the exclusion 
of loans altogether: 
Ribii was weil known among the Arabs. A person would sell something on a deferred payment 
basis. Upon maturity the credit or would say [to the debtor]: 'Will you pay [as agreed] or will you 
add an amount to the [original] debt?,587 
AlI the above quoted reports indicate that an increase was neither agreed nor added 
to the principal amount of the debt for the initial maturity at the time the debt was 
contracted; the incrcase in the debt occuITed only upon default at maturity for the 
582 Tabarl fami' III 69 
583 ibn l:I~r, Tahdib: III: 395. 
584 Tabar1, fami: IV, 59. 
585 Abu al-Qasim Jar Allah Ma4mud b. 'Umar Zamakhshar1, al-Kashshiif"an fjaqii'iq al- TanzJI (Calcutta: Maçba'at al-Laysi, 1856), 
234. 
586 'Abd Allah Bay4awi, Ta/SJr al-Qur'an (Istanbul: Dar al-Tiba'a al- 'Amira, 1886),56. 
587 Abu Bakr Mul)ammad b. 'Abd Allah Ibn al-' ArabI, Al}kiim al-Qur'iin (Cairo: Mu~çafii al-Babî al-l:Ialabl, 1376/1957), 1,241. 
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extended maturity. This means that the initial maturity was interest-free and that it was 
only the extended maturity which attracted an increase (interest). 
As explained above,588 this Jahiliya financial practiee has a st ri king resemblance to 
the early Christian practice whereby the prohibition of usury was effectively evaded 
through a stratagem (lJJJa) by keeping the initial maturity usury-free but deliberately 
short, and charging a compensation (interesse: interest) for the "loss emerging" 
(damnum emergens) from failure by the debtor to repay on the stipulated date, Le., the 
differential position of the creditor arising out of the default at initial maturity, which 
was covertly pre-arranged. Thus the credit or effectively enjoyed the bene fit of usury, 
except for the initial short period, while still complying with the letter of the law which 
prohibited usury. This parallel means that either the Jahiliya age in Arabia was also 
aware of and complied with the prohibition of usury in letter, while flouting it in spirit, 
or that the original credit was truly gratuitous. But if this practice was not a stratagem 
(lJJJa), and if the original debt was truly gratuitous, then it is difficult to comprehend the 
financiallogic of this reported practiee. Why would a debt be interest-free initially and 
then become interest-bearing subsequently? What was the motivation of the lender? 
Why was generosity followed by cruelty? Why would a debt be contracted interest-free 
initially and only upon default of even the soft terms attract interest (100%: doubling in 
one year) which would further aggravate the chances of debt recovery? The prospects of 
debt recovery in case of default are improved by softening the terms and conditions, not 
by hardening them. In case of debt arising out of credit sales, the reported Jahiliya 
financial practiee of no explicit increase for the initial term is understandable because 
the credit priee would have been higher than the cash priee, thus already building-in the 
increase for the initial delay. But in case of debt arising out ofloans, as explained above, 
the reported practiee is utterly incomprehensible. 
The reported Jahiliya debt practice (doubling each year after the initial year) could 
only lead not to full debt recovery for the credit or but to utter financial ruin for the 
debtor. There are historical reports about the Meccan practiee of i'tifiid (ritual suicide )589 
588 Scc II.I.i., p. 35., abovc. 
589 Mul)ammad ibn Al)mad al- Qurtubl, al-Jami' li Af:Jkiim al-Qur'an (Cairo: Dar al-Kit ab aI-'Arabl, 1967),11, 204ff. 
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and qiniina (serfdom, slavery).59o But the practice of i'titad (ritual suicide), whereby a 
bankrupt merchant would separate himself and his family from the rest of the clan and 
starve to death rather than become a liability for relatives, is mentioned in the sources 
only in connection with bankruptcy due to the restricted nature of the Meccan 
merchants' commercial activity and not necessarily due to ribii (usury).591 However, 
qiniina (serf dom, slavery) is mentioned in the sources in connection with ribii (usury),592 
but there are no reports of the widespread incidence of the practice. 
The Qur'an does refer to doubling and redoubling ribii 593 but the specifie mode of 
doubling reported by the exegetes (no increase for initial maturity followed by 100% 
increases for extended maturities) finds no support in the Qur'an. It is quite possible that 
the Qur'an, in the absence of any indicators to the contrary, is simply describing the 
logical process of ribii generation where any rate of increase applied uniformly each 
period results in a doubling and redoubling of the principal over a number of years 
depending on the rate of increase. And this doubling occurs whether the debt attracts 
compound interest (quicker doubling) or even simple interest (slower doubling). The 
argument of the modernists that the doubling ribii prohibited by the Qur'an594 refers to 
compound interest only and not to the simple interest charged by the contemporary 
banks, is therefore not valid because doubling can occur in case of simple interest also. 
Further, compound interest is very much the standard financial practice ofbanks today. 
However, here a historiographie al problem is encountered. The reported financial 
practice (doubling each year after the initial year) as described by the early exegetes, 
such as Tabar!, is clearly contradicted by the ijanafi jurist al-Ja~~a~ in the chapter on 
ribii in his AlJkiim al-Qur'iin, where he contends that the initially specified maturity 
attracted an agreed upon increase: 
The ribi which the Arabs knew and practiced meant lending money [dirhams and dinars] with a 
specified maturity at an agreed upon increase over and above the sum borrowed.595 
590 E. R. Wolf, "Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins ofIslam," Southwestcm Joumal of Anthropology, 7. Albuquerque, 
1951: 329-356. ; Shihiib al-Dln Al)mad al-Qastalanl, Irshiid al-Sari fi $alJllJ al-Bukhari (Cairo, A.H. 1304 [1 RR6!7]), IV, 315ff; Jawiid 
'Ali, al-Mulà,5,5al fi Tiiiikh al-'Arab qabla al-Isliim, 10 vols. Beirut, 1971, VII, 46ff. ; H. Lammens, la Mecque a la veille de /'hègirc 
(Beyrouth, 1924), 237ff; Maxime Rodinson, Muhammad (New York, NY., 1974),36. 
591 Mahmood Ibrahim, "Social and Economie Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mccca", Intemational Joumal of Middle Bast Studic,,' 
(Cambridge University Press: The Middle East Studies Association of North America,), 14 (\9R2), 344. 
592 Ibid., 346. 
593 Q. 3:130. 
594 Q. 3:130. 
595 al-Ja~~ii~, AlJkiim al-Qur'in, 1,465. 
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In the face of the conceptual problems and reporting contradictions discussed 
above, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that it is very difficult to reconstruct 
accurate1y and authentically the actual financial practices of the Jahiliya and it is ev en 
more difficult to relate any Qur'anic injunction with such unauthenticated practices. 
This conclusion supports the view that the object of the Qur'anic injunctions was not 
any concrete local context; it was, and is, an abstract univers al context. 
II.8.v. Islamic Legal Pronouncements 
The views of individual Muslim fuqahii' and muftis, like the madhiihib expositions 
on ribii examined be1ow, are marked by differences of opinion that severe1y hinder the 
development of an encompassing theory of ribii and bay' by utterly failing to handle 
productïve1y the 'illa and l;.ikma of the injunctions. Furthermore, the chronologie al 
presentation ofthese views in Appendix 8, be1ow, does not detect any orderly diachronic 
evolution in the generally understood concept of ribii. While Caliph 'Umar reportedly 
lamented the absence of sufficient Prophetic explication, Caliph 'Ali offered a purely 
economic explication of ribii-prohibition, based on his own opinion596 and on a Prophetic 
l;.adith.597 Companion Ibn 'Abbas 598 initially considered ribii al-jiihiHya - the ribii 
conjectured to have been practiced in the pre-Islamic age - to be the only unlawful ribii, 
which involved increase in the debt for extension of the period of repayment. But the 
question of what exactly was ribii al-jiihiJJya itself has remained unanswered to-date. In 
the absence of firm historical evidence, ribii al-jiihiJJya has been variously defined by 
different modem scholars, each according to his own perspective and agenda. In these 
definitions, there is considerable variation in the details and unanswered questions, e.g.: 
Did the initial agreed period of debt attract ribii, and was it the principal or the ribii 
thereon that was increased (doubled and re-doubled) at the time of extension of the 
maturity? Without allowing these historical controversies to distract the discourse, the 
point is that, according to one version,599 Ibn 'Abbas regarded the historically practiced 
ribii of the Jahiliya age alone as the specifically prohibited ribii based on an authentic 
l;.adith reported by Ibn 'Abbas himself which states in essence: "No ribii except in nasJ'a 
596 Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisl, BilJiir al-An wiir (Tehran: al-Malba'at al-Islamiyyah, 1387), cm, 89. 
597 al-Shaykh u~-Sadugh, al-Khi"iil (Qum, Iran: Mu'assisat un-Nashr ul-Islami, 1403), 1,286. 
598 Togcthcr with Companions Usama Ibn Zayd, 'Abd Allah Ibn Mas'ud, 'Urwa Ibn Zubayr and Zayd Ibn Arqam. 
599 Salch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 34. 
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[delayj" (meaning ribii al-jiihiDya). He considered the earlier six-commodities lJadith as 
superseded by the above quoted lJadith and therefore the ribii al-nasl'a and ribii al-faql 
both provided for in the six- commodities hadith as lawful. He is reported to have later 
retracted this view. 6OO 
Any attempt to restrict the prohibition of ribii to a specifie historical practice, such 
as by Ibn 'Abbas and by modem scholars who still rely on his initial view, localizes the 
import of the Qur'anic and Sunnaic injunctions, tamishes the divinely ordained 
universality ofthese injunctions, and puts a lid ofhistory on the philosophy of the divine 
injunctions on ribii, as will be shown below (chapter IV). 
Imam Abu I;Ianlfa (d. 150/767) and Mul}ammad b. I;Iasan al-Shaybanl (d.189/804), 
on the authority of Mak4ul on the authority of the Prophet, held that there is no ribi 
between Muslims and inhabitants of diir al-lJarb (enemy territ ory) in the dir al-iJarb. 
Although this lJadith is mursal (incompletely transmitted), the only transmitter, i.e., 
Mak4ul al-Shaml al Dimashql (d. 116 AH) was an authoritative jurist, and a lJadith even 
with incomplete isniid (transmitters) from such a source is acceptable. This lJadith 
formed the basis of the permission given by Imam Abu I;Ianlfa and Mul}ammad (al-
Shaybanl) to Muslims to sell one dirham for two dirhams to an enemy in enemy 
territory.601 Another supporting lJadith is quoted to the effect that there is no sin for a 
Muslim in obtaining the wealth of inhabitants of dir al-iJarb by their permission in any 
manner in their t errit ory. 
This permission has profound conceptual and practical implications requiring fuller 
examination. But it is c1ear that this ruling does not legitimize ribii even in enemy 
territory between Muslims. This ruling has a striking resemblance with the 
Deuteronomic injunction (popularly dubbed as the Deuteronomic double-standard, albeit 
without full conceptual investigation) forbidding neshekh only between brothersbut not 
between brother and other. These exemptions raise a fundamental but as yet unexplored 
question about the identity of the actors in the ribii process. What is the defining 
characteristic of the actor that renders his action ribawlor non-ribawl? Diir al-lJarb (vs. 
diir al-Isliim) is only an exoteric manifestation. What then is the underlying esoteric 
600 Ibid. 
601 aI-SarakhsÎ, al-Mabsif.t, XIV, 56, Biib al-,sarffi diir al-fJarb. 
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manifestation? This ruling adds a new question of who to the commonly asked questions 
of what, whyand howof ribii. 
Imam Malik (d. 179/795), on the authority of Zayd b. Aslam,602 Tabar1 (d. 310 
A.H.),603 and Ta4aw1 (d. 321 A.H.),604 aIl give a historical explication of ribii simply in 
terms of ribii al-jiihiHya, without any analytical contribution whatsoever. 
Abu Bakr al-Ja~~ii~ (d. 370/980), the ijanafi jurist and commentator, provides the 
pioneering but damaging basis for the later compartmentalization of ribii into ribii of the 
Qur'an (to mean ribii al-nasJ'a) and ribii of the Sunna (to mean ribii al-facjl), which laid 
the foundation for the Liberal thought on ribii. AdditionaIly, contrary to aIl other 
historical accounts, al-Ja~~a~ contends that ribii al-jiihiHya, like modem-day bank 
interest, consisted of a financial charge for the initial maturity of the loan. He is silent 
about the financial charge for any extended maturities.605 But in a conclusion of far 
reaching significance, he declares that the SharJ'a [technical] connotation of ribii is not 
supported by its literaI meaning of "ribiiis increase." 606 
al-Bayhaq1's (d. 459/1066) contribution also is purely historical rather than 
analytical, simply presenting about two hundred sound and weak traditions on ribii.607 
al-Sarakhs1 (d. 490 or 495/1096 or 1101), the ijanafite jurist, defining ribii both in 
its literaI aspect (excess) and its technical aspect (excess without counter-value), very 
importantly treats ribii as a particular form of bay' (the prohibited form).608 The term 
bay' (though used restrictively by al-Sarakhs1, as weIl as in general parlance) has a widc 
meaning in fiqh which covers aIl types of exchanges, including loans.609 Making a very 
important point on the terminological confusion syndrome, as cited above, he states that 
"[The words] 'facjlis ribii' imply facjlthrough qadrand they imply facjl through a period 
of delay, and both are intended. This was elaborated in the tradition of 'Ubiidah ibn al-
S- 't "610 .ami. 
602 Malik, Muwa!!a: Kitiib al-buyii', Biib al-ribii. 
603 TafSlrlbnJarlr(Bcirut: n.p., 1988), Il,103 and IV, 90. 
604 SharJ; Ma 'iini al-Athiir li '1- TalJiiwl, Il, chapter on ribii, 223. 
605 Abii Bakr Ai)mad ibn' Ali al-Ja~~as al- Rîizl, AlJkiim al-Qur'iin (Bcirut: Diïr al-Kitiïb al-' Arabi, n.d.), 1,465. 
"'6 Ibid., l, 551-2. 
607 Ziaul Haquc, Riba: The Moral Eeonomy of Usury, Interest and Profit (Selangor, Malaysia: Ikraq, 1995), R. 
C<'"al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsiit, XII. 109. 
609 Nyazee. Ribii and lylamic Banking, 20. 
610 Ibid., III. 
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Abu I:Iamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), in a powerful exposition of the function of 
money and in condemnation ofusury, propounds the lJikma of ribi -prohibition thus: 
And whoever makes a transaction of ribii in dirhams and dinars he indulges in denialofblessings 
and conduct of oppression because the se have been created for obtaining other things. There is no 
purpose or benefit in their very selves. Whoever makes them products of trade, makes them the 
object, against the purpose oftheir creation.611 
Elaborating the distinction, Ghazali further states: 
When someone is trading in dirhams and dinars themselves, he is making them as his goal, which 
is contrary to their functions. Money is not created to earn money, and doing so is a 
transgression. The two kinds of money are me ans to acquire other things; they are not meant iàr 
themselves. In relation to other goods, dirhams and dinars are like prepositions in a sentence -
used to give proper meaning to words; or like a mirror reflecting colors but having no color of its 
own. If a person is permitted to sell (or exchange), money with money (for gain), then such 
transactions will become his goal, and thus money will be imprisoned and hoarded. Imprisonment 
of the ruler or post man is a transgression, for th en they are prevented from performing their 
functions; same with money. Selling a dirham with equal amount of it with late payment is also 
not allowed. This can be done only by a generous person who is trying to be benevolent. In the 
case of a loan, an act of generosity such as this conveys to the person gratitude here and reward 
in the Hereafter. But, if someone exchanges dirhams for a bigger amount, there is no question of 
thanks or reward. Further, it is an injustice because it is destroying the qualities of generosity and 
putting it into compensatory exchange. [Italics mine ]612 
Significantly, Ghazali touches the important concept of self-generation of money 
("the two kinds of money are means to acquire other things; they are not meant for 
themselves'') and the other important concept of transgression ("money is not created to 
eam money, and doing so is a transgression ''). However, he does not develop these 
concepts further along philosophical-theological Hnes. For Ghazali, as for many other 
Jewish, Christian and Islamic scholars, the arguments against ribi are sinfulness 
(absolute scriptural prohibition), and the possibility of economic exploitation and 
injustice in transactions. He also posits a purely economic explication of the iJikma of 
ribiï prohibition.613 However, he does not attempt to reconcile this rationale with the 
dire Qur'anic punishments for ribiï -indulgence. 
Other than lending and borrowing, Ghazali discusses transactions where ribiï may 
arise in disguised form, sometimes consistent and sometimes inconsistent with the 
611 Abii l:Iamid al-Ghazafi, IJ;yii' a/- 'Uliim a/-DJn (Bcirut: n.p., 1986), IV, Kitiib al-shukr al-rukn al-awwal, 96-97. 
612 Ibid.,I92. 
61.1Ibid.,4. 
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scriptural prohibition. Notably, similar arguments were developed later by Thomas 
Aquinas.614 
The detailed position of Ghazali, like that of other Arab and European Scholastics, 
on disguised ribii generation has been summed up by Ghazanfar as follows: 
[He] generally assumed that the value of a good was independent of the lapse of time. On this 
assumption, he argue d, there are two ways in which interest [ribaJ can arise in disguised form: it 
can happen when there is an exchange of go Id for gold, wheat for wheat, etc., but with 
differences in quantity or in the time of delivery. If the time of delivery is not immediate and 
excess quantity of the commodity is called for, the excess is riba al-nasiah [sic] (interest due to 
late payment or delivery). If the quantity exchanged is not equal but the exchange takes place 
simultaneously, the excess given in exchange is called riba al-fàdl [sic] (interest due to extra 
payment). Both are forbidden, according to Ghazali. That is, for either kind of interest not to 
occur, exchange should be with equal quantity and ownership transfer should be simultaneous; 
otherwise, "disguised" interest could occur. However, if the exchange involves the same types of 
commodities, such as metals (gold or silver) or foodstuffs (wheat or barley), only riba al-nasiah 
[sic] is prohibited, whereas riba al-fàdl [sic] is permissible. If exchange is between different types 
of commodities (met ais and foodstuffs), then, both kinds are permissible.615 
Surprisingly, a scholar of the intellectual stature of Ghazali appears to resort here 
to a very literaI interpretation of the ribawJ-commodities J;adith in requiring that, in the 
case of the same commodity, "exchange should be with equal quantity and ownership 
transfer should be simultaneous." Apparently he ignores the fact that this is a 
completely meaningless transaction: Why would any rational person exchange the same 
commodity, in the samequantity, and at the sametime? What is the incentive for such a 
transaction? The ribawJ-commodities J;adith is not, and can never have been, ordering 
such a meaningless transaction. As explained below fully,616 it is, on the contrary, 
prohibiting such a transaction, not by a negative command but by a positive command of 
making the transaction meaningless. The J;adith is actually saying that the only way the 
same commodity can be exchanged is in the same quantity and at the same time, which 
makes the exchange meaningless and, therefore, to be avoided. 
Even more surprisingly, Ghazali does not appear to take account of the Prophetic 
categorical pronouncement that "verily, ribiiis in nasJ'a, "in declaring the permissibility 
of both ribii al-nasJ'a and ribii al-fàql in exchanges of heterogeneous commodities ("if 
exchange is between different types of commodities - met ais and foodstuffs - then both 
614 Karl Pribram, A Histo/y of Economie Reasoning(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), 15; Bernard W. Dempsey, 
Interest and U~ury. (Washington DC: Ameriean Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 139. 
615 S. M. Ghazanfar, cd., Medievalls/amie Economie Thought: Fi/Jing the "Great Gap" in European Eeonomie.~. (London; New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 36. 
616 Sec p. 247, bclow. 
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kinds [of ribiiJ are permissible"). In positing this permissibility of ribii a1- nasJ'a, Ghazali 
also completely ignores the express wording of the ribawl-commodities lJadith that 
prohibits nasJ'a and requires hand-to-hand exchange (yadan bi-yadin) in exchanges of 
both homogenous and heterogeneous commodities. Thereby, Ghazali misses a profound 
philosophical-theological argument for the absolute and unconditional prohibition of 
delay in aIl human transaction settlements, which will be posited in this thesis. 
Abu Bakr Mu4ammad Ibn al-'Arab1 (d. 543/1148), the Malik1 jurist and Qur'an 
commentator, upholds the traditional view of Tabar1 that in JahiIiya the financial excess 
was levied not for the initial but for the extended maturity, and refutes the contention of 
al-Ja~~a~ that ribii is a mujma1 term requiring a bayiin, because in its technical usage it 
came to acquire meanings that were not intended in the language: 
.,. [T]hose who consider this verse to be unelaborated, i.e., ambiguous, vague (mujmal), do not 
understand this cross-section of Shari'a. Allah sent His Prophet towards a nation to which he 
himself belonged and whose language he himself spoke. Allah' s book was also revealed in their 
language so that it was easy for them to understand. The dictionary meaning of ribiï is excess 
and the intention in the verse is all excess without any counter-value. 617 
This controversy as to whether ribii is mujma10r not is crucial in the light of u~ii1 
a1-fiqh that, as noted above, regards a word or statement as comprising three levels of 
non-clarity- low: khafiy (obscure); medium: mushld1 (difficult); and high: mujma1 
(ambiguous, vague). For khafiyand mushkil, the researcher or mujtahid may provide the 
clarification. But for mujmal, the ambiguity can only be removed by an explanation from 
the Lawgiver.618 Now, in the light of the generally-held belief on the absence of fuller 
Qur'anic and Sunnaic explanation of the term ribii and in the impossibility of any further 
Prophetie elaborations, if the term ribii is indeed mujmal, how will it be clarified? 
Admittedly, al-Ja~~a~, as pointed out above, classified ribii as an unelaborated (mujma1) 
term in need of explication (bayiin), clearly implying that the explication can only be 
provided by the Lawgiver Himself, but he also declared that such additional explanatory 
Qur'anic and Sunnaic evidence is available. The Prophet provided extensive elaboration 
of the meaning intended by Allah in the [ribiiJ verse by way of explicit commands and 
decisions.619 
617 Ibn aI-'Arabl, Af:Jkiim al-Qur'iin, (Bcirut: n.p., 1988), 1,241,320-321. 
61R Alsharccf, The Code ofSeholars, 55. 
619 al-Ja~~a~, Af:Jkiim al-Qur'iin, 1,464-5. 
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Abu Bakr al-Kasanl (d. 587/1189), the Banafi authority, defines ribii simply in its 
technical (legal) sense in the context of its two types only - ribii al-fac/l and ribii al-nasii' 
(nasJ'a). Even in this technical sense, he does not offer an all-encompassing legal 
de finit ion of ribii. Moreover, he does not give the literaI meaning.620 
al-Marghinanl (d. 593/1196), on his part, simply echoes Ibn 'Arabi's definition of 
ribii.621 
Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) refers to both the ribii of sales and ribii of debt but 
elaborates only on the ribii of debt, introducing the controversial concept of discount for 
early repayment (reverse ribii), in addition to the premium for late repayment (the 
[positive) ribii of Jahifiya).622 
Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl (d.606/1209) again damagingly reinforces the above basis for 
the compartmentalization of ribii. Again, contrary to the traditional historical accounts, 
al-Raz!, like al-Ja~~a~, holds that in ribii al-jiihiliya, a financial charge was levied for the 
initial maturity. And in accordance with the traditional historical accounts, he also holds 
that a financial charge was levied for the extended maturity.623 He rebuts the views of 
Ibn 'Abbas that the prohibited ribiiis ribii al-nasJ'a alone.624 
In Ibn al-Athlr's (d. 1209 CE) SharJ'a definition of ribii 625 the reference to the 
absence of contract of sale in the process of ribii generation points to the Islamic legal 
stipulation that makes invalid (fiisid) any contract of sale containing an element of ribii. 
Furthermore, though not specifically stating it, this definition strongly points to the 
operative princip le of unilateral activity in ribii and bilateral activity in bay', concepts 
that will be expanded below (chapter IV). 
al-Nawawl (d. 676/1278), in a partial contribution to the search for the iJikma of 
ribii-prohibition, and without proposing an alternative, debunked "exploitation" as the 
prohibitory rationale on the grounds that it could apply equally well to legitimate profit 
generation.626 
620 Abu Bakr al-Kasanl, Badij'j' al-$ana'i' (Bcirut: Dar al-Kit ab al-'Arabl, 1982). V, 183. 
621 Burhïin al-Dln al-Marghinïinl, al-Hidaya (Karachi: Qur'an Maryal, n.d.), Kitab al-Buyu', chapter on ribii, lll, 78. 
622 Ibn Rushd, Bidiiyat (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 1995). II, 96. 
62JFakhr al-Dln al-Razl, al- TafS7r al-KabIr, 32 vols. (Bcirut: Dar Il]ya' al-Turath al-'Arabl, 1980), VII, 91. 
624Ibid., VII, 92. 
625 Majd al-Dln al-Mubiirak Ibn Mul]arnrnad Ibn al-Athlr, al-Nihiiya fi Ghaiib al-Ifadith wa al-Athiir (Cairo: n.p., 1322H. ), Il, 66. 
626 Nawawl, al-Majmu', 390-404. 
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Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327), in his conclusions similar to those of the Greek 
philosophers, of St. Thomas Aquinas and of other medieval scholars, and like al-Ghazali 
before hi m, provides scriptural and detailed economic arguments for the prohibition of 
ribii.627 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), the Hanbalite theologian and student ofIbn 
Taymiyya, in an influential but damaging explication of the 1;ikma of its prohibition, 
defines ribii in terms of the degree of its hiddenness: 
Ribii is of two kinds: Jall [manifest] and KhaÎly [hidden]. The JaDhas been prohibited because of 
the great harm it carries and the Khaliy has been prohibited because it is an instrument for the 
JaH. Hence prohibition of the former is deliberate while that of the latter is precautionary [against 
exploitation and wrongful acquisition of other's property]. The JaD is ribii al-nasJ'a and this is 
what was engaged in during the JahiIiya, like allowing the postponement of repayment of 
principal against an increase, and every time there was a postponement, there was an increase ... 
However, ribii al-faç/l has been prohibited to close the access to ribii al-nasJ'a. 628 
Ibn Qayyim is thus the author of the now famous and much relied upon Liberal 
distinction between "hidden ribii" (ribii a1-khafiy), which is ribii by way of increase (ribii 
a1-facj1), and "manifest ribii" (ribii a1-jaH), which is ribii by way of de ferment (ribii a1-
nasTa). For hi m, hidden ribii is not forbidden in itself but only when it is a way to gain 
manifest ribii, which is forbidden in itself. Accordingly, the degree of prohibition was 
not the same in both the categories, being much st ronger in "manifest ribii" or ribii a1-
nasJ'a than in "hidden ribii "or ribii a1-facjl Consequently, "manifest ribii," or ribii a1-
nasTa, cannot become lawful except in the case of pressing necessity (cjariira mulji'a), 
like that which allows the eating of carrion. But, "hidden ribii "or ribii a1-facj1 can 
become lawful in case of need (lJiija) only. "Hidden ribii" or ribii a1-facj1 is prohibited 
when there is fear that it may lead to ribii a1-nasJ'a and it is allowed in case ofneed.629 
This distinction between "manifest" and "hidden" ribii and the association of 
"manifest" with deferment (nasTa) and "hidden" with increase (facj1) betrays a lack of 
cognizance of the Accounting definition of the process of ribii. We are informed by the 
discipline of Accounting that, in a loan transaction, for example, (and exactly opposite 
to Ibn Qayyim's distinction), the benefit accruing to the lender (facj1) is quantifiable and 
manifest (the interest received), while the bene fit of delay accruing to the borrower 
627 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu' Fatawa Shaikh a/-l5liim AlJmad Ibn Taymiyya, 35 vols. + 2 vols. Index (Riyadh: Maçabi al-Riya<), 1983-9), 
XXIX,469. 
62& Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shams al-Dln MuI)ammad b. Abl Bakr, l'/iim a/-Muwaqqi'ln 'an Rabb a/- 'A/am/JI, Il, 1 54ff. 
629 'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhurl, Ma,~adir a/-fjaqq fi '/-Fiqh a/-Is/iiml. 6 vols. (Beirut: al-Majma' al- 'Arabi al-lslaml, n.d.), 111,206. 
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(nasJ'a) is non-quantifiable, hidden and, according to al-Raz1, only an assumption, 
presumption, supposition, hypothesis (?annJ). Now, if Ibn Qayyim has in mind a 
philosophical-theological distinction that negates the convention al accounting 
distinction above, he may have a point to make, but he does not make it clear and his 
choice of terrninology does not point to it either. Such a philosophical-theological 
distinction that attaches greater significance to delay (nasl'a) than to simple excess 
(facjl) will be postulated below (chapter IV). 
The question of dispensing with the prohibition of ribii - whether nasJ'a or facjl-
in case of pressing necessity and need will be taken up below (chapter V). Suffice to 
comment here that indulgence in ribii is a sin akin to the only sin which God will ne ver 
forgive. This rules out any exceptions or exemptions in the case of ribii, and its 
comparison with the specifie exceptional perrnissibility of eating carrion is 
inappropriate. However, the rationale (iJikma) ofthe prohibition of ribii, according to Ibn 
Qayyim, is linked only to its moral aspect: the po vert y of the debtor in the practice of 
pre-Islamic ribii.630 
Ibn Qayyim explained the rationale of the early practice of Arab and Latin 
Scholastics and their Greek predecessors of couching their discussions of interest in 
terrns of precious met aIs and foodstuffs thus: 
The secret behind the prohibition ofunequai exchange of the same kind ofprecious met aIs is that 
their purpose of "moneyness"(thamaniya) will be destroyed; and the reason behind the 
prohibition of unequai exchange of the same kind offoodstuff is that it will destroy their purpose 
of serving as diet.631 
Ibn Kathlr (d. 774/1373), like Ibn al-Athlr, simply explains ribii as "excess on the 
principal without any contract of sale."632 al-'Ayn1 (d. 855/1451) also offers a similar 
definition.633 
Seyhülislam Ebu's-su'ud Efendi, the Ottoman Mufti ofIstanbul (1545-1574), with 
the sanction of Sultan Suleyman, issued perhaps the first-ever fatwii in Islamic history 
declaring the cash trusts (awqiif: pious foundations), which derived their income from 
lending at interest, as valid. This flouting of the legal prohibition on interest-taking, 
without the support of any I:Ianafi authority, was manipulated by Ebu's-su'ud with the 
630 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, J'liim a/-Muwaqqi'7n, II, 1 57ff. 
631 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, J'/iim a/-Muwaqqi'in, II, 140, citcd in Ghazanfar, cd., Mcdieva//s/amie Eco11omie Thought, 136. 
632 Ibn Kath1r, al-Nihiiya. (an authcntic book cxplaining I;adlth tcrminology). 
633 Sadr al-D1n al-' Ayn1, Umdiit al-Qiirl (Constantinople: Matba'a al-Amîra, l310 AH), V, 436. 
153 
help of legal stratagems (lJiyal) giving him the license to call the income payments not 
by the actual name of interest but by the commonly used euphemism of "le gal 
transaction" (mu'iimala shari'iyya). In this fàtwa, issued in spite of the juristically 
correct opposition of the fundamentalist scholar Mehmed of Birgi, Ebu's-su'ud was 
guided not by juristic texts but only by the doctrines ofnecessity and public interest. 634 
Shah Wall Allah of Delhi (d. 1176/1762), the traditionalist Indian scholar, seems 
unwittingly to have provided support to the Liberal viewpoint by further stressing the 
distinction between what he calls the "actual" Qur'an-sourced ribii of debt practiced 
intensely in the JahiIiya and the "figurative" lJadIth-sourced ribii al faql.635 
Shah 'Abd al-'Azlz (d. 1824 A.D.), traditionalist scholar and son of Shah Wall 
Allah of Delhi, driven by political and economic expediency, through a fatwii permitted 
ribii for Muslims in dealings with non-Muslims in diir al-lJarb, which, to him, British 
India was.636 'Abd al-I:Iayy Farangl Ma4ll Lakhnawl (1847-1886) also subscribed to this 
opinion.637 Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) and Mu4ammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), opined 
the permissibility of modern-day bank interest even between and among Muslims, even 
in diir al-Islam, based on political and modernity expediencies. Had these scholars 
known the governing lJikma of ribii-prohibition, being posited in this thesis, they would 
have shuddered before even contemplating such opinions. 
Mu9.ammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), the Grand Mufti of Egypt, and his disciple Rashld 
Riqa (d. 1935), were the first contemporary jurists and scholars of the 20th century to 
clearly defend modern-day bank interest and to exempt it from the ribi-prohibition on 
the grounds that it was not covered under the historical practice of ribii al-jiihillya which 
they treated as the only prohibition, and even that excusable by the doctrine of dire 
necessity. They treated ribii al-fàql and ribii al-nasJ'a both as Sunna-based and therefore 
not prohibited - only makriih (reprehensible). They relied on Ibn Qayyim's distinction 
between "manifest ribii" (ribii jall) and "hidden ribii" (ribii khafiy) in formulating their 
634 Colin Imber, Ehu's-su'ud: The 1~/amic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 37, 145-146; J. R. 
Mandaville, "Usurious piety: the cash waqf eontroversy in the Ottoman Empire", Intemational Joumal ofMiddlc Ea.,·tem Studics, 10 
(1979),289-308; Ebu's-su'ud, Bida'at al-Qiiài, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, MS La1c1i 3,711, ehap. 1; Rev. M. McColI, "Arc 
Reforms Possible Under Mussulman Rule'?" (mimeo,1881), quoted in EI-Gamal, "Interest and the Paradox ofContemporary Islamic 
Law and Finance", 2. 
635 Shah Wafi Allah, Iftdiat Alliih al-Bii/ighah, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Turath, 198'1). Il,106-107. 
636 Mushir-ul-Haq, "Shah' Abd al-' AZ1Z al-Dihlawl and his Times", Hamdard 1.I'lamicus, VII, No.l, 78. 
637 Ibid., VII, No.!, n. 99, 95. 
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position on ribii.638 However, Chibli Mallat, in his discussion of the Egyptian Savings 
Funds scheme of the early 20th cent ury, points out that these scholars were not 
explicitly or openly suggesting that interest is acceptable without any qualification; they 
seem to have tolerated it if a scheme of muqiiraba could be devised to legitimize the 
interest on the employees' deposits.639 
The criticism ofIbn Qayyim's position, above, applies equally weB to the position 
of Mul1ammad 'Abduh and Rashld Riq.a insofar as they share the concept of "manifest 
ribii" (ribii jaD) and "hidden ribii" (ribii khafiy). Moreover, their conclusion that 
compound interest ("interest accruing on interest aIready accounted") is the manifest 
ribii (ribii jaD), which was originaBy practiced as ribii al-jiihiDya and which is the only 
form of ribii prohibited by the Qur'an, is a position that completely ignores the intrinsic 
meaning and implications of the terms ribii and bay' as used in Q. 2:275. 
Mu4ammad Abu Zahrah (d. 1974), the famous Egyptian faqJh, echoing Shah Wafi 
Allah, does further damage to theoretical development by spelling out the distinction 
between ribi of the Qur'iin and ribiofthe Sunna.640 
Abul A'lii Mawdum (d. 1979), though a traditionalist and neo-revivalist, 
unwittingly but clearly spells out the foundation of what is the Liberal position and 
again inhibits theoretical development by pointing out the distinction between ribii al-
nasJ'a (fii'ida) as the ribii of (prohibited by) the Qur'an, and ribii al-faql as the ribii of 
(prohibited by) the Sunna.641 
For 'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhurl, the contemporary Egyptian authority on Islamic 
law,642 the prohibition of ribiiis the rule, and - unlike the position of 'Abduh and Riq.a-
is not under the presumption of aversion (kariihiyap43 For hi m, only compound interest 
is first and foremost prohibited in verse Q. 3: 130; and based on the testimony of the 
reports on pre-Islamic ribii and also by implication, simple interest would not be 
638 Saleh, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 35-36. 
639 ChibIi MaHat, "The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence," l~lamic Law and Finance. SOAS, 
London, 1988,74. 
""'Abu Zahrah, Foreword to Zakl al-Dln Badawl, N~anyat al-Ribii al-Mul;arram Fi al-Shan'a al-lsliimiyya. (Cairo: Dar wa -Matabi' 
al-Sha'b, 1940), trans. Nyazee, quotcd in his, Ribii and l~lamic Banking, 13. 
641 Ibid., 165. 
642 Sa1ch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 36-37. 
643 Sanhurl, Ma~iidir al-lfaqq, III,222-234. 
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prohibited.644 Sanhüri distinguishes between ribii a1-jiihiHya, ribii a1-fàq1 and ribii a1-
nasTa as follows: 
Ribii al-faljl is a way to achieve ribii al-nasl'a which is a way to achieve ribii al-jiihillya. It is 
sufficient, as far as ribii al-nasl'a is concemed, to allow payment to be postponed once the debt 
has matured, charging further interest, so as to attain ribii al-jiihillya . Consequently, ribii al-fàljl 
and ribii al-nasl'a are not under a direct prohibition (contrary to pre-Islamic ribii, which is), but 
under a prohibition of illicit means - a prohibition designed to close the loopholes which might 
lead to pre-Islamic ribii.645 The result of such degrees of prohibition is that ribii al-jiihillya is 
allowed only in case of pressing necessity (ljariira muliiJlJa), while ribii al-faljl and ribii al-nasl'a 
are deemed lawful in case ofneed (/;1iija).646 
The focus of Sanhür1 on ribii a1-jiihiHya as the object of direct prohibition attracts 
the same criticism as that of Ibn 'Abbas above. Both localize the import of the 
Qur'anic/Sunnaic injunction at the cost of its universality and deeper philosophie al 
meaning. The dispensability of the prohibition of ribii in case of pressing necessity and 
need has already been commented upon above in the case of Ibn Qayyim. 
Ibrahim Zaki al-Badawi, another Egyptian scholar of Islamic law, argues that the 
strict prohibition of ribii should apply only to the pre-Islamic form. 647 
The positions of Sanhür1 and Badawi, outlined above, have been refuted by critics, 
as pointed out by Saeed, on the grounds that "verse Q. 3: 130 is the first stage of the 
prohibition of ribii, or that the term 'aq'iifan muqii'afatan' (doubling and redoubling) 
mentioned in the verse is only explaining what the Arabs practiced, not that the interest 
charged would be lawful if the amount were not doubled.648 Moreover, in their view, the 
last ribi-related verses (2:275-8) have clearly stated that any increase over and above the 
principal should be ribii, and as such prohibited. This applies to any form of interest 
whether it is simple, compound, fixed or variable." 649 
Sorne modemists, such as Doualibi, differentiate between consumption and 
production loans and support the legality of interest on production loans and the 
illegality of interest on consumption loans, on the grounds that, out of concem for the 
poor, the Qur'anic prohibition applies to consumption loans only.650 This position is 
644 Saeed, l~/amic Banking, 43. 
645 Sanhiïrl, Ma,siidir a/-fjaqq, 111,222-237. 
646 Ibid., III, 237. 
647 Quoted in Chibli MaHat, "The Debate on Riba", 80. 
64& Mul}ammad 'Abd Allah Draz, a/-Ribii fi NB?ar a/-Qiiniin a/-/s/iiml(Cairo: International Association of Islamic Banks, n.d.), 12-13. 
649 Saecd, Nlamic Banking, 43. 
650 Mul}ammad Abii Zahra, BIllJiith fi a/-Ribii (Kuwait: Dar al-Bul}iith al- 'Ilmiyya, 1970),52-57. 
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contested by cri tics who maintain that rather than consumption loans, it was production 
loans that were prevalent in Arabia at the time of the prohibition of ribii. 
Sorne other modernists651 maintain that the prohibition of ribii covers only 
individuals, not the giving or taking of interest amongst corporate bodies, such as 
companies, banks, or governments (institutional credit), or the taking of interest from 
corporate bodies by individuals (individu al deposits), because an individu al cannot 
exploit a larger organization like a bank.652 The Pakistan Council of Islamic Ideology 
likewise could not unanimously agree on the inclusion of institutional credit under the 
heading of ribii.653 
This stance on exempting interest on "institutional credit" from the purview of the 
rib.iprohibition is not tenable on the grounds that cIassical and medieval Islamic law did 
not recognize the separate legal entity status of corporate bodies; aIl are individuals. For 
example, the Qur'an and the derived Islamic law speak of the rights and obligations not 
of the "government" but of the "governor" (ruler: lJiikim). Moreover, this stance is based 
on the rationale of "exploitation," which, not being universally operative, cannot serve 
as the rationale of the universally applicable prohibition of ribii. 
Notwithstanding the fiqhl differences of opinion surveyed above, 'Abd al-Raqman 
al-Jazlrl, in his al-Fiqh "alii al-Madhiihib al-Arba"a - a modern compendium on the 
juristic opinions of the four predominant Sunnl schools of Islamic jurisprudence -
elaborates on the severely prohibited (nahyan mughallll?an) ribii, but still merely reflects 
the prevalent depth of the discourse.654 
These individual legal definitions and explanations suggest a process of graduaI 
watering down of the perception of the riba:.prohibition as one moves from the 
traditionalist to the modernist thought model. At one end of the prohibitory spectrum is 
the complete and absolute prohibition, as evidenced in the definitions by al-Sarakhsl, al-
Kasanl and Ibn Rushd. At the other end of the spectrum is a steadily widening scenario 
of partial and contingent prohibition, as evidenced in the definitions by the Liberal 
scholars Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn Qayyim and MU\lammad 'Abduh/Rashld Riga. It culminates in 
651 Quoted in Saeed, Islamic Banking, 45-46. 
652 Abdul Jabbar Khan, "Divine Banking System." Journal ons/amie Banking and Finance. Summer 1984, 24-44. 
653 Decision taken on January 13, 1964, in response to a question from the Pakistan Ministry of Finance, as quoted in Nawazish Ali 
Zaidi, "Islamic Banking in Pakistan" Joumal of fslamie Banking and Finance. Summer 1988, 21-30. 
654 'Abd al-RaI)man al-Jazîrî, al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madhiihib al-Arba'a (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijariyya al-Kubra, n.d.), 61h ed. Il,245-8. 
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the formulation of Sanhurl, where not an forms of ribii are prohibited, and ev en when 
prohibited, become permissible on the sanction of the doctrine of necessity and even 
need. 
In an these juridical definitions and explanations the focus of attention is the form 
of the financialleconomic excess, how it arises, how its prohibition is sourced and, for 
the Liberal scholars, how it can be restricted or even evaded. The definitions do not go 
beyond the technical usage of the term ribii to connotations other than the 
financial/economic that are expressed in the Qur'an itself. Moreover, these legal 
expositions, although touching upon the concept of excess in exchanges of homogeneity, 
do not explore this concept for discovery of the true occasioning factor ('illa) and 
rationale (iJi1ana) of the prohibition of ribi and permission of bay~ thus remaining 
completely oblivious of the perilous nature of the underlying concepts. 
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CHAPTERIII 
JURIDICAL, HERMENEUTICAL AND SCRIPTURAL MODELS 
The extant sources on usury/ neshekh/tokos/ribii surveyed in the preceding chapter 
fumish the basis for an exclusive Islamic juridical model and two Islamic hermeneutical 
models with historical roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition as weIl. These models are 
critiqued below for their structural characteristics and for the extent of their 
contribution to a defensible theory, and the scriptural model is recapitulated in 
preparation for the new theory subsumed in the divine law of ribii and bay'. 
111.1. CUITent Islamic Juridical Model: U$iï1 aJ-Fiqh 
The model of ribii-proscription and bay'- permission developed by Islamic legists, 
while totally neglecting the moral and the more important hermeneutically crucial 
philo sophic al and theological perspectives underlying these scriptural injunctions, 
employed an outward form-oriented legal approach that is fraught with the danger of 
fizzling out into what a contemporary scholar calls "a meaningless exercise and a 
quibble over semantics."655 To be sure, specifically there is no juristic agreement either 
on the definition and categories or on the occasioning factor and ration ale underlying the 
concepts of ribii and bay'. Mired in disagreement, not fully supported by the rules of u~iiJ 
aJ-fiqh (legal methodology) itself, and hence not helpful for new theory development, 
this juridical construct is critiqued below. 
Based on a legalistic approach, ribawJ transactions were classified by the fuqahii' 
into three categories: (1) ribii al-faç/l (ribii of excess), produced by the unlawful excess of 
one of the counter-values in an exchange (2) ribii aJ-nasl'a (ribii of delay), produced by 
delaying complet ion of the exchange of the counter-values, with or without an excess, 
and (3) according to sorne scholars, including the f.lanbali Ibn Qayyim, a third category 
known as ribii aJ-jiihillya, often manifested by the lender as king the borrower at maturity 
date to settle or increase, with the increase normally occurring by charging interest on 
the debt initially accrued.656 
655 Saeed, 11o'/amie Banking, 40, 
656 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, l'/iim a/-Muwaqqi'ln 'al1 Rabb a/- 'A/amln, cd. Mu~ammad 'Abd al-J:liimid, 4 vols. (Bcirut: al-Matba'a 
al-' A~riyya, 1987), II, 1 53ff. Nabil Salch notes that Ibn Qayyim did not infer from the division of ribii into three categories all the 
effccts which wcre to be dcduecd later on by Mu~ammad 'Abduh, Rashld Riqii and others (compound intcrest). 
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The proponents of the above third category of ribi regarded this ribi al-jihiliya as 
the one directly referred to in the Qur'iin, and the other two categories, ribiï al-faql and 
ribiï al-nasTa, as the ones referred to in the Prophet's tradition (lJadithr57 
The schools of law are not in agreement even on the exact definition of the first 
two categories of ribiï as shown by the differences in the generally accepted views of the 
major four Sunnl schools. For them, ribiï al-faql occurs, when, in an on-the-spot (hand-
to-hand) transaction, there is an excess in one of the counter-values which belong to the 
same genus Oins) and both counter-values are (i) weighable or measurable (f,lanafis); (ii) 
either currency, or storable nourishment for mankind (Miilikls); (iii) either currency, or 
foodstuffs (Shlifi'1s); and (iv) either currency, or are measurable or weighable 
(f.IanbaIis).658 On the other hand, ribiï al-nasTa occurs when delivery of one counter-
value is deferred in a sale transaction involving counter-values which are susceptible to 
ribii The counter-values should be: (i) of the same genus or both weighable or 
measurable (f,lanafis); (ii) storable nourishment for mankind, or both currency (Miilikls); 
(iii) both foodstuffs, or both currency (Shiifi'1s); and (iv) both measurable or weighable, 
or currency (f.IanbaIis). 659 
Without attempting to resolve the irreconcilable causal differences of madhiïhib 
opinion reflected above, an elaborate, albeit still unsatisfactory, juridical definition of 
ribiïhas been posited as follows: 
[Ribii is] an unlawful gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values in any 
transaction purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species (anwii', sing. naw'), which 
belong to the same genus (jins) and are govemed by the same efficient cause tilla, pl. 'ilal). 
Deferred completion of exchange of such species, or even of species which belong to different 
genera but are govemed by the same 'illa, is also ribii, whether or not the de ferment is 
accompanied by an increase in any one of the exchanged counter-values.66o 
In the madhiihib categorization of ribii, the definition of ribiï al-faql is clear, 
though not unanimous. But the definition of ribiï al-nasTa is ambiguous in that it does 
not explain how, or what type of, ribiï arises in this case of delay when occurrence of 
excess in any of the counter-values is not a requirement for this undefined ribiï of delay 
to arise? This definition also does not specify the beneficiary of the ribiï of delay. 
657 'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhurl, Ma,"iidir al-lfaqq fi 'l-Fiqh al-b'liiml 6 vols. (Beirut: al-Majma' al-' ArabI al-Islaml, n.d.), 111,217-1 X. 
658 Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Lcgitimatc Profit, Second Edition (London; Dordrecht; Boston: Graham & Trotman, (992), 19-26; 
Jazlri, Fiqh, Il, 250ff; both summarized by Saccd in his, l~lamic Banking, 35. 
659 Sa1ch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 19-26, summarized in Saeed, l~lamic Banking, 35. 
660 Sa1eh, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 16. 
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Nyazee attempts to rectify these definitional deficiencies through an exposition of 
ribii a1-faç/1 and ribii a1-nasl'a based on the foundational definition of ribii and further 
explanation of its two kinds given by al-Sarakhsi: 
Ribii in its literaI meaning is excess ... and in the technical sense (in the Sharl'a), ribii is the 
stipulated excess without a counter value in bay' (sale/exchange ).661 
[The words] "façll is ribii" imply façll through qadr and they imply fàçll through a period of 
delay, and both are intended. This was elaborated in the tradition of 'Ubiidah ibn aH;limit.662 
Based on the above, Nyazee defines ribii as the excess that is revealed as (1) 
excess through qadr (estimation), i.e., excess in quantity or amount, determined by 
weighing, measuring or counting, called ribii al-fa(Jl and (2) excess through nasl'a or 
nasii' (delay), i.e., excess from benefits of delay, determined by clocking the period of 
delay during which one party enjoys the benefits from the utilization of the exchange 
commodity, called ribii a1-nasl'a. For Nyazee, the distinction between ribii a1-faç/l and 
ribii a1-nasl'a is determined by two factors: method of estimation and identification of 
the beneficiary. In both kinds of ribii, an excess is revealed, but determined differently; 
ribii al-faç/l is determined through weight, measure or count, while ribii a1-nasJ'a is 
determined by clocking the period of delay during which the borrowed amount or 
commodity is used by the borrower. Even more crucial factor of distinction for him, 
ignored by other modem scholars, is the identification of the beneficiaries. It is the 
lender/seller who receives the excess known as ribii a1-faç/1, while the benefit of ribii a1-
nasl'a goes to the borrower/purchaser, who uses the amount or commodity during the 
period ofrepayment or delay.663 
Within this technical paradigm of ribii, based on the juridical definition by al-
Sarakhsl, in which he gives the literaI meaning of ribii as "excess" and the technical 
meaning as "the stipulated excess without a counter value in bay:" Nyazee posits a 
very concise and lucid juridical definitional model664 that, as will be shown, is somewhat 
useful in clarifying the "terminological confusion syndrome" referred to above. 
661 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsüt, XII, 109. 
662 Ibid III 
(6) Ny~cc, JUba and IsIamie Banking, 19ff. 
664 Ibid., 19-39. 
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Nyazee identifies the main elements of the above definition by al-Sarakhsl thus: 
(a) Ribii is "excess," (b) It is an excess that is stipulated in a bay' (exchange), and (c) It 
is an excess that is without a counter value.665 Derived from this, his model defines ribii 
as excess revealed in two ways, i.e., through: 
1. Qadr(estimation) arising from weight, measure, or count of the two quantities being 
exchanged in a bay'. If the exchange is ribawl, this excess is called ribii al-facjl, 
where the beneficiary is the seller, or in the case of a loan, the credit or. 
2. NasJ'a or Nasii' (delay) arising from the benefits of delay of payment or delay of 
delivery, measured by the period of delay. If the transaction is ribawl, this excess 
(benefit) is called ribii al-nasJ'a, where the beneficiary is the party effecting the 
delay.666 
Hence, based on the above distinction between the beneficiaries of the excess, and 
contrary to popular understanding, in any loan transaction the creditor becomes the 
recipient of ribii al-facjl and the debtor the recipient of (the bene fit of) ribii al-nasJ'a. The 
interest payment received by the credit or is ribii al-facjl and not ribii al-nasJ'a.667 It will 
be noted that ribii al-nasJ'a is not objectively quantifiable as it is the unspecifiable 
benefit attributed to the debtor through the use of the loaned amount during the period 
of repayment. The recognition of this distinction is among the very crucial elements for 
a correct understanding of the concept of ribii. The lack of clarity and precision on this 
point among many contemporary scholars and even judges668 has been the source of 
much confusion. In complete disregard for this inter-Iocking relationship between these 
two aspects of ribii, contemporary scholars maintain, apparently without sufficient 
justification, that "ribii al-nasJ'a is the ribii of the Qur'an and ribii aJ-facjl is the ribii of 
the Sunna."669 It can be seen that this Liberal assertion, read together with the 
conceptual distinction between ribii al-facjl accruing to the credit or and ribii al-nasl'a 
accruing to the debtor, implies (perhaps unintentionally and inadvertently), that neither 
the Qur'an nor the Sunna of itself offers a complete prescription for a loan transaction. 
665 Ibid., 20. 
666 Ibid., 20-21. 
667 Ibid., 23. 
66' Notieeable in the different opinions expressed in the judgment of the Sharî'a AppeIIate Beneh of Pakistan Supreme Court of 
December 23, 1999. Sec web site of Advanced Legal Studies Institute, Islamabad (www.nyazee.com). 
669 Nyazee, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 23. 
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The Qur'an is being seen as catering to the borrower alone and the Sunna to the lender 
alone. This is clearly an untenable implication. The compartmentalization of riba- by 
contemporary scholars into ribii of the Qur'an and ribii of the Sunna is, therefore, 
conceptually not supportable. Nyazee maintains that this compartmentalization is rooted 
in the explanations of ribii provided by Ibn Rushd, al-Ja~~a~ and particularly al-Razl, all 
quoted above.670 
Nyazee concludes that both fat/J and nasl'a are to be found in the type of ribii 
mentioned in the Qur'an, and both are included in the types (of ribii) mentioned in the 
Sunna. Ribii aJ-fàqJ and ribii aJ-nasl'a are prohibited by the Qur'an just as they are 
prohibited by the Sunna. In fact, ribii of the Qur'an and ribi of the Sunna are exactly the 
same. The Sunna is merely acting as a commentary.671 
The Sarakhsl model at the foundation of the fiqh discourse on ribii, as structured by 
Nyazee, suffers from the major flaw that, by its own definition, while the benefit of ribii 
al-fàqJ accruing to the lender/seller is weighable, measurable and countable, the bene fit 
of ribii aJ-nasl'a accruing to the borrower/purchaser is not only not weighable, 
measurable or countable, but it also lacks certitude of occurrence. The 
borrower/purchaser may or may not derive any bene fit from the borrowed amount or 
commodity. As pointed out by al-Raz}, this bene fit is only ?annJ 672 (resting on mere 
assumption, presumptive, supposed, hypothetical). Thus, if the ribi aJ-nasl'a is a bene fit 
of delay and this benefit is only ?annJ (?annJ ribii), how could the Prophet have said 
"Verily, ribi is in nasJ'à'? 673 Whatever the Prophet intended by this saying - whether 
nasl'a is the default case or the exclusive case of ribi - the point is that nasl'a does 
cause ribii, so that the question is: What that ribii is and how is it triggered? It is 
definitely not the above expounded ?annl bene fit of delay referred to in the 
jurisprudential scholarship. This question requires further exploration and an answer will 
be proffered below (chapter IV), where it will be shown that delay causes a definite 
double occurrence of fàçfl of a type more profound than the weighable and measurable 
fàqJ associated with ribii aJ-fàql 
67() See Ibid., 23-24. 
671 Ibid., 27. 
672 Fakhr aI-Dln aI-Raz1, Mafiit71J al-Ghayb, Il, 531. 
673 Bukhar1, $aIJIIJ, Il, 138. 
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In spite of these conceptual shortcomings, "the traditional interpretation of ribi in 
Islam is the raison d'être of Islamic banking."674 This is based on the beHef of Islamic 
banking theorists and Muslim legists that any reinterpretation of the traditional Islamic 
legal definition of ribii was out of the question, based on the idea of the immutability 
and permanence of Shari'a rules advocated by two highly influential neo-Revivalist 
groups: al-Ikhwiin al-Muslimiïn (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt and Jamii'at Isliimi 
(Islamic Party) ofPakistan.675 However, it is contended that the traditional/neo-revivalist 
interpretation of ribii faces insurmountable obstacles in today's financial and economic 
environment as it does not appear to be either totally implementable or morally 
justifiable.676 "Any correction to the course of Islamic banking may not perhaps be 
possible without a fresh look at this concept based on the overaIl instructions of the 
Qur'an and Sunna, and in the light of contemporary economic and financial 
realities ... "677 [italics mine]. 
This stand of Islamic banking theorists and Muslim legists, disallowing 
reinterpretation of the traditional Islamic legal definition of rib.ibased on the notion of 
immutability of Islamic law, has to be qualified in the light of the c1ear distinction 
between din, shari'a and fiqh. As pointed out by Masud, 'VIn is the essence and is 
common in aIl revealed religions. Sharl'a, on the other hand, has differed from one 
religious community to the other. Fiqh is an interpretation of Shari'a by jurists, muftls 
and qaqis, and thus a product ofhuman reason."678 While the notion of (im)mutability is 
a major debate in Islamic law among influential thinkers, 679 in order to preserve the 
674 Saeed, Islamie Banking, 3. 
675Ibid., 1. 
676Ibid., 2. 
677lbid., 3. 
678 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Shii!ibl:~ Philosophy ofL~/amie Law(lslamabad: Islamie Rcscareh Institutc, 1995),9. 
679 As summed up by Masud, ibid., 1-9, the immutability view is held by most traditionalist Muslimjurists and by a large numbcr of 
Islamieists sueh as C. S. Hurgronje [Review article on L. W. C. van dcn Bcrg's translation of Minhiij al-Tiilibln (Batavia, 1 R62-1 RR4) 
in Revue de l'hiltoire des religions, XXXVII (1898), 1-22, 174-203; available in G. H. Bousquet and J. Schaeht (cditors), Selceted 
Works of C Snouek Hurgronje (Lcidcn, 1957),214-255]; G. Bcrgstrllsscr [Grundzüge des Mamisehen Reeht.~, published by J. 
Sehaeht in Bcrlin, 1935. Cf. J. H. Kramcrs, "Droit dc l'Islam ct droit islamiquc" in Analecta Orientalia: Posthumous Writings ami 
Selcetcd Minor Works of J. H Kramers, Vol. 2 (Leidcn: Brill, 1956),67]; J. Sehaeht ["Theology and Law in Islam", in G. E. Von 
Grunebaum (cd.), Theology and Law in Islam (Wiesbaden, 1971),4 ff.]; N. 1. Coulson [History, 1-2]; H. A. R. Gibb ["Constitutional 
Organization", in M. Khadduri and H. J. Liebesny (cds.), Law in the Middle East, Vol. 1 (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1955), 
4. Also in Gibb and H. Bowcn, lylamie Society and the West, Vol. 1, part 2 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957), 1 14]; H. J. 
Liebesny ["Religious law and Westernization in the Moslem Near East", in The Ameriean Joumal of Comparative Law, Vol. II (no.4, 
1953),492]; M. Khadduri ["From Religion to National Law", in 1. H. Thompson and R. D. Reisehauer (editors), Modemization of 
the Arab World (Princeton: Nostrand, 1966), 3R]; H. Lammens [Islam, Belicfand Institutions (London, 1929), R2]; G. Makdisi 
["Remarks on Traditionalism in Islamie Religious History", in Carl Lciden (cd.), The ConDiet ofTraditionalism and Modemism in 
the Muslim Middle East (Austin: University of Texas, 1966),77]; and, J. N. D. Anderson [Mamie Law in the Modem World (New 
York: New York University Press, (959), 17]. Thc mutability view is hcld by Muslim reformists sueh as Subl]l Mahmas~anl [Fal;-afàt 
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qualitative integrity of the law, it is the Sharl'a, the divine law, alone which is 
immutable, while fiqh, the human understanding of this divine law, is man-made and 
hence mutable. In fact, as pointed out by Masud,680 very few even Muslim thinkers daim 
divine origin of fiqh. Therefore, any changes in the fiqh definitions and rules of ribii, 
indicated by on-going ijtihiid, should not be objected to. However, in the process of 
mutation of man-made fiqh, the goveming principle is not compatibility with other 
further man-made constructs, such as the financial and economic environment, but 
compatibility with the immutable Sharl'a. The real guiding factor for this reassessment 
is not contemporary economic and financial realities, but univers al transcendent al 
realities. It is true that any correction to the course of Islamic banking may not perhaps 
be possible without a fresh look at this concept based on the overall instructions of the 
Qur'an and Sunna, but this fresh look at the concept of ribiihas to be made in the light, 
not of contemporary economic and financial realities, but of philosophie al and 
theological considerations. The so-called "contemporary economic and financial 
realities" themselves are also the object ofthis fresh look. 
In the development of the juridical repertoire on the proscription of ribii and the 
permission of bay', the primary ("from")681 textual sources, Le., the Qur'an and the 
Prophetic lfadith fumish the scriptural framework, and the secondary ("through")682 
sources, i.e., ijmii' (consensus) and qiyiis (analogy) cater to the positive law framework. 
While the Qur'an and the Prophetie lfadith provide the bare injunctions, examined 
above,683 ijmii' of the classical, medieval and contemporary jurists/juridical institutions is 
supposed to provide workable interpretations of the injunctions, which it has failed to do 
beyond contestably dedaring that interest in aH its forms constitutes the prohibited ribii, 
and qiyiis is supposed to provide the extrapolation of the injunctions beyond the six 
al- TashrJ" fi al-Isliim (Beirut, 1952), trans. by F. J. Ziadeh, The Philosophy oflurisprudcncc in l~/am (Leiden: Brill, 1961); 
Muqaddima fi IlJyii 'Uliim al-Sharl'a (l3eirut: Dar al-'i1m l'il mala'ïn, 1962); 'Transactions in the Sharl'a", in Khadduri and 
Uebesny (eds.), Law in the Middle East, Vol. 1 , 179-202], based on Abu 1sl)iiq Ibrahim b. Musa al-Shapbl (d. 790/131\1\) [al-
Muwiifàqiit fi u..~iil al-AlJkiim, cd. M. Mul)yl al-Dln 'Abd al-J:lamld, 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at Mul)ammad 'Ali Subayl), 1970)] and by 
experts sueh as Y. Unant de Bellefonds ["Immutabilité du droit musulman ct réformes legislatives en Égypte", Rcvue intemationa/c 
dc droit comparé, 7 (1955): 5-35; Traité de droit musulman comparé, Vol. 1 (Paris: Mouton, 1964]; Leon Ostrorog [Thc Angora 
Rcfol711 (London: University of London, 1927), 19]; and S. G. V. Fitzgerald ["Nature and Sources of Sh arl 'a", in Law in the Midd/c 
East, op. ci!., 1\7]. 
68" Masud, ShiifibJ's Philosophy ofl~/amie Law, 9. 
681 A tcrm uscd by Hallaq, in History, 1. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Sec Il.2.v and Il.3.ii., above. 
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commodities named in the ribawl- commodities iJadith, which it does, albeit in varying 
degrees in the different madhiihib(legal schools), as examined below. 
III.l.i. Critique of the CUITent Juridical Construct from the Qur'an 
Essentially, the c1assical/medieval/contemporary juridical construct developed 
exc1usively from the Qur'an is limited to agreement on the absolute prohibition of ribii 
and permission of bay'. Although hinted at, there is no attempt at formaI identification 
of the tamylz 684 (distinction) of these terms and no juridical extrapolation of the 'jJia 
(ratio iegis; occasioning factor) ofthese injunctions directiyfrom the Qur'an. Moreover, 
the juridical extraction of the iJilana (rationale) of the prohibition from the Qur'an, 
based on an inaccurate translation of the term "?uim" as "injustice," is, at the least, 
misleading. Consequently, this juridical construct is not helpful for comprehensive 
theory development, which requires definite input on all the elements - tamylz,685 'iiia 
and iJilana. 
III.l.ii. Critique of the CUITent Juridical Construct from the lfadith 
The juridical construct from the iJadith, on the other hand, is virtually limited to 
disagreement on the injunction and on its 'illa and iJilana. On iJadith authority, a 
distinction is made between ribii aJ-nasJ'a (ribii of delay) and ribii al-faql (ribii of excess), 
with the latter being assigned a secondary importance and even outright dispensability. 
Again, as many as nineteen 'iiai (occasioning factors) have been extracted from the six-
commodities iJadith, which is testimony to significant inconc1usiveness and juridical 
disagreement among madhiihib and fuqahii'.686 Finally, in spite of its great hermeneutical 
potential, the iJadith material, particularly the ribawl-commodities iJadlth, which is at 
the cutting edge of philosophy-theology, has not been mined for the ultimate iJilana of 
the prohibition. Thus, this exegetical/juridical construct is even less helpful, if not 
outright confusing, for theory development. 
684 Scc n. 47, p. 27, abovc, for this eoincd tcehnieal usage. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Nyazcc, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 68, bascd on Mul).ammad ibn' Ali Shawkanl (d. 1839), Irshiid al-Fu/il/ ifii TalJqlq a/-Ijaqq min 
'!lm al-U.~iil. 
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IIl.l.iii. Critique of the CUITent Juridical Construct through Ijmii< 
The "through" source of ijmii' has also been utilized, though infrequently, in the 
legal discourse on ribii.687 But this consensus, or even the lack thereof, is limited to the 
prohibitional, absolutist, definitional, applicatory, specificational and punitive aspects of 
interest/usury. There is no ijma'ic (consensual) attempt at, much less agreement on, 
discovering the 'illa and lJikma of ribii -prohibition, which is not conducive to the task of 
new theory development. 
Even on the conceptual prohibitory issues of ribi, there is considerable controversy 
at the SharJ'a court and juridical academy levels. The most significant CUITent court 
controversy is the divergent views of The Pakistan Federal SharJ'a Court688 and the 
presently reconstituted SharJ'a Appellate Bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court689 on 
whether aIl forms of interest are subsumed by the prohibited ribii. 
The controversy at the juridical academy level concems the permissibility of the 
pre-specification of profits as a percent age of capital, as opposed to the conventional 
practice of a percent age of actual realized profit in a muqiiraba (commenda) contract 
under the SharJ'a. This permissibility was rather controversially opined in a fatwii (legal 
opinion) by the al-Azhar Islamic Research Institute (IRIt90 but was officially rebutted 
by the largest possible juristic body, the Council of the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy 
(UA: Majma 'al-Fiqh al-IsliimJ) of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 
reiterating the rejection of the Islamic legitimacy of aIl forms ofbank interest.691 
The legitimacy of this al-Azhar fatwii rests on the fact that pre-specification of 
profits is not prohibited by any Canonical Text. And in any case, the core issue in the 
ribii discourse is not the pre-specification or otherwise of profits, rather it is the method 
687 By individuals such as Ibn 'Abd al-Barr a[-Malik1 (d. 463 H), Quf!abi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn I;lajr al-Makk1 (d. 974 H), Dr. 
Muhammad Sayyid Atiyya Tan!awl, Mufti of Egypt and later Grand Imam (Imam al-Akba!') and Rector (Shcikh) of al-Azhar, and by 
institutions sueh as [slamie Couneil of Europe (in its Islamie Univers al Declaration), Pakistan Couneil oflslamie Ideology, Islarnie 
Jurisprudence Academy (UA: Majma'al- Fiqh aJ-üliiml) of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Meeting of Islamic Banks 
in Kuwait ([ 983), Fiqll Academy (Majma' al-fïqh al-Isliiml) of the Muslim Wor[d Leaguc (Rabi.1al al- 'A/am a/-Islaml), fïqll 
Aeademy of [ndia, Pakistan Federa[ Shaii'a Court, Shaii'a Appellate Bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court, and al-Azhar [stamic 
Research Institutc (IR[). 
688 Judgment on Riba of the Pakistan Federa[ Shari'ah Court of November [4, 1991. Reprodueed. (Lahore: Pakistan Law Digest 
(PLD) Publishers, [992). 
6'9 Judgment on Ribaofthc Shari'ah Appellate Bench of Pakistan Supreme Court of Deeember 23,1999 ([s[amabad: Advanecd Lega[ 
Studies Instilute, www.nyazee.com.2000). 532; and 2002 Judgment of the reconstituted Bench overtuming ils own 1999 Judgment. 
690 Fatwaissued in December 2002 by the Grand Imam (Imam al-Akbar) and Rector (Shcikh) of al-Azhar, Dr. Muhammad Sayyid 
Aliyya Tan!awi, reiterating his fàtwa of 1989 when he was Mufti of Egypt. This most recent fatwa is also fully supported and 
approved by, and is known as the fatwa of, the al-Azhar Islamic Rescarch lnstitutc (IRI). 
691 Ibid., 3. 
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of generation and distribution of the profits. However, this fatwii only violates the 
c1assical rules of the silent partnership contracts known as muqiiraba or qiriiq (analogous 
to the Medieval European commenda contract and the Jewish heter isqa). 692 But the 
Islamic legal status of the muqiiraba contract itself is an as yet unanswered question in 
contemporary scholarship. Is there any Canonical support for the muqiiraba contract? 
Moreover, as will be elaborated below (V.7.i. and V.7.iL), the muqiiraba contract and 
the mushiiraka (partnership) contract, even in their prevalent c1assical versions that are 
among the main instruments of contemporary Islamic finance, to the extent that they 
treat the financial institution and its customers and depositors as separate legal entities, 
require restructuring to comply with the ribawi prohibition of excess and delay in an 
exchange ofhomogeneity. 
These differences of opinion on the part of prestigious international juristic 
entities, often based on differing perspectives, mirror the state of contemporary 
consensus (ijmii') on the crucial question of ribii, and point to the need to understand 
ribiiin its true meaning and significance. 
IIl.l.iv. Critique of the CUITent Juridical Construct through Qiyiis 
The fuqahii' have extensively utilized the "through" source of qiyiis (analogical 
reasoning) in extrapolating the injunctions on ribii. In the case of loan transactions, the 
single criterion for detecting ribii is the presence or absence of an element of increase 
over and above the principal, which yields uniform juridical formulations. But in the 
case of sale and barter transactions, the madhiihib focus on different features of the 
commodities and employment of fundamentally different 'ilal (occasioning factors) 
leads to different and even contradictory juridical formulations. Yet again, these 
formulations suffer from the further weakness of the employed occasioning factors that 
do not fully comply with the rules of u.~iïl al-f]qh itself. These madhiihib premises and 
formulations are critiqued below. 
IIl.l.iv.a. Critique of Ribawl-Commodities Definition in Fiqh 
The literalist view of the definition ofthese prohibited commodities limits them to 
the six named by the Prophet in the ribawJ-commodities 1;adIth, Le., gold, silver, wheat, 
692 See EI-Gamal, "Intercst and thc Paradox ofContemporary Islamic Law and Finance", 9-10. 
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barley, dates and salt. Accordingly, the literalist prohibition does not extend to any other 
commodities, which can all be exchanged with an excess even in an exchange of similar 
genus without any restrictions. The obvious juristic implication being that there is no 
room for the application of analogy (qiyiis) in this matter.693 The Z;ahids, though 
subscribing to this view, nevertheless, permit the extension of the rneanings of the six 
commodities to others through the implication of the meanings.694 
On the other hand, the analogical view on ribawl commodities, however, differs 
amongst the various madhiihib. Firstly, there are madhiihib differences of opinion on the 
definition of species.695 The characteristics that determine the species according to the 
I:Ianafi fiqh are three: common composition, common custornary use, and Ievei of 
required workmanship; according to I:IanbaIi fiqh, only two: cornmon origin and 
common name, regardless of customary use; according to Malilà fiqh, only one: 
common customary use or utility; according to Shafi '1 fiqh, aiso one: common specifie 
narne; and, according to Ja'farl fiqh, again one: common narne. As is evident, then, the 
madhiihib discourse is entangled in the rnechanics of hornogeneity; it investigates only 
what leads to hornogeneity, and not what homogeneity leads to. Secondly, there are 
madhiihib differences of opinion on the analogical extension of the ribawl cornrnodities. 
The I:Ianafi and also I:IanbaIi fiqh allows the extension of the prohibition to an 
commodities that are weighable and measurable.696 The Shafi '1 fiqh restricts the 
extension of the prohibition to go Id, silver and edibles that are weighable and 
measurabJe.697 The Maliki fiqh limits the extension of the prohibition to edibles that are 
storable. These juristic differences, as Mawdüdi adrnits, lead to differing juristic 
injunctions, treating the same commodity differently as to the ratio legis of its 
prohibition, thus rnaking the same commodity transaction lJariim in one madhhab and 
lJaliil in another. Yet, he asserts - rather indefensibly - that these juristic differences are 
693 This vicw is expressed by the :.(':ahirls, as also by scholars Qatlida, Tawiis, 'Uthman al-Battl, and Ibn 'Uqayli l;Ianbali. as report cd 
in Mawdiidî, Siid, 179-180. 
694 Nyazee, Ribii and l;'/amic Banking, 71. 
695 Qari Muhammad Amin Naqshbandi, l;-lamic Economies (Lahore: Iqra Books, n.d.), 383. 
696 This vicw is also hcld by 'Ammar, as rcported in Mawdiidî, Siid, 180. 
697 This vicw is aIso hcld by Sa'1d bin al-Musayyab, as reported in Mawdiidî, Siid, 180. 
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not over matters covered explicitly by the divinely revealed and inspired texts, but over 
matters that are mutashiibihiit (ambiguous) and at the border between IJaliil and IJariim.698 
IIl.l.iv.aa. Critique ofI:Ianafi Fiqh on Ribii 
Synopsis ofHanafi Teaching on Ribii699 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or measurability 
(wheat for wheat) 
Case II 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or measurability 
(go Id for silver) 
Case III 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
ABSENCE ofweighability or 
measurability (COUNT ABILITY) 
(animal for animal) 
Case IV 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HETEROGENEITY of estimation 
method: weighability, measurability, 
countability 
Critique 
I:Ianafi Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain prohibited in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Deferred transaction, even without 
gain, prohibited 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
III (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
III (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
IV (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
IV (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
transaction 
The I:Ianafi fiqh rulings in Cases 1 to III are strictly in accordance with the 
requirements of the ribawl-commodities IJadith under which gain is prohibited in 
exchange of homogeneity and permitted in exchange of heterogeneity, but deferment 
prohibited in both cases. However, Case IV is rather problematic. The I:Ianafi ruling IV 
(a) conforms to the ribawl-commodities IJadith, but IV (b) does not. This ruling permits 
both a deferred transaction and a gain in it. But the goveming IJadith does not permit 
any deferred transaction at a11, let alone a gain in a deferred transaction. The I:Ianafi 
698 Ibid 180-181 
699 Ext;~eted fro~ Saleh, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 25-26 (not nceessarily the unanimous view of ail seholars of the sehool). 
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reasoning in this case is probably based on a generally held, but erroneous, un-spelled 
out assumption that faql (self-generating excess), in order to materialize, always 
requires homogeneity of estimation method. And since Case IV involves heterogeneity 
of estimation method, even deferment cannot cause any façIl (self-generating excess) to 
arise; hence gain from deferment will not be self-generating and, therefore, permissible. 
As will be shown, deferment can not only cause façIl (self-generating excess, even 
without homogeneity of estimation method), but façIl of a more profound nature, and 
not once but twice in what is perceived to be a single deferred transaction. This could 
explain the Qur'anic prohibition of ribi"doubled and re-doubled" (ad'ifan muqi'afatan) 
and the .(zadith statement that indeed real ribais in nasJ'a (deferment). 
III.1.iv.ab. Critique ofMiilild Fiqh on Riba 
Synopsis ofMiilild Teaching on Riba 700 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus - currency 
or storable nourishment 
(dinars for dinars; wheat for wheat) 
Case II 
HETEROGENEITY of genus -
currency or storable nourishment 
(dinars for dirhams; wheat for beans) 
Case III 
NON-STORABLE FOODSTUFF, 
homogenous or heterogeneous 
(bananas for lettuce) 
Case IV 
NON-FOODSTUFFS, 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or 
measurability, and 
HOMOGENEITY of Purpose 
(material for material) 
Matild Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain prohibited in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Deferred transaction, even without 
gain, prohibited 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
III (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
III (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
IV (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
IV (b) Deferred transaction, evcn 
without gain, prohibited 
700 Extractcd from Sa\ch, Unlawful Gain, Sccond Edition, 30-31 (not ncccssarily thc unanimous vicw of ail scholars of thc school). 
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Case V 
NON-FOODSTUFFS, and 
HETEROGENEITY of genus 
(material for currency) 
Critigue 
V (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
V Cb) Gain permitted in def. transaction 
The aforementioned Malikl fiqh rulings suffer from the generallimitation of being 
confined only to a11 currencies and a11 starable foodstuffs, excluding a11 other items from 
the purview of riba-prohibition, although these rulings are an extension over the Zahir1 
coverage of only two named currencies and four named foodstuffs. However, their 
additional requirement of starability (longevity vs. perishability) for foodstuffs to 
become ribawl, though mundane in appearance, has a deeper philosophical connotation. 
As will be demonstrated below (in chapter IV), for any self-emanation (fal/l) and self-
subsistence to occur, the subject must, by definition, have longevity, which, in the case 
of currencies, is inherent and, in the case of foodstuffs, is best guaranteed by their 
quality of storability. Perishable food, by definition, cannot subsist, let alone self-
subsist. 
In Cases I and II, the Malikl fiqh rulings conform to the requirements of the ribawl 
-commodities J;adith. In Case III, ruling III (a) is a direct offshoot of the Malik1 
storability requirement for foodstuffs. This ruling appears to be a refinement of the 
general perception of fadJ as being applicable ta a11 items, by maintaining, in effect, that 
perishable food is not capable of fadl, at least not of any duration. Ruling III (b) is in line 
with the goveming J;adith. 
The Malikl fiqh rulings for Cases IV and V, are again problematic. Rulings IV (a) 
and V (a) are the product of the Malikl restriction of ribawJ commodities to foodstuffs. 
In these rulings, the fact is ignored that it is homogeneity and, according to the Malik1s 
themselves, longevity, which are the requirements for ribii, and that these requirements 
apply to aIl commodities, not just to the named category of foodstuffs. This ruling also 
flies in the face of their storability (longevity) argument by exempting from ribiï-
purview a11 non-foodstuffs, which genera11y have the inherent quality of longevity. 
Ruling IV (b) on the other hand complies with the requirements of the goveming J;adith, 
whereas ruling V (b) is not defensible because the goveming J;adith prohibits deferment 
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for a11 homogenous and heterogeneous commodities without limitation; it will be 
demonstrated below (chapter IV) that deferment produces doubled facJl of a more 
profound nature. 
III.l.iv.ac. Critique of Shafi'i Fiqhon Ribi 
Synopsis of Shafi 'i T eaching on Ribi701 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus: a11 currencies 
or aIl foodstuffs 
(gold for gold; dates for dates) 
Case II 
HETEROGENEITY of genus: a11 
currencies or a11 foodstuffs 
(gold for silver; dates for wheat) 
Case III 
HETEROGENEITY of genus: foodstuff 
vs. non- foodstuff 
(wheat for iron) 
Case IV 
NON-CURRENCIES AND 
NON-FOODSTUFFS: homogenous or 
heterogeneous 
(wood for wood; wood for lead) 
Case V 
HETEROGENEITY of genus: currency vs. 
other (incl. foodstuffs) 
(iron for gold; rice for silver) 
Critique 
Shafi 'i Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain prohibited in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Deferred transaction, even without 
gain, prohibited 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
III (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
III (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
IV (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
IV (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
transaction 
V (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
V (b) Gain permitted in def. transaction 
The Shafi'i fiqh rulings on ribii, 1 (a), II (a), III (a), 1 (b), II (b) and III (b) are in 
conformity with the ribawl-commodities J;adlth in prohibiting excess in spontaneous 
exchanges ofhomogeneity and permitting it in spontaneous exchanges ofheterogeneity, 
701 Extractcd from Salch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 26-27 (not ncccssarily the unanimous view of ail scholars ofthc school). 
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as weIl as in prohibiting delayed settlements with or without excess. However, the 
Shiifi '1 restriction of riba-prohibition to currencies and foodstuffs only is a restrictive 
economic approach to the issue. Rulings IV (a) and IV (b) take a restrictive view of the 
goveming J;adith in exempting non-currencies and non-foodstuffs from the purview of 
ribi-prohibition, and a110wing both excess and delay in a11 their permutations and 
combinations. This approach robs the goveming J;.adith of its immense analytical value. 
III.l.iv.ad. Critique of l;IanbaIi Fiqh on Ribii 
Synopsis ofHanbaIi Teaching on Riba 702 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus: a11 
foodstuffs, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method- weighability or 
measurability 
(riee for riee; grain for grain) 
Case II 
HOMOGENEITY of genus: a11 
foodstuffs, and 
ABSENCE ofweighability or 
measurability (COUNT ABILITY) 
(oranges for apples), or 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method-weighability or 
measurability and 
NON-FOODSTUFFS(gold for silver) 
Case III 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of 'ilia: a11 
measurable or a11 weighable or a11 
foodstuffs 
(wheat for barley) 
Case IV 
HETEROGENEITY of genus: 
currency vs. ribawl commodity Le. 
weighable or measurable or foodstuff 
ijanbali Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain prohibited in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Deferred transaction, even without 
gain, prohibited 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
III (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
III (b) Deferred transaction, even 
without gain, prohibited 
IV (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
IV (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
transaction 
702 Extractcd from Saleh, Un/awfu/ Gain, Second Edition, 29-30 (not necessarily the unanimous view of ail scholars of the school). 
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Case V 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HETEROGENEITY of 'jJia: 
measurable vs. weighable 
(wheat for meat) 
Case VI 
ABSENCE ofweighability or 
measurability, and 
FOODSTUFFS 
Critique 
V (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
V (b) Conflicting opinions on Gain in 
deferred transaction 
VI (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
VI (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
transaction 
The I:Ianbali fiqh rulings l (a) and l (b) comply with the ribawJ-commodities 
iJadith in requiring equality in spontaneous exchanges ofhomogeneity and in prohibiting 
delayed settlements with or without excess. However, these rulings take a view of ribii 
even more restrictive than the Zahir! view in focusing only on foodstuffs as ribawl 
commodities. Ruling II (a), though not in conformity with the text of the governing 
iJadith due to its permitting excess in an exchange of homogeneity, is in fact a case of 
applying legal refinement and precision to the iJadith text. The continuation of 
homogeneity in excess generation in materials requires either weighability or 
measurability. Excess through countability does not guarantee homogeneity. Therefore, 
prohibition of excess through exchanges of homogeneity applies only in the cases of 
weighability or measurability; it does not apply in that of countability. This explains 
their ruling that excess in spontaneous exchange ofhomogeneity is permitted in the case 
of countable items of exchange. However, the I:IanbaIi restriction of ribii -prohibition to 
foodstuffs only, and permission of excess in spontaneous exchange of homogeneity of 
estimation method in the case of non-foodstuffs is a very restrictive view of the 
governing 1;amth. However, ruling II (b) is in conformity with the governing 1;amth in 
outlawing deferred transactions, with or without gain. Rulings III (a) and III (b) are in 
compliance with the governing 1;amth in permitting excess in spontaneous exchanges of 
heterogeneity of genus and in prohibiting deferred transactions, with or without gain, 
even in heterogeneous exchanges. Rulings IV (a) and V (a) comply with the governing 
1;amth in permitting excess in spontaneous exchanges of heterogeneity of genus. But 
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rulings IV (b) and V (b) are in conflict with the goveming iJadith in permitting excess in 
deferred transactions of heterogeneity. Ruling VI (a) is in conformity with the legally 
refined and precise interpretation of the goveming iJadith in permitting excess in 
spontaneous exchanges, but ruling VI (b), in permitting both excess and deferment, 
contravenes the goveming iJadith which prohibits deferred transactions altogether. 
III.1.iv.ae. Critique ofIbaqi Fiqh on Ribii 
Synopsis ofIbam Teaching on Ribii703 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of 'iiia 
Case II 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HETEROGENEITY or 
HOMOGENEITY of 'iJia 
Critique 
Ibaqi Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Gain prohibited in deferred 
transaction 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
transaction 
The Ibaqi fiqh ruling l (a), in permitting excess in spontaneous exchanges of 
homogeneity, contravenes the ribawl-commodities iJadith which expressly prohibits it. 
Ruling l (b), in permitting delayed settlements, also contravenes the goveming iJadlth 
which prohibits it altogether. Ruling II (a) is in conformity with the goveming iJadith in 
permitting excess in spontaneous exchanges of heterogeneity. Ruling Il (b) again 
contravenes the goveming iJadith, which prohibits deferred transactions altogether, even 
without or with gain, in cases of both homogeneity and heterogeneity of genus. 
Heterogeneity of genus does not sanction deferred transaction. 
III.l.iv.af. Critique of Z8.hirl Fiqh on Ribii 
The Zahirls do not accept analogy (qiyiis) as a valid source of law. For them, ribii 
can occur only in the loan transaction referred to in the ribii prohibitory verses of the 
Qur'an and only in the six commodities specifically mentioned in the ribawl-
703 SaIch, UnJawfuJ Gain, Second Edition, 33-34 (not ncccssarily thc unanimous vicw of ail scholars of thc school). 
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commodities lJadith of the Prophet. Therefore, derivation of 'ilal (rationes legis), so 
central to the other madhiihib, has no place or relevance in Zahir! fiqh. 
III.1.iv.ag. Critique of Ja'fan Fiqh on Ribi 
Synopsis of Ja'fan Teaching on Ribii704 
Exchanged Counter-Values 
Case 1 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or 
measurability 
Case Il 
HETEROGENEITY of genus, and 
HOMOGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or 
measurability 
Case III 
HOMOGENEITY of genus, and 
ABSENCE ofweighability or 
measurability (COUNT ABILITY) 
(animal for animal) 
Case IV 
HETEROGENEITY of estimation 
method - weighability or 
measurability 
Critique 
Ja'fan Fiqh Rulings 
1 (a) Gain prohibited in spontaneous 
transaction 
1 (b) Deferred transaction, even without 
gain, prohibited 
II (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
II (b) Conflicting opinions on Gain in 
deferred transaction 
III (a) Gain perrnitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
III (b) Conflicting opinions on Gain in 
deferred transaction 
IV (a) Gain permitted in spontaneous 
transaction 
IV (b) Gain permitted in deferred 
Transaction 
The Ja'farl fiqhrulings on n'bii 1 (a), 1 (h), II (a), III (a) and IV (a) comply with the 
ribawJ-commodities lJadith in requiring equality in spontaneous exchanges of 
homogeneity and in prohibiting delayed settlements with or without excess. However, 
the conflicting opinions in rulings II (b) and III (b), and the ruling IV (b) have no hasis in 
the goveming IJadith which outlaws deferred transactions altogether. 
The originality of ShI' a view resides in the fact that ShI' a fiqh, in a departure from 
other Islamic jurisprudential schools, permits ribii among certain categories of people: 
master and slave, father and son, and hushand and wife. 705 
704 Extracted from Saleh, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 33 (not necessarily the unanimous view of ail scholars of the school) . 
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For them, the union of the patrimonies (dhimma miiliyya) of the master and the 
slave renders any transaction between them devoid of ribii.706 Since the slave is the 
property of the master and aH his possessions belong to the master, they regard the 
master and the slave as only one party in the transaction. Accordingly, any transaction 
between the two is a transaction by the master with himself, in which case, according to 
them, there is no place for ribii. 
Transactions between father and son, for them, are also beyond the prohibition of 
ribii and faH under the category of iiJsiin (doing good), which the Qur'an urges sons to do 
to their fathers, and which is interpreted to mean passing benefits to them.707 Any excess 
in a transaction between father and son is therefore not ribii but iiJsiin. The rib~ 
exemption between father and son is not applicable between mother and son, based on a 
iJadith attributed to Imam 'Ali~ and cannot be extended to mothers by analogy (qiyiis), 
which is not recognized by the la'farl fiqh. 708 
Transactions between husband and wife are also devoid of ribii, on the authority of 
the abovementioned iJadith attributed to Imam 'Ali, which states "there is no ribii 
between father and son, master and slave, nor between husband and wife but between 
you and those whom you do not own .... "709 According to the majority la'farl view, the 
husband and wife exemption is applicable to permanent marri age only and not to the 
temporary marri age (mutiijrecognized in Shi'ite Islam.7Io 
The originality of la'fad fiqh in granting exemption from ribii-prohibition to the 
three relationships above lies in their pioneering attempt to point to the philosophical 
connotation of ribii. It is a unique - albeit only partiaHy suecessful - effort to bring out 
the underlying process and the distinguishing eharacteristie of ribii. The basis for their 
exemption of the master-slave relationship is, rightly, philosophie al. But the basis for 
exempting the father-son relationship is moral (iiJsiin) and that for the husband-wife 
relationship traditional (iJadith), without reference to the underlying rationale. A critique 
ofthese exemptions in the light of the new theory of ribiiwill be posited in ehapter IV. 
705 Abu al-Qasim • Ali ibn l:Iasan al-MüsawÎ, al-Inti,~iir. (Tchran, 1971),212-213, quotcd in Salch, Unlaw!ul Gain, Second Ed., 38. 
706 al-MusawÎ, al-fnti,viir, 2l2-2\3; Yusuf al-BaI)ranl, al-lfadii'iq al-Niiifira. 22 vols. (Bcirut, 1985), XIX, 259. 
707 al-BaI)ranl, al-lfadii'iq al-Niiifira, XIX, 260-261; al-Musawl, al-lnti,<iir, 213-214; Mui)ammad l:Iasan al-Najafi, Jawiihir al-Kaliim. 
43 vols. 7th cd. (Bcirut, 1981), XXIll, 379. 
70R Ibid. 
709 Ibid. 
710 al-Bai)rïinl, al-Ifadii'iq al-Niit/ira, XIX, 261. 
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III.l.iv.b. Critique of 'IlIa of Ribii -Proscription in Fiqh 
The Islamic jurisprudential discourse on the 'ilIa of ribif-proscription is very 
complex and even divisive, although the basis of this juridical discourse is the common 
set of ribawJ~ommodities alJiidJth presented ahove. 711 As Saeed puts it: 
Juristic discussion tended, firstly, to probe into the 'illa (efficient cause) of the prohibition of 
each commodity mentioned in the 'six-commodities iJadJth.' Identification of the 'illa was 
intended to extend the prohibition to other similar commodities by me ans of the jurisprudential 
tool of analogy (qiyiis), which meant not to look into the social and moral reasons for the 
prohibition, but to establish the letter of the law. Since the iJadJth did not provide any reason for 
the prohibition conceming these six commodities, jurists had to resort to ijtihiid to identify the 
'illa. On the basis of certain terms used in sorne versions of the iJadJth, they arrived at 'illas [sic] 
which naturally differed amongst the schools oflaw.712 
Ta the preceding statement it may he added that the ribii-qiyiis was likewise not 
meant to look into the philosophie al and theological ration ale for the prohibition, which, 
as it tums out, might prove to be one of its greatest shortcomings. Additionally, the 
lJadith only did not explicitIyprovide a reason for the prohibition, although the impiicit 
reasons are subsumed by its wordings. 
Current juristic repertoire does mention "similarity" as an 'jJia of ribii, but not an 
exclusive one. Furthermore, it does not work out the implications of this 'ilia of 
similarity for the tamyJz (distinction) of ribii or the lJilana (rationale) of its prohibition. 
In its 'ilia formulation, it conjoins similarity with the physical qualities of the 
Prophetically-named six commodities, namely currency value, food value, weighability, 
measurability, storability, etc. In this approach of combining the abstract with the 
material aspects, the doors to the search for implications of the concept of similarity are 
closed. Making the material aspects of the commodities the "operative conditions" for 
the working of the 'iiia of ribii immediately limits the scope of ribii discourse to physical 
human welfare, shutting out all metaphysical explanations. 
On the contrary, these material operative conditions are only "incident al" 
characteristics of the named commodities, and not the 'ilia of ribii. In the ribawJ-
commodities lJadith the only and exclusive 'illa is "similarity." The actual operative 
principle, Le., the distinguishing criterion employed, is "similarity" vs. "dissimilarity" 
("goId for goid ... " [similarity] ... "if the commodities diffèr ... " [dissimilarit y]), and not 
711 Citcd in II.3.ii. abovc and prcscntcd in full in Appcndix 5, bclow. 
712 Saccd, Is'lamic Banking, 34. 
179 
"goldness" vs. "non- goldness," or "weighability" vs. "non-weighability," etc. The 
J;adith lays down the requirements of exchange for cases where there is "similarity" and 
where there is "dissimilarity." The J;adith is not structured to lay down rules of 
exchange either for gold vs. non-go Id or for weighable vs. non-weighable, etc. Rather, it 
specifically mentions only "dissimilarity," and not "non-goldness" or "non-
weighability," etc. Any reading of the latter two concepts into this J;adith is only by 
implication at best and by speculation at worst. 
Conditions Pertaining to Rule-Occasioning Factor ('illa) 
The topic of 'jJla and its derivation has been extensively and variously treated in 
major u~iil works, such as those of Shafi '1, al-Ghazali, ibn Rushd, Ibn Qudama and al-
Sarakhsl, to name but a few. In this study, however, in evaluating the CUITent and the 
posited 'iJal (occasioning factors) of the rule governing the prohibition of ribii and 
permission of bay: sole reliance will be placed on the classic works of Abu al-I:Iasan 'Ali 
Sayf al-Dln Amidi (d.630/1232). His al-IJ;kiim,713 in the words of Hallaq, 714 represents 
the culmination of discourse on u~iil al-fiqh in that he sums up virtually all arguments 
that preceded him in the field, making his work representative of a wide range of method 
and substance in u~iil715 
The derivation conditions laid down in the u~iil, though not aIl non-controversial, 
for the formulation of the occasioning factor tilla) giving rise to the rule governing a 
case, as captured by the classic works of Amidi, and as presented by Bernard Weiss,7I6 
coyer: (a) determinacy and role ofrationales: conditions 3, 9, 14, and 15; (b) relationship 
of the occasioning factors and the occasioned rules: conditions 8, Il, and 16; (c) 
7lJ Amidi, Abii al-f:lasan 'Ali Sayf al-Dln. al-llJkiirn fi U,"ulal-AlJkiim, 3 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at 'Ali ~ubayry, 1968); Muntahii al-Sul fi 
'Ilm al-l},çiïl (Cairo: Marba'at MuI)ammad 'Ali ~ubayry, n.d.). 
714 Observation made by Hallaq in a rcview ofthis dissertation, November 2006. 
715 Major primary works on u,~ul and their authors that preceded Amidi inc\udc, by madhhab: 
(1) Hanatl Madhhab: Abü Bakr Mul)ammad ibn Abl Sahl al-SarakhsÎ (d. 48311090), al-l},~iïl, cd. Abü al-Wafii al-Afghanl, 2 
vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 139311973). 
(2) Shafi'Î Madhhab: MuI)ammad b. Idrîs Shafi'i, al-Risii/a, cd. MuI)ammad Sayyid KilanÎ (Cairo: Mu~rafii BabÎ aI-l:IalabÎ, 
1969); al-Risàla, cd. Al)mad MuI)ammad Shitkir (Cairo: Mu~rafii Babi al-l:Ialabl, 1940). Trans. Majid Khadduri, al-Ia~a/a li 
l},~ulal-Fiqh: Treatise on the Foundations oflslamie Jurisprudence, 2ncl cdn (Cambridge: Islamic Tcxts Society 1987); 
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 50511111), al-Musta,çfii min 'Ilm al-l},"iïl, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Amlriyya, 1324/1906) ;al-
Mankhiïl min Ta'liqiit al-lJ,çiïl, cd. Mul)ammad f:lasan Haytu (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1980); Shifii' al-Ghalilli Bayiin al-
Shabah wa al-Mukhll wa-Masiilik al-Ta 'HI, ed.f:lamd al-Kablsl (Baghdad: Matba'at al-Irshild, 1390/1971). 
(3) Malikl Madhhab: Abu al-Walid MuI)ammad ibn Al)mad ibn Rushd (d. 59511198), al-pariïra fi lJ,yul a/-Fiqh aw Mukhta"'ar a/-
Musta,yfii, cd. Jamal al-Dln al-'AlawÎ (Bcirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islaml, 1994). 
(4) Hanbali Madhhab: Muwaffaq al-DÎn Ibn Qudama (d. 620/1223), Rawqat al-N~jr wa-Jannat a/-Mun~jr, cd. Sayf al-Dln al-
Kiitib (Beirut: Dar al-Kitilb al-'Arabi, 1401/1981). 
716 Bernard G. Weiss, The Seareh for God's Law: I.,-!amie Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Din al-Amim (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1992),561-570. 
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multiplicityof features of occasioning factors and ofrules: conditions 6, 10, 12, and 13; 
and (d) affirmative and negative rules: conditions 4, and 17. 
These derivation conditions are first summarized below and then the 'ilal of the 
ribi-proscription as postulated by the various madhihib are evaluated for compliance 
with these conditions. 
(A) NON-CONTROVERSIAL CONDITIONS (aIl accepted by Amidi) 
Non-Controversial: Condition # 7 
(a) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must be extendable to the novel case 
for the analogy to be valid. 
(b) The occasioning factor behind a rule must be present in a case other than the case 
govemed by that rule in order to be a true occasioning factor. 
Non-Controversial: Condition # 18 
(a) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not have been extrapolated from 
the rule falIaciously. 
(b) The original rule must not prove to be inoperative: any occasioning factor 
extrapolated from it cannot be productive of a valid analogy. 
(c) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not consist merely of sorne 
feature of the principal case that happens to be present whenever the IUle is operative 
and absent whenever it is inoperative. 
(d) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not be capable of being 
countered by sorne other occasioning factor for which there is equal supporting evidence 
and which is not present in the novel case. 
(e) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not be in conflict with a clear 
Qur'anic or Sunnaic text or with an Ijma'ic consensus. 
Non-Controversial: Condition # 19 
(a) The occasioning factor must be determined solely by the Legislator and the indicator 
through which it becomes manifest must accordingly be a SharJ'a indicator: an indicator 
supplied by the Legislator. 
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(B) CONTROVERSIAL CONDITIONS 
Controversial: Condition # 1 
The occasioning factor must neither be identical with the case to which the rule applies 
nor be a part of that case. The controversy surrounds the second part of the condition, 
which Amidi rejects on the ground that most of the analogies in fact involve occasioning 
factors that are part of the factual bundle to which the occasioned rule applies. 
Controversial: Condition # 2 
The occasioning factor must be "that which prompts or occasions" (al-bii'ith). To 
remove the tautology, the condition has been rephrased by Weiss as "the occasioning 
factor behind the original rule must truly occasion the rule," which according to Arnim, 
means "it must entail a rationale [lJikmajthat the Legislator may be said to have in mind 
as His purpose in establishing the rule." Weiss explains that this condition does not 
equate 'illa with lJikma; it simply requires that the 'illa entails, or is linked to, a lJikma. 
The condition presupposes that the 'illa is not just any feature (wa~f) of the principal 
case but is rather a feature that is tied to a lJiJana, thus making the existence of a lJikma 
a sine qua non of analogy. This controversial condition is accepted by Amidi. 
Controversial: Condition # 3 
The occasioning factor must not consist of an indeterminate lJikma. Specifie constant 
determinate features of cases that give determinacy to an indeterminate lJikma, and not 
the indeterminate lJikma itself, should constitute the rule-occasioning factor. This 
controversial condition is accepted by Amidi with qualification. 
Controversial: Condition # 4 
Affirmative original rule must have a positive occasioning factor, i.e., something that 
exists, something present as opposed to something absent. This controversial condition 
is accepted by Amidi. 
Controversial: Condition # 5 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not itself be a ru le of law. This 
controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
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Controversial: Condition # 6 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must consist of a single feature of the 
principal case; it may not be a complex of several fe at ures. This controversial condition 
is rejected by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 8 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must be unrestricted in its operation as a 
rule-occasioning factor; it must occasion the rule in every case in which it is present. 
This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim with qualification. 
Controversial: Condition # 9 
The lJibna to which the occasioning factor behind the original rule is tied must be 
uniformly coincidental with the rule; whenever the lJibna obtains, the rule must also 
obtain; otherwise, the occasioning factor ceases to be valid. This controversial condition 
is accepted by Arnim with qualification. 
Controversial: Condition # 10 
Where the occasioning factor behind the original rule consists of a complex of several 
features of the principal case (for rejecters of Condition 6), the features must constitute 
a unit such that the validity of the analogy is not dependent upon any one of them 
considered apart from the others. This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # Il 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must be such that if it is negated the rule 
must also be negated. This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim with 
qualification. 
Controversial: Condition # 12 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must be the sole factor occasioning that 
rule: it must not be one of sever al occasioning factors operating simultaneously to give 
rise to the rule. This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 13 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not also be the occasioning factor 
behind sorne other ruie. This controversiai condition is rejected by Arnim. 
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Controversia1: Condition # 14 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must serve to give determinacy to sorne 
l;ikma (rat ion ale ). This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 15 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule, as the giver of determinacy to a 
rationale, must be indispensable to the working of the ration ale such that the ration ale 
will never obtain in a particular case apart from it. This controversial condition is 
rejected by Arnim. 
Controversia1: Condition # 16 
The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not obtain after the rule has already 
become operative: the rule must not have been previously operative apart from the 
occasioning factor. This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 17 
Where the original rule assumes a negative form and the occasioning factor is sorne 
impediment to the operation of the corresponding affirmative rule or the non-realization 
of sorne condition upon which the operation of the affirmative rule depends, the 
occasioning factor behind the affirmative rule must be actually present and operative. 
This controversial condition is accepted by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 18 
(f) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not have the effect ofrestricting 
the reference of a general expression in the Qur'an. This controversial condition is 
rejected by Arnim. 
(g) The occasioning factor behind the original rule must not be capable of being 
countered by a factor that occasions the contrary of the original rule. This controversial 
condition is rejected by Arnim. 
(h) The occasioning factor must not entail any addition to what is contained within the 
meaning of the Qur'anie and Sunnaic texts. This controversial condition is rejected by 
Arnim. 
(i) The original rule from which the occasioning factor is extrapolated must itself be 
established with absolute certainty. This controversial condition is rejected by Arnim. 
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Ci) The occasioning factor must not be in conflict with the opinion of a Companion of 
the Prophet. This controversial condition is rejected by Amidi. 
(k) The presence of the occasioning factor in the novel case must be established with 
absolute certainty. This controversial condition is rejected by Arnim. 
Controversial: Condition # 19 
(b) An indicator that is used to establish an occasioning factor must not itself serve to 
establish the rule governing the novel case. This controversial condition is rejected by 
Arnim. 
Madhiihib Fiqh Compliance with Derivation Conditions 
The compliance with these conditions by the various madhiihib in the development 
of their 'ilal of ribii -prohibition is evaluated below: 
III.l.iv.ba. Critique of 'Illain I:Ianafi Fiqh 
According to the Banafis, the 'illa, for both the currencies and edibles included in 
the six-commodities iJadith is similarity of species and similarity of method of 
estimation (qadr): weight in case of currencies and measure in case of edibles, in line 
with the commercial practice in the age of the Prophet.717 In an exchange, when both 
factors -similarity ofspecies and similarity ofmethod of estimation - are present, both 
excess in weight/measure (ribii al-fa(1) and delay in delivery (ribii al-nasl'a) are 
prohibited. In case only one of the factors is present - similarity of method of estimation 
- then excess in weight/measure (ribii al-faql) is permitted but delay in delivery (ribii al-
nasl'a) is prohibited. In case both the factors - similarity of species and similarity of 
method of estimation - are absent (e.g. exchange between currencies and edibles), then 
both excess in weight/measure (ribii al-faql) and delay in delivery (ribii al-nasl'a) are 
permitted, according to I:Ianafi fiqh. 718 
I:Ianafi fiqh considers only weighabiJjty and measurabiJjty as the components of 
the method of estimation (qadr), to the exclusion of counting. This is not an omission or 
oversight, but has a sound philosophicalltheological reason connected with the l;1ikma of 
the rib;J:.proscription, though not postulated by them. As for the 'illa itself, while the 
717 al-SarakhsÎ, al-Mabsiit. XlI, 116-20. 
718 Nyazec, Ribii and lçj;mic Ba1Jki1Jg, 69. 
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I:Ianafi reasoning appears to be sound in the case of the presence of both or one of the 
factors of the 'illa, their reasoning in the case of the absence of both factors of the 'illa 
does not appear to be defensible. In this latter case (dissimilarity of species and 
dissimilarity of estimation method) they permit both excess in weight/measure (ribii al-
facfl) and delay in delivery (ribii al-nasJ'a). But this twin permission runs contrary to the 
Prophetie ribawJ-commodities l;adith, which clearly stipulates that in the event that the 
commodities differ (as to species and estimation method), they may be sold as one 
wishes (facfl permitted), providedthe exchange is hand to hand (nasJ'a prohibited). This 
I:Ianafi position is based on their assumption that the prohibition of excess and 
prohibition of delay are both govemed by the presence of similarity of species and 
similarity of method of estimation. As will be shown below, while the prohibition of 
excess is indeed, as in the I:Ianafi position, govemed by similarity of species and 
similarity of estimation method (weight/measure), contrary to the f.Ianafi position the 
prohibition of delay is not condition al upon the presence of these two factors of the 'illa. 
Prohibition of delay stems from a unique phenomenon, connected directly to the f}ikma, 
and applies even when both the factors of this 'jlla are absent. Put differently, the 'jlla of 
the prohibition of delay is different from the 'jlla of prohibition of excess. Moreover, 
these two factors of the 'iila, as the I:Ianafis caU them (similarity of species and 
similarity of estimation method), are not the 'iJla itself. These two factors are only the 
"necessary conditions," (as held by the Shafi'ls, although for species only), for the 
emergence of the 'iila of excess, which is a single phenomenon and has a direct link to 
the l;ikma of the prohibition, in accordance with the requirement of u~iil al-fiqh.719 This 
conclusion is a major component of the thesis of this work and is elaborated below 
(chapter IV). 
Nyazee has concluded that the I:Ianafi position of not requiring immediate 
exchange in case of dissimilarity of species and dissimilarity of estimation method 
enables credit sales (buyii' al-nasTa), and pre-paid sale (bay' al-salam) under certain 
conditions. no But as will also be argued below (chapter V), the permissibility of credit 
sales itself under Islamic law is at best questionable, while bay' al-salam is not the rule 
719 Weiss, Search forGod:~ Law, 563, (Condition # 2). 
720 Nyazce, Ribii and l.'/amic Banking, 69-70. 
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but an exception. In bay' al-salam the prepaid price is a loan for a fixed period as 
permitted by Q. 2:282, and then the sale takes place in the regular manner when the 
goods are manufactured and ready. 
Jurisprudentially, the Banafi 'jJla for the rule of riba-proscription does not meet 
the crucial conditions debated in jurisprudential circles as summarized above (III.1.iv.b). 
Firstly, as pointed out above, the two factors of 'iJla identified by the Banafis (similarity 
of genus and similarity of estimation method) are not the 'illa itself, but only the 
"necessary conditions" for the emergence of the 'i11a. Even if these two factors are 
accepted as the 'iJla, the Ijanafi stipulation of the two factors as the 'j11a attracts the 
controversy surrounding the permissibility of a multiplicity of features of the original 
case acting as the 'iJla. It flagrantly conflicts with Condition #6 that requires that the 
occasioning factor behind the original rule must consist of a single feature of the 
principal case: it may not consist of a complex of sever al features. F urt hermore , as a 
crucial failure, the Ijanafi 'i11a does not conform fully with Condition# 2 which 
requires that the occasioning factor behind the original rule must entail a rationale 
(i}ikma) that the Legislator may be said to have in mind as His purpose in establishing 
the rule and that the 'i11a should entail, or is linked to, a i}ikma. Banafi fiqh does not 
show how their identified 'iJla of similarity of genus and similarity of estimation 
method entails, or is linked to, a i}ikma, or what that i}ikma is. By not meeting this 
crucial requirement, the Ijanafi fiqh on riba utterly fails the test of analogical validity 
and jurisprudentiallegitimacy. 
III.l.iv.bb. Critique of '/l1a in Shafi '1 Fiqh 
In Shafi'I fiqh, currency-value (thamaniya) and food-value (ta'am) are the 'iJalin 
the cases of currency and edibles respectively, extending the prohibition of riba to all 
precious metals possessing a currency-value, and to aIl food items.721 Contrary to the 
Ijanafi view, similarity of species, for the Shafi '1s, is not an element of the 'i11a, but only 
a necessary condition.722 
The major flaw in the Shafi 'i position is that their 'iJal of currency-value and food-
value have no demonstrable connection with a plausible i}ikma. Their 'iJal have 
721 al-Nawawl, Minhifj al-Tiilib7n, trans. L. W. C. Van Berg. 1,355. 
722 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsii!, XII, 116-120. 
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implications for the temporal market economy (possible money market disequilibrium 
and human hardship), but no connection to a lJilana compatible with the dire 
punishments ordained for ribii. The Shafi'I extension of ribi-prohibition to aIl currency 
and food items, including countable items, by including countability along with 
weighability and measurability as part of the method of estimation, severs the only 
(though unpronounced) methodological link that the Shafi'I 'ilal could have had with 
the lJikma. This severance completely undermines the strength of the Shafi '1 'ilal, as will 
be shown below. 
From the standpoint of u~iïl al-fiqh requirements, again as a crucial failure similar 
to the I:Ianafi failure, the Shafi '1 'jJla does not conform fully with Condition #2 which, 
as shown above,723 requires that the occasioning factor behind the original rule must 
entail a ration ale [lJilana]that the Legislator may be said to have in mind as His purpose 
in establishing the rule and that the 'iJla should entail, or is linked to, a lJikma. Shafi'I 
fiqh does not show how their identified 'jJal of currency-value and food-value entail, or 
are linked to, a lJilana, or what that lJilana is. By not meeting this crucial requirement, 
the Shafi'I fiqh on ribi utterly fails the test of analogical validity and jurisprudential 
legitimacy. 
III.l.iv.bc. Critique of 'Illa in Ma1ikl Fiqh 
Malikl fiqh, like the Shafi'I version, regards currency-value and food-value as the 
'iJal for the currencies and edibles respectively. The critique of the Shafi'I position, in 
III.l.iv.bb, above, applies equally to the Malild position, as their 'ilal are the same. 
Therefore, the Malikl fiqh on ribi likewise fails the test of analogical validity and 
jurisprudentiallegitimacy. 
However, there is an additional Maliki requirement of storability for the attribute 
of food, thus excluding perishable food from the prohibition.724 This Malik1 requirement 
of storabiJjty (implied longevity as opposed to perishability) is a very important -
though entirely unrecognized and unformulated by them - condition for the emergence 
of the 'illa of excess, as will be shown in chapter IV. It may suffice to note here that 
longevity, leading to eternity, is a defining and essential characteristic of self-
723 Scc, p. 1 X2, abovc. 
724 Ibn Juzay, Qawiinln al-AlJkiïm al-Sharl'a, 279-280. 
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emanation; today, for instance, man is seeking self-emanation (through cloning) to 
achieve etemity. 
III.l.iv.bd. Critique of '111ain ijanbali Fiqh 
ijanbali fiqh, like the ijanafi, considers similarity of species and similarity of 
method of estimation to be the factors in the 'ilia for the prohibition of excess and 
prohibition of delay in currencies and edibles. But it adds countabiJity to weighability 
and measurability as a method of estimation.725 
The critique of the ijanafi position, delivered in III.1.iv.ba., above, applies equally 
to the ijanbali position as their 'jJal are the same. Therefore, ijanbali fiqh on ribii also 
fails the test of analogical validity and jurisprudential legitimacy. Additionally, the 
ijanbali inclusion of countability along with weighability and measurability as yet 
another method of estimation severs the link which their 'illa of excess could have had 
with the f;ilana. This severance, as also in Shiifi '1 fiqh, completely demolishes the 
strength ofthe ijanbali 'illa, as will be shown below in chapter IV. 
III.l.iv.be. Critique of '1iia in IbaQi Fiqh 
IbaQi fiqh does not have a uniform position on the 'ilia of ribii's proscription, the 
application of which is rather limited under that fiqh. 726 As in the ijanafi fiqh, sorne 
Ibii<Ji scholars regard weighabiJjtyand measurabiJjtyas the 'illa. 727 al-Shammiikhl adopts 
the Shiifi '1 position on 'jJla, though substituting for foodstuff the term "what is produced 
by the soil."728 
This lack of cohesion in the IbaQi fiqh on ribii prevents any meaningful contrast 
with the calibrated hermeneutical model below (chapter IV) and with the u$iil al-fiqh 
requirement, above, (III.l.iv.b). However, to the extent of its similarity with the ijanafi 
and Shafi'I fiqh positions, the fragmentary IbaQi fiqh on ribii also utterly fails the test 
of analogical validity and jurisprudentiallegitimacy. 
725 Nyazcc, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 71. 
726 Salch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 20-21. 
727 AI-Basyanl, Mukhta"'ar al-Ba.,yiinJ (Oman, 1397 AH), 177. 
n. al-Shammakhf" • Amir ibn' An. al-lijiih, 1Il, 28. 
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III.l.iv.bf. Critique of '/Hain Zahirl Fiqh 
For the Zahids, analogy (qiyiis) is not a valid source of law. Therefore, they 
confine ribii to the named six commodities.729 Accordingly, in their fiqh there is no need 
to determine 'ilal for the extension of the iJukm of ribii. But, as already pointed out 
above/30 the Zahids permit the extension of the meanings of the six commodities to 
other commodities through the implication of the meanings.731 
III.l.iv.bg. Critique of 'IHa in Ja'fan Fiqh 
la'fad fiqh recognizes similarity of genus and similarity of means of valuation 
(taqmr) by weight or measure as the two necessary elements of the 'illa. 732 For them, 
similarity of genus arises from similarity of name 733 or similarity of attributes.734 
Weighability or measurability, for them, is to be determined according to the practice in 
the time of the Prophet, or in its absence, according to local custom.735 
This la'fart position on the 'illa has the same elements as the I:Ianafi position and, 
therefore, the same comments apply here as in III.1.iv.ba, above. Therefore, the la'fad 
fiqh on ribii similarly fails the test of analogical validity and jurisprudentiallegitimacy. 
III.1.iv.bh. Critique of 'IHain Individual Fuqahii'Works 
A large number of differing 'ilal of the injunction of ribii - as many as nineteen -
have been discovered and posited by the classical juristS.736 Most of these are covered by 
the madhiihib exposition on the 'illa and their critique, above, comprising the work of 
representative fuqahii' of each madhhab.737 The 'ilal and their critique presented above, 
therefore, provide a complete coverage of the fiqh repertoire on the issue. 
729 Abu Mu4ammad 'Abd Allah b. Sa'id Ibn l:Iazm, al-MuiJallii (Beirut: n.p.,I978; Cairo: Idara Taba'at al-Munlriyya,l350),VIII, 468. 
7'0 Scc 1I1.I.iv.a., p. 169, abovc. 
731 Nyazcc, Ribii and l~/amie Banking, 71. 
732 JamaI al-Dln al-l:Iasan ibn Yusuf al-Mu~ahhar, Tab,~iriit al-Muta 'allim/n fi AiJkiim al-DI n, 127. 
733 Riil) Allah aI-Khumaynl, TaiJr1r al- Waslla (al-Najaf: Matba'at aI-Adab, [bctwccn 1964 and 1978]), l, 537; scc also Abu al-Qasim 
Najm al-Dln Ja'far ibn l:Iasan 'Ali, al-Mukhta~'ar al-Nafi' fi Fiqh al-Imiimiyya, 151. 
734 Ibid. 
735 M. J. Maghnlyah, Fiqh al-Imiim Ja 'far al-$iidiq (Bayrut: Dar al- 'llm IiI-MaIayln, 1965), VIII, 277. 
736 Nyazcc, Ribii and Mamie Banking, 68, bascd on Mul)ammad ibn 'Ali Shawkanl (d. 1839), Irshiid al-FuiJiil ilii TaiJq7q al-f:laqq min 
'llm al-Usiil. 
737 al-Sar~khsl on l:Ianafi fiqh; al-Nawawl on Shafi'i fiqh; Ibn Qudama on l:Ianbali fiqh; Ibn Juzay on Malikl fiqh; al-Basyanl, al-
Shammakhl and al-Saliml on Iba<!1 fiqh; and al-Murahhar, al-Khumaynl and al-Murta4a on Ja'farl fiqh. 
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III.1.iv.c. Critique of QikmaofProscription of Ribii in Fiqh 
Any search for the ration ale (lJikma) of proscription of ribii and its rational 
explanation is a departure from the standard method of classical Islamic law. The 
casuistic analogical method of the classical and medieval fuqahii' did not encourage the 
formulation of juristic positions on the rationale (lJikma) of Scriptural injunctions. 
Moreover, since the extension (through 'illa), and not interpretation (through lJikma), of 
the lJukm of ribii was the matter of practical concern at that time, the madhiihib 
formulations were developed only for the 'ilia. Hence, unlike the abundant madhiihib 
literature on 'ilia, there is no formaI madhhab formulation on the rationale (lJikma) of 
proscription of ribii. "Although few classical scholars acknowledge a need to go beyond 
the usual 'illas [sic] ... in order to 'understand' ribii laws or identify their deeper 
'causes,' there have been a few attempts to do so, famous perhaps because of their 
rarity."738 Only sorne individual scholars have opined on the subject, the more pro minent 
being those examined below. 
Ibn Kaysan (d. 911 or 912 C.E.) opined that "the reason (ai-maq~iid) for the 
prohibition of ribii is kindness towards people" (i.e., by not charging an increase). This 
opinion was reported and debunked by al-Nawaw1739 "since this logic would extend 
incorrectly to profit-making .... "740 Further critical evaluation ofthis ration ale is posited 
below in dealing with Ibn Qayyim's rationale of "exploitation of the poor." 
Ibn Rushd (d.595/1198), the philosopher and Mâlikl jurist,741 as pointed out by 
Vogel, preferred and extended the I:Ianafi 'ilia of equality of measure to posit 
"mathematical equivalency" as the lJikma (ration ale) of proscription of ribii. For Ibn 
Rushd, the rationale of ribi-prohibition is the "goal of exalting fairness of exchange, 
advanced by insisting on exact mathematical equality of exchange whenever that 
equality is possible and appropriate. Adequate equality is usually achieved by 
transacting through the medium of currency, the purpose of which, he notes, is to 
provide a neutral measure of respective values. If, however, the two countervalues being 
exchanged have similar uses and are either both measured by volume, both weighed, or 
738 Vogc1 and Hayes, L~/amic Law and Finance, 78. 
739 al-Nawawl, a/-Mf!imii', IX, 390-404 ("fàr' Il madhiihib a/- 'u/amii' Il bayiin 'il/at a/-ribii Il a/- 'ajniis al-arba'a"). 
740 EI-Gamal, "An Economie Explication of the Prohibition of Ribii in Classieallslamie Jurisprudence" 
(http://www.ruf.ricc.edurc1gamal/files/islamie.html). n. 1,2. 
741 Ibn Rushd, Bidiiyat, Il, 129 ff. 
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both currency, then exact mathematical equality ought to be required."742 Extending Ibn 
Rushd's mathematical equality theory, Vogel posits "prevention of uncontrolled 
inequality" as the rationale for the prohibition of delayed exchanges of goods within 
these three groupings.743 Further precision is added to this 'Ibn Rushd rationale' by EI-
Gamal who states, "Ibn Rushd dramatically enlarged the scope of ribii,744 and held the 
1;.ikma to be ghubn fii1;.ish (excessive injustice/criminal fraud745), where justice meant 
'equality or proportionality of the transaction' with no connotation of injustice to, or 
exploitation of, the poor."746 Ibn Rushd himself states: 
It is thus apparent from the law that what is intended by the prohibition of ribii is what it 
contains of excessive injustice (ghubn fii/;lish). In this regard, justice in transactions is achieved by 
approaching equality. Since the aUainment of such equality in items of different kinds is difficult, 
their values are determined instead in monetary terms (with the Dirham and the DJniir). 
For things which are not measured by weight and volume, justice can be determined by me ans of 
proportionality. 1 me an, the ratio between the value of one item to its kind should be equal to the 
ratio of the value of the other item to its kind. For example, if a person se Ils a horse in exchange 
for clothes, justice is attained by making the ratio of the price of the horse to other horses the 
same as the ratio of the price of the clothes [for which it is traded, tr.] to other clothes. Thus, if 
the value of the horse is fi ft y, the value of the c10thes should be fi ft y [If each piece of c1othing's 
value is five], then the horse should be exchanged for 10 pieces of clothing. 
As for [fungible] goods measured by volume or weight, they are relatively homogenous, and thus 
have similar benefits [utilities]. Since it is not necessary for a pers on owning one type of those 
goods to exchange it for the exact same type, justice in this case is achieved by equating volume 
or weight, since the benefits [utilities] are very similar ... 747 
Here Ibn Rushd is clearly advancing a rudimentary economic argument, which EI-
Gamal has subsequently rendered in modem economic terminology of "Pareto 
efficiency," a concept of Welfare Economics. While this economic justice-based 
rationale of exact mathematical equality or proportionality is promising per se, it is not 
commensurate with the ordained Qur'rulÎc punishment for indulgence in ribii, and its 
Prophetic equivalence with shirk and incest. Moreover, beyond this rationale of justice, 
Ibn Rushd in philosophy - as also Vogel in law and EI-Gamal in economics - does not 
explore any philosophical and theological explanation that will be posited in this thesis. 
Vogel here raises what he caUs an interesting side question: "why [is it that] qarç/ 
loans without interest are lawful, when sales with delay of a ribawl good for an cqual but 
742 Vogel and Hayes, 1.~/amic Law and Finance, 78. 
743 Ibid., 79. 
744 Waf)ba al-Zuf)ayfi, al-Fiqh al-Isliiml wa Adillatuh (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1997), Fourth reviscd cd., V, 3724-3725. 
745 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionary, 779. 
746 EI-Gamal, An Economie Explication of the Prohibition of Ribii, 5. 
747 Ibn Rushd, Bidiyat (Bcirut: Dar al- Ma'rifat, 1997), vcrificd by 'Abd al-MaJîd Tu'mat J:lalabl, III, 184, trans., EI-Gamal, in his 
"An Economic Explication ofthc Prohibition of Ribi'; 5. 
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delayed price in the same good (e.g., ten bushels ofwheat now for ten bushels ofwheat 
later) are not lawful?" He posits the technical fiqh answer that interest-free loans are 
licit because "loans are always presently due, liable to being called at any time, a 
provision favoring the lender and reducing his market risk. As important is the Prophet's 
description of qarq as a charitable act, implying that the lender's voluntary acceptance 
of the delay in the exchange is charity." He further posits that delayed sales are illicit 
presumably because delay introduces an unreasonable inequality into the exchange.748 
These rationales, based on morality (charity) and justice (equality of exchange), are 
rather weak and are not compatible with the punishments for the sin of ribii. A st ronger 
and compatible philosophical-theological rationale arising out of transfer of ownership, 
not in loans but only in delayed sales, is posited in chapter IV, below. 
Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl (d. 606/1209), decl are s the rationale (1;ikma) of the 
prohibition of ribii to comprise the following: 749 
(1) "The first reason is that taking of ribii implies appropriating another person's 
property without giving him anything in exchange ... Now, a man's property is for 
fulfilling his needs, and it has great sanctity .... This means that taking it from him 
without giving him something in exchange is 1;aram." - [justice rationale]. 
This argument, viewed from a theological perspective, has aIl the ingredients of the 
ex-nihilo creation argument, but is not developed further by him along these Hnes. 
(2) "The second reason is that dependence on ribii prevents people from working to eam 
money ... [with aIl its undesirable economic consequences]" - [economic ration ale ]. 
Eisewhere, Razl expands on this ration ale as foIlows: 
God forbade ribii only because it prevents people from busying themselves for gain, because if the 
owner of the dirham can by me ans of a ribii contract gain an additional dirham whether in cash or 
credit, it becomes easier for him to win the me ans of subsistence. He will rarely bear the burden 
ofprofit, commerce, and arduous crafts.750 
(3) "The third reason is that permitting the taking of ribii discourages people from doing 
good to one another ... and from lending with goodwill, expecting back no more 
than what they have loaned" - [moral rationale]. 
748 Vogel and Hayes, [.l'lamie Law and Finance, 79-80. 
749 Fakhr al-Dln al-Raz!, al- Tatsk al-KabIr, VII, 94. 
750 Ibid., Maf8ti1; al-Ghayb (Istanbul: al-Matba'a al- 'Amlra, 1891), II, 531. 
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(4) "The fourth reason is that the lender mostly would be rich, and the borrower poor. 
[Th us] allowing the contract of ribi would involve enabling the rich to exact an 
extra amount from the weak poor" - [social rationale]. 
These arguments from al-Raz! are based on sound justice, economic, moral and 
social rationales. But none of them are compatible with the gravit y of the Qur'anic 
punishments for, and the Prophetic graphic descriptions of, the sin of ribii 
Ibn Qayyim (d. 751/1356), the I:IanbaIi jurist,751 regards prevention of "commercial 
exploitation" of the weak po or by the strong rich as the rationale (lJikma) of the 
prohibition of excess in debt transactions, explaining the Jiihiliya practice thus: 
In the pre-Islamic period, ribii was practiced by giving extra time to repaya debt and adding a 
charge against this extension until one hundred became thousands. In most of the cases, only a 
needy individual would keep doing so as he would have no choice but to defer the payment of the 
debt. The credit or agreed to defer his demand for repayment of the debt, and waited so that he 
might gain more profit on the principal. On the other hand, the debtor was forced to pay the 
increased amount to ward off the pressing demands of the credit or and the risk of the hardships of" 
prison. Thus, as time passed and the loss of the debtor went on increasing, his troubles multiplied 
and his debt accumulated until aU his possessions and belongings were lost to the creditor.752 
The rationale (i}iJana) of the prohibition of delay in settlement of sale transactions 
is regarded by Ibn Qayyim to be simply prevention of potential injustice to the 
economically weaker party in a barter transaction: 
Had the sale of these commodities [wheat, barley, dates and salt] been allowed on deferred 
payment basis, no one would have sold them unless at a profit. If so, the seller would then have 
desired to sell them on an on-the-spot basis for the greed of profit. This would have raised the 
co st of food for the needy, hurting them severely. Most people do not have dirhams or dinars, 
particularly those living in isolated areas or deserts. Hence, they exchange food for food ... Had it 
been allowed, it could have led to the form ofpre-Islamic riba [sic] which is represented in their 
saying: "Either you pay or add to the debt." One measure could become ultimately many 
measures. 753 
Ibn al-Qayyim's position on i}ikma of ribiis captured by Vogel thus: 
Ibn al-Qayyim argued that the Qur'iin shows the reason for its vehement prohibition of ribiiby 
contrasting ribii and charity. The core case of ribiiis 'pay or increase,' i.e., ribii af-jiihiliya, where 
one obligated to pay is given an extension against an increase in debt. This is exploitation of the 
needy, he says, since only a needy person would pay more for a mere extension of time. To such 
a pers on the rich have a dut y to give charity, not to take something more from him. The 
prohibition of other forms of ribii, particularly ribii af-Jàçlf and ribii al-nasJ'a, which includes 
even equal exchanges of ribaw] goods with delay, is to prevent that evil l'rom arising in any 
form. These prohibitions prevent go Id, silver, and foodstuffs (the latter are essential for life, and 
are often used in lieu ofmoney) l'rom being traded like ordinary commodities. Such trading leads 
751 Ibn Qayyirn, l'film af-Muwaqqi7n, Il, [53-[64. 
752 [bid., li, 154. 
753 [bid., li, 157-158. 
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inevitably to exploitation of the poor through hoarding and speculation as weB as through loan8 
with interest and increasing debts in return for a delay.754 
Vogel further points out: 
For Ibn al-Qayyim, ribii rules are comprehensible not because each and every act they prohibit is 
intrinsically unjust, exploitative, or unfair, but because to prevent such acts from occurring God 
has taken the precautionary step of excluding certain goods from ordinary commerce. Because of 
the vehement divine disapproval of such situations, the law does not merely enjoin faimess and 
enforce it in particular cases; instead, it deploys rules designed to prevent the occurrence of 
unfair situations. 755 
This "prevention of exploitation of the poor" rationale of Ibn al-Qayyim, who died 
in 751/1356, is not tenable for four reasons. Firstly, the rationale of injustice 
(exploitation) had already been debunked by al-Nawawl, who died in 676/1278, sorne 
three quarters of a cent ury before Ibn al-Qayyim, on the grounds of being equally 
extendable to profit which he regards as legitimate.756 Secondly, the Qur'anic prohibition 
of ribiï is absolute and unconditional. The Qur'anic prohibitory verse states: "Allah has 
prohibited ribiïf" This verse does not state: "Allah has prohibited ribii, if ... " S uch 
unconditional injunction cannot have a conditional rationale (exploitation of the poor) 
which may or may not exist in aIl situations. Thirdly, exploitation, even when operative, 
cannot attract for the sin of ribii the drastic Qur'anic punishments and the graphic 
Prophetic equations with idolatry(shirk), adultery and incest. Fourthly, this "exploitation 
of the poor" rationale is based on a negligent interpretation of the last part of the 
Qur'anic verse 2:279, "liï ta:rlimuna wa-1iï tu:r1amun." As pointed out by EI-Gamal, this 
phrase is popularly taken to mean injustice in the sense of exploitation of the poor 
debtor by the ri ch credit or. The standard meaning of this phrase, according to Abii 
Ja'far, Ibn 'Abbas and others,757 is [then you should collect your principal] "without 
inflicting or receiving injustice," which is interpreted as "without increase or 
diminution" where both an increase or a decrease of the amount retumed relative to the 
amount lent would be considered injustice.758 This is also, as explained above,759 Ibn 
Rushd's concept of injustice based on the "equality or proportionality of the 
transaction." However, even this "equality" interpretation of the phrase is not entirely 
754 Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance, 82. 
755 Ibid. 
756 al-Nawawl, al-M;ljmu', IX, 390-404. ("far' fi madhiihib al-'ulamii' fi bayau 'illat al-ribii fi al-'ajnas al-arba'a"). 
757 al-Tabarl Jiimi' Il 109-110 
?SM El-Gama\' An E~o~omie Ex~lication of the Prohibition of Ribii, 3. 
759 Sec n. 739, p. 192, above. 
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satisfactory. As will be posited below (chapter IV), from the standpoint ofhermeneutical 
balance in the riba-inj unct ions, the most appropriate interpretation of this phrase, as 
already explained above,760 is "transgression" - the stepping into the forbidden territory, 
i.e., the sanctuary (l}ima) of someone else. 
Vogel notes that a common addition to this rationale (what may be called the 
"distributive justice" rationale) is that riba-prohibition, by forcing the investor to bear 
risks, prevents the ri ch from remaining forever ri ch and the po or forever poor. He refers 
to Qur'an 59:7, which is often cited for this proposition, which requires distributing 
booty to, among others, the needy and the orphans "so that it may not [merely] make a 
circuit among the wealthy ofyou."761 
Ibn al-Qayyim's exposition also brings out another rationale, that of "minimizing 
commerce in currency and foodstuffs," which is also posited by Ibn Rushd. Voge1 
explains that, for Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Rushd, "if money is to remain a neutral measure 
ofvalue, it must not be dealt with as a commodity. Because foodstuffs are often used in 
lieu of money and because they are basic needs of mankind, they should be treated as 
much as possible as if they also were neutral and stable values, withdrawn from 
commerce. "762 
The rationales of "distributive justice" and "minimizing commerce in currency and 
foodstuffs," advanced by Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Rushd, are again untenable because 
these are not commensurate with the Qur'anic drastic punishment and the Prophetic 
graphic equations for the sin of ribii. 
In addition to these individual opinions about the l}iJana, as pointed out by 
Voge1,763 many aspects of Islamic commerciallaw rely on the classic legal maxim of al-
khariij bil-qamiin, which is contained in authentic Prophetic a1}adith,764 dealing with 
slaves, and which is popularly translated as "gain accompanies liability for loss." This 
suggests that gain is morally justified only when it involves risk to secure it and that, 
therefore, riskless gain is unjust. This maxim, however, does not legitimize gharar that 
involves "undue risk." 
7«) Sec ".2.v.ba., p. 63, above. 
761 Vogel and Hayes, Islamie Law and Finance, 83. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Abu Dawud, Tirmidhl, Nasa'i, and Ibn Maja lJadith no. 2242/1 and 2243/2, 57. 
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Islamic legal tradition has put this maxim in service as the rationale of the 
prohibition of ribii which entails a gain, but does not by contract entail a risk of loss. 
This maxim has also been utilized as the legitimizing basis of "profit/loss sharing" 
structure of Islamic finance industry, through the financial instruments of mushiiraka 
and muqiiraba. 
There are two problems with this "profit/loss" maxim as utilized in the Islamic 
juridical repertoire. Firstly, rendering the term al-khariij as "gain" is problematic since 
the lexical meaning of the term has a st ronger connotation of "extraction; tax" than of 
"gain." Surprisingly, another authentic iJadith 765 which juxtaposes ribiJ (profit) with 
qamiin has not been put in service for this purpose. Moreover, the term al-qamiin has a 
st ronger lexical connotation of "security; guarantee; liability" than of "loss." This 
absence of a satisfactory meaning of the term has been commented upon by EI-Gamal: 
Despite thousands of references to the legal maxim 'al-khariij bil-ifamiin '(return must be justitied 
by guarantee/risk) in the Islamic jurisprudence and finance literature, 1 have yet to read a single 
satisfactory explanation of what it means ... [either] it is merely tautological ... or inviting the 
legal stratagems ... In either case, it is difficult to understand the substance of this oft-quoted 
maxim. 766 
Secondly, the profit/loss maxim ("lin king lawfulness of gain to risk") as the 
rationale of prohibition of ribii is, again, not commensurate with the Qur'anic 
punishment for, and Prophetie condemnation of, the sin of ribii. 
Another closely linked argument [rationale] against interest-taking in loans is 
advanced by Kasan1767 which, in the words ofVogel, states: 
Most loans not only shield the lender from risk, but they also involve consumables, i.e. goods 
which yield benetits only through being consumed. Unlike a donkey or a farm, wheat or money 
produces no fruit or yield (kharaj) [sic], and are in that sense sterile. A lender who gets 
compensation beyond exact restitution of his goods is exacting gain from someone in return fàr 
nothing, and is therefore unjustly enriched Gain can fairly be derived from money only when 
one invests it in property that does yield tangible gain, such as the donkey or the land.768 
As further noted by Vogel, Kasanl recognizes that "for consumables the thing 
itself represents the usufruct; hence to exact interest is to take a compensation for 
765 Ibn Maja, IJadith no. 2188/2, 31. 
766 EI-Gamal, "Interest and the Paradox ofContcmporary lslamic Law and Finance", 21, n. 48. 
767 al-Kasanl, Badii'j' al-Sanii'j', VII, 395-96. 
76R Vogel and Hayes, l~/~ic Law and Finance, 84. 
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nothing."769 Similarly, Sarakhsl defines ribiï in the technical sense as "the stipulated 
excess without a counter-value in bay' (sale)." 770 
The above argument by Kasanl and the definition by Sarakhsl both come very 
close to the creation-based argument posited below (chapter IV) as a ration ale of 
prohibition of ribii, but neither of these jurists (like Vogel), develops this argument 
beyond the exoteric temporallevel (unjust enrichment) to an esoteric theologicallevel. 
III.1.iv.d. Summary Critique of aU Madhiihib Fiqh on Ribii 
As is evident from the individu al critiques on madhiihib expositions on 'illa and 
fuqahiï' expositions on iJilana, above,771 aH the extant Sunnl and Shl'ite madhiïhib fiqh 
on ribii fail the test of analogical validity and jurisprudential legitimacy. They either 
flagrantly violate even the explicit requirements of the flag-bearer ribawi-commodities 
iJadlth of the Holy Prophet, or flout the crucial conditions imposed by their own rules of 
derivation of 'illa and iJikma laid down in the u$ui ai-fiqh. In extrapolating their fiqh, 
they flout the ribawl-commodities iJadlth by contravening its requirements on 
homogeneity and instantaneity in exchanges. They flout their own u$ui ai-fiqh rules of 
derivation by failing to posit a rationale [iJikmaj that the Legislator may be said to have 
in mind as His purpose in establishing the rule, and which, inter alia, is commensurate 
with the drastic punishments for violation. They further violate these rules by failing to 
posit an 'ilia which entails, or is linked to, a plausible iJikma, inter alia, compatible with 
the associated punishment. This state of affairs on the aH-important fiqh of ribii, arising 
from juridical deficiencies, is very criticaHy alarming and requires a solid juridical 
redressing. 
IIl.l.iv.e. Critique of Bay'in Fiqh 
The concept of bay' in Islamic law is much wider than its popular translation as 
sale. Article 149 of the Mejelle de fines it as: "bai' [sic], in the generic sense, is the 
transfer of a definite ascertained object, having a legal value, in exchange for an 
equivalent; or, in Shafi'1law, the transfer of a definite use of property in perpetuity in 
exchange for a priee. This definition includes a large number of different contracts, 
769 Ibid., 84, n. 24. 
770 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsiit, XII, 111. 
771 Sec m.1.iv.b. and Ill. i .iv.c, abovc. 
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among which sale in the specifie sense is the transfer of a definite ascertained object 
seen by [or at least known to] both parties for a definite equivalent in money. " Nyazee 
articulates the same idea in an expanded version thus: 
The term bay' is usually translated as sale, however, it has a rnuch wider rneaning in Islamic law. 
This terrn covers all commutative contracts, that is, contracts in which there is an exchange of 
two counter-values. In other words, ownership in one counter-value is passed to the other party in 
lieu of another counter-value. In this wider sense, the term ijarah (hire), for example, is included 
in the rneaning of bay', because it is the exchange of benefits arising frorn rented property for 
rent, or it is the exchange ofwages for services rendered. Hire is often referred to by the jurists as 
the sale of benefits arising periodically. Sorne go to the extent of considering the rnarriage 
contract as sorne kind of sale insofar as it amounts to handing over ownership in benefits (tamlik 
al-maniifl') in exchange for dower.772 
Nyazee further states that al-Sarakhsl has explained the similarities and 
distinctions between bay' and nikil}.773 
al-Sarakhsl explains that if an excess of one commodity is without an equivalent 
retum ('iwiid, badal) in a sale transaction, it will be contrary to the requirements of a 
valid bay'. Therefore, such an inequitable exchange or sale is unlawful from the 
legal/moral point of view; and therefore, any stipulation of surplus or excess profit in 
transaction of exchange would be illicit because a valid or legal sale is necessarily a 
mutual transaction of exchange-value for an equal exchange value. 774 
Ibn al-' ArabI opines that trade (tijiira) is bay~ involving the exchange of 
commodities (including money) for commodities. He classifies bay' (exchange) into 
three types: (l) material substance for another material substance, i.e., commodity or 
money for commodity or money, (2) purchase/sale by paying money in advance (salam) 
or on the basis of a manufactured item, and (3) ijiira: sale of a material substance 
(money) for usufruct (manfa'a).775 
Taking bay' in its restricted sense of sale, according to al-Kasanl, the I:Ianafi jurist, 
there are four basic types of sale: barter, cash sale, salam and ~arf He explains: 
Sale with respect to counter-values is divided into four types, the sale of an ascertained 
commodity ('ayn) for an aseertained commodity ('ayn) , which is the sale of goods for goods and 
is called harter; the sale of an ascertained commodity ('ayn) with a dayn, and this is the sale of 
goods for absolute priees (currencies), which are dirhams and dinars, or their sale for copper coins 
or with a described rneasured commodity as a liability (debt) or a described weighed commodity 
or described identical counted items; the sale of a dayn with an ascertained commodity ('ayn), 
772 Nyazee, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, 42. 
m al-Sarakhsl, a/-Mabsiit, XIll, 109. 
774 Ibid., XII, 109. Sec al~o, The Eneyclopedia ofls/am (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1936), Ill, 1148. 
775 Ibn al-' ArabI, Al;kiim a/-Qur'iin, l, 241-2. 
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which is salam; and the sale of a dayn with a dayn, which is the sale of an absolute priee for an 
absolute priee, and is ealled ~arf 776 
Each one of these four types of sale can be either immediate or delayed. Further, 
this description does not capture the full juristic spectrum of sale by excluding sale of 
benefits or of services, which are treated by the jurists separately under the headings of 
gara and ji 'ala, etc.777 
Ibn I:Iazm contrasts bay' and ribii from a legal and moral perspective thus: 
Bay' involves a mutual transfer of the proprietary right to hold the material substance or 
property. Thus bay' and ribi share a common attribute, and individu al operation of each is thc 
same: eaeh comprises a mu'awada (mutual exchange) of goods for goods - but one exehange is 
just, permissible and good, and the other unlawful, perverse and noxious, and falls in the category 
of grave st sins.778 
In a comparative study of the madhiihib fiqh, Fitzgerald states that all schools are 
agreed on the definition of bay', above.779 Except for minor technical terminological 
differences, like the distinct treatment of the concept of dayn in I:Ianafi fiqh, there are no 
fundamental fiqh differences among the various madhiihib. Hence, there is no separate 
treatment of each madhhab on this concept in this thesis. 
Significantly, the fiqh definition of bay', above, is centered on the concept of 
counter-values of different commodities, benefits and services. The central theme is, 
therefore, heterogeneity of exchange, which is a crucial concept in this study. 
111.2. Current Hermeneutical Models 
The work of the linguists, jurists, exegetes, historians, philosophers, contemporary 
scholars, and economists on usurylribii individually examined above/80 varied as it is, 
has evolved diachronically and culminated in distinct but divergent hermeneutical 
models.781 Although formulated here primarily in the Islamic context, essentially these 
models are also fully and equally retlective of the similar divergent thought streams in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Islamic hermeneutical effort on the issue of prohibition of ribii ostensibly derived 
from the Qur'anic/Sunnaic Scriptural Model, may be classified for analytical purposes 
776 al-Kasanl, Badiï'j' a/-$aniï'i: V, 134. 
777 Nyazcc, Ribiï and lç/amic Banking, 46. 
7n Ibn I;Iazm, al-MuJ;allii, VIII, 183, 351. 
779 S. G. V-Fitzgerald, Muhammadan Law: An Abridgcmcnt Accarding ta its Variau.~ Schaal.;' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 979), 182. 
?SO Sec ehapter Il, abovc. 
781 This section draws heavily on, and extensivcly reproduees verbatim from, the earlier unpublished work ofthis author, 
Azecmuddin Subhani, "The Islamie Doctrine of RibiïProhibition: A Modular Herrncncutieal Examination" (master's thesis, MeGill 
University, 2002). 
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broadly into the TraditionalistlRevivalistlNeo-Revivalist and the LiberallModemist 
paradigms. Both camps share the contemporary scholarship on ribii and agree that the 
rationale (lJikma) of its prohibition is the moral concept of injustice (exploitation). What 
they differ on is, in effect, whether the lJikma (rationale) of injustice can serve as the 
'ilia (occasioning factor) of prohibition of ribii. The Traditionalists insist on using the 
traditional 'ilai (occasioning factors) identified by medieval jurists; the LiberaIs 
advocate the use of their posited lJikma of injustice as the 'ilia, thereby sanctioning the 
"just" modem- day bank interest. 
As will be argued below, the scholarship of both camps suffers very acutely from 
grave weaknesses, namely, a restricted view of ribii, imperfect formulation of the 'illa, 
and absence of identification of a plausible lJikma, aIl crucial elements of theory, the 
absence ofwhich completely demolishes these thought models. 
III.2.i. Traditionalist Model 
This Model is the by-product of the TraditionalistlRevivalistlNeo-Revivalist 
Movement that is represented by the c1assical and medieval Revivalists and the 
contemporary 20th century neo-Revivalist groups. 
However, although the Revivalism of the 18th and 19th centuries is characterized 
by, among other things, a caU to a "going back" to the original Islam, an attempt to 
shake off the idea of the fixity and finality of the tradition al schools of law, and an 
attempt to perform ijtihiid [research effort] to rethink for oneself the meaning of the 
original message,782 the derived Traditionalist Model of ribii, as championed by the Neo-
Revivalists, is still plagued by the notion of taqIld (adherence to tradition al madhiihib) 
and absence of ijtihiid This phenomenon is explained by their perception of ijtihiid, 
which is based on their belief and an explicit recognition that the Qur'an and Sunna 
contain a complete way of life who se sanctity and purity should not be tamished by new 
interpretations influenced by time and circumstances.783 For the neo-Revivalists, then, 
the function of ijtihiid would be to find solutions to problems not explicitly covered by 
the Qur'an and the Sunna. Accordingly, they emphasized are as such as Qur'anic 
7.2 Rahman, "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities", in Welch and Cachia (cds.). Islam, 317. 
78J Chandra Muzaffar, "Islamic Resurgence: A Global Vicw." in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (cds.). Islam and Society in 
Southcast Asia (Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studics, 19R6), 5-39, quotcd by Saccd in his, 1~/amie Banking, X. 
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punishments (fJudiid), Qur'anic and Sunnaic family laws, and identified interest on loans 
as ribii. 784 As noted by Saeed, according to them, no Qur'anic or Sunnaic ru le is to be 
reinterpreted or modified; it is to be accepted and applied without modification 
irrespective of time, place and level of social or economic development, since, for them, 
the SharJ'a is good for aIl times and places. Saeed further notes that even though both 
Modemism and neo-Revivalism have been influential in shaping Islamic thought in 
modem history, it is the neo-Revivalist movement which has been the most influential 
in the development of Islamic banking theory, which was largely developed in order to 
implement the traditional interpretation of ribi(embraced by the neo-Revivalists) in the 
area ofbanking and finance. 785 
The proponents of the Traditionalist ModeF86 of ribi include many classical, 
medieval and contemporary exegetes and scholars.787 Their individual presentations 
differ in detail - too many to review here, and the important ones have been presented 
above.788 The summarized collective Model essentially maintains that: 
• Ribi is literally "excess" and technically a "financial excess;" 
• Ribi covers all forms of financial excess - regardless of nature or source; 
• Ribi is prohibited strictly and unequivocally by the Qur'an supplemented by the 
Sunna, without anyexceptions; 
• Ribi has a ritual obedience and/or an economic, social, moral and spiritual 
rationale (J;ikma) for its prohibition; 
• Violation of ribi -prohibition is subject to grave other-worldly punishment; 
• Extension of ribi-prohibition beyond the named six commodities is a point of 
dis agreement amongst the various schools of law, both as to the very 
permissibility and the 'jJal (occasioning factors) for the extension. 
78. Rahman, "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities", in Welch and Caehia (cds.). l~/am, quoted in Saeed, Mamie Banking, R. 
785 Saeed, ü/amic Banking, 8. 
7"''The presentation of the structural eharaeteristies of this Model here, and not the analysis, draws heavily and Iiberally on Nyazee, 
Ribii and l~/amie Hanking. 
787 Promincnt among the sc, in chronologie al order, are: Abu l:Ianlfa (d. 150/767), Anas b. Malik (d. 179/796), Mu~ammad ibn al-
l:Iasan al-Shaybanl (d. IR9/R05), Mu~ammad ibn IdrIS al-Shafi'I (d. 204/820), M~ammad ibn Isma'Il aHlan'anl (d. 21I1R26), 
Al)mad b. l:Ianbal (d. 24I1R55), Abu Bakr A~mad ibn 'Ali al-Ja~~a~ al-Razl (d. 370/9RI), Abu Mul)ammad 'Abd Allah ibn Sa'ld ibn 
l:Iazm (d. 456/1064), Abu Bakr M~ammad ibn Abl Sahl al-Sarakhsl (d. 483/1090), Abu l:Iamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), Abu Bakr 
ibn Mas'ud al-Kasanl (d. 587/1189), Abu al-Walid Mu~ammad ibn A~mad Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl (d. 
606/1209), Shihiib al-Dln Abu al-'Abbiis Al)mad ibn IdriS Qarafi (d. 6R4/1285), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327), Abu Is~aq IbrahIm ibn 
Musa al-Sha!ibl (d. 790/1388), Shams al-Dln Mul)ammad ibn 'Abu al-'Abbas al-Ramli (d. 1004/1595), Mu~ammad Amin ibn 
'Uthman Ibn 'Abidln, (d. 1258/1868), Sayyid Qu!b (d. 1966), and Abul NIa Mawdudl (d. 1979) who has written extensivcly on 
Islamie eeonomies and on ribii. 
788 Sec 11. 8. V., above. 
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A review of the available literature indicates complete agreement of the classical 
fuqahii' on the essential features of the scriptural prohibition as summarized above. 
Their consensus, cast in modern terms, is that the prohibition covers compound interest, 
simple interest and other types of ribii.789 The only significant difference of opinion 
among the classical fuqahiî' concerns the derivation of the detailed rules ('ilal) of ribiî 
for the extension of the prohibition. 
The method of interpretation employed by the classical jurists (fuqahiî'), forming 
the majority of the Traditionalist group, and their identification of the source of the 
prohibition is distinguished by their conformity with u~iïl al_fiqh.790 CruciaIly, however, 
this conformity is only with the general source requirements, and, as shown in this work, 
not with the specifie derivation requirements of the u~iïl al-fiqh for formulation of the 
'illa and lJikma of injunctions. Accordingly, they treat the Qur'iin as supplemented and 
elaborated (bayiin) by the Sunna as one source, and not the two, separately and 
independently of each other, as two sources. Thus they interpret the prohibition of ribii 
as a single, single-sourced prohibition. They maintain that the only source of prohibition 
is the Qur'iin and that the alJiidith are only elaboratory in nature, re-enforcing the 
Qur'anic unequivocal prohibition. The Qur'anic prohibition is comprehensive and hence 
covers aIl "excess" (ribii) whether arising through nasJ'a (delay), the so called Qur'anic 
ribiî al-nasJ'a, or through qadr (estimation - weight, measure, count), the so-called 
Sunnaic ribii al-faf/l This method of interpretation sets the Traditionalists apart from 
the LiberaIs in the matter of the coverage of the prohibition.791 
The Model employs the literaI meaning of the term ribii as "excess,"792 but the 
various shades ofmeaning and applications ofthis term used in the Qur'an, as illustrated 
above,793 do not find any treatment in the Model. Its focus of attention immediately 
narrows down only to the contextual financial/economic connotation of the term, i.e., 
usury/interest and other commodity excess. Ribii is juridically defined as excess without 
counter value/94 but the concept is not developed further. 
789 Nyazcc, Ribii and lslamic Banking, 17. 
790 Ibid. 
791 Ibid., 8. 
792 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsiit. XII, 109. 
793 Sec Il. 2. V., p. 50, ab~vc. 
794 al-Sarakhsl, al-Mabsii!. XII, 109. 
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As to the coverage of the prohibition, the c1assical fuqaha', as already explained 
above, basing their exegesis on the general ll$iiJ aJ-fiqh and deeming the Qur'an as the 
single source and the Sunna as its elaboration, and treating the Qur'anic usage of the 
term ribiï as a generic usage and requiring the bayiin (explanation) from the Sunna, 
regard the ribiï-prohibition, in the economic sphere, as aH encompassing and 
consequently covering aH forms of financial increase, Le., both ribiï al-nasJ'a and ribiï aJ-
fàcjJ. 
The Model treats this financial/economic excess as strictly and unequivocaHy 
prohibited. It treats the prohibitory injunctions and their supporting verses as mulJkamiït 
(firm) and not as mutashiibihiit (doubtful). Notwithstanding sorne dissenting opinion, it 
does not recognize benignancy of the charge, mutual agreement of the parties, or 
need/necessity as grounds for any exceptions from the ambit of the prohibition. 
As to the rationale (lJikma) for the prohibition of ribii, sorne traditionalist scholars 
regard the observance of the prohibition as a matter of ritual obedience.795 For them, 
therefore, the diseovery of the rationale of the prohibition is not required or even 
necessary. But the majority of the traditionalist jurists seek both the lJikma and the' illa 
of the prohibition.796 In line with the adoption of the contextual financial/eeonomic 
meaning of the term, these scholars attribute economic, social, and the associated moral 
and spiritual factors as the governing princip les of the lJikma. The word "exploitation" 
could perhaps be used as a catchall term to capture this wide spectrum of ration ale very 
neady completely. In dealing with this rationale of exploitation, the Model, however, 
does not address the question of the benignancy of the charge, or the presence of mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
The Traditionalist Model has accorded an extensive treatment - with internaI 
significant disagreement - to the question of the ratio legis tilla) 797 of the lJukm of 
prohibition of ribawl eommodities. The Prophetie ribawl-commodities lJadith, as already 
noted, has identified only six commodities (go Id, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt), 
without explicitly c1arifying whether the ribii rule is restricted to these six named 
795 Nyazee, Ribii and l~/amic Banking, \04. 
796 Ibid. 
797 The following presentation of' il/a is bascd on the work of Nyazee, Ribii and ll'lamic Banking, (67-71. Thcsc juristie differcnecs of 
opinion arc dctailcd in many works of Islamie fiqh including c.g., Ibn Qudama, al-Mughn7, IV, 124-127. 
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commodities or is extendable to other commodities as weIl, and if so, what those other 
commodities are and how are they to be ascertained. What is the ratio legis ('illa) to be 
applied for the extension of the .Qukm of prohibition? 
Also, as already seen, the Zahids, and sorne others, restrict the prohibition only to 
the six named commodities on the basis of their rejection of qiyiis as a valid source of 
law.798 A majority of the fuqahii', however, agreed on the permissibility of the extension 
of the prohibition and employed qiyiis (analogy) as the method of extension. Sorne 
fuqahii' sought the extension through qiyiis al-ma 'nii (applied in the presence of higher 
or lower order literaI meanings of the word under examination).799 Others sought it 
exclusively through qiyiis al- 'illa (applied in the presence of equivalcnt meanings of the 
word under examination) requiring the discovery of the 'illa.80o The discovered 'illa, 
however, is different according to the various schools of law (madhiihib), as detailed 
below. 
FinaIly, the Traditionalist Model recognizes the directly named Qur'anic 
punishments for the violation of the ribii-prohibition. There are no primary-sourced 
prescribed temporal punishments. However, the Model incorporates what is reported to 
be a set of secondary-sourced temporal punishments. Based on the last words ofverse Q. 
2:279, juristic opinion reportedly provides for exercise of compulsion on the offender to 
abandon ribii, and in case of persistence, the majority of such opinion caUs for his 
imprisonment till abandonment, while even his execution is called for in the opinion of 
Ibn 'Abbas, ijasan al-Ba~d, and Ibn Sidn.801 
The Traditionalist Model incorporating the neo-Revivalist view is the dominant 
one in the contemporary ribii debate.802 "This view emphasizes the legal form of ribii as 
expressed in Islamic law, and insists that the words specified in the Qur'an should be 
taken at their literaI meaning, regardless ofwhat was practiced in the pre-Islamic period. 
According to this view, since the Qur'an has stated that only the principal should be 
taken, there is no alternative but to interpret ribii according to that wording. Therefore, 
the existence or otherwise of injustice in a loan transaction is irrelevant. Whatever the 
79R Ibn l:Iazm. al-MlÙJalra, VIII, 468. 
799 Nyazce, Ribii and lçlamic Banking, 68. 
800 Ibid. 
ROI Gauhar, Translations From The Quran, 136. 
802 Saecd, lçlamic Banking, 49. 
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circumstances are, the lender has no right to receive any increase over and above the 
principal."803 As Saeed puts it, "whatever the value of the neo-Revivalist interpretation 
of ribii, it is this interpretation which is the basis of current Islamic banking theory as 
weIl as practice. "804 
Contemporary juridical support for the complete banning of a11 forms of ribii is, 
however, not uniformly present in a11 Muslim legal jurisdictions. One jurisdiction bans it 
cornpletely,805 another prohibits it but does not rnake the prohibition mandatory,806 sorne 
do not prohibit it at all,807 others distinguish commercial loan-ribii which is permitted 
and civil loan-ribii which is banned,808 while still others officially sanction "parallel 
banking systems" that incorporate both conventional interest-based and Islamic interest-
free banking.809 This highlights a tension between the contemporary Islamic financial 
theory and practice on the one hand and the relevant state legislation on the other. In the 
contemporary juridical scenario, in essence, in terms of the banning of all forrns of ribii 
(financial excess), the Traditionalist Model finds recent full support, among others, in 
the rulings of the leddah-based Fiqh Academy of the Organization ofIslamic Conference 
(OIC) and in the now-reversed judgments of the Pakistan Federal Shar1'a Court (FSC) 
and the Sharl'a Appellate Bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court (1999). 
III.2.ii. Liberal Model 
This Model is the by-product of the LiberaliModemist Movement.8lO 
Contemporaneously, Liberal thought is represented by the Modemist movement, which 
is a product of the late nineteenth cent ury. In the Islamic context: 
It called for fresh attempts to revive ijtihiid, to derive relevant principles from the Qur'an and 
authentic Sunna and to formulate necessary laws based on these principles. Modernists criticized 
what they called the 'atomistic' approach to deriving rules from the Qur'an and also the early 
jurists' failure to understand its underlying unity. The Qur'an, according to the Modernists, was a 
phenomenon that occurred in the light of history and against a socio-historical background. They 
saw it as a response to that situation consisting, for the most part, of moral, religious, and social 
pronouncements in answer to specifie problems confronted in concrete historical situations. 
According to the Modernists, to in si st on a literai implementation of the rules of the Qur'an, 
'OJ Abu Zahra, BulJiith fi al-Ribii, quoted in Saeed, L~lamic Banking, 49. 
'04 Saeed, L\'/amic Banking, 50. 
R05 Islamic Republic of Iran. 
R06 Saudi Arabia. 
R07 For example, Bahrain. 
SOR For example, Kuwait. 
809 Malaysia and Pakistan. 
"'0 The presentation of the structural characteristics ofthis Madel hcrc, and not the analysis, draws heavily and liberally on Nyazcc. 
Ribii and lslamic Banking. 
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shutting one's eyes to the social change that has occurred and is so palpably occurring, was 
tantamount to deliberately defeating its socio-moral purposes and objectives.811 
The Modernists also called for: "(i) selective use of the sunna; (ii) the exercise of 
systematic original thinking with no claim to finality; (iii) a distinction to be made 
between the Sharl'a and fiqh; (iv) avoidance of sectarianism; and (v) a revers ion to the 
characteristic methodology but not necessarily to the law and solutions of the classical 
schools, extinct and extant."812 
In line with this thinking, Modernist contemporary Muslim scholars have a 
fundamental difference of opinion with the neo-Revivalists about the question ofIslamic 
admissibility of modern bank interest that revolves around a contentious jurisprudential 
point: Should the ration ale of injustice, as maintained by the Modemists, or the formaI 
Islamic legal form of riba-prohibition, as maintained by the neo-Revivalists (mirroring 
the Traditionalists), determine the scope of riba-application? 813 
The Liberal Model, with support from at least two classical and many 
contemporary exegetes and scholars,814 cannot correctly be labeled as a homogenous set 
of thought. It is an umbrella category incorporating a diversity of opinion of 
contemporary scholars divided roughly along the lines of the two main constituent sub-
groups, the contemporary religious scholars and the contemporary secular scholars, and 
further compounded by individu al differences of opinion within each of the two sub-
groups. While the contemporary Liberal religious group has the advantage offamiliarity, 
but the privilege of disagreement, with the methods of the Traditionalist group, the 
contemporary Liberal secular group has only the privilege of disagreement. In this 
Model, then, the only point of agreement is disagreement with the Traditionalist Model. 
The Liberal Model seeks curtailment, dispensation and circumvention of the prohibition. 
Another binding factor in the contemporary Liberal Model is the obsessive concem with 
the sanctity of modemity. The Liberal Model derives its guiding princip les from the 
historie al context but tempers them by the modem context. In fact, it treats the 
xli Rahman, Islam and Modemity, 2-19, quoted by Saeed in his, Islamie Banking, 6-7. 
812 Said Ramdan, lv/amie Law (Lahore: n.p., 1970),71-73; Subl)l Mal)masanl, Fa/safàt a/-Tashrl' fi a/-/,,-Jiim. trans. Farhat J. Ziadeh 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), 5lff, 92-98; Sir Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in l,-Jam (Lahore: Sh. 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), 129, 151ff, 171-3; S. Waqar Ahmed Hussaini, b-Jamie Environmenta/ Systems Engineering (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ud., 1980),23, quoted by Saeed in his, lv/amie Banking, 7. 
m Saccd, ü/amic Banking, 41. 
'14 Prominent c1assical scholars inc1ude Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/686) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350). Contcmporary Liberal scholars 
dealing with ribiiinclude Mul)ammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), Rashid RiQa (d. 1935), Abii Zahra (d. 1974), 'Abd ar-Razzak as-Sanhurl (d. 
1971), Ibrahim Zakl al-Badawl, and Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), to narne but a fcw. 
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historical context as the cradle and the modern context as the grave for the derived 
principles. 
The Liberal Model differs from the Traditionalist Model in many respects, 
including the modifiability, the source, the binding force, the coverage and the 
dispensability of the prohibition. Points on which this Model does not record any 
dissent, although not positively stated by its proponents, are regarded as being common 
between the two Models and are dealt with accordingly. 
The method of interpretation employed by contemporary scholars and their 
treatment of the sources differs from that of the classical fuqahii'.815 In disregard of, or 
even non-familiarity with, u~iil al-fiqh, they treat the Qur'an and the Sunna as two 
separate, independent sources, with the Qur'an as the primary source and the Sunna as 
the secondary, non-complementary source.816 This characterization carries with it an 
unsupportable assertion of a lesser binding force for the Sunna. Prohibition of ribii is 
interpreted as a dual, double-sourced prohibition, with only the so-called Qur'anic ribii 
al-nasl'a claimed as the original prohibition sourced in the Qur'an - the Qur'anic or 
primary prohibition, implying a greater binding force. The so-called Sunnaic ribii al-facjl, 
claimed to be not sourced in the Qur'an, is a later extension by the Prophet of the 
original Qur'anic prohibition of ribii al-nasl'a and is sourced in the ribawl-{;ommodities 
1;.adJth- a Sunnaic or secondary prohibition, implying a lesser binding force. 
Like the Traditionalist Model, the Liberal Model also employs the literaI meaning 
of the term ribii as "excess" and, similarly, the various shades of meaning and 
applications of this term used in the Qur'an do not find any treatment in this Model as 
weIl, where too the focus of attention immediately narrows down only to the contextual 
financialleconomic connotation of the term - usury/interest and other commodity 
excess. 
The Liberal scholars have a point of agreement with the c1assical fuqahii' that the 
prohibition, in its technical sense, apphes to financialleconomic increase and, therefore, 
both ribii al-nasl'a and ribii al-facjl are prohibited. But they have a point of disagreement 
with the traditionalists on the source and the resulting binding force of the prohibition 
R15 Nyazcc, Ribii and 1~/amic Banking, 8. 
816 Ibid., 11-13. 
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that serves to narrow down the coverage of the prohibition. Thus even within this 
narrow financial/economic connotation, there is a further narrowing of scope. The 
Liberal Model treats the so-called Sunnaic ribii al-faql as altogether excludable from the 
coverage of the prohibition on the basis of the doctrine of Sunnaic lesser binding force. 
Even within what is termed by them as the ribii of the Qur'an, the Liberal Model, as a 
group, relying on the contextuality of one of the Qur'anic inj unct ions, and on the 
economic rationale for the prohibition, limits the prohibition to compound interest and 
interest on consumption loans, but that too dispensable on the basis of the doctrine of 
necessity. It exempts from the prohibition simple interest and interest on production 
loans as being non-exploitative. Another view regards the prohibition as being 
applicable to usury and not to interest, Le., only to the modem context of excessive 
interest, and not to the modem-day bank interest. 
For the limitation of the prohibition to compound interest, reliance is placed on the 
"ribii doubled and redoubled" verse of the Qur'an, thus employing the specificity of the 
verse and ignoring the generality of the other ribii prohibitory verses which employ a 
generic usage of the term ribii. 
The Liberal Model treats this narrowly defined financial excess as not strictly 
prohibited. One shade of opinion treats the prohibitory injunctions and their supporting 
verses as mutashiibihiit and not as muiJkamiit. Even when they do not subscribe to this 
view, they treat the prohibition as dispensable. They con si der the prohibition on simple 
interest and interest on production loans as dispensable based on rationale (non-
exploitative nature). They consider the prohibition on ribii al-faql, if not altogether 
exc1udable, then at least dispensable on the basis of the doctrines of iJiija (need) and 
ma~laiJa (public interest). For them, ribii al-faql, provided in the Sunna, is simply 
makriih and not iJariim. Finally, they consider the prohibition on compound interest or 
usury and on interest on consumption loans as dispensable on the basis of the doctrine of 
qariira (necessity). One extreme opinion even regards the ribii al-jiihillya as allowed in 
case of pressing necessity and ribii al-faql and ribii al-nasl'a as allowed in case ofneed. 817 
R17 Sanhür1, Ma,.'iidir al-Ifaqq, 111,237. 
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The Model recognizes benignancy of the charge, mutual agreement of the parties, 
and necessity as grounds for inapplicability of the prohibition. It regards the prohibition 
itself as subject to interpretation and modification. 
Operating within the confines of the Traditionalist Model, the Liberal Model also 
contextually employs the economic, social, moral and spiritual rationale (lJikma) as the 
explanation for the prohibition. But, as a major point of departure, adding precision and 
refinement to the concept, the LiberaIs make a very effective use of the catchall term 
"exploitation." In dealing with this ration ale of exploitation, the Model pointedly raises 
the question ofthe benignancy ofthe charge, and of the presence ofmutual agreement of 
the parties. It makes the obvious, simple, yet powerful point that if the charge is benign 
and/or mutually agreed, it is not exploitative and, if exploitation is the rationale for the 
prohibition, then whatever is non-exploitative is not covered by the prohibition. This 
line of argumentation accentuates the need for the discovery of the true ration ale for the 
divine prohibition. 
The Liberal Model has not identified the ratio 1egis ('111a) of the ribawJ 
commodities on the pattern adopted by the Traditionalist Model. It appears that the 
Liberal Model makes no distinction between the concepts of lJikma and 'jJ1a. It uses the 
two terms interchangeably, and as shown above, employs the concept of exploitation to 
refer to lJikma and 'illa both. However, in one shade of Liberal interpretation, 
"conformity with historical practice" - to coin a new expression- appears to have been 
used as the '111a. This view regards the historical practice of ribii a1-jiihillya as the only 
prohibited ribii and eontends that only what eonforms today to the historie al praetiee of 
ribii a1-jiihillya is prohibited, and whatever does not conform to this practice is 
exempted. 
The Liberal Model, like the Traditionalist Model, reeognizes the directly named 
otherworldly punishments for the human violation of ribit-prohibition. There is no room 
for interpretation or disagreement on these punishments. These are clearly and directly 
ordained in the Qur'an. They also recognize that there are no primary-sourced prescribed 
temporal punishments and the secondary-sourced punishments were advocated only by a 
minority of the Traditionalist group. 
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The strength of the Liberal Model has been undermined by sever al developments. 
Firstly, the LiberaIs' views and their advocated "exceptions" to the ribi-prohibition have 
been countered by neo-Revivalist critics with both economic and scriptural arguments, 
which has weakened their position. For example, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, one of 
the leading Islamic banking theorists, states: 
Efforts of some pseudo-jurists to distinguish between riba [sic] and bank interest and to 
legitimize the latter [have] met with almost universal rejection and contempt. Despite the fact 
that circumstances force many people to deal with interest-based financial institutions, the 
notion of its essential illegitimacy has always remained. 818 
Secondly, the LiberaIs have seen their position undermined by "their inability to 
present a consistent theory of ribi on the basis of the rationale of prohibition which is 
specified in the Qur'an." Thirdly, the Liberal position has been practically challenged by 
the "rise of Islamic banking institutions, inspired by the neo-Revivalist thinking on the 
issue of ribii, which have adopted the view that any interest is ribii, and as such is 
prohibited." 819 
With the adoption of the philosophical-theological arguments for the prohibition 
of ribii, developed below (chapter IV), the relative strength of the two Models will 
further be accentuated in the direction outlined above. 
Contemporary juridical support for Liberal thought on ribii, in terms of liberalizing 
the prohibition, is quite extensive in the Muslim world, coming chiefly from the 
prestigious juridical academy - the Egyptian al-Azhar University in Cairo - and the civil 
legislation ofmany Muslim countries themselves. 
1I1.2.iii. Critique ofHermeneutical Models 
In the light of the meaning, regulatory framework and the structural and 
hermeneutical aspects of prohibition of ribi examined above, a critical hermeneutical 
evaluation of the Muslim Traditionalist and the Liberal Models in terms of their 
employment of the meaning, application, rationale, underlying cause and consequence of 
ribii, can now be attempted in order to summarize the hermeneutical imbalance in thesc 
models. 
818 Muhammad Nejat ullah Siddiqi, l~sucs in Islamic Banking: Se/ectcd Papcrs (Leicester: Islamie Foundation, 1983 b), 9-10. 
819 Saeed, Islamic Banking, 48-49. 
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A survey of the exegetical literature indicates that there is unanimity of opinion 
amongst the Traditionalist and Liberal exegetes and jurists on the literaI and lexical 
meaning of ribii as "excess, growth, addition." Thus, while there is no apparent Arabic 
linguistic problem, either the Models do not recognize at aIl or, more simply, do not 
express the intrinsic distinguishing characteristic of the "excess, growth, addition" that 
is being referred to. The Models do not satisfactorily answer sorne fundamental 
questions raised by many scholars: Does ribii refer to every, or only to a specific, type of 
"excess, growth, addition?" What sets ribii apart from bay'? What makes ribii prohibited 
(iJariim) and bay' permitted (iJaliil)? And above aIl, what is it that attracts the Qur'anic 
threat of Satanic insanity for confusing the two terms with one another? Surely, a simple 
inability to comprehend the commercial distinction between two seemingly commercial 
terms can easily be a case of ignorance of commercial knowledge, and cannot be so 
serious as to be equated with Satanic behavior and punishable with eternal Hell Fire. 
Conversely, in the modern vernacular, a degree in commerce, finance, or law, in itself, 
cannot be a passport to Heaven. And surely, indulgence in one seemingly commercial 
activity cannot be such a grave sin as to imperil such grave punishment as eternal Hell 
Fire. What, then, is the veiled layer of meaning beyond the apparent commercial 
meaning that attracts such punishment? As will be shown below, the absence of an 
adequate treatment of the above questions in the Models has a very profound bearing on 
the very meaning of the term with aIl the consequent misconceptions, which is what 
makes ribii appear to be "the supreme of aIl the Quaestiones Vexatae"820 ofIsiamic law. 
This lack of precision of meaning represents the first hermeneutical flaw in the Models. 
In spite of the above-referred agreement on the lexical meaning of ribii as "excess, 
growth, addition," the focus of attention of both Models immediately narrows down to 
the economic/financial application of the term in varying degrees. Accordingly, attempts 
are made to confine the term to economic/financial excess arising out of delay or 
estimation, and to equate it with the English language terms of usury or interest or both. 
In these Models, this confinement of the application of ribii only to the 
economic/financial aspect of human activity is quite understandable in the light of at 
least two factors. Firstly, in the historical context of Revelation (the mercantile 
820 A tenn borrowed from Rayner, Thcory ofContracts in Islamic Law, 266. 
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character of the immediate recipients - the Quraysh - and oftheir habitat - Mecca), the 
commercial/financial/economic aspect was the most readily discernable, identifiable and 
prevalent candidate for the first application of the term ribii as a process of growth. 
Secondly, on a more specifie plane, the Qur'an, following its contextual approach, uses 
the term ribii in its economic application when it refers to a reportedly prevalent Arab 
financial practice of "ribii doubling and redoubling" (3:130), or conceptually, when it 
contrasts ribii with $adaqa (2:276) and with zakiit (30:39). The Qur'an also contrasts ribii 
with bay' (2:275). This ribiilbay' contrast appears, at first sight, to be clearly, and only, a 
further economic application, and serves as the hermeneutic foundation of the CUITent 
ribii mode1s. But this ribiilbay' contrast does not have the exclusive economic 
connotation that is claimed for it. This contrast has a very profound esoteric connotation 
that, as will be expounded below, is the hermeneutic foundation of the Qur'anic/Sunnaic 
Model. However, even setting aside this question of interpretation of Q. 2:275, in any 
case, there is still ample Qur'anic source material and Arab customary usage to link ribii 
with human economic activity. However, this does not mean that ribii, with its generic 
meaning of "excess, growth, addition," is confined to the economic sphere only. As a 
matter of fact the Qur'anic usage of the term, as detailed above,821 conveys at least six 
different shades of meaning that identify the presence of the process of ribii in many 
other spheres. 
F urt hermore , the Prophetie aiJiidith equating ribii with shirk and with incest, 
quoted above,822 refer to the existence of over seventy categories of ribii. Clearly, not aB 
the categories be10ng exc1usive1y to the economic sphere. 
Even within this narrow financialleconomic application, the Liberal thought 
attempts to downgrade or reject sorne applications that the Traditionalist thought 
regards as covered by the prohibition. Firstly, the Liberal downgrading of the ribii al-fàql 
as a secondary lesser binding prohibition is not defensible either procedurally or 
conceptually. Procedurally, it is in violation of u~iil al-fiqh for not treating the Qur'iin 
and the Sunna as one binding source. Conceptually, downgrading the ribii al-fàql runs 
counter to the very essence of the concept of ribii. Secondly, the Liberal attempt to 
821 Sec II. 2. v. aa., pp. 51-52, abovc. 
822 Sec II. 3. ii., p. 66, abovc. 
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altogether exclude simple interest from the prohibition net is challengeable. For the 
limitation ofthe prohibition to compound interest/usury only, reliance is placed by them 
on the "ribii doubled and redoubled" verse of the Qur' an (3: 130). Their argument is 
based on the specificity of the verse and ignores the generality of the other ribii-
prohibitory verses that employa generic usage of the term ribii. The counter-argument 
could be advanced that had it been the divine purpose to prohibit only a specific 
practice, then the specifie Q. 3: 130 suffices for the purpose. What then is the target of 
the other generic-meaning and comparative-meaning verses? What the Liberal 
interpretation ignores is the more plausible position that the Qur'anic prohibition being 
generic is necessarily also comprehensive and that Q. 3: 130 is only one example of a 
covered practice familiar to the immediate audience of the Revelation. In fact, the nature 
and severity of the prescribed punishment in Surat al-Baqara strongly suggests that the 
coverage and the depth of the prohibition go even further - much beyond the mere entire 
financial and economic spheres. The authentic alJiidith equating ribii with shirk and with 
incest with one's own mother are very suggestive of the deeper and broader import of the 
term ribii and the rationale of its strict prohibition. 
The lack of explicit recognition that rib,q:.application covers the financial spectrum 
in its entirety and even goes far beyond the economic sphere is the major factor that 
prevents in the current Models the synthesis of meaning, application, rationale, 
underlying cause and consequence. This limitation of application represents the second 
hermeneutical flaw in the Models. 
The Qur'an and the lfadith, while very emphatic on ribii-prohibition, and very clear 
on the nature and severity of the other-worldly punishment for its violation, are 
explicitly and completely silent on the rationale (lJilana) underlying the prohibition and 
the punishment. It has, therefore, been left to the jurists to ask what ribii is, why it is 
prohibited, and how it is puni shed? 
In line with their restricted economic paradigm of ribii, the exegetes have picked 
up the readily discemible economic connotation cIues from the Qur'an when it contrasts 
ribii with bay' and ribii with zakiit/$adaqa. Accordingly, ribiiis treated as the opposite of 
bay' from an economic and social viewpoint and as the opposite of zakiit/$adaqa from a 
related moral and spiritual viewpoint. Consequently, an the benefits and virtues of bay' 
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and zakiit/~adaqa are seen as absent from ribii. Based on this model, the exegetes have 
corne up with a number of negative effects of the practice of ribii and they treat these as 
the rationale for the divine prohibition of ribii. According to them, these negative effects 
of ribii under the economic and social category include exploitation, inequity, injustice, 
wealth concentration in few hands, economic depressionlcrisis, and social 
resentment/anger leading to revolution, and under the moral and spiritual category, 
selfishness, miserliness, callousness, ungratefulness, greediness, avarice, meanness, 
hatred, resentment, spite and jealousy. 
While the exegetes have demonstrated the negative effects of ribii practice from 
the economic and the related social, moral, and spiritual st andpoint s, very thoroughly, 
forcefully and convincingly, yet they have not done so conclusively. They have not even 
attempted to prove that these negative effects of ribii are the necessary and the only 
concomitants of ribii, Le., ribii cannot result in any thing but these stated negative 
effects and that ribii can never have any positive effects. While it is very clear and has 
been amply explained by them what human effects ribii as an instrument can, and does, 
have in the hands of an oppressive pers on, the exegetes have not even asked, let al one 
answered, the question what human effects ribii as an instrument can, and does, have in 
the hands of a benign person? And, in the light of the answer to this question, what then 
is the real rationale for the strict prohibition of ribii and the severe other-worldly 
punishment for its violation? They have not answered the logical question why, if 
exploitation is the prohibition rationale, non-exploitative practices - involving benign 
charge and/or mutual consent - are also classed as prohibited. And, they have also not 
even asked the question of whether, how and why ribii is applicable to other than 
economic spheres ofhuman creative activity. 
These unanswered questions are further compounded by an inadequate 
interpretation of the connotation of "interplay of similarity/dissimilarity" in the ribawl-
cornrnodities f;adith and by virtually no explanation of the ratio legis tilla) in the oft-
quoted riba:.incest and the rarely quoted ribii-shirk equivalence af;iidith. This lack of 
identification of the definitive and plausible rationale (f;ikma) for the prohibition 
constitutes the third herrneneutic flaw in the Models. 
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The derivation and identification of the 'iiai (underlying causes) of prohibition of 
ribahas received substantial coverage particularly in the Traditional Model, as examined 
in detail above.823 This derivation represents an impressive intellectual effort, but is 
narrowly conceived by definition and design. Both Models, with sorne exceptions, seek 
the 'ilia in the context of the named six commodities only in order to extend the 
prohibition to other commodities. This could be termed as a micro-level approach in the 
economic sphere as against a macro-level approach in the univers al sphere. The juristic 
Traditionalist Model seeks the distinctive characteristics of the named six commodities 
but not the distinctive characteristic of ribiitself. It ignores the essence and explores the 
manifestations of the prohibition. It looks at the characteristics not of ribabut of what 
riba is reflected through. It diagnoses not the disease but the patients. It concentrates on 
the exoteric micro-level indicators of similarity, weighability, countability, 
measurability, storability, valuability and edibility of the commodities, but not the 
esoteric distinguishability of riba that runs through the commodities. Even in this 
exoteric micro-Ievel fiqhl analysis, as detailed above,824 none of the derived 'ilai fully 
meet the very conditions laid down in the u$ui ai-fiqh itself for derivation of 'jlla. On the 
other hand, the scholarly Liberal Model, as pointed out above, does not have a 
systematic approach to the whole concept of iJikma and 'ilia of riba -prohibition. 
The employment of a systematic but exoteric micro-level approach in the 
Traditionalist Model and a non-systematic approach in the Liberal Model, and non-
compliance with u$ui ai-fiqh conditions for 'ilia derivation in both Models, constitutes 
the fourth hermeneutical flaw in the Models. 
As indicated above,825 the directly named punishments for the violation of the riba 
-prohibition are all other-worldly in nature. There are no primary-sourced prescribed 
temporal punishments. There is a minority secondary-sourced punishment of death. This 
punitive aspect of riba-prohibition presents an ijtihadic challenge which in the current 
Models has not received the attention that it caUs for. The dilemma to be resolved is 
that riba is seen as a temporal activity, and indulgence in it is regarded as a sin. The 
explicitly ordained punishment for this temporal violation is non-temporal (other-
823 Scc III. 1. iv., abovc. 
824 Sec 1II.l.iv .h., abovc. 
825 Scc II. 4., abovc. 
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worldly) only, and, this other-worldly punishment is not commensurate with ribii seen 
only as a temporal violation. 1s the punishment, then, too harsh, or is the violation more 
than temporal? The punishment, being divinely ordained, cannot be unjust. Our 
perception of ribii must then be at fault. The CUITent Models do not address this 
dilemma. They do not respond to the following specific questions: 
Firstly, ribiiis seen as a temporal activity and part of the fiqh a1-mu'ama1itbut the 
primary-sourced prescribed punishments are all other-worldly and not temporal in 
nature. And there is hardly any evidence of the application of the minority secondary-
sourced temporal punishments. However, regardless of the validity of this minority 
juridical opinion, these temporal punishments do not and cannot replace or abrogate the 
other-worldly punishments that are expressly divinely ordained. The question then still 
remains: Why only other-worldly punishments for temporal violations? 
Secondly, the prescribed other-worldly punishments represent the most extreme 
end of the punitive spectrum, which is certainly not commensurate with ribi se en only 
as a violation ofhuman economic and social rights. Why is there such grave punishment 
for violation of one (economie/social) component of iJuqiiq a1- 'ibid when violation of 
any other of its components does not attract such punishment? These other-worldly 
punishments are by themselves evidence and proof that riba:.indulgence must involve a 
far graver sin. Even the reported juristic opinion-based punishment of execution for ribi-
indulgence is similarly harsh and incompatible with the economic/social connotation as 
the only manifestation. 
No intellectually defensible attempt appears to have been made to evaluate the so 
far humanly "discovered" rationales in juxtaposition with the divinely ordained 
punishment. One unsatisfactory attempt at reconciliation has involved the raising of the 
status of the violation by proclaiming that the nature of the Divine punishments shows 
the importance that God attaches to human economic rights. These unresolved points of 
rcconciliation between the rationale and the punishmcnt arc a furthcr, thc fifth, 
hermeneutic flaw in the CUITent Models. 
Based on the above analysis, the underlying hermeneutic flaw of the Traditionalist 
and the Liberal Models of ribi can be summed up as one of imba1ance. There is 
imbalance between the meaning and the application, imbalance between the application 
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and the rationale, imbalance between the rationale and the underlying cause, and finaHy 
imbalance between aH these variables and the punishment. The hermeneutical problem is 
that these ribii -prohibition Models start with the generic meaning of the term, narrow it 
down to one sphere of activity by relying only on the historicity, contextuality and 
specificity of meaning, search for the prohibition rationale and the underlying cause in 
this narrowed context, attempt to promulgate the prohibition on the strength of this 
narrowed context ration ale, and make no meaningful attempt to reconcile the ration ale 
with the punishment. This skewness of the Models is cIearly in need of alignment 
through calibration. 
This internaI calibration of the ribii model requires exegetical and juristic research 
to discover from the Qur'anlSunna itself a meaning for ribii, beyond the technical and the 
contextual, one that is intrinsic and distinctive in terms of its uniqueness (tamylz),826 and 
then to formulate a definition of ribii that in turn should represent a complete synthesis 
of the meaning, the application, the rationale and the underlying cause of the 
prohibition, and the consequence of violation of the prohibition. Without this 
delineation and synthesis, confusion about the concept will persist, hindering the 
juridical transformation from interpretation to implementation. 
This calibrated hermeneutical model, based on Qur'anic and Sunnaic evidence and 
rationally derived from a new theory of divine law of normative behavior (ribii vs. bayj 
is presented below (chapt ers IV and V). But, first it is necessary to recapitulate the 
Qur'anic/Sunnaic Model, which serves as the foundation of the current Models 
ostensibly and of the new Model truly. 
III.3. Scriptural Model 
The salient structural features of the prohibitory model derived from an objective 
study of the rib&.prohibitory injunctions, contained in the Qur'anic verses and Prophetie 
a/Jiidith quoted above,827 may be recapitulated as follows. 
826 See n. 47, p. 27, above, for this coined technical usage. 
827 See II. 2. v. and II. 3. iL, above. 
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III.3.i. Qur'aruc/Sunnaic Prohibition 
The Qur'anic prohibition of ribii is graduaI but ultimately unequivocal and strict. 
While ribiihas been juxtaposed against ;S'adaqa (charity) and zakiit (alms tax) as well, it 
is solely in the ribiilbay' juxtaposition that the notion of iJariim (prohibited) and iJaliil 
(permitted), respectively, has been enjoined. The violation of the prohibition has been 
associated with dire wamings, rejection ofbelief, and sin. 
The Sunnaic prohibition of ribii is rather terse, expressed in a very matter of fact 
manner. The aiJiidith deal with the prohibition, not through the notion of iJariim directly, 
but through positive and negative command, curse, and association with the notions of 
shirk (idolatry), adultery, and incest. This prohibitory method is very revealing, 
especially in the identification of the 'illa (cause) and iJikma (ration ale) of the 
prohibition, although it has not been utilized to full advantage by the contemporary 
scholarship. 
III.3.iL Qur'aruc/Sunnaic Meaning 
The Qur'an and the Sunna do not explicitly fumish a theoreticallconceptual 
meaning of ribii, though the ribawJ-commodities lJadith does contain indicators of 
conceptual meaning that has to be extrapolated. The only meanings that may be directly 
gleaned are in two contexts - generic and contextual. 
III.3.iLa. Qur'aruc/Sunnaic Generic Meaning 
The Qur'anic usage of the term rabiilribii conveys the generic meaning of the 
process of addition, excess, growth, as revealed in the various verses cited above.828 The 
cited alJiidith also convey such meaning. 
III.3.iLb. Qur'aruc/Sunnaic Contextual Meaning 
The Qur'an uses the term al-ribii in the prohibitory verses, but without assigning 
any explicit definite meaning to it. One contextual usage in the Qur'an, al-ribii aq'iifàn 
muqii'fàtan (ribii doubling/redoubling)829 and the juxtaposition of ribii with rii'iisu 
amwiilikum (your capital, principal),830 apparently conveys the meaning of financial 
increase. The only other contextual use, referring to the Jewish practice of ribii, only 
828 See [1.2. v. aa., pp. 51-52, above. 
829 Q. 3: 130. 
830 Q. 2: 279. 
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mentions ribiï without specifying any particular meaning or form. While generally 
believed to refer to their financial praetice, it eould have a broader meaning. 
III.3.iii. Qur'8nic/Sunnaic Definition 
The Qur'an does not provide any specifie elaborate definition of ribii. It only 
contrasts ribiï with ~adaqa (2:276), with zakiït (30:39) and with bay' (2:275). There are 
Sunnaic indicators of the existence of ribiï in exchanges involving similarity of genus. 
The ribawl-commodities lJadith provides a comprehensive definition of ribiï in stating 
to the effeet that any exeess and/or delay in an exchange ofhomogeneity, and any delay 
in an exchange of heterogeneity constitutes ribii. A further explication of this ribawl-
commodities lJadith, leading towards a clearer concrete definition of ribiï and bay' is 
provided in the Baml- and Khaybar-dates alJiïdith cited above.831 
III.3.iv. Qur'8nic/Sunnaic Application 
The Qur'anic/Sunnaic application of the term ribiï is both generic and contextual 
as detailed below: 
III.3.iv.a. Qur'8nic/Sunnaic Generic Application 
The verb rabii (derived noun: ribii) has been employed in the Qur'an in several 
generic applications: 
1. Economie (inerease in wealth)832 
2. Politieal/lnternational (one nation exceeding another )833 
3. Social/Biologieal (bringing up, raising a child)834 
4. Theological (overpowering grip of GOd)835 
5. Botanical (garden on a height)836 
6. Geological (swelling earth, high ground)837 
7. Hydrological (rising foam)838 
." Sec p. 67, abovc. 
m Q. 2:276; 30:39. 
""Q.16:92 . 
• 34 Q. 17:24; 26: 18. 
8J5 Q. 69:10. 
836 Q. 2:265. 
837 Q. 22:5; 41 :39; 23:50. 
"8Q.13:17. 
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The Sunna also employs the term ribiiin sever al generic applications, as detailed in 
the various aiJiidIth cited above,839 but which, beyond the economic/financial application, 
have not been explicitly recognized by the scholarship and not yet put into exegetical 
service: 
1. Economic/Financial (l}adith on ribii- contract participants) 
2. Philosophical (l}adith on exchanges ofhomogeneity and heterogeneity) 
3. Biological (l}adIth on adultery/incest-ribi correspondence) 
4. Theological (iJadith on idolatry/ shirk-ribii direct parallel, self-emanation from 
unilateral action and ex nihilo creation from delay). 
In addition to embedding these four specifie generic applications, several of these 
al}iidith declare ribii to have - albeit metaphorically- seventy three abwib (chapters, 
types, kinds).840 A legitimate question faces the proponents of the exclusive 
economic/financial connotation of ribi: How can aIl this intended multiplicity be fully 
accounted for by usury and interest alone? What are the rest of them, beyond the four 
readily identified by the Prophetie al}idith above? An answer will be posited below 
(chapter IV). 
III.3.iv.b. Qur'3nic/Sunnaic Contextual Application 
The concept of ribi has been contextually employed in the Qur'an, as detailed 
above,841 as a financial growth process (usury/interest), referring to the actual practice of 
the Arabs. The Sunna also employs the concept of ribi contextually when it deals with 
the commercial/financial aspects (purchase/sale of Bam]~ates, Khaybar-dates, and 
abolition of the ribii of 'Abbas ibn 'Abd al-MuHalib on the occasion of the Farewell 
Pilgrimage).842 
I1I.3.v. Qur'aruc/Sunnaic Rationale (/Jikma) 
The Qur'an does not provide any explanation, or even explicit mention, of the 
rationale (hikma) underlying the prohibition of ribii and the dire punishment for its 
violation. It only contrasts ribii with bay< (Q. 2:275) declaring one as iJariim and the 
839 Sec II. 3. iL, p. 65, above. 
840 Scc, C.g., Ibn Maja, Sunan, l}8dithno. 2275/3, 72. 
841 Scc III. 3. iL b., above. 
842 Sec II. 3. iL, above. 
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other as J;aliil, in association with Satanic Insanity and Hell Fire punishment for 
equating the two terms. The contrast of ribii with $adaqa (Q. 2:276), and with zakiit (Q. 
30:39) is only an indirect indicator of the ration ale for the prohibition. The Sunnaic 
equivalence of ribii with incest with one's own mother is a very stark contrast, but the 
underlying cause for the equivalence, the ratio legis tilla), is not clarified. 
III.3.vi. Qur'8.nic/Sunnaic Ratio Legis tilla) 
The Qur'an and the Sunna do not provide any definite pointers to the 'illa, the 
underlying cause, of ribii, which could be applied to distinguish what is ribawl from what 
is non-ribawl. At least three Prophetic aJ;iidlth, cited above,843 pinpoint transactions 
which give rise to ribii, but the underlying 'illa still remains unspecified. From one of 
these, the famous ribawl (six)-commodities J;adlth a large number of differing 'ilal- as 
many as nineteen - 844 have been discovered by the classical jurists, sorne of which have 
also been discussed above.845 
III.3.vii. Qur'8.nic/Sunnaic Punishment 
The Qur'an ordains strict punishments for violation of the rib8=-prohibition. The 
Sunna condemns all participants of the ribii process, without directly specifying any 
punishment, and graphically equates ribii with grave st of sins, only implying the 
associated punishments. These punishments/admonitions are detailed in II.4 above. 
III.3.viii. Qur'8.nic/Sunnaic Permission of Bay' 
The Qur'anic permission of bay' cornes from Q. 2:275, which directly declares 
bay' to be J;aliil (permitted) and emphasizes its distinction from ribii at the pain of 
Satanic insanity for those who fail to see it. Sunnaic permission of bay' is both direct 
and indirect. The Baml-and Khaybar-dates af;iidith directly lay down a procedure of bay' 
(sale of dates for money and purchase of desired dates for money) as the permitted mode 
of conduct. Another Prophetic J;adlth declaring "nikiilJ is my sunnà' provides indirect 
permission of bay'. Nikiil; popularly means marri age but technically it means sexual 
intercourse which is an inter-active process, which, in tum, is the defining characteristic 
of bay'. The extended meaning ofthis J;adlth, then, is that bay'is a Prophetic Sunna. 
843 Scc II. 3. iL, p. 65 ff., abovc. 
844 Nyazcc, Ribii and l\'/amic Banking, 68. 
845 Sec Ill. Uv., abovc. 
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111.4. The Building (ljtihiidic) Task 
The guidelines and wamings gleaned from the Qur'an and supplemented by the 
Sunna have posed an ijtihiidic challenge to discover the true meaning and fulI 
implications of the crucial terms, ribii and bay', that have not been defined explicitly in 
the Qur'an and Sunna themselves, and to which the extant scholarship has not done full 
justice. 
This ijtihiidic task as pinpointed by Vogel has already been quoted above,846 but 
due to its direct relevance it is repeated here in a slightly expanded version: 
The question arises, why, if such transactions [iibawJ] me et with the approval of both parties 
(tariùjin), are they divinely disapproved? The Qur'iin asks this very question, but in a more 
penetrating way - why is sale [bay'j not like ribii? - and gives the emphatic, if obscure, answer 
that God has allowed the one and prohibited the other. Given the question and the response, it 
becomes morally urgent to be able to distinguish ribii from ordinary trade. What sorts of 
"increase" or inequality in exchange transform lawful commercial gain into condernned usury, 
despite both parties' ready consent? In what circumstances does the desire for gain become 
perverted and corrupt? Unfortunately, the answers to these vital questions have never been easy. 
The Caliph 'Umer reportedly Iarnented that the Prophet never spelled out the full sc ope of ribii: 
['Umer said,] The last verse revealed was the verse of ribii, and [then] the Messenger ofGod was 
taken [in death]. He had not explained it to us. So leave ribii and doubt [ribahJ 847 
In response to this ijtihiidic task and in the light of the foregoing critique of the 
contemporary juridical and hermeneutical models, a calibrated hermeneutical/juridical 
model of the divine law of riba:.prohibition and bay'- permission is presented in the next 
chapter. 
846 See 1.2., p. 19, above. 
847Vogcl and Hayes, lçlamic Law and Finance, 63. 
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CHAPTERIV 
NEW THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
IV.l. Theoretical Setting 
As seen in the previous two chapters, the scholarly utilization of the contribution 
of linguistics, script ure , prophetie guidance, exegesis, philosophy and jurisprudence has 
not produced a comprehensive theory capturing aIl aspects of the ribi discourse. Filling 
this lacuna through introduction of a philosophical-theological perspective in the 
discourse to extract a comprehensive theory requires examination of certain crucial 
terms/concepts that have either a significant normative re1evance or very meaningful 
morphologie al and functional affinity with the focal terms of this study - ribii and bay". 
Accordingly, the notions of Divine law and SharJ"arequire a briefreview for their role as 
the setting for the new theory. The term rabb (lord) requires detailed examination for its 
cognate linguistic root and functional commonality with the focal term ribii, which sets 
the new theory into motion. The concepts of Divine tawlJJd (singularity) and human 
tathniya (duality) - in the context of this study - warrant full treatment, for these are 
the very essence of the new theory. But before this examination, two foundational 
concepts for the new theory require definition. 
IV.l.i. Foundational Concepts 
Centered on the posited notion of divine and human "action," the new theory 
employs the two essential modes of action, i.e., intra-action and inter-action as 
foundational concepts with the following adopted shades of meaning: 
IV.l.i.a. Intra-action 
Intra-action is that mode of "action" wherein only one agent is operative and that 
agent is acting on a homogeneous agent, Le., on itself, or on a cognate object or on 
a similar object in order to create/grow or merely to attempt to create/grow. 
IV.I.Lb. Inter-action 
Inter-action is that mode of "action" wherein two agents are operative and each is 
acting on an opposite heterogeneous agent, i.e., on an object other than itself in 
order to create/grow or merely to attempt to create/grow. 
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IV.l.ii. Nature of Law - Divine or Human? 
Without unmanageably broadening its sc ope to delve into the huge controversy 
over the question of whether the nature of law is divine or human, this study, by 
definition, is consciously based on the apparently non-provable religious premise that 
aIl law is divine and that the human role is merely to search for it and extrapolate it. 
This study, accordingly, is a search for the divine law ofnormative behavior as perfected 
and encapsulated in the Islamic notions of ribii and bay~ sorne aspects of which were 
revealed in earlier monotheistic faiths as we11. 
IV.Uii. Divine Law for Normative Behavior - The Shaii'a 
The Qur' an declares that a SharJ'a (path, law of life) was ordained for each of the 
three communities.848 In chapter V, this study will also, inter alia, review the current 
scholarship on what that Sharl'a is for each of the three monotheist faiths of the 
Abrahamic tradition. It will then argue for and posit a connection between the concepts 
of ribii / bay' and the Islamic SharJ'a, which the Qur'an declares to be the completed and 
final revelation for aIl humanity for a11 time to come. 
IV.l.iv. Meaning of Rabb (Lord) 
The term rabb has a crucial significance for this study, and is, therefore, examined 
in detail. This Arabie expression a1-Rabb -rendered as "The Lord," "The Sustainer" and 
"The Supporter," as frequent Qur'anic titles for the Divine Being - is an ism a1-~ifà 
(attribute), whereas Allah is an ism a1-dhiit(essence). "Rabb, in its literaI meaning, is 'to 
bring up,' that is, to bring or educate anything up to its perfect standard, by slow 
degrees, and inasmuch as the Almighty is He who can bring everything to perfection, the 
word aI-Rabb is especially applied to God."849 In Hebrew, Rab (:11) enters into the 
composition of many names of dignity and office in the Bible. In Muslim theology, the 
word is used in various combinations: Rabb a1- 'lzzii (Lord of Glory), Rabb aI- 'A1amln 
(Lord of the Uni verse ), Rabb al-Arbiib (Lord of Lords), and Rabb al- 'lbiid (Lord of His 
Servants). The word is also used for a master or owner, e.g.: Rabb a1-Diir(the master of 
R4R Q. 5:4S. 
R49 al-Bay4awl, CommcntaIy, p. 6, \ine 10, Flügcl's cdition. 
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the house), Rabb al-Arq(a landowner), Rabb al-Miil(a possessor ofproperty), and Rabb 
al-Salaf( a person who pays in advance for an article). 850 
The linguistic difficulty surrounding this word is its complexity of meaning: 
[It] embraces a wide complex of meanings not easily expressed by a single term in another 
language. It comprises the ideas of having a just claim to the possession of anything and, 
consequently, authority over it, as well as of rearing, sustaining and fostering anything from its 
inception to its final complet ion. Thus the head of a family is called rabb al-diir ('master of the 
house') because he has authority over it and is responsible for its maintenance; similarly, his wife 
is called rabba! al-diir ('mistress of the house'). Preceded by the definite article al, the 
designation rabb is applied, in the Qur'an, exclusively to God as the sole fosterer and sustainer of 
all creation - objective as well as conceptual - and, therefore, the ultimate source of all 
authority.851 
When applied to God, the word rabb also means "the Creator of aIl things and 
promoter of their progress from lower stages of existence towards higher evolutionary 
stages, while simultaneously providing sustenance to all living things."852 The notion of 
se1f-subsistence embedded in the term rabb applied to God is brought out when rabb is 
defined as "the One Who nourishes with the love of both father and mother."853 
Crucial for but absent from the ribii scholarship is the recognition of the significant 
point that the Arabie morphologie al roots of the words rabb (r. b. b.) and ribii (r.b. w.), as 
can be seen, are cognate, though not the same, as claimed by sorne. For one, Naqshbandi, 
commenting on this cognate relationship, merely calls it: "not a coincidence; [rather] 
heavenly designed."854 He does not further explore its effects on the ribii discourse; he 
neither examines the implications of this relationship, nor elaborates his assertion of its 
being heavenly designed. For another, Richard Bell maintains that "the root [of the word 
rabb] r. b. b. appears in Arabie in the sense of "increase," from which, as Torrey argues, 
the sense of "Lord" for the noun may be derived."855 This erroneously suggests a 
common root for the words rabb and ribii, whereas in fact the roots are only cognate. 
Very significantly for this thesis, lexically the word rabb means the Lord, rubiibiyiit 
means the divine attribut es, and, therefore, ribawa (ribii) can be rendered as the divine 
mode. Morphological comparison of the terms, rabb and ribii, follows: 
850 Hughes, DictionalY of/sIam (1885), 531. 
851 Asad, Me.\:\'age orThe Qur'iin, 1-2, 
H52 Naqshbandi, /s/amic Economies, 360, 
853 Hishiim Amlr 'An, The Message orthe Qur'iin in Perspective (Vermont; Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company Ine" 1974),31 (Mirza 
Abul Fazl's eommentary on Surat a/-Fiitifta), 
R54 Naqshbandi, /s/amie Economies, 360. 
855 Bell, CommcntalY on the Qur'iin, l, l, 
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COMP ARISON OF WORDS: RABB and RIBA856 
RABB RIBA 
Root [. f2. f2. r. b. w. 
- - -
Root Type Sound; Doubled Defective 
Verbal F orms: 
(3PMS)* 
Form 1 rabba rabii 
Type Transitive Intransitive 
Verbal Noun various, incl. rubiibiyya rabii : rubiiw 
Participles: 
Active riibblll1 riibin 
Passive marbiiblll1 
Meaning To be master, be lord, have T 0 increase, to grow, to grow up, 
possession, control, command, to exceed, to be more than 
or authority 
Form II rabbaba rabbii 
Type Transitive Transitive 
Verbal Noun tarblbun tarbiyya 
Participles: 
Active murabbibun murabbin 
Passive murabbablll1 murabban 
Meaning T 0 raise. bring uQ (a child) To make or let grow, to rear, 
to rai se. to bring uQ, to educate, 
to teach, to instruct, to breed, 
to grow, to cultivate, to develop 
FormIII riibba riibii 
Type Transitive Transitive 
Verbal Noun muriibbatun/ribiibun muriibiitun 
Participles: 
Active muriibblll1 muriibin 
Passive muriibbun muriiban 
Meaning To deifv. to idolize To Qractice usury 
* Third Pers on Masculine Singular 
856 Mcanings from Hans Wchr, Arahic-English Dictionary, 370, 374. 
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This chart reveals the relationship of the terms rabb and ribii as very close, 
sometimes even synonymous, sometimes apparently antonymous, but always very 
meaningful. Significantly, while the root of the word rabb is sound and doubled, that of 
ribii is defective. In its basic verbal F orm l, while rabb denotes mastery, ribii denotes the 
process of acquiring that mastery (growth, excess, superiority). In the derived verbal 
Form II, there is perfect synonymy: both terms denote raising and bringing up. Very 
significant is the juxtaposition of the derived verbal Form III where, while rabb denotes 
deifying and idolizing, ribii denotes practicing usury. This Form III morphological 
juxtaposition of idolizing (shirk) and practicing usury (ribii) could be the linguistic basis 
for the IJadlth, cited above,857 which dec1ares that "ribiihas seventy two levels and shirk 
(idolatry) is like that." 
lmportantly, this chart also helps explain the mistaken human affirmation and its 
divine negation, in Q. 2:275, that ribii and bay' are similar. The consensual exegetical 
view - albeit untenable - is that the human affirmation of the similarity of ribii and bay' 
was based on their alleged perception that both ribii and bay' yield an increase or excess 
and, therefore, are similar. While it is correct that ribii (usury) as a process by itself 
yields a nominalincrease or excess for the taker, bay' (sale) as a process by itself does 
not and can not yield an increase or excess. Firstly, the sale transaction, to be honest and 
to reflect a "just price" must exhibit an absolute equality of value on both sides, Le., no 
increase per se. Secondly, the sale has to be compared with an earlier purchase to start 
the process of profit-determination. Thirdly, even so, the comparison of the sale and 
purchase may result either in a profit or in a loss, Le., an increase/excess or a 
decrease/deficit, depending upon the quantum of the two processes. Thus, unlike usury 
(ribii), the act of sale (bay'J per se cannot be he Id to be a generator of excess. Moreover, 
even ribii cannot generate a real increase: it generates a nominal increase for the taker 
but an offsetting equal nominal decrease for the giver, resulting in zero net increase for 
the two taken together. It merely transfers wealth, does not produce additional wealth. 
This is common business knowledge and could not, therefore, have been the basis for the 
human declaration ofthe similarity of ribii and bay'. 
&57 Sec II. 3. iL, p. 65, abovc. 
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The Qur'anic stipulation, in 2:275, of the punishment of Satanic insanity for 
holding ribii and bay' to be similar clearly suggests a more profound and valid reason for 
the divine negation of this similarity. The morphological analysis of ribii and bay', 
presented above,858 fumishes such a reason. The human affirmation of similarity was 
more likely and plausibly based on the fact that the verbal Form III of ribii is seen to be 
transitive (requiring both subject, i.e., lender and object, i.e., borrower) and that so is the 
verbal Form III of bay'(to make a contract with someone). But human reasoning ignored 
the fact that ribiiin its very basic verbal form is intransitive (requiring only the subject), 
and even in the verbal Form III of ribii ("to practice usury"), the direct subject and the 
direct object in the transaction are one and the same, Le., money. And, therefore, the 
equation of ribii, which intrinsically is intransitive (subject acting on itself: self-
subsistence, independence), with bay~ which indisputably is transitive (subject acting on 
the object: interdependence), produces a disparity of theological proportions that is 
being obliquely hinted at in Q. 2:275 at the pain of Satanic insanity. 
IV.l.v. Concept of Taw.wd(Singularity) and Tathniya(Duality) 
The concept of the taw.qid(singularity) ofGod and the tathniya(duality) of man is 
a recurrent theme in the Qur'an reflected in , among others, the following verses: 
First relevant verse: 
• Say: "He is Allah, (the) One. The Self-Sufficient Master, Whom all creatures need, He neither 
eats nor drinks. He begets not, nor was He begotten. And there is none co-equal or comparable 
unto Him.".859 
This verse, inter alia, underscores the singularity, self-sufficiency, nOll-
dependence, and absolute self-emanation of the Creator - the first concept that has a 
crucial defining role for this study. 
Second relevant verse: 
• And of everything We have created pairs: that ye may receive instruction.86o 
Third relevant verse: 
• Glory to God, Who created in pairs all things that the earth produces, as well as their own 
(hum an) kind and (other) things ofwhich they have no knowledge.861 
858 Sec II. 1. iL a., abovc. 
859 Q. 112:1-4. 
860 Q. 51 :49. 
861 Q. 36:36. 
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The latter two verses declare the polarity (duality) of aU creation including human 
- the second concept that has a crucial defining role for this study. 
The defining role of the three above cited verses for this study is underscored by 
the following exegetical excerpts on the last two cited verses: 
Commentary on verse 51 :49: 
... (3) AU things are in twos: sex in plants and animals, by which one individual is 
complementary to another; in the subtle forces of nature, Day and Night, positive and negative 
electricity, forces of attraction and repulsion; and numerous other opposites, each fulfiUing its 
purpose, and contributing to the working of God's Universe; and in the moral and spiritual 
world, Love and Aversion, Mercy and Justice, Striving and Rest, and so on; - aU fulfilling their 
functions according to the Artistry and wonderful Purpose of God. Everything has its counterpart 
or pair or complement. God alone is One, with none like Him, or needed to complement Him. 
These are noble things to contemplate. And they lead us to a true understanding ofGod's Purpose 
and Message. 862 
Commentary on verse 36:36: 
The mystery of sex runs through aU creation - in man, in animal life, in vegetable life, and 
possibly in other things of which we have no knowledge. Then there are pairs of opposite forces 
in nature, e.g. , positive and negative electricity, etc. The atom itself consists of a positively 
charged nucleus or proton, surrounded by negatively charged electrons. The constitution of 
matter itself is thus referred to pairs of opposite energies. 863 
Fourth relevant verse: 
• And by the even and the odd.864 
This verse also complements the theme of the other three above cited verses and 
hence has a crucial defining role for this study, which is brought out by two exegetical 
excerpts, a Prophetie i}adIth and a philosophie al exposition below. 
The exegetical excerpts are: 
• The contrast between even and odd forms the subject of learned argument among those who 
deal with the mystic properties of numbers. In any case, even and odd foUow each other in 
regular succession: each is independent, and yet neither is self-sufficient. In ultimate analysis 
every even number is a pair of odd ones [???]. And aU things go in pairs: see Q. XXXVI: 36, 
and n. 3981. In the animal world pairs are but two individuals, and yet each is a complement of 
the other. Both abstract and concrete things are often understood in contrast with their 
opposites ... 865 
• ... 'Even' and 'Odd' is interpreted differently by different religious scholars. Sorne said: ... 
Others said: 'Even' is aU the creatures and 'Odd' is AUah. 866 
The Prophetie i}adIth states: "God loves odd numbers."867 
862Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur'iin, nn. 5025, 1427. 
86'Ibid., n. 3981,1178. 
864 Q. 89:3. 
'65Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur'iin, n. 6110, 1731. 
8""Muhsin Khan and Taqi-ud-Din Hilali, The Noble Qur'an, n. 2, 865. 
867 Muslim, Dhikr 6, quotcd by al-Ghazali in his, al-Maq:~ad al-Asnii fi Sharl; Asmii' Alliih al-Ifu.\'nii. 
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The philosophical exposition (contemporary Muslim) reads: 
The odd numbers are "retrospective" in the sense that they express an infolding toward Unit y, or 
the Divine Origin, whereas the even numbers are "prospective" in the sense that they express on 
the contrary a movement in the direction of manifestations, the world, or the universe.868 
Fifth relevant verse: 
• And over it are nineteen (angels as guardians and keepers of Hell). And We have set none but 
angels as guardians of the Fire. And We have fixed their number only as a trial for the 
disbelievers, in order that the people of the Script ure may arrive at certainty and that the 
believers may increase in faith, and that no doubts may be left for the people of the Script ures 
and the believers, and that those in whose hearts is a disease and the unbelievers may say, 
"What symbol doth God intend by this?" Thus doth God leave to stray whom He pleaseth, and 
guide whom He pleaseth: and none can know the armies of thy Lord, except He. And this is no 
other than a warning to mankind.869 
The relevance of this verse for the study and its one plausible explanation is that it 
dilates on the concept of singularity (Creator) and plurality/multiplicity (Creation). 
From number 1 to 19 is the domain of singularity. Within this domain, each number 
from 1 to 9 is an absolute singularity representing a vertical ascension, while each 
number from lOto 19 starts with the number 1, and represents not a vertical ascension 
anymore but a horizontal extension. After 19, start the domains of duality(20 to 29) and 
multiplicity (30 onwards), until the number 99, when the process starts aIl over again 
with further horizontal extensions. Not only this, but in fact, the entire Sura 74, 
containing this verse, appears to be a step-by-step waming, explanation and description 
ofpunishment for the practice of ribii, which is specifically hinted at in verses 6 and 15. 
But this Sura has not been put into exegetical service in the contemporary ribii 
discourse. 
Sixth relevant verse: 
• Verily, the number of months with Allah is twelve months (in a year), so was it ordained by 
Allah on the Day when He created the he avens and the earth; of them fàlff are Sacred 
[lJlffwlllm] That is the right religion [al-din al-qavvimJ, so wrong not yourselves therein, and 
fight against the mushrikiin (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the Oneness of 
Allah) collectively. But know that Allah is with those who are pious (al_muttaqiin).87o 
Seventh relevant verse: 
• The postponing (of a Sacred Month) is indeed an addition to disbelief.! thercby the disbclicvers 
are led astray, for they make it lawful one year and forbid it another year in order to adjust the 
number of months forbidden by Allah, and make such forbidden ones lawful. The evil of their 
deeds is made fair-seeming to them. And Allah guides not the people who disbelieve.871 
868 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, /.;'lamic Spirituality, Foundations(London: Rout1cdge & Kegan Paul, 1987),50. 
869 Q, 74:30-31, 
870 Q, 9:36, 
871 Q, 9:37, 
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These two verses have a very profound allegorical meaning that furnishes crucial 
Scriptural support for this thesis. Qur'anic exegetes have commented contextually on 
these verses but have not tackled the basic questions raised therein. 
There are two main problems with the reviewed commentaries on these verses. 
Firstly, most translators/commentators have imprecisely translated the Arabie 
expression a1-din a1-qayyim as: correct code (Mawdüdi); true ordainment (Zafar Ansari); 
correct system (Zafrulla Khan); straight usage (Yusuf Ali); regulation of affairs (Biiqir 
Behbudil Collin Turner); right reckoning (Shakir Ali); and ever-true law [of God] 
(Asad). The only precise and lexically correct translations are: right religion (Pickthall; 
Muhsin Khan), and perfect religion (Rashad Khalifa). 
Secondly, the commentators have not tackled any of the basic underlying 
questions. Why does the Qur'iin emphasize twelve as the ordained number of months in 
a year, and why are any of them, and exactly four of them, declared sacred (J;arim)? 
Above all, how does this fixation (of twelve) and designation (of four) constitute the 
straight religion (a1-din al-qayyim)? How the violation of these four sacred months is 
associated with the notion of idolatry (shirk) evident from the reference to the idolaters 
(mushrikiin) in the verse? And, how does the postponement of one of the sacred (J;arim) 
months from one year to another result in an addition to disbeHef (kufr)? 
Most commentators' answers, though not directly addressing the above questions, 
are confined to the contextual scenario - the timing of the pilgrimage (J;ajj), the freedom 
for their summer and winter trading caravans, and the strategie military advantage over 
the enemy. The only divine context mentioned is Alliih's will to keep to the lunar 
calendar and thereby rotate the timing of the pilgrimage throughout the seasons, over 
the solar year, so as not to make it always too difficult (summer) or always too easy 
(winterl spring). 
Elaborating on the term a1-dfn a1-qayyim, which he translates as "the ever-true law 
[of God]," one of these commentators, Asad, offers a "natural law" explanation by 
stating that "the months spoken ofhere are lunar months, progressively rotating through 
the seasons of the solar year. Since reckoning by the easily observable lunar months is 
more natural than by the arbitrarily fixed months of the solar year, it is described in this 
passage as the 'ever-true law' (din) [of God]." The key phrase in Q. 9:37 "jnnami a1-
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nasi'u ziyiidatun fi al-kuIH"is rendered by him as: "intercalation (also postponement) is 
an instance of refusaI to acknowledge the truth" [italics and underlining mine]. 
Nevertheless, the commentators are either silent or fail to explain how the contextual 
scenario or the naturallaw explanation above constitutes the straight religion. 
The allegorical meaning that answers aU of the above questions raised by these two 
verses is hidden therein but surfaces upon deeper reflection. Firstly, the designation of 
four months as sacred (iJariim) means they are out of bounds for humans and are in the 
divine domain. That leaves eight months, out oftwelve, in the human domain. Now, the 
ratio of these "divine" months to these "human" months is 4:8 or, arithmetically 
simplified, 1:2 (Divine vs. Human). This is the temporal and arithmetical expression of 
the most profound theological reality - the Singularity of the Divine and the Duality of 
the Human, which is the central theme of this thesis. This expression is the true 
profession of the Islamic faith and thus the "straight religion" (al-din al-qayyim). 
Secondly, the postponement of one divine month from one year to the next would leave 
only three divine months in the initial year and make five months divine in the next. 
This disturbs the neat, divinely ordained 1:2 ratio of Divine vs. Human in both years, 
and thus amounts to an "addition to disbeHef (kutr)"by tampering with the theological 
reality. Furthermore, in order to make it clear that it is not any quadruplity (denoted by 
the number four) but the singularity (denoted by the number one as in the above ratio 
1 :2) of the divine that is actually meant, the lirst month of the lunar calendar - one of 
the four "divine" months - is elsewhere named muiJarram al-iJariim (the sacred of the 
sacred). 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to posit any other plausible or tenable 
explanation of how keeping to the calendar constitutes the "straight religion," and of 
how tinkering with the calendar amounts to an act of shirk and ku/i: 
Morphologically, the word tawiJJd is derived from the root: w. iJ. d which in its 
basic verbal Form 1 means to be alone, unique, singular, unmatched, without equal, 
incomparable. In the derived causative verbal Form II, it means to make into one, unite, 
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unify, to connect, join, link, bring together, combine, and merge.872 Both these 
connotations ofmeaning have been utilized in the scholarship, as shown below. 
The notion of tawlJld - in its basic meaning of the singularity of God - is a 
foundational notion in the dogma of the religion of Islam, a religion based as it is on 
what is in the nature of things particularly the Divine nature itself. Being the first 
Article of Faith in Islam, this notion of tawiJldhas also attracted copious Scriptural and 
human attention. The Qur'an is replete with pointed assertions and reminders of this 
point. The scholarship is ri ch with discourses on this central idea. Hossein N asr even 
goes to the extent of characterizing this discourse for non-Muslims as a pleonasm: 
It [taw~lld] is, in fact, emphasized so much that for a non-Muslim it seems as a pleonasm, a kind 
of excessive reiteration of something which is obvious. But to the Muslim the idea of unit y does 
not just mean the assertion that there is only one God sitting in heaven instead of two or three. 
No religion could convert a quarter of the population of the globe ... withjust such a simple idea. 
Unit y is, in addition to a metaphysical assertion about the nature of the Absolute, a method of 
integration, a me ans of becoming whole and realizing the profound oneness of aH existence ... 
Every manifestation of human existence should be organicaHy related to the Shahiida, Lii jliiha 
jllii Alliih, which is the most univers al way of expressing Unity.873 
While rightly emphasizing its centrality and significance, this characterization of 
tawiJld, nevertheless, misses sorne important implications of the notion. Firstly, what the 
discourse ignores is that, while the singularity of God is apparently being over-
emphasized, the dualityofman is likewise being over-emphasized. The Qur'an is equally 
replete with assertions and reminders about the creation of man, and of everything, in 
pairs.874 What is the significance and implication of the juxtapositional notions of the 
singularity of God and the duality of man? Secondly, the discourse translates tawiJld as 
"unit y," not in its basic sense of "numerical singularity" but more in the derived sense of 
"union": a method ofintegration, a means ofbecoming whole and realizing the profound 
oneness of aIl existence - the notion of walJdat al-wujiid of Ibn 'ArabI. This notion of 
the oneness of all existence does fumish a moral code for human action. But what 
fumishes the truly practical code - the modus operandi - for human action is the notion 
of the singularity of God with its necessarily flowing intra-activity (one agent acting on 
itself), and of the duality of man with its necessarily flowing inter-activity (one agent 
acting on its opposite). Hence, for humans, the divine law ordains prohibition of ribii 
872 Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictionary. 1236. 
873 Nasr, fdcal~ and Rea/Hies of/s/am, 29. 
874 Q. 6:144-5; 13:3; 20:53; 26:7; 31: 10; 36:36; 39:6; 42: Il; 43:12; 50:7; 51 :49. 
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(intra-activity) and permission of bay' (inter-activity). This is the practical significance 
ofwhat appears to be a pleonasm. 
TawiJldhas been declared the core of a11 Islamic religious knowledge, "as we11 as 
its history, metaphysics, esthetics, ethics, social order, economic order, and indeed the 
entire Islamic world order."875 How does tawiJld serve this function? As shown above, on 
the moral plane, tawiJld operates as the notion of union with God, while on the practical 
plane, it operates as the notion of singularity of God and, its opposite, the duality of 
man. 
Arithmetica11y, this notion of unit y and duality can be expressed very simply. 
Unit y cannot "multiply" itself, for 1 x 1 = 1, always. Duality can, and is required to, 
"multiply" itself, for 2 xl = 2, but 2 x 2. = 4. Put theologically, God does not, will not, 
cannot(?) "multiply" Himself. Man, on the other hand, does, will, can, must, "multiply." 
IV.I.vi. Modes of Creation and Growth 
Theoretically, the process of creation and the subsequent existence/growth of any 
object or concept can originate and continue only from three sources: (i) from nothing 
(nihilo); (ii) from itself(the object or concept itself); and (iii) from other (something 
other than the object or concept itself). If something is created from nothing, it is called, 
in theological and philosophical discourse, ex-nihilo creation. To coin two new terms, 
when something is created from the thing itself, it may be called ex-sui creation 
(creation from self), which in this work will be referred to as intra-action; finally, when 
something is created from something other, it may be called ex-allo creation (creation 
from other), which in this work will be referred to as inter-action. 
Although a11 these three concepts play a crucial role in new theory development in 
this work, the two concepts that are in practical binary mode and act as the pillars of the 
new theory are intra-action or ex-sui creation (creation from self), and inter-action or ex-
allo creation (creation from other). 
IV.1.vi.a. Ex-nihilo creation (khalq min aI- 'adam) - creation from nothing - as debated 
by theologians and philosophers, is a process wherein only one agent is operative and 
875 Ismail al-Faruqi quotcd in Tamara Sonn, "Tawl)ld" in The Oxford Eneyclopedia orthe Modem l,'lamie World. cd. 1. Esposito. 
(Oxford University Press, 1995), 190-198. 
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where that agent acts on nothing in order to create or attempt to create. It is thus 
indisputably, if anything, an exclusive divine creative fiat - beyond human capability. 
God created the universe from nothing. For Him, it is only a matter of "kun! fa yakiïn" 
(Be! and it iS).876 Other verses which attest to this divine capability are: 
• He [Zakariyya] said: "My Lord! How can 1 have a son when my wife is barren, and 1 have 
reached the extreme old age?" 
He [Allah] said: "So (it will be). Your Lord says: It is easy for Me. Certainly 1 have created you 
before, when you had been nothingl,,877 
• And man says: What! Once 1 am dead, shall 1 be raised to life again? 
Does man not remember that We created him before out of nothing?878 
• Has there not been over man a period of time when he was not a thing worth mentioning? 
Verily, We have created man from nil/fa (mixed drops of male and female sexual discharge), in 
order to test (try) him, so We made him hearer and seer. Verily, We showed him the way, 
whether he be grateful or ungrateful.879 
Very significantly, these verses declare man's initial creation out of nothing - ex-
nihilo creation of man - and his subsequent creation from a mixture of duality (male 
sperm and female egg) for the purpose of testing him (for conformity with this duality 
model), and showing him the way (sharI'a). These verses thus encompass and support 
several crucial concepts in this study - creation from nothing, creation in duality mode, 
worldly test and the sharl'a. 
On the other hand, man cannot create something from nothing. Man has to act on 
something to create something. Ex-nihilo creation is, therefore, not a human capability 
or category, and cannot therefore be rendered in terms of human actions. It can only be 
expressed in its generic form. As will be shown below, man can only attempt to simulate 
ex-nihilo creation. But even this attempt - a failure at best - will, nevertheless, 
constitute the serious-most transgression in the divine domain. 
IV.l.vi.h. Ex-sui crea/ion or In/ra-ac/ion (khalq min al-nafs) - creation from the thing 
itself - means a process wherein only one agent is operative and where that agent acts 
upon itself in order to create or to attempt to create. This process, therefore, is one of 
intra-action. And intra-action leads to self-subsistence, self-emanation, perfection, 
purity, in finit y and eternity. Intra-action is the purest form of growth - a replication, a 
'76 Q. 2: 117; 3 :47; 36:82. 
877 Q. 19:8-9. 
878 Q. 19:66-67. 
879 Q. 76:1-3. 
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duplication of quality of exact self - exactly the same characteristics mirrored in the 
growth, without any impurity coming from the inter-action of two agents with 
necessarily different genetic characteristics. Again, the attribut es of self-subsistence, 
self-emanation, perfection, purity, in finit y and etemity are divine attributes. Ex-sui 
creation is also, therefore, an exclusively divine mode of growth based on intra-action. 
AIso, intra-action results in inbreeding. In the human domain, incest with one's own 
mother (the subject of a Prophetie iJadith on ribii) is the utmost limit of inbreeding 
involving circular action. Incest with other members of the biologie al family unit 
involves lesser degrees of inbreeding. Also, man can attempt self-replication, self-
emanation and etemity through the genetic engineering technique of human cloning, but 
the operative attribute still remains divine. Therefore, with the sole exception of the 
institution of waqf (endowment) which is "the only form of perpetuity known to 
Islam,"88o any human act which is intra-active - or ev en an attempt at that - is a 
transgression in the divine domain. This is borne out by the following Qur'anic verses: 
• Nay, but man doth transgress all bounds.881 
• In that he looketh upon himself as self-sufflcient.882 
These two verses are the most direct Qur' anic assertion of human self-sufficiency 
representing a transgression in divine self-sufficiency. 
The third support ive verse is: 
• Wa-hi tamnun tastakthir.883 
This verse has been variously translated as "and give not a thing in order to have 
more" (Muhsin Khan); "nor expect, in giving, any increase (for thyself)!" (Yusuf Ali); 
"and show not favour, seeking worldly gain!" (Pickthall); "and bestow not favours that 
you may receive again with increase" (Shakir Ali); "do not bestow favours in 
expectation of retums" (Ahmed Ali); and "and do not through giving seek thyself to 
gain, or, lit., do not bestow favours to obtain increase" (Asad). 
880 George Makdisi, The Rise ofCol/egcs: Institutions ofLeaming in 1~/am and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1981), n. 232. 
881 Q. 96:6. 
882 Q. 96:7. 
""1 Q. 74:6. 
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Notwithstanding the translation differences, the underlying theme of the verse is 
very significant in clearly prohibiting any excess in an exchange of homogeneity (intra-
action). 
On a theological level, as pointed out above, in his famous expression, Aristotle 
speaks of the Unmoved Mover as 'Thought thinldng itse]f'.884 This is the most succinct 
expression of the concept of intra-action, and ensuing self-subsistence, which this thesis 
posits as one of the distinguishing characteristics of riba and as an exclusive divine 
capability. "The plain meaning of this is that God is the object of his own thinking." 885 
As Aristotle put it in his Metaphysics, "it is by thinking of itself [sic] that God knows 
and controls aH things." Aristotle rejects the notion that God might think of something 
other than "itself' (which would amount to inter-action: one agent acting upon another) 
precisely because this would diminish God's power (which is intra-action: one agent 
acting upon itself).886 
IV.1.vi.c. Ex-alio creation or Inter-action (khalq min al-ghayr) - creation from 
something else - is the process wherein two different agents are operative and acting 
upon each other, i.e., an agent is acting on its binary opposite in order to create or 
attempt to create. It is the only process of creation and growth that is inter-active. Inter-
action does not lead to etemal growth, but to a negotiated, defined and constrained 
growth and ultimate decay. Inter-action leads to imperfection and impurity. Recent 
genetic research, for example, has demonstrated that the male ceH introduces 
"imperfection" in the human embryo. Inter-action is the only mode and source of 
creation and growth that is in conformity with the structural design and purpose of the 
creation of man. It is the exclusive human domain. The Qur'an repeatedly emphasizes 
the creation of man in pairs - duality and the resulting inter-activity. According to al-
Kinm, the blissful state of everlasting life of the heavenly bodies, as compared to the 
terrestrial entities, is by virtue of the fact that they have no opposites [Le., no inter-
action]. 887 
884 Aristotlc, Metaphysic,;; 1072bI9. 
885 The Encyc/opcdia ofPhifosophy, cd, in chief Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. & The Free Press, 1967), l, 161. 
886 Aristotle, Mctaphysics, 1072bI9. 
887 Abii Riqa, Rasa'if a/-Kindi a/-Fa/safiyah (Cairo: n.p., 1950, 1953),253, quotcd in Majid Fakhry, HMOly ofl;'/amic Phi/osophy, 
2nd cd. (London: Longman; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 82, 
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IV.2. The New Critical Theory 
A new theory of normative behavior, derived from the divine law of prohibition of 
ribii and permission of bay', is developed below in terms of its three foundational 
constituents: (1) distinction (tamylz),888 (2) ration ale (iJilana) and (3) cause tilla: ratio 
legis). 
IV.2.i. Posited Distinction (Tamylz) 889 of Ribii and Bay' 
Conventional scholarship, as seen above, has not searched for the intrinsic 
distinguishing characteristic of ribii and bay· (a1- ·un~ur a1-mumayyiz) 890 beyond their 
apparent external manifestations. The common historical perception of ribii is that of an 
evil human action, due primarily to the empirically observed historical manifestations of 
the practice of usury/interest. But as will be demonstrated below, ribii is, in fact, a pious 
and pure divine action, absolutely devoid of any evil, but - for this very reason -
prohibited to humans. The reason for this conventional misperception is concentration 
on its observable, exoteric economic manifestations to the complete exclusion of its 
non-observable, esoteric manifestations. The sum total of conventional scholarship is 
confined to associating ribii with its most apparent manifestation of interest/usury, and 
associating bay' with its indirect manifestation of profit/loss. The analogical extension 
of the six named cornrnodities in the ribawl-cornrnodities iJadith also has utilized only 
the apparent external characteristics of the commodities - currency-value, food-value, 
weighability, measurability, storability, etc. This narrow exoteric application has 
handicapped the conventional scholarship in harmonizing the prohibition rationale and 
punishrnent for ribii. The distinguishing characteristic of the Arabic linguistic terms ribii 
and bay' will, therefore, be sought not in the exoteric products but in the esoteric 
processes underlying these two concepts, not only in the Script ure and the lexicon, but 
also in the linguistic theory of semiology/semiotics which, as explained above,891 holds, 
inter alia, that linguistic meaning resides in binary oppositions. In line with this science 
of signs for the study of the linguistic structure, the Arabie linguistic terms ribii and 
RR8 Sec n. 47, p. 27, above, for this coined tcchnical usage. 
",9 Ibid. 
890 A new composite term in the ribii discourse as an expanded equiva\cnt of lamy/z. 
R91 Sce 1.3., above. 
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bay', in terms of their distinguishing characteristic and their binary opposition, may 
appropriately be depicted as shown below: 
Semiological Binary Opposition of Ribii, Bay' and Zakiit 
Ribi: 
Zakit (~adaqa): 
= Intra-action: one agent self-emanating 
= Inter-action: two agents exchanging 
= Intra-action: one agent se1f-annihilating 
(reverse) 
Incidentally, this depiction dispels the popular exegetical misconception that the 
Qur'anic binary opposition is between ribii and zakiit/$adaqa. As is evident above, both 
ribii and zakiit/$adaqa are in the same category of intra-action, and hence cannot be in 
binary opposition to each other. Yet, while both are intra-active, ribii is prQscribed, and 
blotted, because it is self-emanating, and zakiit/$adaqa is pr~scribed, and even promised 
manifold reward, because it is self-annihilating. This is the only logical explanation of 
the particular juxtaposition of ribii with ~adaqa in Q. 2:276 and with zakiit in Q. 30:39. 
The binary opposition, then, is between ribii /zakiit/ sadaqa and bay'. 
IV.2.i.a. Posited Distinction (Tamylz) 892 of Ribii 
The distinguishing and defining characteristic of any object or concept, by 
definition, must refer to that inherent quality of the object or concept that is universally 
present. If it is present in sorne situations and absent in others, it may be a characteristic 
but not the defining characteristic. The distinguishing/defining characteristic (tamyJz) of 
892 Sec n. 47, p. 27, above, for this eoined teehnieal usage. 
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ribii is, therefore, to be sought in the operative modes in which this characteristic 
functions to actualize the inherent processes of growth and creation. As will be 
explained below, the growth operative mode is intra-action (ex- sui creation) and the 
creation operative mode is ex- nihilo action (ex- nihilo creation). 
Intra-action (ex- sui creation) 
As a technical term, ribiihas come to be identified exc1usively with interest/usury. 
Notwithstanding their historicaHy evolving meanings and their present conceptual 
difference, the current intrinsic meaning of interest and usury is money generation from 
money. The Qur'an apparently points to this process when referring to the "doubling and 
re-doubling ribii."893 
As a generic term, however, ribii has several applications. As noted above,894 the 
Qur'anic text as a linguistic contribution applies the term ribii, in its different 
grammatical derivations, to denote "excess"/ "increase" or "growth" in such seemingly 
diverse processes as rabwatin (height: hillock);895 riibiyan (rising: foam);896 arbii 
(exceeding, being more numerous: nation);897 rabbayiinl and nurabbika (bringing up, 
raising: child);898 rabat (swelling: earth);899 and riibiyatan (overpowering: grip ).900 
At the bottom ofthese seemingly diverse technical and Qur'anie expressions, there 
is a very crucial, common distinguishing characteristic. Close scrutiny of the above 
usages - money generation from money, growth of the hill, rising of the foam, being 
more numerous of the nation, bringing up of the child, swelling of the earth, and being 
overpowering of the grip - c1early demonstrates that aH these diverse processes of 
growth have one feature in common: in each case only one agent is operative and it is 
acting on itself. The Iii'il (subject) and the maFiil (object) of the fi? (verb/action) is 
one and the same entity, acting on itself in order to produce growth. In other words, they 
are aH intra-active processes. Other than this intra-action, there is no feature common to 
893 Q. 3:130. 
894 See 11. 2. V., above. 
895 Q. 2:265; 23:50. 
89"Q.13:17. 
897 Q. 16:92. 
898 Q. 17:24; 26: 18. 
899 Q. 22:5; 41 :39. 
90"Q.69:10. 
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these diverse applications of the term ribii. Thus intra-action (ex-sui creation), being the 
modus operandi of ribii, is the growth mode of its distinguishing characteristic (tamylz). 
This philosophical notion of intra-action (ex-sui creation) as a mode of the 
distinguishing characteristic (tamylz) of ribii has a more profound theological 
connotation. Intra-action is an exchange of homogeneity - one agent operating upon 
itself - and any growth therefrom leads to self-emanation. The exchange of a small apple 
for a larger homogenous apple can be regarded as a self-emanating growth of the small 
apple for the initial possessor of the small apple. Likewise, a sum of money left in a bank 
savings account or put out on loan at interest can keep on growing - intra-acting and 
self-emanating. Moreover, without being restrained by the opposite inter-action, this 
process of self-emanation can be continued ad infinitum leading in tum to etemity. But 
self-emanation and the ensuing self-subsistence, and etemity, are exclusively divine 
traits.901 Except for the Divine Himself, this mode of intra-action, by virtue of the 
underlying process of self-emanation and etemity, is therefore an act of what may be 
termed "divine imitability" on the part of anyone or anything that indulges in it. 
Thus, it can be posited that intra-action (ex-sui creation) is the "growth mode," 
both in its technical and generic sense, of the distinguishing and defining characteristic 
of ribii which is "divine imitability." In its tum, as expounded below,902 this act of 
"divine imitability" both directly and perfectly entails a lJilana (ration ale) for ribii-
prohibition which is fully commensurate with the ordained punishment. 
Ex -nihilo creation 
However, in the context of creation, ribii operates in another mode of the 
distinguishing and defining characteristic of "divine imitability": ex-nihilo action (or ex-
nihilo creation: ibdiij, which is triggered by "delay" in settlement, with/without growth. 
The ex-nihilo creation argument in this work draws heavily on the Islamic legal 
(fiqh) notion of "unit y of the transacting session" (ittilJiid al-majfis). The notion 
stipulates that a transaction, to be complete and legally valid, must be completed in a 
single session of the two participants. 
901 Q. 112:1-4. 
902 Sec IV. 2. ii. a., bclow. 
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Reliance on this notion for the development of the ex-nihilo creation argument was 
objected to as "reliance on a legal fiction, damaging the strength of the argument."903 In 
response, it may be posited that the Islamic legal requirement of the unit y of the session, 
wittingly or unwittingly on the part of the jurists (fuqahii')/04 far from being a legal 
fiction, is in fact an expression of a fundamental law of nature. For ex ample, sexual 
intercourse - a biological transaction - must be completed in one session for it to be 
effective. If its completion in one session is interrupted, the remainder cannot be 
completed in another session. The process cannot be picked up in the new session at the 
point where it was left off in the previous session. The interrupted activity of the old 
session is rendered ineffective. It must be resumed in the new session anew. This basic 
law applies not only to biological transactions but to all other transactions, for all are 
part of the Process of exchange (bay"J. Reliance on this notion is, therefore, reliance not 
on a legal fiction but on a fundamentallaw of nature, which will, rather than damage, 
support the ex-nihilo creation argument as shown be1ow. 
The assertion that ribii operates in an ex-nihilo action mode triggered by delay is 
substantiated, though not explicitly explained, by the Prophetie alJiidith that "there is no 
ribii, except in nasJ'a [delay]," 905 and "verily, ribii is in nasJ'a."906 While the alJiidith 
themse1ves are silent on the question of "how," the exegetical and juridical scholarship 
has not answered the question satisfactorily, either. Literally, these a1;iidith seem to be 
confining ribii to nasJ'a only. However, these a1;iidith cannot be taken in their literaI 
sense, for, as per the ribawl-commodities lJadith and the Baml-dates lJadith, ribii does 
arise, even without the presence of de1ay, in exchanges of homogeneity. What these 
al;.iidith are doing, therefore, is only to emphasize the gravit y of that ribii which is 
triggered by de1ay in settlement. The question, then, is: What is that ribii? The only 
explanation posited by scholars so far is that in a credit sale or a fixed-rate loan 
transaction, while the seller/creditor has a predetermined fixed profitlinterest, the 
buyer/debtor has the potential of an undetermined and variable monetary benefit from 
903 An objection raised at the oral defense of the Proposai for this dissertation at the Institute of Islamic Studics, McGill University, 
Montreal, February 1,2005. 
904 As per the fl/qahii; the reason for the uuity of the session is merely a eontraetual neccssity of cxprcssing rù/ii (consent) and thc 
so-called "the meeting of the two minds." They completely ignore the more fundamental rationale for the rcquircment. 
905 Bukharl, ;iaI]JI]. Kitiib al-BI/Yu'. Biib bay' al-mniiri bi al-mniir nasa 'an; also ;ia!JJI] Muslim and Ml/.\'flad Al]mad. 
906 Ibid., $aIJ11J, Il, 138. 
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the use of the money for the duration of the delay. It is cIaimed that this undetermined 
and potentially large monetary benefit is being referred to as the real ribii in these 
aJ;iidith. But, as pointed out by al-Raz!, this potential bene fit is only {JannJ907 (resting on 
mere assumption, presumptive, supposed, hypothetieal). A {JannJ benefit eould not have 
been the basis of these emphatie Prophetie a1;iidith. The answer to the question of how 
delay triggers a severer kind of ribii must lie elsewhere. 
The only tenable answer appears to be that delay in seulement produces a 
semblance of ex-nihilo creation, which in turn is an exclusive divine power. The delayed 
settlement transaction is, therefore, an attempted incursion into the exclusive divine 
domain and henee the severe st form of prohibited ribii. It is an act of "divine 
imitability." But this answer begs the further question: How does delay lead to ex- nihilo 
creation? Again, the only tenable answer can be along the following Hnes. Delay in 
settlement of an exchange, breaking the unit y of the exchange session (ittiJ;iid al-majlis), 
leads to two instances of ex-nihilo creation. When the settlement is postponed, the 
majlis (exchange session) is virtually broken into two majiilis (sessions) - the initial 
majlis in which the eommodity is given by seller to buyer, and the subsequent majlis in 
which settlement will be made by the buyer to the seller. Now, in the first majlis, the 
seller gave the eommodity to the buyer, but the buyer gave nothingtangible in exehange 
(except his promise to pay). This receipt of the commodity in ex change for nothing, in 
that majlis, thus constitutes an instance of ex-nihilo creation of that commodity for the 
buyer. Similarly, in the second majlis, the buyer gave the payment to the seller, but the 
seller gave nothing in exchange, as he had already given the commodity in the first 
majlis. This receipt of money in exchange for nothing in the second majlis thus 
constitutes an instance of ex-nihilo creation of that money for the seller. The delayed 
transaction, by producing these two instances of ex-nihilo creation, invites the Prophetie 
J;adith: "there is no ribii [of such severity], except in nasl'a." 
This, however, leads to a further legitimate question: Why does the Qur'an permit 
stipulated-period loans,908 when such lending obviously involves delayed settlement 
which, as shown above, produces ex-nihilo creation? The explanation lies in the fact that 
907 Fakhr al-Dln al-Raz., MafiitJlj al-Ghayb, Il, 531. 
90& Q. 2:282. 
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a loan only involves transfer of possession and not transfer of ownership which occurs 
only in a sale and which is essential for ex-nihilo creation to take place. Therefore, 
lending and its equal settlement - delayed by definition - does not involve ex-nihilo 
creation and hence is permitted. 
Thus it can be posited that ex-nihilo action is the "creation mode," both in its 
technical and generic sense, of the distinguishing and defining characteristic of ribii, Le., 
of "divine imitability." 
To sum up, intra-action (ex-sui creation) and ex-nihilo action are, therefore, two 
operative modes or processes exclusively inherent in ribiï. And, as established in this 
section above, intra-action and ex- nihilo action are two modes of "divine imitability" -
transgression in the divine sphere. Therefore, "divine imitability," operating through 
intra-action and ex-nihilo action, is the distinguishing and defining characteristic 
(tamylz) of ribiï. 
In addition to the above arguments, the presence of intra-action and ex- nihilo 
action in ribii is fully supported by the evidence of a Prophetie 1;adJth, which, though 
extensively utilized for exoteric analogie al extension, has surprisingly not so far been 
put in exegetical service for such an esoteric conclusion. This 1;adJth, in its two but fully 
compatible versions, already cited above,909 is the most complete elaboration of the 
Qur'anic prohibition of ribii and permission of bay' (in Q. 2:275), notwithstanding the 
reported lament of the Caliph 'Umar that the Prophet did not live long enough to explain 
it fully. These versions are repeated here for their relevance to the discussion: 
From 'Ubîïdah ibn a~-~amit, who said, "The Messenger of Allah said, 'Gold for gold, silver for 
silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, Iike for Iike, in equal 
weights, from hand to hand If these species differ, then, sell as you like, as long as it is from 
hand to hand. ,"910 
The Messenger of Allah said, "Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, 
dates for dates, salt for salt, like far like, from hand ta hand He who gives in excess or acquires 
an excess has charged ribii; the pers on giving and acquiring have the sarne li ab il ity [guilt] in 
this." 911 
909 Sec Il. 3. ii., p. 67, abovc. 
910 Muslim, $aIJ71J. Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib al-,~arfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan; also in al-san'anÎ, Subul al-Saliim SharlJ 
Bulügh al-Mariim, III, 72 
911 Muslim, $aIJ71J. Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib al-,sarfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan. 
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This lJadlth has been the subject of constant disagreement and, more importantly, 
of misinterpretation. Its traditionalist interpretation still reads absolute equality and 
instantaneity as the requirement for an exchange ofhomogeneity: 
As early as the 2nd/8th cent ury, based on a strictly literalist interpretation of the reports, the 
doctrinaire group, with their rigid interpretations, ruled that barter of certain commodities -
gold, silver, and certain foodstuffs - against a commodity of the same species was only 
permissible when the offerings on both sides were exactly equal in weight or quantity and when 
delivery on both sides was immediate. Former Medinan doctrine had allowed the exchange of 
gold ore against a sm aller weight of gold coinage, the difference covering the cost of minting; but 
to the doctrinaire group this constituted ribii and was th us prohibited.912 
This led an Orientalist scholar of the stature of Coulson, among others, to 
conclude, albeit partially correctly and partially incorrectly: 
This approach naturally resulted in the law of the doctrinaire group assuming a highly negative 
character, in essence if not in form, to the degree that it lost touch with practical needs and 
circumstances. It is difficult to see any point or purpose in a transaction where 'Umar takes 20 lb. 
ofZayd's wheat in exchange for 20 lb. ofhis own wheat in the same session.913 
Coulson is partially correct in criticizing the above transaction as meaningless and 
the doctrinaire position as negative. However, he is partially incorrect, and the 
doctrinaire group totally incorrect, in deducing that such a transaction was the intent of 
this Prophetie l}adlth. How could the Prophet, with his divinely revealed wisdom, have 
ordained such a pointless exchange? 
Similarly, a prominent contemporary lslamic economist, Chapra, citing another 
Muslim scholar, 'Abd al-KarIm al-KhatIb, falls prey to interpretational confusion 
regarding this l}adith. Like Coulson, they both agree that "on the surface it appears hard 
to understand why anyone would want to exchange a given quantity of gold or silver or 
any other commodity against its own counterpart, and that too 'spot'." But they contend 
that "what is essentially being required is justice and fair play in spot transactions; the 
price and the counter-value should be just in all transactions where cash payment 
(irrespect ive of what constitutes money) is made by one party and the commodity or 
service is delivered reciprocally by the other."914 Chapra further contends that: 
Any thing that is received as extra by one of the two parties to the transaction is ribii al-Iàç/l, 
which could be defined in the words of Ibn al-' ArabI as "aU excess over what is justified by the 
counter-value." Justice Can be rendered only if the two scales of the balance carry the same value 
of goods. This point was explained in a most befitting manner by the Prophet, peace be on him, 
912 Bucklcy, ThcoJogicaJ Examination. 199-200. 
91J Coulson, Histo/y, 42. 
914 'Abd al-KarIm al-Khatlb, aJ-Siyiisah aJ-Miiliyyah fi al-Isliim (Bcirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1975), 141-6. 
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when he referred to six important commodities and emphasized that if one scale has one of these 
commodities, the other scale also must have the same commodity, "like for like and equal for 
equal." To ensure justice, the Prophet, peace be on him, even discouraged barter transactions and 
asked that a commodity for sale be exchanged against cash and the cash proceeds be used to buy 
the needed commodity [Baml-dates fJadlth] This is because it is not possible in a barter 
transaction, except for an expert, to visualize the fair equivalent of one commodity in terms of ail 
other goods. Hence the equivalents may be established only approximately thus leading to sorne 
injustice to one or the other party. The use of money could therefore help reduce the possibility 
of an unfair exchange.915 
This discourse about justice and its practical realization is valid. But the point that 
Chapra appears to be missing is that, while the phrase "like for like and equal for equal" 
signifies equality of value - which is certainly the requirement of justice as he rightly 
claims - this phrase also signifies an exchange of homogeneity in which any increase is 
not being allowed, and that the ensuing phrase in the lJadith "ifthese species differ, sell 
them as you wish" signifies an exchange of heterogeneity in which increase is being 
allowed and neither value nor physical equality is a condition. These concepts of 
homogenous and heterogeneous exchanges will be analyzed below. 
The point was made by Coulson, and also indirectly by Chapra, above, that an 
exchange of homogeneity with the condition of equality and in st ant aneit y is a pointless 
transaction, without any motivation for the seller or the buyer. And the question was 
raised by this writer, above, as to how the Holy Prophet could have ordered such a 
transaction? What they are missing - Coulson completely and Chapra partially - is that, 
as already explained, this lJadith is not ordering this equal and instantaneous exchange 
ofhomogeneity, rather it is prohibitingthis exchange, although not by a direct negative 
command (amr nahJ) of "do not do this," but by the rhetorical indirect positive command 
of making the exchange meaningless and purposeless. Instead of saying, for example, 
"do not smoke," it is saying "smoke but without lighting the cigarette." Although the 
lJadith starts by saying "go Id for gold ... ," it does not mean 'TSell] gold for gold, like for 
like, in equal weights, from hand to hand;" it actually means 'TThe only way you can 
exchange] gold for gold [is] like for like, in equal weights, from hand to hand [which is 
meaningless and hence betler avoidedj. He who gives in excess or acquires an excess [or 
delays] has charged ribii. " 
915 Chapra, Just Monetary System, 59-60. 
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This 1;adith thus clearly establishes that intra-action (exchange of homogeneity), 
when it is allowed to yield an excess, is ribii. Thus intra-action becomes one aspect of 
the distinguishing characteristic of ribii. 
This riba-expounding 1;adith also requires instantaneity (Trom hand to hand") in 
both homogenous and heterogeneous exchanges, Le., it is prohibiting delay of settlement 
in both types of exchanges. The other cited 1;adith "verily, riba is in nasJ'a" directly 
holds "delay" to be the originator of ribii. While these a1;adith do not go beyond "delay" 
as a generator of ribii, the only plausible connection of "delay" with ribii, as shown 
above, is that "delay" in settlement leads to a semblance of ex-nihilo creation. 
Therefore, the extended meaning ofthese a1;adith is that ex-nihilo creation is the other 
aspect of the distinguishing characteristic of ribii. 
This concept of ex-nihilo creation in relation to rib.i-generation was utilized -
albeit in a differing shade of meaning - by Kasiïn1916 who, in the words of Vogel, states 
that "... A lender who gets compensation beyond exact restitution of his goods is 
exacting gain from someone in retum for nothing, and is therefore unjustly 
enriched ... "917 As is evident from this passage, Kasanl is treating the notion of creation 
from nothing in a very temporal sense of unjust enrichment, without any metaphysical 
trace. 
In summary, the aforementioned assertion that "divine imitability," operating 
through intra-action and ex-nihilo action, is the distinguishing and defining 
characteristic (tamylz) of riba is not only fully borne out through rational arguments but 
also fully supported by Prophetic a1;adith. 
IV.2.i.b. Posited Distinction (Tamylz) 918 of Bay' 
As already noted the term bay' denotes such processes as sale, bargain, business 
deal, commercial transaction, profession of loyalty, pledge of allegiance,919 and ev en the 
act of marriage. Again, these seemingly diverse economic, poli tic al and biological 
processes have one feature in common: in each case two agents are operative and they 
are acting on each other. The fii'il (subject) and the mariil (object) of the fi? (action) 
916 al-Kasanl, Badii'i' al-$anii'i: VII, 395-96. 
917 Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance, 84. 
918 See n. 47, p. 27, above, for this eoined technical usage. 
919 Hans Wchr, Arabic-English DictionEilY, 375. 
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are two different and opposite agents - buyer and seller, commodity and money, ruler 
and ruled, husband and wife - each acting on the other to produce growth. In other 
words, they are aIl inter-active processes. Other than this inter-action, there is no feature 
common to these diverse applications of the term bay". Significantly, the Qur'an also 
associates the apparently inter-active verb rabilJat (root: r.b.lJ), and not the intra-active 
verb rabat (root: r.b. w.), with the growth resulting from the inter-active noun tijiïra 
(trade, sale/purchase). 920 
Thus, it can be conc1uded that the distinguishing and defining characteristic of 
bay~ both in its technical (sale) and generic (exchange) sense, is inter-action. 
IV.2.ii. The Search for Rationale (Ifikma) of Ribiï and Bay'Injunctions 
While legal precision about the ratio iegis (occasioning factor, 'iJia) of ribiï-
proscription has a decisive role in law formulation through analogy (qiyiïs), a legitimate 
question poses itself: Why look for the rationale (lJikma) of the ribiï and bay' 
injunctions? Our ancestors ignored this search, why search now? Why has the se arch 
acquired necessity and urgency? The answer to these questions requires an examination 
of the approach of Islamic classical jurisprudence to this issue, which Ibn Khaldun (d. 
1406) sums up thus: 
The Divine Legislator, not bound by limits ofhuman reason, demands unquestioning acceptance. 
The goal of the (human) se arch is what, and not why, the Divine Legislator has commanded.921 
Accordingly, almost aU schools oflslamic law (madhiïhib) foUowed a literalist and 
non-analytical methodology whereby, in the words ofSaeed: 
920 Q. 2:16. 
The constituent elements of each command or prohibition in the Qur'an were interpreted by 
examining the most immediate and literai meaning of the relevant text and emphasizing it at the 
expense of the underlying reason or rationale .... Once a prohibition or command was recognized, 
its surface meaning was emphasized. The methodology followed in schools of law demanded that 
commands or prohibitions be followed irrespective of whether or not we lmow the rationale. . .. 
In fact attempts to arrive at a rationale were not even seen to be a fruitful exercise, though sorne 
scholars attempted to do so .... Since almost ail exegetes belonged to schools of law, and 
rationales were generally ignored in these schools, the exegetes did not seem to find it an 
attractive option to interpret the meaning of ribi in the light of its rationale .... Not much 
attention was attached to the rationale for the prohibition of riba [sic] either in the exegetical 
sources or in juristic discussions, in line with the prevailing juristic emphasis on legal forms, 
literai and immediate meaning of the relevant texts, and the more concrete aspects of each 
prohibition. 922 
921 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, cd. E.M. Quatrcmcrc (Paris, 1858), III, 27 ff. 
922 Saccd, l~/amic Banking, 27. 
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This historical explanation is fully supported by a statement OfRazl: 
The prohibition of ribii is proved by a text [of the Qur'anJ. It is not necessary for mankind to 
know the rationale of duties. Therefore, the prohibition of ribii must be regarded as definitely 
known even though we do not know the rationale for its prohibition.923 
Here Raz! is not only denying the importance of the search for the ration ale, he is 
also denying even our need to know if any rationale exists. But, Saeed arrives at an 
important conclusion about the need to know the rationale: 
The point emphasized by Raz! is that searching for the rationale of the prohibition is not 
important: mankind merely has to comply. Furthermore, according to this view, we do not even 
need to know if any rationale exists. It could be argued that if there is general agreement among 
Muslims on the meaning, nature and form ofwhat is prohibited, there may not be much point in 
probing into the rationale. However, in the absence of agreement [such as exists today J,it may be 
difficult to justify such an attitude towards the rationale and we should perhaps be allowing it to 
have a decisive role in determining what is prohibited. Which transactions are regarded as ribii 
and which are not has been a matter of sorne dispute since the time of the Companions of the 
Prophet. For this reason it is of the utmost importance to refer to the rationale in order to arrive 
at a balanced view as to what is or is not riba [sic]. 924 
This successful establishment of a case for the identification of rationale, however, 
raises an important question of legal methodology itself: Can the ration ale (iJikma) 
perfonn the function of efficient cause ('illa) in analogy (qiyiis)? Three contrasting 
juridical views, as summarized by Amidi,925 are: (i) J;.ikma can perform the function of 
'illa whether it [.(Jikma] is explicit or not or whether its existence can be ascertained 
independently or not;926 (ii) J;.ikma can not perfonn the function of 'illa at all;927 and 
(iii) if the J;.ikma is explicit and if its existence can be ascertained independently, then it 
can perfonn the function of 'illa.928 
The view of al-Raz! and Bayqaw! that J;.ikma can perfonn the function of 'illa 
relies on the argument that '"J;.ikma is the intention of the Lawgiver in enacting the law. 
If it cannot be used to extend the rules, then the 'illa which is after aIl based on the 
J;.ikma cannot be used for extension of a rule. If the 'illa can be used, then J;.ikma should 
be given priority in extending the rules."929 But in practice, the scholars regarded lJikma 
as minor and unimportant apparently because "'illa could be used objectively and easily, 
whereas the jurist would have to consider many factors in arriving at a decision on the 
921 Raz!, Tafslr, VII, 94. 
924 Saccd, Islamic Banking, 27. 
925 Abii al-l:Iasan 'An Sayf al-Dln Amidi, al-llJkiim fi ij,siïl al-Af;kiim, 3 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at 'An :;;ubayl),1968), Ill, 290, quotcd in 
Saecd, lslamic Banking, 36. 
926 This vicw is attributcd ta Fakhr al-Dln al-Raz! (d. 606/1209) and BaYQRW! (d. 685/1286) 
927 This vicw is attribut cd ta thc majority of seholars of u:5iïl al-fiqh. 
928 This is the vicw of Amidi (d. 630/1232). 
929 Saccd, l\'1amic Banking, 36. 
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basis of J;iJana. A decision arrived at in that way would change according to the 
circumstances, whereas a decision arrived at on the basis of 'illa could remain 
immutable."930 Nevertheless, the 'ilia approach still proved inadequate both in juridical 
theory and practice, as also noted by Saeed: 
The inadequacy of the 'illa approach is glaringly obvious in the discussion of riba [sic] in both 
the early and the modem period. In the case of riba [sic] as prohibited in the sunna for instance, 
each school of law arrived at an 'jJia which had nothing to do with the circumstances of the 
transaction, the parties thereto, or the importance of the commodity to the survival of society. 
There was no emphasis on the moral aspect. This approach, which could be described as 
superficial and devoid of moral and humanitarian considerations, led to sorne amazing 
conclusions by several jurists ... [and] also led to sorne other unfortunate developments as in the 
case of riba:.related l,1iyii[legal stratagem].931 
In rebuttal, it may be posited that the 'ilIa approach has proved inadequate, as 
argued by Saeed, not because of any conceptual problems with this approach but because 
of the development and use by the jurists of 'ilai (plur. of 'illa) that are at best 
superficial, half-baked and unrelated to any plausible J;iJana. When an 'ilia is properly, 
fully developed and is related to a plausible J;iJana, as required by the u~iii ai-fiqh, then 
the use of this 'ilia for rule extension will automatically take account of the J;ikma. But 
the real problem is that, in the case of ribii at least, it is impossible to construct an 'ilia 
grounded in moral considerations (injustice) to accord with and take account of the 
morality-based J;iJana (injustice). Such a juridical quest is a de ad-end: a moral 'ilia is not 
inventable and a moral J;iJana not plausible. Injustice is not an intrinsic distinguishing 
characteristic (tamylz) of ribii; it may only be an outcome of ribii though not omni-
present; therefore, injustice can serve neither as an 'illa nor as a J;iJana. However, an 'ilia 
that is based on philosophical-theological grounds (intra-activity and ex-nihilo creation, 
which are the intrinsic distinguishing characteristics of ribii) can be constructed, as 
already done above, to accord fully with a J;iJana based on theological grounds (lihirk), as 
will be demonstrated below. In this case, the 'ilia approach is fully adequate and can 
operate in tandem with a plausible and related J;ikma. 
Additionally, at a tille - sueh as today - when the very wisdoll of the Qur'anie 
proscription of ribii is being questioned, when the proscription is being branded as out-
dated, when it is being declared incompatible with the dictates of modemity, when, at 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid., 37. 
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best, attempts are being made to confine the proscription to certain outmoded financial 
practices of the Age of Darkness (Jahiliya), and when modern banking practices are 
being declared beyond the purview of the Scriptural proscription, the search for and 
identification of a plausible rationale (IJikma) of ribi-proscription could not be more 
urgent and essential, not only for the health of the financial system but for the very 
integrity of the Islamic legal system. 
Accordingly, a search for the distinguishing characteristic (tamylz; a1- 'un$ur a1-
mumayyiz) of the crucial focal concepts of ribi and bay: and for the ensuing rationale 
(IJikma) of their proscription and permission, respectively, has been conducted as the 
primary focus of this research and a set of distinguishing characteristics and rationales -
not explicitly posited so far in the Islamic intellectual repertoire - posited below. These 
conclusions, in turn, support a new critical, philosophical-theological theory of what 
may also be described as normative "admissible emanation/growth" in monotheist legal 
milieu. 
Admittedly, the concept of this posited rationale is alluded to in the following 
Prophetic 1;.adJth, though not specifically as a rationale, but only as a paralle1 of the 
process of ribi: 
'Abd Allah Ibn Masüd has reported that the Prophet said: "Ribii has over seventy kinds and shirk 
(associating partners with Allah) is like that." - Reported by al-Bazzar, with the same 
transmitters as those of the Sa411}, in Ibn Maja with sound isniid932 
But very surprisingly even the existence of this parallel has not ever been 
mentioned, let alone further explored and developed, by exegetes and fuqahi'. 
lnvaluable as it has proven as an evidence, support and the seal for this research, this 
Prophetic 1;.adJth surfaced fairly late in the writing phase and thus did not steer the 
course of the research process, whose conclusions were arrived at entirely independently 
ofit. 
IV.2.ii.a. Posited Rationale (lfikma) of Riba-Prohibition 
It has been established above933 that intra-action (leading to self-emanation and 
eternity) and ex-nihilo creation are two processes operating in ribii These two processes 
932 Mu,snaf 'Abd al-Razziiq, VII l, 315; Masnad al-Bazziirwith rcfcrcncc to Kashf al-Asriir, l, 64, chaptcr of al-shirk, I}adith no. 91; 
Sunan Ibn Miija, chapter on trade, seetion on ribii, I}adithno. 2275. 
9.13 See IV.2. i. a., above. 
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were also seen to be two aspects of the distinguishing and defining characteristic 
(tamylz) of ribii, which was seen to be "divine imitability," because both these actions 
- intra-action and ex-nihilo creation - are strictly and exclusively divine functions, 
beyond the very structural capability of man. Ribii is thus purely and simply in the 
domain of the divine. Thus human indulgence in ribii, through the attempt at intra-
action and ex-nihilo creation, constitutes transgression in the divine domain. And any 
transgression in the divine domain is an act of shirk (idolatry) - an attempt to share 
certain attributes of the Divine. Therefore, the human practice of ribii is an act of shirk 
Hence the rationale (lJikma) of ribii-prohibition is that ribii being a divine act, human 
indulgence in ribii is an act of shirk (associating partners with God), which is strictly 
prohibited and which, inter alia, is one sin that God does not tolerate and never forgives. 
This prohibition rationale is totally cornrnensurate with the ordained Qur'anic 
punishments for the human indulgence in ribii. For one, ribii-indulgence is threatened 
with "war from Allah." After aIl, when does one rational being threaten war? Only when 
one's domain (JJimii) is threatened or transgressed. For another, the sin of ribii 
indulgence is threatened with "etemal Hell Fire." Again, which sin will attract etemal 
Hell Fire and never be forgiven by Allah? Obviously, as the Qur'an stipulates, the sin of 
shirk934 For yet another, ribii-indulgence is threatened with "Satanic insanity." Once 
again, what was the Satanic insanity? Obviously, again as per the Qur'an, it was Satan's 
open defiance of the Divine Will and his attempt to set himself up as a competing force 
(mushrik) in diverting man from the ordained straight path of inter-action. Finally, ribii-
indulgence is the sole sin which carries "accountability for the past," Le., no automatic 
condonation.935 Now, which sin but shirk carries no automatic pardon for its past 
commission? Even a kiifir(disbeliever) is automatically pardoned for the past. It is only 
the mushrik(who associates partners with God) who is not. 
Shirk (idolatry - associating partners with AŒih) can take two different forms, 
namely, (l) considering more than one entity as go d, or (2) considering certain attributes 
934 Q. 4:48. 
935 Q. 2:275. 
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of Allah to be shared by other entities.936 The case ofhuman indulgence in ribii falls into 
this second category of shirk 
In terms of u$ul al-fiqh, there is a perfect harmony between the posited tamy]z 
(distinction), 'illa (occasioning factor) and J;.ikma (rationale) of ribii. As se en above, 
intra-action leads to self-emanation, and, without being restrained by inter-action, this 
process of self-emanation can be continued ad infinitum leading in turn to eternity. Both 
self-emanation and eternity are solely divine attributes. This mode of intra-action, 
therefore, attaches to the occasioning factor of "divine imitability," which thus entails 
the J;.ikma that ribii is prohibited (J;.ariim) because it is tantamount to sharing in the 
exclusive divine attribut es of self-emanation and eternity, which is an act of shirk 
(idolatry). 
The eternity argument is fully supported by the following theological extract: 
Islamic theology long held to the principle that participation in the attributes of eternityinvolves 
participation in that of divinity or, in other words, eternity is God's most characteristic 
attribute.937 This me ans that the world or any material thing even inanimate - is rendered a 
second God by the mere attribution of eternity. We find this principle in the thought of as early a 
theologian as Jahm ... Eternity would then be predicated to something other than God, which 
would for him be blasphemy.938 
The posited J;.ikma of shirk (idolatry) for the prohibition of ribii (marb]t in the 
Torah) is fully supported by Judaic, Christian and Islamic teachings. Yet astonishingly, 
these teachings have sel dom been commented upon, much less emphasized, in any of 
these traditions. Relevant extracts, already quoted above, are repeated here for their 
immediate relevance: 
Supporting Judaic Rabbinic Thought on Usury Rationale: 
The Gemara of Babylonian Talmud quotes Rabbi Jose (130-160 A.D. ):939 
Come and see the blindness of the man who lends at interest: ... if someone gets together 
witnesses, a notary and ink, and writes and signs (a contract), he denies the God of Israel. 940 
936 Maulana Mufti Mohammad Shafi, Mas 'a/a' Sud (Urdu), The Issue of Interest, trans., Anwar Ahmad Meenai (Karachi: Darul Ishat, 
1997), 71-72. 
937 Ibn l:Iazm, a/-Fisal, Il, 127; Ibn Abll:1adld, Shar" Na"j, XIII, 91; al-Shahrastanl, Mi/il, l, 4R; Nihiiyat a/-Iqdim, 192-194,201; 
Risii/a fi a/-Ka/am (MS 452), 2. 
038 Husam Muhl E1d1n al-Alousl, "The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought" (Doctor of Philosophy diss. Cambridge University, 
1965), 191-192. (Published. Baghdad: Baghdad University; National Printing and Publishing Co., n.d.). 
939 Maloncy, Background, 125. 
940 Baba Mc? j'a" 71a. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 461). 
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Similarly, the Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud dedares interest-taking as denial 
ofYahweh: 941 
Come and see the blindness of those who lend at interest: if anyone calls another an idolater, an 
incestuous man or a murderer, the other seeks vengeance on his life; but doesn't one who hired a 
notary and witness and tells them to attest (a usurious contract) denv the Place? This brings out 
that evervone who lends at interest denies the Principle. [of divine authority t 42 
Supporting Christian Patristic Teaching on Usury Rationale: 
Jacob of Saroug (c. 451-521), the Syrian Monophysite Bishop, in a sermon in 
Syriac, associates paganism with lending at interest: 
Satan was lamenting the collapse of his authority as a result of the recent disappearance of 
paganism. In order to recover his power, he is going to make use of lending al inleresl (rebitha): 
priests and monks will indulge in this practice, and it will be their undoing. Once they have 
begun it, their orthodoxy, their cult of the true God, will matter little. '1 do not mind,' exclaims 
the Devil, 'if the priest uses the interest he draws from his money to buy an axe with which to 
smash the temples of the gods! The love of gold is a greater idol than any idol of a god ... It is 
worth as much to me as aIl those idols put together. They have cast down the idols, but they will 
never cast down the coins that we shall put in their place ... ' 943 
Supporting Islamie Ordinanee on Ribi Rationale: 
Explicit Prophetie Pronouneement: 
As noted above, 'Abd Alliih Ibn Masud has reported that the Prophet associated 
ribii with shirk: 
Ribiihas over seventy kinds and shirk(associating partners with Allah) is like (as bad as) that. 
- Reported by al-Bazzar, with the same transmitters as those of the $ai}Ji}, in Ibn Maja with 
sound isniid944 
Implicit Qur'8nle Pronouneement: 
While instructing to give up "what remains of ribiï" (miï baqiya min al-ribiï) -
which could refer either to the remainder of financial ribiï daims or to the remainder of 
other than financial forms of ribiï - the Qur'an wams against transgression in the divine 
domain, Le., shirk: 
Give up what remains of ribii ... You shall have vaur base (ru'iis amwiilikum). Do not lransgress 
(li tiJ.?limÜlla), and you shall not bc transgrcsscd (wa-li tU?lamiina) 945 [trans. mine]. 
941 Maloncy, Background, 125. 
942 Gcmara of JcrusaJcm Talmud, Baba Mc? j'a, V, Il d (Maloney transI. from Bonsirven, 462). 
943 Trans. and cd., Abbe Martin, in Zcitschrift dcrdcutschcn morgcn/andischc GcscJ/schafl, 1875, pp. 107-147, quoted in Maxime 
Rodinson, l~/am and Capita/i~m, 239. 
944 Mu,maf 'Abd a/-Razziïq, VIII, 315; Masnad a/-Bazziïr with rcfcrcncc to Kashf a/-Asriïr, l, 64, chapter of aJ-shirk, lJadlth no. 91; 
Sunan Ibn Miija, Kitiïb aJ- Tijiiriit, Biib aJ-taghH?1 fi a/-ribii, lJadlth no. 2275. 
945 Q. 2: 279. 
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IV. 2.iLb. Posited Rationale (lfiJana) of Bay'- Permission 
It is a repeated Qur'anic declaration and an undisputed empirical observation that 
aIl creation,946 including man foremost is in pairs. Natural human reproduction (as 
against artificial cloning) involves the equal sharing of the genes of both the male and 
the female partner. Inter-action thus operates in the very genetic code of humanldnd. 
This "duality mode" is the hallmark of human creation. When the human positive and 
negative currents (male and female) inter-act, there is reproduction - creation. But if the 
angels, consigned to the "unit y mode" and made of light, were to have positive and 
negative currents (male and female), and if they were to inter-act, the result would not 
have been reproduction but destruction, as when the positive and negative poles of 
electricity inter-act, there is a spark - fire. 
Thus genetically structured to be inter-active, humans have been permitted to 
practice bay' (inter-active hetero exchange). Inter-active behavior on earth, albeit with 
the full exercise of human free will, being the very test and purpose of human creation, 
the exercise of bay' has only been pennitted (declared l;aliil) and not ordained (not made 
farq). Ribiiis forbidden, but its alternative bay' is not ordained; rather, simply permitted, 
in order to allow human free will full scope to operate and the humans to thereby pass 
the test of inter-active behavior of their own accord. Had bay' been ordained, the 
integrity of the test would have been compromised. Compliance would have become a 
matter of dut y , not of free will. 
The rationale (l;iJana) of bay'-permission, in juxtaposition with ribii-prohibition, 
therefore, is to see how far man, left to his own free will and free actions, and with only 
divine suggestion but not divine instruction, makes the duality model a success on this 
transient earth by passing the test of inter-active behavior. This also answers one of the 
thesis questions as to why bay' is only pennitted, not ordained 
IV.2.iiL Posited Ratio Legis ('111a) of the Ribii and Bay' Injunctions 
The central role of 'illa, the ratio legis or ratio decidendi, or occasioning factor in 
the process of analogical reasoning has been emphasized thus: 
The most crucial step in the process of formulating the law on the basis of an analogy is the 
ascertainment of the occasioning factor behind the original rule ... Perhaps the most important 
946 Excluding only sorne very elcrnentary life forms like prokaryotie (singlc-celled) organisrns that inelude baeteria. 
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out come of the controversies over the conditions of validity of an analogy is the general 
agreement among the jurisprudents to the effect that the occasioning factor behind a rule of law 
must be evident and determinate if it is going to serve as the basis for a rule-producing analogy. 
Because ofthis insistence upon evidentness and determinacy, most jurisprudents rejected the ide a 
that a rationaie [J;ikmaJbehind a rule of Iaw may be regarded as the occasioning factor. .. For the 
majority ... the occasioning factor proper couid only be sorne feature of the case to which a rule 
applied: only specific features of cases were characterized by the evidentness and determinacy 
that the analogizing process required and that rationales lacked. On the other hand, ail agreed 
that rationales were aiways invoived: the particular feature of a case deemed to be the 
occasioning factor behind a rule must serve the purpose of pinning down, delimiting, giving 
determinacy to, an otherwise vague and elusive rationaIe.947 
This passage underscores that the occasioning factor must be evident and 
deterrninate, may not consist of the rationale, can only be a feature of the case, and must 
give deterrninacy to a rationale. 
The requirement that the occasioning factor could only be a feature of the case 
raises the question of the selection of the feature from amongst a multiplicity of 
features attached to a case that alone can serve as the occasioning factor. The mujtahid 
may not select any feature entirely on his own judgment. According to Amidi's account, 
Islamic jurisprudence has prescribed seven different methods for this selection process.948 
These methods are reviewed below and applied, where possible, to the selection of the 
goveming feature ofthe riba- prohibition rule that can serve as the occasioning factor. 
Ratio Legis ('HIa) Selection Methods: 
Method # 1: Referral to the Ijma' 
The legal source of ijma' has limited applicability in the contemporary Islamic 
context and therefore, this method (referral to the ijma') will not be productive in the 
'ilia selection process presently. 
Method # 2: Referral to the ExplicitSense ofQur'3.nic or Sunnaic Text (aJ-na$$ aJ-$aiilJJ 
For the riba-prohibition rule, this method too has limited potential: while the 
Qur'anic text does not provide any explicit pointer to any feature of the case that could 
serve as the occasioning factor, the Sunnaic text (ribawl-commodities iJadithJ does 
provide an expiicit pointer, though not to the feature generating the occasioning factor, 
but to the conditions necessary for the generation of the occasioning factor. This 1;adith 
explicitly mentions homogeneity of genus and non-instantaneity of settlement -
947 Weiss, Scarch for God's Law, 593-594. 
948 Ibid., 594-595. 
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features which are only the necessary conditions for but not the occasioning factors 
themselves, which are implied and need to be searched further. The J;adith does not 
spell out either how the homogeneity of genus and non-in st ant aneit y of settlement lead 
to those features of the case which can serve as the occasioning factors. 
Method # 3: Referral to an Implicit Sense of a Qur'iinic or Sunnaic Text (dalii1at al-
tanblh wal-' Imi') 
This method has the greatest potential for the identification of the features of the 
case of ribii that can serve as the occasioning factors for the rule. As already explained 
above, the intra-activity of the process of growth is the common feature of the 
Qur'anic usage of the term ribii, in its several different grammatical derivations, to 
denote excess, increase or growth, such as rabwatin (height: hillock),949 riibiyan (rising: 
foam),950 arbii (exceeding, being more numerous: nation),951 rabbayiinl and nurabbika 
(bringing up, raising: child),952 rabat (swelling: earth),953 and riibiyatan (overpowering: 
grip).954 The same process of intra-activity is present in the case ofinterest/usury, which 
is the technical meaning of ribii, in that money begets money, Le., money intra-acts with 
itselfto produce more money. The Qur'an points to this intra-activity in referring to the 
"doubling and re-doubling of ribii."955 The Sunnaic text (ribawl-commodities l}adJth) on 
the other hand is less implicit and more explicit on the feature of intra-activity when it 
dwells specifically on the homogeneity and heterogeneity of genus, prohibiting excess 
(ribii) in exchanges of homogeneity (intra-action) and permitting it in exchanges of 
heterogeneity (inter-action). Based on these implicit Qur'anic and Sunnaic indicators, it 
can be concluded that the COmmon goveming feature of the case of facJl (excess) in 
exchange of homogeneity, both in its linguistic and technical meanings, is its intra-
activity. It has been demonstrated above that intra-activity, by causing self-emanation, 
entails and leads to a plausible rationale (l;ikma) commensurate with the ordained 
punishments for indulgence in ribii. Thus, the feature of intra-activity meets the main 
949 Q. 2:265; 23:50. 
95() Q. 13:17. 
951 Q. 16:92. 
952 Q. 17:24; 26: 18. 
953 Q. 22:5; 41 :39. 
954 Q. 69:10. 
955 Q. 3:130. 
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juristic conditions, outlined above, to serve as the occasioning factor for the rule of 
proscribing !agI (excess) in exchanges ofhomogeneity. 
The Sunnaic text (ribawJ-commodities l}adith) also requires hand to hand 
(in st ant aneous) settlement in exchanges of both homogeneity and heterogeneity, 
branding the absence of instantaneity ribii. This requirement implies that delay (nasJ'a) 
in settlement - both homogenous and heterogeneous - can lead to the feature of this 
case which serves as the occasioning factor for the rule. It has been demonstrated above 
that delay in the settlement of any exchange by breaking the unit y of the exchange 
session (majlis) leads to two instances of ex-nihilo creation, which again leads to a 
plausible rationale (l}iJana) commensurate with the ordained punishments for ribii-
indulgence. 
In summary, it can be posited that based on the implicit sense of Qur'anic and 
Sunnaic texts, intra-activity is the occasioning factor for the rule prohibiting excess 
(!agI) in homogenous exchanges, and ex-nihilo creation is the occasioning factor for the 
rule prohibiting delay (nasJ'a) in both homogenous and heterogeneous exchanges. 
The issue of the "illa of bay" is not as complicated, and there are also implicit 
Qur'anic and Sunnaic indic at ors. The Qur'an repeatedly mentions the creation of 
everything in pairs and permits human exercise of bay". The ribawl-commodities l;amth 
and the Baml-dates l}amth both permit heterogeneous exchanges in bay'. These 
indicators bring out the existence of inter-activity - an agent acting upon a 
heterogeneous agent - as the occasioning factor in the process of bay". 
Method # 4: Elimination of Alternatives (al-sabr wal-taqslm) 
The application of this method requires the compilation of an exhaustive list of aU 
the possible features of a case and the identification of those features which cannot be 
the occasioning factor in the hope of eliminating aIl but one, which then becomes the 
occasioning factor by default.956 The application of this procedure to the governing 
ribawl-commodities l;adith (naming six commodities: gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates 
and salt), which prohibits excess (!agI) in homogenous exchanges and delay (nasl'a) in 
both homogenous and heterogeneous exchanges, produces the following exhaustive list 
of fourteen features of the case of ribii / bay' for consideration as occasioning factor(s): 
956 For a discussion ofthis mcthod, scc GhazaTI, Musta,~fii, Il, 295-96; GhazaTI, MankhiiJ, 350-52. 
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1. Homogeneity of genus: Homogeneity of genus is a neutral state of affairs that is 
not capable of becoming an occasioning factor. It is a necessary condition - as 
also maintained by Shafi'i - for the operation of intra-activity which, as shown 
below, is alone capable ofbecoming a mode of an occasioning factor. 
2. Heterogeneity of genus: Heterogeneity of genus, by definition, is not ev en a 
necessary condition for the operation of intra-activity. Hence the question of it 
becoming an occasioning factor does not arise at aH. 
3. Homogeneity of estimation methods (qadr) - weighability, measurability, 
countability: Homogeneity of estimation method of weighability and that of 
measurability are necessary sub-conditions for the continuation of homogeneity 
of genus, which as shown above is a necessary condition for the operation of 
intra-activity which in tum is capable of becoming a mode of an occasioning 
factor. Thus, homogeneity of estimation method of weighability and that of 
measurability are not, by themselves, capable of being the occasioning factor. 
Countability, on the other hand, is not even a necessary sub-condition for the 
continuation ofhomogeneity of genus. Weighability and measurability guarantee 
homogeneity; they do not admit heterogeneity. Heterogeneous commodities 
cannot be weighed (by mass) or measured (by volume) together without being 
unfair. But countability can never guarantee homogeneity, for it can be applied 
equaHy to both homogeneity and heterogeneity. Thus, any link of countability 
with an occasioning factor is totally absent. 
4. Heterogeneity of estimation methods (qadr) - weighability, measurability, 
countability: Heterogeneity of estimation methods of weighability and 
measurability rules out homogeneity altogether. Countability, by its nature, does 
not guarantee homogeneity. Therefore, heterogeneity of weighability, 
measurability, and countability cannot become the occasioning factor. 
5. Specified commodities (six): If the specification of the six named commodities is 
considered to be a feature of the case, the question of analogical extension and 
an underlying occasioning factor does not arise in the first place. 
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6. Exchangeability: Exchangeability is not restricted to homogeneous commodities; 
it appHes equally to heterogeneous commodities. There fore , it cannot serve as 
the occasioning factor. 
7. Edibility: Edibility is a characteristic common to four of the six named 
commodities, but it cannot serve as the occasioning factor because the lJikma 
that it entails is satisfaction of basic human needs, the denial of which is not 
commensurate with the ordained punishment. Furthermore, edibility is not 
exclusive to homogeneous commodities. 
8. Currency value: Currency value again is a characteristic common to two of the 
six named commodities, but it cannot serve as the occasioning factor because the 
lJikma that it entails is potential disequilibrium in the currency market, which 
again is not commensurate with the ordained punishment. Like edibility, 
currency value is also not exclusive to homogeneous commodities. 
9. Nutritional value: Nutritional value is a characteristic common to the edible four 
of the six named commodities, but again it cannot serve as the occasioning 
factor because the hikma that it entails is human nourishment, the denial of 
which yet again is not commensurate with the ordained punishment. 
10. Storability (longevity): Storability of a commodity (longevity as opposed to 
perishability) is a sub-condition for the continuation of homogeneity of genus, 
which is a necessary condition for the operation of intra-activity which al one is 
capable ofbecoming a mode of an occasioning factor. Thus, storability is not, by 
itself, capable ofbeing the occasioning factor. 
This elimination of ten of the maximum possible fourteen identifiable features 
leaves, by default, the following features, four in number but combinable into two sets, 
to serve as the occasioning factors for ribii and bay'respectively: 
11. Intra-activity: Intra-activity in the process of excess generation tantamounts to a 
semblance of self-emanation. Thus on merit as weIl, it is capable of serving as an 
aspect of the occasioning factor of the lJukm of ribiibecause the lJikma that it 
entails is shirk (idolatry), which alone is commensurate with the ordained 
punishment. 
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12. Inter-activity: Inter-activity in the process of excess generation precludes self-
emanation and guarantees ex-alio creation. Thus on merit as well, it is capable of 
serving as the occasioning factor of the lJukm of bay'because the lJikma that it 
entails is conformity with "creation in pairs" - operation in a duality mode. 
13. Instantaneity: Instantaneity of settlement assures creation from something 
(countering ex-nihilo creation). Thus on merit as well, it also is capable of 
serving as the occasioning factor of the lJukm of bay' because the lJikma that it 
entails is conformity with "creation in pairs" - operation in a duality mode. 
14. Delay: Delay in settlement leads to ex-nihilo creation. Thus on merit as well, it 
is capable of serving as an aspect of the occasioning factor of the lJukm of ribii 
because the lJikma that it entails is shirk (idolatry), which alone is 
commensurate with the ordained punishment. 
Features #11 and # 14, Le., intra-activity and ex-nihilo creation qualify not simply 
as occasioning factors of the lJukm of ribiiby default, but also as true and fully operative 
occasioning factors on merit. Both these features are modes of a process of "divine 
imitability," which, as shown above,957 is the distinguishing/defining characteristic 
(tamylz) of ribii. 
The utilization offeatures #11 and # 14 for determination of the occasioning factor 
tilla) of the lJukm of rib~ leaves, by further default as weIl as on merit, the last two 
remaining features #12 and #13, Le., inter-activity in excess generation (no self-
emanation) and instantaneity of settlement (creation from something) as true and fully 
operative aspects of the occasioning factor of the lJukm of bay: which may be termed 
"instantaneous inter-action." 
Method # 5: Establishing "Suitability" of a Feature vis-à-vis a Known Rationale 
This method involves establishing the "suitability" (muniisiba) of a particular 
feature vis-à-vis a known rationale.958 It has been established above959 that the rationale 
of the ribii-prohibition is shirk (idolatry). It has also been established above960 that the 
957 Scc IV. 2. i. a., abovc. 
958 Ghazali presents the most extensive defense ofthis method as rational and not subjective in his Shi/jj' a/-Ohfif fi Bayiin a/-Shabah 
wa/-Mukhll wa-Masiilik a/-Ta 'fil, cd. f:lamd a1-Kablsl (Baghdad: Ma!ba'at al-Irshad, 1390/1971), 142-266. 
959 Sec IV. 2. ii. a., abovc. 
960 Sec IV. 2. i. a., abovc. 
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distinguishing characteristic of ribii is "divine imitability," which operates through the 
processes of inter-active growth and ex-nihilo creation. It has further been established 
above that intra-activity and ex-nihilo activity are processes inherent in ribii. Therefore, 
these two fe at ures, intra-activity and ex-nihilo activity, as occasioning factors of ribii, 
have direct "suitability" vis-à-vis a known [posited] rationale, Le., shirk(idolatry). 
The rationale for the permission of bay' for humans was posited above961 as 
compliance with the very purpose of creation - operation in a duality mode. Operation in 
a duality mode was also shown to require inter-action - ex-alio (other) creation. Thus 
inter-action as an occasioning factor of bay' has a direct "suitability" vis-à-vis a known 
[posited] rationale of operation in a duality mode. 
Method # 6: Establishing the "Similitude" of a Particular Feature 
This method utilizes the principle of "resemblance" (shabah). But there is 
considerable juristic difference of opinion on the very definition of "resemblance" and 
what it entails,962 and this method presupposes the existence of multiple categories of a 
case govemed by the single rule. But, since the application in the case of ribiihas so far 
been confined to financial ribii only, such multiple categories of cases do not yet exist. 
Henee this method does not have applicability in the current state of scholarship. 
Method # 7: Noting Concurrence between a Feature and the Rule of the Case 
This method involves noting concurrence between a particular feature of a case and 
the rule that govems that case.963 "Here the mlfitahid simply observes that whenever a 
certain rule becomes applicable a certain feature of the case is always present and 
conc1udes from this that the feature in question is the occasioning factor."964 
For its operation, this method too requires the existence of multiple categories of 
cases govemed by the single rule. But, as noted above for Method # 6, the absence of 
multiple categories of the case of ribii precludes the application ofthis mcthod as weil. 
961 Scc IV. 2. iL b., abovc. 
962 Weiss, Scarch tiJrGod:~ Law, 595, 628. 
96' For a discussion ofthis mcthod, scc Abii Isl)aq Ibrahim b. 'Afi al-Shlrazl, Sharf:J a/-Luma', cd. 'Abd al-MaJld Turkl, 2 vols. 
(Bcirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islaml, 1988), II, 860-62; Abii al-Wafid b. Kha1afal-Bi\)I, lf:Jkiim a/-Fu,~iil fi Af:Jkiim al-U,~ii/, cd. 'Abd al-
MaJld Turkl (Bcirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islaml, 1986),649-51. 
964 Weiss, Scarch forGod:~ Law, 595. 
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The "Qarafi Means" 
In addition to the aforementioned 'illa selection methods in service in Islamic 
jurisprudence ("Ami di Methods"), the Maliki jurist Shihab al-Dln al-Qarafi (d. 
684/1285), who, in the words of Malcolm Kerr, was "an authority on methods of 
jurisprudence frequently cited by modern writers,"965 lists eight means used to identify 
the 'illa in a given legal ruling:966 
(1) Explicit textual indication (na$$); 
(2) Implicit textual indication ('imii'); 
(3) Suitability (muniisaba): conduciveness of a rule to the promotion of a bene fit 
(ma$laJ;.a) or the prevention of an evil, subdivided as follows: 
(a) Compelling necessity (qariïra): Protection of the "five universals" 
(al-kulliyyiit al-khams) deemed to be recognized in the SharJ'a: life, religion, 
family, reason, and property (also a sixth: honor, according to sorne); 
(b) Importance (J;.iija): need but not imperativeness; 
(c) Mere supplementary embellishment (tatimma): general encouragement of 
good works and good character 
(4) General resemblance (shabah): no inherent "suitability" or promotion of bene fit 
(5) Concomitance (dawariin): consistent presence or absence of an attribute 
(6) Experimentation and enumeration (sabr wal taqsJm): process of elimination using 
a criterion of relevance 
(7) Examination from all sides (tard): conjunction of the ruling with the attribute in 
all its forms but without any regard for "suitability" 
(8) Refinement of the basis of the ruling (tanqJJ;. al-manii,t): isolating the 'illa from 
the accompanying superfluous, but connected, elements of its context. 
A comparison of these "Qarafi Means" and the "Arnim Methods" shows that they 
are essentially the same: specifically, Qarafi # 1 conforms to Arnim # 2, Qarafi # 2 to 
- - - -
Arnim # 3, Qarafi # 3 to Arnim # 5, Qarafi # 4 to Arnim # 6, Qarafi # 5 to Arnim # 7, and 
Qarafi # 6 to Arnim # 4. Of the remaining two, Qarafi # 7 is closely related to Qarafi # 5 
965 Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories ofMul}ammad 'Abduh and RashJd Rie/a (Berklcy: University 
of California Press, 1966), 66. 
966 TanqJI} al-Fu,sul fi '!lm al-[J,sul, published as chap. 2 in Adh-DhakhJra, a collection ofQarafi's writings (Cairo, 1961), l, 125-126. 
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and 6, and Qarafi # 8 is a subsidiary method of clarification. The application analysis 
shown above for the "Amidi Methods," therefore, applies equally to the "Qarafi Means." 
IV.2.iii.a. Posited Ratio Legis ('illa) of RibiInjunction 
The application of the Amidi 'illa selection methods # 3 (Implication: tanblh), # 4 
(Elimination: taqslm), and # 5 (Suitability: muniisiba), as shown above, leads to the 
identification of intra-activity and ex-nihilo activity as the occasioning factors or ratio 
legis ('illa) of the rule of ribii -prohibition. 
IV.2.iii.h. Posited Ratio Legis ('illa) of Bay'Injunction 
The application of the Amidi 'ilIa selection methods # 3 (Implication: tanblh), # 4 
(Elimination: taqslm), and # 5 (Suitability: muniisiba), as shown above, leads to the 
identification of inter-activity as the occasioning factor or ratio legis ('illa) of the rule of 
bay'-permission. 
IV.2.iv. New Theory Recapitulation 
Based on the distinction (tamylz),967 rationale (iJikma) and ratio legis ('illa) of ribii 
-prohibition and bay'-permission, posited in this chapter, above, the new theory may he 
recapitulated in terms of its underlying premises, supporting evidence and conclusions: 
Premise: Ribii is a creation process and a growth process 
Evidence 
(a) Linguistic Evidence: 
The complete lexical agreement on this literaI meaning. 
(h) Scriptural Evidence: 
The unamhiguous linguistic usage in the Torah and the Qur'an, denoting 
this meaning. 
Premise: The creation process represents ex-nihilo creation (From nothing) and the 
growfh proccss represenfs infra-action, i.c., sclf-cll1anafion and sclf-
sustenance 
967 See n. 47, p. 27, abovc, for this coincd technical usagc. 
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Evidence 
(a) Empirical/Rational Evidence: 
• Ex-nihilo creation: Delay in settlement of exchange (nasl'a), with or 
without excess (fàcjl), produces two instances of semblance of 
creation of something from nothing. 
• Intra-actioniSelf-emanation: Claim to a financial excess (ribii) from a 
loan, for example, is intra-active, Le., it does not require inter-action 
of another productive agent for its actualization; it is self-emanating. 
(b) Scriptural Evidence: 
• Ex-nihilo creation: Divine creation is ex-nihilo creation (Kun 
fàyakiin: Be and it is!). And ribii is part of the Divine creative 
activity. 
• Intra-action/Self-emanation: Qur'anic linguistic usage of ribii, and 
derived verbs, which demonstrates intra-active growth - one agent 
acting on itselfto grow, Le., self-emanating. 
(c) Sunnaic Evidence: 
• Ex-nihilo creation: The "ribii in nasl'a" J;adlth, although sHent on the 
mechanics, originates the ex-nihilo creation argument for ribii. 
• Intra-actioniSelf-emanation: 
oThe ribawl-commodities J;adlth identifies ribii as the excess from 
an exchange that demonstrates homogeneity, Le., intra-activity. 
oThe ribii-shirk equivalence J;adlth juxtaposes ribii with shirk, Le., 
claiming a share in Divine Attributes, and intra-action/self-
emanation is an absolute Divine Attribute. This makes ribii intra-
acti ve/ self-emanating. 
oThe ribii-incest equivalence J;adlth compares ribii, at the lowest of 
its seventy two levels, with incest with one's own mother, which 
is the closest possible biological manifestation of intra-
activity/self-emanation, Le., not being able to procreate by 
himself, he procreates from the agent that procreated him in the 
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first place (the newly emerging technology of human cloning is 
the perfect act of intra-action). 
Premise: Ex-nihilo creation and intra-action/self-emanation are in the Divine Domain 
Evidence: 
(a) EmpiricallRational Evidence: 
The empirical observation and the philosophie al postulate that ex-nihilo 
creation, if at aIl a possibility, and intra-actionlself-emanation are beyond 
human capability and, hence, strictly in the Divine Domain. 
(b) Theological Evidence: 
The monotheist beHef system putting ex-nihilo creation and intra 
actionlself-emanation strictly in the Divine Domain. 
(c) Scriptural Evidence: 
The Qur'anic declaration of God's creation of the uni verse and man 
from nothing (Kun fayakiin: Be and it is!), and of His self-emanation 
and self-subsistence. 
Premise: Neither human design nor humanpurpose of creation permit eitherex-nihilo 
creation or intra-action/self-emanation 
Evidence: 
(a) Empirical Evidence: 
The very creation of the human embryo requires the male sperm and 
female egg which precludes both ex-nihilo creation and intra-action. 
(b) Scriptural Evidence: 
The Qur'anic repeated declaration that "aIl creation is in pairs."968 
Premise: Ribi is Divine Domain 
Evidence: 
(a) Lexical Evidence: 
Rabb (the Hebraic/ Arabic term for God - the Sustainer) and Marblt/Ribi 
(the Hebraic/Arabic terms for growth - Sustenance) have cognate 
968 Q. 6: 144; 13 :3; 20:53; 26:7; 31: 1 0; 36:36; 39:6; 42: 11; 43: 12; 50:7. 
267 
linguistic roots. In Arabic these are r.b.b. and r.b. W., respectively. Ribii, 
therefore, is an inherent activity of the Rabb. 
(b) Rational Evidence: 
As established above, the distinguishing characteristics of ribii are ex-
nihilo creation and intra-actionlself-emanation, both of which are in the 
Divine Domain. Ribii, therefore, is in the Divine Domain. 
(c) Scriptural Evidence: 
The nature and severity of the Qur'anic punishments for human 
indulgence in ribii, which are consistent only with the sin of transgression 
in the Divine Domain. 
Prernise: Riba is applicable to all conceivable spheres of human activity and not 
restrietedjust to the historieal notion offinancial activity 
Evidence: 
(a) Lexical Evidence: 
The lexical meaning of the basic verb rabii "to grow," without any 
qualification and certainly without restriction to financial growth only. 
(b) Scriptural Evidence: 
969 Q. 2:276; 30:39. 
970 Q. 16:92. 
971 Q. 17:24; 26:18. 
972 Q. 69:10. 
97J Q. 2:265. 
The Qur'anic sever al generic applications, beyond the financial, of the 
verb rabii, Le. econornic (increase in wealth),969political/intemational (one 
nation exceeding another),970 socia1/biological (bringing up, raising a 
child),971 theological (overpowering grip of God),972 botanieal (garden on a 
height),973 geologieal (swelling earth, high ground),974 and hydrologie al 
(rising foam).975 
974 Q. 22:5; 41:39; 23:50. 
975 Q. 13:17. 
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(c) Sunnaic Evidence: 
• The i}adith that declares ribii to have seventy three abwib (chapters, 
types, kinds ),976 not a11 of which multiplicity conceivably and legitimately 
can be fully accounted for by usury/interest alone. 
• The several specifie generic applications of the term ribii in the 
ai}iidith" beyond the financial, i.e. economic (i}adith on ribii contract 
participants), philosophie al (six-commodities i}adith on exchanges of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity), biological (i}adith on adulterylincest-
ribii correspondence), and theological (i}adith on idolatryl shirk-ribii direct 
parallel, on self-emanation from unilateral action and on ex -nihilo 
creation from delay). 
(d) Rational Evidence: 
The all-encompassing feature of "divine imitability" (manifesting 
through intra-action i.e. ex-sui creation and non-action Le. ex-nihilo 
creation) as the posited 'i11a (occasioning factor) of ribii would virtually 
extend, by analogy (qiyiis), the i}ukm of ribii potentia11y to any and a11 
human actions. 
Conclusion (based on the aforementioned riba:.premises): 
Ribïï is a Divine Function. Human indulgence in ribïï is, therefore, a transgression in 
the Divine Domain, an act ofshirk (idolatry) - c1aiming a share in Divine Attributes 
and thus a negation of Divine Singularity (taw41d), potentia11y in a11 conceivable 
spheres ofhuman activity. 
Premise: Bay' is an exchange process - a process of negotiation, of give and take, of 
offer and acceptance 
Evidence: 
976 Ibn Maja, Sunan, lJadfth no. 2275/3, 72. 
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Lexical Evidence: 
AH the lexical connotations of bay' - sale, purchase, oath of aHegiance, 
making a contract, marri age, etc. - which display a process of negotiation, 
of exchange, of give and take, of offer and acceptance. 
Premise: Bay' as an exchange process is not a growth process per se; it requires 
another process to activate growth 
Evidence: 
Accounting Evidence: 
According to the "Matching Principle" of Accounting, profitlloss 
deterrnination requires mat ching the sale proceeds with acquisition costs. 
For the deterrnination of growth (profit/loss), therefore, bay' (sale) requires 
comparison with an earlier process of acquisition (purchase, gift, or 
inheritance ). 
Premise: This exchange process is inter-active, i.e., an agent is always acting on 
another agent 
Evidence: 
(a) Lexical Evidence: 
AH lexical connotations of bay' - sale, purchase, oath of aHegiance, 
making a contract, marriage, etc. - denote an agent acting on another 
(inter-action). 
(b) Scriptural Evidence: 
The Qur'anic juxtaposition of ribii and bay:977 and the exposition of bay' 
not as the narrower "commercial sale" but as the broader "bilateral 
action" or "intercourse."978 
Premise: This exchange process is in the Human Domain 
Evidence: 
977 Q. 2:275. 
978 Q. 24:37. 
(a) Scriptural Evidence: 
• The Qur'anic recognition of tijiira and bay' as legitimate human 
activities.979 
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• The Qur'anic pointed declaration of bay' as 1;alil (permissible) for 
man.980 
• The Qur'rulÎc repeated affirmation of the creation of humans and 
other living creatures "in pairs,"981 and invitation to reflect on it.982 
Premise: Both human design and human pUlpose of creation presuppose inter-action 
Evidence: 
(a) Empirical Evidence: 
The very creation of the human embryo requires the inter-action of male 
sperm and female egg. 
(b) Scriptural Evidence: 
The Qur'anic repeated declaration that "aIl creation is in pairs."983 
Conclusion (based on the aforementioned bay'-premises): 
Bay' is a Human Function. Human indulgence in bay' is, therefore, the permitted 
normative human mode of action, an expression of Human Duality (tathniyat al-
insanlyya), and, by implication, a confirmation of Divine Singularity(taw41d). 
Master Conclusion (based on the aforementioned ribii and bay' conclusions): 
Critical Theory: 
Human indulgence only in acts ofinter-action (bay': ex-alio creation), human 
non-indulgence in any and every act of intra-action (riba: ex-sui creation), and 
human non-indulgence in anyattempts at non-action (also riba: ex-nihilo creation) is 
the divine law of normative behavior for humanity. Human conformity with this 
divine law is the very purpose ofhuman creation, his temporal test, and his heavenly 
mode of etemal existence. 
IV.3. New Theory Compliance Test: U~ii1 al-Fiqh 
The posited ratio legis ('illa) and rationale (1;ilana) of the 1;ulan (injunction) of 
ribi and bay' embedded in the new theory must comply with u$iil al-fiqh requirements 
979 Ibid. 
9g0 Q. 2:275. 
981 Q. 6:144; 13:3; 20:53; 26:7; 31 :10; 36:36; 39:6; 42:1 1; 43:12; 50:7. 
982 Q. 51 :49. 
983 Q. 6: 144; 13:3; 20:53; 26:7; 31 :10; 36:36; 39:6; 42:11; 43:12; 50:7. 
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in order to acquire legitimacy and admission into the fiqh repertoire. Such compliance 
tests are administered below: 
IV.3.i. Compliance with the Derivation Rules of Ratio Legis tilla) 
The posited 'ilal of riba-prohibition and bay'-permission are tested below for 
compliance with the same rules of derivation, laid down in u$iii ai-fiqh as captured by 
Arnim and summarized by Bernard Weis,984 against which the existing fiqh on ribii and 
bay'was evaluated in the previous chapter. 
Compliance with Non-Controversial Conditions 
There is full compliance of the posited 'illa with a11 the non-controversial 
conditions laid down in u$iii ai-fiqh, as shown below: 
Condition # 7 (a): There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia in the original 
financial rule is extendableto the novel non-financial casees). 
Condition # 7 (b): There is full compliance since the posited 'i11a is present in a 
casees) (non-financial) other than the case (financial) governed by that rule. 
Condition # 18 (a): There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia has not been 
extrapoiated from the rule fallaciously. The extrapolation is based on the recognized 
methods of "implication" (tanblh), "elimination" (taqslm), and "suitability" (muniisiba). 
Condition # 18 (b): There is full compliance since the original rule has not proved 
to be inoperative. 
Condition # 18 (c): There is full compliance since the posited 'illa behind the 
original rule does not consist merely of some fèature of the principal case that happens 
to be present whenever the rule is operative and absent whenever it is inoperative. 
Condition # 18 (d): There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia behind the 
original rule is not capable of being countered by sorne other 'illa for which there is 
equal supporting evidence and which is not present in the novel case. 
Condition # 18 (e): There is full compliance since the posited 'i11a is not in conDict 
with a c1ear Qur'anic or Sunnaic text or with an ijmii'ic consensus. 
984 Weiss, Scarch for God's Law, 561-570. 
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Condition # 19 (a): There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia has been 
detennined solely by the Legislator, and the indicator through which it has bec orne 
manifest is accordingly a SharJ'a indicator: an indicator supplied by the Legisiator. 
Compliance with Controversial Conditions 
There is full compliance even with almost aIl the controversial conditions debated 
in the u$ui ai-fiqh, as shown be1ow: 
Condition # 1: There is full compliance of the posited 'ilia with the first part of 
this condition since the posited 'ilia is not identicai with the case to which the rule 
applies. There is no compliance of the posited 'illa with the second part of this 
condition, which requires that the 'illa not be a part of the case. This part of the 
condition is controversiai and rejected by Arnim on the ground that most of the 
analogies in fact involve occasioning factors that are part of the factual bundle to which 
the occasioned rule applies. 
Condition # 2: There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia is in fact "that which 
prompts or occasions" (ai-bii'ith). Or to remove the tautology, "the occasioning factor 
truly occasions the rule," which, according to Arnim, means "it entails a rationale 
[iJikmaJ that the Legislator may be said to have in mind as His purpose in establishing 
the rule." This condition does not equate 'illa with iJikma; it simply requires that 'ilia 
entails, or is linked to, a iJikma. The condition presupposes that 'illa is not just any 
feature (wa$f) of the principal case but is rather a feature that is tied to a iJikma, thus 
making the existence of a iJikma a sine qua non of analogy. 
Condition # 3: There is full compliance since the posited 'ilia does not consist of 
an indetenninate iJikma. Specifie constant detenninate features of cases that give 
determinacy to an indeterminate iJikma, and not the indeterminate iJikma itse1f, 
constitute the rule-occasioning factor, as required. 
Condition # 4: There is full compliance since the affirmative (as weIl as the 
negative) original rule does have a positive 'ilia. 
Condition # 5: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa behind the original 
rule is not itseifa rule of law. 
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Condition # 6: There is full compliance since the posited 'jJla does consist of a 
single featureofthe principal case: it is not a complex of several features. 
Condition # 8: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa is in fact unrestricted 
in its operation as a rule-occasioning factor. 
Condition # 9: There is full compliance since the lJikma to which the 'illa is tied is 
uniformly coincidental with the rule: whenever the lJikma obtains, the rule obtains. 
Condition # 10: This condition, operative when the 'illa consists of a complex of 
several features, is not applicable to the posited 'illa which consists of a single feature. 
Condition # Il: There is full compliance since the posited 'jJla is in fact such that 
if it is negated the rule is also negated. 
Condition # 12: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa is the sole factor 
occasioning the rule; it is not one of several occasioning factors operating 
simultaneously to give rise to the rule. 
Condition # 13: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa behind the original 
rule is not also the occasioning factor behind sorne other rule. 
Condition # 14: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa does serve to give 
detenninacy to sorne lJikma (rationale). 
Condition # 15: This condition, which is rejected by Arnim, requires that the 
occasioning factor behind the original rule, as the giver of determinacy to a rationale, 
must be indispensable to the working of the rationale such that the rationale will never 
obtain in a particular case apart from it. Full compliance with this condition is 
debatable, since in the case of ribii the rationale (shirk) could also be triggered by 
something other than the posited 'illa of intra-action and ex-nihilo action. 
Condition # 16: There is full compliance since the posited 'illa does not obtain 
after the rule has already become operative and since the rule had not been previously 
operative apart from the occasioning factor. 
Condition # 17: There is full compliance since the posited 'jJla behind the 
affirmative rule is actually present and operative. 
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Condition # 18 (f): There is full compliance since the posited 'illa, as best as can 
be ascertained, does not have the effect of restricting the reference of a general 
expression in the Qur'in. 
Condition # 18 (g): There is full compliance since the posited 'illa behind the 
original mIe is not capable of being countered by a factor that occasions the contrary of 
the original mIe. 
Condition # 18 (h): There is full compliance since the posited 'illa does not entail 
any addition to what is contained within the meaning of the Qur'iinie and Sunnaie texts. 
Condition # 18 (i): There is full compliance since the original rule from which the 
posited 'illa has been extrapolated has itselfbeen established with absolute certainty. 
Condition # 18 0): There is full compliance since the posited 'illa, as best as can be 
ascertained, is not in confliet with the opinion of a Companion of the Prophet. 
Condition # 18 (k): There is full compliance since the presence of the posited 'illa 
in the novel case has been established with absolute certainty. 
Condition # 19 (b): There is no compliance with this controversial condition, 
which is also rejected by Amidi, that an indicator used to establish an occasioning 
factor must not itself serve to establish the mIe goveming the novel case. 
Besides compliance with practically all the conditions laid downldebated in the 
c1assical fiqh, above, the posited 'ilal also conform to conditions laid down in modem 
fiqh influenced by the concept of social utility of the SharJ'a. According to Malcolm 
Kerr, the twentieth-century Egyptian commentator 'Abdalwahhab Khallaf, "who se 
methodology is careful and, by contemporary standards, rather conservative, but who 
nonetheless reflects the modem urge to emphasize the social utility of the SharJ'a," 
explains that the 'illa must be (1) "suit able" (munisib), Le., plausibly conducive to the 
underlying iJikma, (2) "objectively recognizable" (?iihir), and (3) "c1early defined" 
(munç/abitJ. As shown above, the posited 'ilal meet aU three conditions. 
AdditionaUy, the posited 'ilal also meet another criterion laid down in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Hallaq states: 
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Similarly, ratio legis attested by more than one text was deemed to outweigh another supported 
by a single text.985 
The posited 'ilal of ribi-prohibition and bay'-permission, Le., intra-activity and 
inter-activity arising out of exchange of homogeneity and heterogeneity, respectively, 
are supported, as required by the above reference, by more than one text, Le., by both the 
Qur'an (2:275) and the Ifadith (the ribawl-commodities and Bam]/Khaybar-dates 
ai}idith). On the contrary, the 'ilal conventionally posited in Islamic jurisprudence -
weighability, measurability, storability, currency value, and food value (edibility) - are 
only seemingly supported by only one text (the ribawl-commodities i}adith), and that too 
inconclusively because, as shown above, these commodity characteristics do not fully 
meet the conditions for sound 'illa derivation laid down in the u$iil al-fiqh. 
To sum up, the posited 'illa for the rule of ribi (intra-activity and ex-nihilo 
creation manifesting as "divine imitability") and the posited 'illa for the rule of bay' 
(inter-activity) are not only derived using the three most relevant and important of the 
seven potential selection methods prescribed in the u$iil al-fiqh, but they likewise 
comply with the rules of derivation also laid down in the u$iil al-fiqh. 
IV.3.ii. Compliance with "Criteria ofCredibility" ofthe Rationale (JJikma) 
While there are sever al conditions for testing any posited 'illa, as seen above,986 
only three criteria are discernable in the associated Rules of Derivation for testing any 
posited i}ikma. The Rules of Derivation are concerned primarily with 'ilia, but the inter-
connectivity of 'ilia and i}ilana permits the extraction of i}ilana criteria therefrom. As 
will be seen in the test results below, there is complete conformity of the posited i}ikma 
of ribi and bay' injunction with the three derived criteria in u$iil al-fiqh. 
1. Plausibility of the Ifikma: The posited i}ikma must be such "that the Legislator may 
be said to have [it] in mind as His purpose in establishing the rule" (as per Amidf, 
from Controversial Condition # 2, above). The posited i}ilana of shirk for riba-
prohibition is plausible as the divinc1y intended J;ilana beeause the severity of the 
ordained admonition for the sin of ribi is fully compatible only with the gravit y of 
the sin of shirk: absence of pardon (absolute for shirk, contingent for ribi) is the 
985 Hallaq, "Can the Shar1'a Be Restored'!", in Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser, cds., 1.~/amie Law and the Challenge of' 
Modemity(Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2004),16. 
9R6 Sec III. 1. iv. b., above. 
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common feature of these two sins alone. The posited lJikma of bay'-permission -
inter-action under free will (conformity with human design and purpose of creation)-
is plausible as the divinely intended lJikma because inter-action is fully compatible 
with the divine design and purpose ofhuman creation in pairs. 
2. Determinacy of the lfiJana: The posited lJikma must be determinate (from 
Controversial Condition # 14). The posited lJikma of shirk for riba-prohibition is 
determinate, as there are no multiple interpretations or degrees of shirk In 
determinacy, this rationale is not like the oft-posited rationales of exploitation and 
injustice; it is difficult to determine exactly where exploitation and injustice start 
and end, but shirkis clear-cut. 
3. Uniform Coincidentality of the lfiJana with the Rule: The posited lJikma must be 
uniformly coincidental with the rule (from Controversial Condition # 9). The posited 
lJikma of shirk for ribi-prohibition is uniformly coincidental with the rule of 
prohibition of ribi for humans. The lJikma of shirk is present in all the posited 
applications ofthe rule of ribi-prohibition. 
To sum up, the posited lJikma of riba-prohibition, Le., shirk (idolatry) and the 
posited lJikma of bay'-permission, i.e., inter-action under free will (conformity with 
human design and purpose of creation), by displaying plausibility, determinacy and 
uniform coincidentality, fully meet the derived u$ul al-fiqh criteria for establishing the 
lJikma. 
IV. 4. Posited Application Scope of Ribii and Bay' 
The application scope of ribi is not limited to interest/usury as restrictively 
denoted by its technical meaning. As put by a contemporary jurist: 
The Qur'an did not define the term, since to define is to limit and restrict, and the Qur'an, being 
the last Testament was to enure for the benefit of the creation till the end of time and thus had to 
cater to the ever-evolving new forms and dimensions of ribi. Indeed as to the aIl enveloping 
paradigms of riba, it was so prophesied more than fourteen centuries ago [by the Prophet]: 987 
'There will certainly come a lime for mankind when everyonc will take libii and, if he does not do 
so, its dust will reach him. ' 988 
987 Abu Dawud, Kitiib al-Buyii', Biib fi ijtiniibi al-shubuhiit ; also in Ibn Maja. 
988 Sharl'a Appellate Bench ofthc Supreme Court of Pakistan, Judgmcnt on Ribii, Dccember 23,1999, Opinion of Justicc Wajihuddin 
Ahmad, (Islamabad: Advanced Legal Studies Institutc.www.nyazce.com .. 2000), 322-379. 
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Given this Prophetic prediction and given this thesis that intra-action and ex-nihilo 
creation that are neutral notions not exc1usively characteristic of any single activity are 
at the core of ribii, practicaIly aIl the actions - not only financial- and even the thoughts 
of man can be susceptible to ribii. In any and aIl spheres, man can act or think in a 
manner which smacks of intra-activity and consequent self-subsistence, self-emanation 
and ultimate etemity. Several authentic Prophetic alJiidith cited above989 dec1are ribii to 
have, albeit metaphorically, seventy-two abwiib (chapt ers, types, forms). This 
multiplicity of ribawl abwiib has never been spelled out so far by u$ul al-fiqh: neither by 
the Qur'an, nor by the lfadith, nor by qiyiis, nor by ijmii'. Islamic fiqh did not name 
these multiple applications perhaps because - ribiibeing confined in the fiqh only to its 
technical meaning of financial excess - no need was felt to disco ver the distinguishing 
characteristic of ribii that could be tested in other than financial activities. But now, 
with the posited discovery and identification of its true distinguishing characteristic of 
"divine imitability" through intra-activity and ex-nihilo creation, ribii can be freed from 
its financial prison and its presence detected in other spheres of human activity as weIl 
through analogical extrapolation (qiyiis). The posited defining characteristics of intra-
action/ex-nihilo creation and inter-action applicable to ribii and bay', respectively, will 
determine the sc ope of application of these two concepts beyond the conventionaIly 
restricted financial/commercial sphere, thus dispelling what might be caIled the 
"application confusion syndrome." 
Sorne of the most readily apparent applications so extrapolated are identified 
below. These coyer either existing or newly emerging human practices. Islamic law 
already faces - or will soon face - the task of pronouncing on the licitness or otherwise 
of these and similar practices. To be plausible, enforceable, effective and readily 
acceptable, the solicited rulings will need to be based on grounds much firmer than 
ethics alone. Today, for example, both the secular and religious rejection of human 
cloning and stem celI research must ers only ethical arguments that are insufficient to 
quelI the opposition to its rejection. Stronger and fool-proof arguments are required. The 
explanations posited in this work, beyond the convention al ethical approach, constitute 
such conc1usive arguments that will strengthen this juridical review. Financial ribiiis the 
9R9 Sec II. 3. ii., p. 65 ff., abovc. 
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only application currently identified in the scholarship. The several other indicated, 
potential applications of ribii are the pioneering and exclusive outcome of this research. 
The research on, and search for more of, these applications must continue. Similarly, 
bay', popularly restrictively translated as "sale," refers to a broader neutral process of 
exchange and thus encompasses many other applications, also indicated below. 
IV.4.i. RibiiCategories 
The presence of intra-actionJ ex-nihilo creation is readily detectable in many 
acts/concepts, which are thereby rendered not just morally and ethically but, what is 
more crucial, theologically culpable on grounds of being ribawJ, and which may be 
classified as: 
IVA.i.a. Financial Ribii: 
• Interest and Usury Charge (all forms): Intra-activity, the basic ribawl 
characteristic, is embedded in the generation of money directly from money, 
without the intervention of another agent, in a11 forms of interest and usury. 
IVA.i.b. Commercial Ribii: 
• Profit-Determination: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is inherent in 
the underlying process of profit measurement (mat ching of sale and purchase using 
the same currency/barter unit), which requires comparison ofhomogeneity, though 
not direct exchange ofhomogeneity. 
• De1ayed Settlement of Transfer of Ownership in any Transaction: Ex-nihilo 
creation (two occurrences), the more crucial ribawl characteristic, is discernable in 
the structure of all such transactions of delayed settlement, e.g., credit sales (buyer: 
goods/services received now in exchange for nothing now, and later, seller: 
payment received then in exchange for nothingthen). 
• Artificial Juridical Personality Creation: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl 
characteristic, is present in the concept of artificial juridical personality through 
the replication of the attempted human capacity to live inperpetuity. 
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IV.4.i.c. Economic Ribii 
• Capitalism: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is integral to capitalism 
to the extent that it is interest-based and classically non-profit-sharing with labor 
(self-preserving and non-participatory). 
IV.4.i.d. Agricultural Ribii: 
• Agricultural Growing (zara'a): Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is 
evident in agricultural growth (zara 'a), which, through the use of the verb rabat in 
22:5 and by specification in 56:64, the Qur'an reserves for Divine action; only the 
inter-active sowing (lJaratha) is conceded to human action (Q. 56:63).990 
IV.4.i.e. Labor Ribii 
• Delayed Wage Settlement: Ex-nihilo creation (two occurrences), the more 
crucial ribawl characteristic, is discernable in the structure of this transaction of 
delayed settlement (master: work received now in exchange for nothing now, and 
later, laborer: wage received then in exchange for nothing then). But the Islamic 
(and Judaic) requirement that the laborer be paid his wages before the sweat on his 
forehead is dry is generally taken only in the sense of fairness and justice. 
Significantly, the Muwa.f.fa' of Malik b. Anas (II, 609-686) lists the "payment of 
wages to laborers in an indefinite manner" among the various forms of ribii, 
without, however, this specific explication. 
IV.4.i.f. Religious Ribii 
• P(M)atrilineal Religious Leadership (directly vertically-descending): Intra-activity, 
the basic ribawl characteristic, is manifest in any system of patrilineal (father-to-
son) hereditary religious leadership, e.g., in Caliphate and Imamate, as an act of 
attempted self-replication and ensuing perpetuity through direct progeny.991 
990 Q. 22:5 dcseribcs the act of agricultural production (growing l'rom the earth) by the vcrb rabat, the féminine I<'orm l, from the root 
r.b. w .. Aeeordingly, "to grow and eultivate" (plantslflowers) is one of the lexical meanings of the Form Il verb rabbiifrom the same 
root. The Qur'an associates many commercial terms, Iike buying, selling, trading, and profit-making, with human beings, but its 
rcfcrences to agriculture arc always in divine terms. Though the Arabie term for agriculture, zirii'a, is not mentioned in the Qur'an 
even once, its assoeiated verb zara 'a (to grow) and noun zar' (green erop) appear in a total of t1ve verses, with the growinglgrowth 
being attributed to divine aet in each case (Q. 14:37; 18:32; 32:27; 39:21; 56:64). In fact, Q. 56:63 concedes only the act of sowing 
((lJaratha) to man. Any human claim to the proccss of this activation (growing) is, thcrcforc, a transgression in the divine domain, 
and may be labelcd as agricultural ribii. 
991 A cali ph, imam, or political, tribal, feudal or communal leader, short of living and achicving rule in perpet uity for himsclf, can 
approximatc it by dccrceing the position to his progcny in perpctuity. 
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IV.4.i.g. Political Ribi 
• P(M)atrilineal Rulership (directly vertically-descending): Intra-activity, the basic 
ribawl characteristic, is manifest in any system of vert ic ally-descending patrilineal 
(father-to-son) hereditary rulership, e.g., in monarchy and dictatorship, etc., as an 
act of attempted se1f-replication and perpetuity through direct progeny. 
IV.4.i.h. Social Ribi 
• P(M)atrilineal Tribal, Feudal or Communal Leadership (directly vert ic ally-
descending): Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is manifest in any 
system of vertically-descending patrilineal (father-to-son) hereditary leadership, as 
an act of attempted self-replication and perpetuity through direct progeny. 
• Intra-Family Marriage: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is visible in 
marriage within the family circle of blood relatives (though outside the expressly 
prohibited closed circle) through near proximity to intra-active reproduction. The 
resulting inbreeding, though not exactly intra-active, gives it a ribawl color. A 
Prophetie J;adith tells followers to go as far out of the family circle as possible for 
marriage.992 
• Master-Slave and Mother-Child Relationships:993 Intra-activity, the basic ribawl 
characteristic, is structurally inherent in the master-slave re1ationship by virtue of 
ownership, and naturally in the mother-child re1ationship by virtue of the breast-
feeding of the child by the mother. The father-child and husband-wife 
relationships, by contrast, are naturally inter-active. 
IV.4.i.i. Cultural Ribi 
Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, as an attempt at perpetuity is 
manifest in the artistic activity of humanlanimal image reproduction in print and in 
sculpture. A Prophetie i}adith curses the artist, among others. 
992 This inbreeding, eonspieuous in the Jewish and Muslim eommunities with widespread intra-family marri ages, is medieally proven 
to be the cause of a fatal degcncrativc brain disordcr _. technieally known as ccroid lipofuscinosis and popularly eallcd Batten's 
Disease after the name of its diseoverer - that leads to a complete vegetative state and eventual death of the patient. Yusuf, this 
author's late son to whom this researeh projeet is dedieated, was one sueh victim. 
993 Discussed in la'far! fiqh for exemption from prohibition of ribii. Sec III.I.iv .ag., pp. 177-178, above. 
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IV.4.i.j. Biological Ribii 
• Masturbation: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is inherent both in the 
male and female practice of masturbation, which is an instance of perrect 
biological intra-action involving a biological agent actually acting upon itself, but 
only an attempted se1f-emanation because of impossibility of direct reproduction 
(pro-creation) - the most elementary form ofbiological ribii. 
• Homosexuality/Same-Sex Marriage: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl 
characteristic, is inherent in the practice of homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage,994 which are instances of near-perfect biological intra-action involving a 
biological agent acting, though not upon itself, but upon a member of its own sex. 
This is only an attempted se1f-emanation due to the present impossibility, but 
future possibility,995 of direct pro-creation - the next higher form ofbiological ribii. 
• Incest (zinii' al-malJiirinl96): Yet again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl 
characteristic, is inherent in the practice of incest, which is another instance of 
near-perrect biological intra-action where a biological agent acts, again not upon 
itse1f, but upon a member of its immediate family unit - the first ex ample of actual 
self-emanation with resulting direct pro-creation. Incest with one's own mother is 
the closest proximity to perfect biological intra-action where, being otherwise 
incapable of pro-creating from himself, man pro-creates from the person (mother) 
who pro-created him in the first place. Short of cloning, this is the closest 
achievable proximity to biological self-emanation, as also borne out by the lJadith 
that equates ribii with incest with one's own mother - the highest form of natural 
biological ribii. 
994 As per a report in The Gazette, Montreal, Monday, June 7, 2005, A 3, Pope Benedict XVI condcmns samc-scx marriagc as 
"anarchic pseudo-matrimony" as against matrimony whieh "is not just a casual sociological construction, but rathcr an institution 
that has ils roots in the most profound essence of the human being." 
995 As per reports in The Gazette, Montreal, Monday, June 20, 2005, A 18, and Tuesday, July 11,2006, A 14, this attcmpt at self-
emanation may not, however, remain futile mueh longer as scientists have "created the precursors ofhuman sperm and eggs from 
'building bloek' stem eclls, raising the prospect that infertile and homosexual couples eould have babics that arc gcnctically their 
own. A British tcam has, for the first time, used embryonie stem cclls to grow primordial germ eells that later develop into either 
sperm or eggs. ln addition to being potentially ofuse in assisted reproduction such as in vitro fcrtilization, synthetic sex cc Ils could 
be used in thcrapeutic cloning and medical researeh. Sorne researchers believe that the breakthrough means an egg eould, in theory, 
be generated from a man 's own stem cells and even that a ehild eould be ereated from sperm and an engineered egg from the same 
man." Likewise, the turning of stem cclls into sperm capable ofproducing oŒpring raiscs the possibility ofwomen making spcrms 
and of lesbians having their very own ehildren. 
996 al-Ba'albakl, AI-Mawrid: Arabie-English Dietionmy, 609. 
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• Adultery and Other Illegal Sexual Intercourse (zinii'): Intra-activity, the basic 
ribawl characteristic, can potentially be detected also in all instances of illegal 
sexual intercourse. These acts can be legally deemed intra-active because, although 
there is an opposite physical agent, there is no legal recognition of that opposite 
agent, Le., an absence of the marri age (nikii.h) contract. 
• Animal and Human Cloning: Yet again, intra-activity, the basic ribawJ 
characteristic, is inherent in the practice of c1oning, which is the most perfect and 
complete instance of genetically engineered productive intra-action, and where, 
through genetic engineering, a biological agent acts and relies completely on itse1f 
to reproduce its replica. Unlike normal natura1 biological inter-action of male and 
female, where the offspring inherits the DNA of both parents almost equally, 
animal and human cloning produces an offspring who inherits the DNA of only a 
single chosen parent exclusively - the highest form of engineeredbiological ribii. 
• Cancer: Intra-activity, the basic ribawJ characteristic, is also inherent in the 
nature-initiated and operated fatal biological activity of cancer where, unlike the 
normal process of limited "good" cell division to sustain bodily growth,997 the 
uncontrolled runaway se1f-replication of "bad" cells has no limit on replication 
which goes on for ever even outside the human body in the laboratories as weIl. 
Nature itself does not tolerate this self-replication for long in the human body, 
which accordingly suffers premature death. This could also be one meaning of Q. 
2:276 which declares that AŒih exterminates (yam1;aqu Alliih) ribii. 
IVA.i.k. Psychological Ribii 
• Oedipus Complex: Intra-activity, the basic ribawJ characteristic, is also discernable 
in this Freudian psychoanalytical concept, just as it is in the c10sely related 
physical biological process of incest. Named after the Greek legend of Oedipus, 
who unwittingly kills his father, marries his mother, and then blinds himself in 
remorse, the Oedipus Complex concerns the young child's attraction to the parent 
of the opposite sex and initial jealousy of, but ultimate identification with, the 
parent of the same sex, the failure to successfully negotiate with which is the 
997 According to gcncrally-hcld medieal opinion, it is limited to 24 times only. 
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primary cause of nervous disorders.998 Through the fantasy of assuming the role of 
the same-sex parent and operating on the other-sex parent, the Oedipus Complex 
has aIl the ingredients of self-emanation, i.e., short of self-procreating, nurturing 
the fantasy of procreation from the one who procreated you in the first place. 
Could the Qur'anic punishment of Satanic insanity for indulgence in ribiï (Q. 
2:275) be a reference also to this nervous disorder resulting from the self-
emanating notion of Oedipus Complex? 
IV.4.i.l. Nutritional Ribiï 
• Wine Consumption: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is also 
demonstrable in the process of wine production. For Islamic fiqh unanimously, the 
distinguishing characteristic of khamr (wine), and consequently the J;ilana 
(rationale) as well as the 'illa (occasioning factor) of its prohibition, is merely its 
effect of intoxication, to the utter exclusion of its cause and meaning of 
fermentation.999 However, Ibn Maskawaih, through his theory of development of 
the vine and date-palm from plant-life to the threshold of animal-life, partially 
posits the basis of an eventual philosophical-theological prohibition rationale. 1000 
But even he does not develop further the point that wine is the outcome of 
knnentation, which is a classic example of nutrition al intra-action of one 
substance resulting in the purest of substances. Wine production is the only 
example of a rotten eatable generating a pure eatable (drinkable), which further 
displays a quality of in finit y by going on purifying, rather than rotting, with time 
(aging of wine). And pure wine is what is promised in Heaven. 1OO2 Is it that the 
process of purification (the ordained zakiïh), if continued indefinitely, could lead to 
the pure Essence? The Qur'an itself explicitly acknowledges undefined benefits of 
wine consumption for mankind (medical science has only postulated the 
therapeutic benefits of red wine for cardiovascular disease), but declares the sin-
99. Deal and BeaI, ThcO/y For RcJigious Studios, 4. 
999 ln the Jewish faith, there is prohibition, though not ofwine, but of eating fèrmcntcdbread during the Passover fasting. 
1000 Ibn Maskawaih, Af-Fauz af-A,vghar, 78-83. According to him, in the case of the underlying plant products - grapcs and dates-
the last stage of devc\opment [ofplant-Iife] is reaehed in vine and date-palm that stand at the threshold of animallife. ln the date-
palm a c\car sex-distinetion appears. Bcsides roots and fibers it develops something that funetions Iike the animal brain, on the 
integrity ofwhieh depends the life ofthe date-palm. This is the highest stage in the development ofplant-life and a prelude to animal 
Iife. 
1002 Q. 47: 15; 76:2. 
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not the hann - of it to be greater than its benefits. IO03 The 'ilia of wine prohibition 
is, therefore, intra-action and wine consumption definable as nutritional ribii. 
• Pork Consumption: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is also 
demonstrable in the process of pork consumption. The Qur'an prohibits the 
consumption of meat of khinz1r (pig), but does not describe the 'illa or the iJikma 
of its prohibition beyond calling it rijs, which in addition to "dirty" may also be 
rendered as "shameful," "disgraceful" and "atrocious. "1004 Very significantly, recent 
medical research has shown pig biology to be strikingly similar to human biology. 
The human consumption of pork could, therefore, approximate human 
consumption ofhuman meat - cannibalism. Supported not only by this intra-active 
act of cannibalism, but also by the oft-neglected adjectival connotations of rijs as 
"shameful," "disgraceful" and "atrocious," park consumption is includable in the 
instances of the prohibited ribii. 
• Cannibalism: Yet again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is 
demonstrable in cannibalism - an agent feeding on itself - which is reflected in the 
fatal brain-wasting Mad Cow Disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or 
BSE), caused by cows being fed on cow's carcasses, and in its fatal human variant 
(Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, or CJD), caused by eating beef from such an infected 
cow - both being terminal forms of insanity. The Qur'anic association of "eating 
ribi" with Satanic insanity lO05 could temporally refer to this intra-activity and 
resulting insanity from BSE and CJD. 
IV.4.i.m. Engineering Ribi 
Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is in-built in the recently invented 
"self-replicating" robot which is a robotic tower made of cubes that performs no useful 
function except to reproduce,1006 and in the next expected step of creating "self-
sustaining" [ribawl?jrobots that could self-replicate or, at least, self-repair. 
1003 Q. 2:219. 
1004 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Diction;uy, 378. 
1005 Q. 2:275. 
1006 Created at Corne\l University and announeed in the prestigious science journal, Nature., as report cd in The Gazette, Montreal, 
Thursday, May 12,2005, A22. 
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IV.4.i.n. Virtual Reality Ribii 
Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is again visible in the CUITent 
scientific efforts to reconstruct a simulation of a living organism inside a computer, and 
to recreate full-blown model of Escherichia coli (E. coli), the humble resident of the 
human gut - a virtual twin. 1007 
IV.4.i.o. Architectural Ribii 
Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is again visible in the building of 
multi-storeyed skyscraper structures which represents vertical intra-action - one storey 
acting on another - as opposed to horizontal inter-action - one building negotiating with 
adjacent buildings, without building on itself. A Prophetic iJadJth wams of the building 
ofhigh-rises as one of the signs of the impending Doomsday. 
IV.4.i.p. Conceptual Ribii 
• Philosophical Ribii: Intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is 
unmistakably evident in the concept of khudJ (PersianJUrdu), of Pakistani 
philosopher-poet Iqbal, which may be rendered as "I-ness" or "self-ness," meaning 
an exclusive human focus on the self. Interestingly, in PersianJUrdu, khud means 
"self," khudJ "self-ness," and, Khudii, whatever the significance, God (Allah). 
Poetically, Iqbal exhorts man to raise the level of his khudJ ("I-ness") to an extent 
where God will be "obliged" to ask man what he wants as his own destiny. 1008 
This, in addition to the Western philosophical concept of egoism, is an illustration 
of conceptual intra-action. 
• Intellectual Ribii: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is 
unmistakably evident in the legal and general concept of ra y (personal opinion) as 
a source of law or of general action in which the opinion-holder or actor acts upon 
him/herself to produce an opinion or action. By contrast, ijmi' (consensus) and 
shura(consultation) are inter-active and, thereforc, non-ribawlproccsscs. 
1007 The New York Time,,; "Building a Virtual Microbe, Gene by Gene by Gene", Science section, August 16,2005. 
1008 Muhammad Iqbal, A.sriir-i Khudi (Secrets of the Self) (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1915; 2nd ed. 1918). Countering this work is 
his, Rumiiz-i Bikhudi (Secrets ofSc1flcssncss) (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1918) (both Persian). English translations eovering 
these Persian works inelude: V. G. Kicrnan, Poems from IqbaJ (London: John Murray, 2nd cd., 1955); and Mustansir Mir, Tulip in the 
Desert: A Selection ofthc Poctry of Muhammad /qbal (London: Hurst; Montreal: Queens-McGiIl University Press; and New Delhi: 
Orient Longman, 2000). 
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• Literary Ribii: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is detectable in 
"passion/ardour" (Persian/Urdu: 'Josh') - one of the three components of natural 
poetry in the Urdu language - which has been defined by the celebrated Urdu poet, 
Altaf Hussain I:Iafi (d. 1914), "as the expressing of a poetic conceit in such an 
effective way that it is almost as if the poet has not composed the conceit, rather 
the conceit has taken hold of the poet and arisen by itself" (I:Iafi, 1953: 158). In 
other words, the quality of passion/ardour Oosh) refers to creating the illusion that 
the poem arose spontaneously.loo9 This literary production of an agent acting upon 
itself is c1early intra-active. 
• Academic Ribii: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is detectable 
in scholarly dogmatism which is an act of sole intellectual self-reliance, self-
sustenance, and self-emanation. The contrasting process of scholarly concession is 
inter-active and, therefore, non-ribawl. 
• Post-Modernity Ribii: Again, intra-activity, the basic ribawl characteristic, is 
evident in the spirit of post-modem thought which is an attempt at "self-creation," 
and "self-consciousness of the de-actualized self. "1010 
IV.4.ii. Bay' Categories 
The application sc ope of bay: as will be shown below, is not limited to "sale," 
which is denoted by its restrictive technical meaning. What has been quoted above for 
ribii 10ll applies equally well to bay' and may be re-phrased as: The Qur'an did not define 
the term, "since to define is to limit and restrict," and the Qur'an, being the last 
Testament "was to enure for the benefit of the creation till the end oftime and thus had 
to cater to the ever-evolving new fonns and dimensions of [bay'j."IOI2 
Conventional Categories of Bay' 
Conventionally, the defining characteristic of the process of bay' is the act of 
"offer" (ijiib) and "acceptance" (qabiiJ), represented hy a handshake. Accordingly, the 
1009 Javed Majeed, "Nature, Hyperbole and the Colonial State," in Islam and Modcmity - Muslim Intcllcctual~ Rc"pond, cds., J. 
Cooper, R.L. Nettler, Mohamed Mahmoud (London: LB. Tauris, 2000), 15. 
1010 Patrick G1ynn, God: The Evidence: The Rcconcjfjation of Faith and Rcason in a Postsccular World (Roeklin, CA: Forum, 1999), 
146-147. 
1011 See IV. 4., n, 980, p. 277, above. 
1012 Sharl'a Appellate Beneh of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Judgment on Ribii, Oecember 23, 1999, Opinion of Justice 
Wajihuddin Ahmad, (Islamabad: Advanced Legal Studies Institute.www.nyazee.com .. 2000), 322-379, 
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term bay" conventionally refers to those processes that involve offer and acceptance. As 
seen above, while technically bay" is taken to mean "sale," lexically, the extended 
meaning also covers contract, homage, pledge of allegiance and even purchase, and 
juridically, the noun bay"is rendered as exchange including even marriage. 
Posited Categories of Bay' 
With the positing of inter-action (an agent acting upon its binary opposite) as the 
distinguishing characteristic of bay: the meaning of this term, which is declared by the 
Qur'an to be lJa1iil,l0J3 can further be extended analogically to include a11 those human 
processes, material or abstract, that are inter-active. Sorne ofthese processes are detailed 
in V.5.ii., below. 
IV.5. Eschatological Dimensions 
But give glad tidings to those who believe and work righteousness that for them are Gardens, 
beneath which rivers flow. Every time they are fed with fruits therefrom, they say: "Why, this is 
what we were fed with before," for they are given things in similitude; and they have therein 
companions pure and holy; and they abide therein for ever. - Q.2:25. 
The eschatological scenario sketched in the above verse - the notions of reward, 
similitude, duality and etemity - constitutes the finallink in the development of the new 
theory of divine law of normative behavior. 
As per the Scripture, and partial empirical evidence as we11, the "duality model" 
of creation is initially associated with this created universe of jinn and man and other 
subordinate creatures only; elsewhere, beyond this universe, we are told a "singularity 
model" prevails; there the only known existents are single: God is single and alone, and 
His heavenly creations, the angels, are not in pairs; they have no opposite companions. 
However, an introduction of the "duality mode!" is promised in the otherwise 
singularity scenario of the Hereafter in the form of "pure and holy companions" for man 
in Paradise. The "Here-to-before" is a model of pure singularity. The "Here" is 
temporally a mode! of pure duality. And the "Hereafter" is promised to be converted 
partially (for man only) into a model of duality. This duality mode! in the Hereafter is, 
however, associated with the Paradise only - no companions are promised in the Hell. 
And entry to the Paradise is made dependent upon compliance with God's commands in 
1013 Q. 2:275. 
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this universe, especiaUy as they relate to man's creation. Thus, this divinely desired and 
divinely promised first-time introduction of the duality mode! in the Paradise becomes 
contingent upon the success of the duality mode! in this universe, which is thus at best 
an "experimental laboratory." The purpose of creation of man is to test the success of 
the duality model. 
The animaIs and the plants in this created universe are also part of the duality 
model, by also being in pairs. Their actions also are inter-active but only intuitive!y. 
There is no exercise of independent reasoning and free will in them and they cannot but 
act inter-actively. But the role of man is to ensure the success of this duality model in 
spite of the exercise of his independent reasoning, judgment and free will, through 
understanding this purpose of duality c1early and acting accordingly for its success in an 
inter-active manner in aH dealings (bay'J, without any incursions in the domain of 
singularity, intra-active behavior and growth, and eternity (ribii). Thus, the divine law of 
ribii and bay' is not just temporal; it has crucial implications flowing into the Hereafter. 
Exercising his divinely gifted free will, if eve1)7man fails the test of ensuring the success 
of the inter-active duality model on earth by indulging in the intra-active singularity 
mode!, man will face eternal HeUfire as threatened by God, and aU will be denied 
Paradise. Since the introduction of duality model is promised for man in the Paradise 
only, with no one going there, the duality mode! will not materialize in the Paradise. 
This absence of duality mode! on earth and later in Paradise is contrary to the revealed 
Divine wish. God in His absolute wisdom and absolute power has desired man to 
successfully implement the duality mode! on earth as a condition for its introduction in 
Paradise. At the instigation of Satan, man has already once failed the test. Adam and 
Eve were created as pure companions, oblivious of their sexuality, and were told to live 
in, and eat freely from, all of the Garden of Eden except from the Tree of Eternity 
(shajarat al-khuldJ,l°14 However, upon Satan's instigation, they ate from this tree and 
thereby their sexuality became manifest to them. The implication is that if allowed to 
stay in this state of sexual awareness, biological reproduction could have taken place in 
Paradise. But Paradise is a place of pure and holy companionship, not of biological 
reproduction. God wants aU biological reproduction to take place on this "impure" earth, 
1014 Q. 20:120. 
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and then to resurrect aH and admit the qualifying reproduced population into Paradise. 
God in His infinite wisdom and power has already allowed Satan to have one feather in 
his cap by luring man to the forbidden tree and He has accepted Satan's challenge to 
lead man astray on earth. If man fails the second test on this earth, this would add 
another feather in Satan's cap. Obviously, God does not want this to happen. He exhorts 
man to pass the test of success of duality model on earth. He seeks a goodly loan from 
man. Is this not the meaning of the Qur'anic verse: 
Who is he that will lend to Allah a good1y 10an so that He may multiply it to him many times? 
And it is Allah that decreases or increases and unto Him you shall return - Q. 57: Il. 
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CHAPT ER V 
THEORETICAL EXTRAPOLATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The research findings in the previous chapter trigger several extrapolations, new 
definitions, modifications, elaborations and implications as foUows. 
V.l. T erminological Precision 
The two primary juristic technical expressions currently in vogue to designate 
types of ribii - ribii a1-façI1 (ribii of excess) and ribii a1-nasJ'a (ribii of delay) - are neither 
Qur'anic nor strictly Sunnaic. While the Qur'an does not use these expressions at aU, the 
/Jadith only uses the word nasl'a, though again not as a designation or type of, but as a 
factor leading to, ribii. The invention and employment of these composite terms in fiqh 
is the victim of what may be called "terminological confusion syndrome,"1015 even the 
recognition of existence -let alone the removal- ofwhich is conspicuous by its absence 
in the convention al scholarship so far. Even upon a cursory lexical examination '"ribii" 
essentiaUy means "excess," while <'facjJ" also means "excess."IOI6 Therefore, the 
composite term ribii a1-facj1 ("excess of excess") is in the first place a tautology. 
Secondly, it thereby attempts to describe the "effect" of a process (i.e., the excess), and 
not its "cause." Nor is the construction of the second composite term, ribii a1-nasl'a, 
consistent with that of the first term. Here, the term ribii a1-nasl'a is describing not the 
"effect" (the excess) but the apparent "cause" of the process (delay). Moreover, this term 
is silent on the fact that, as shown above,I°17 nasl'a (delay) causes two instances of fàçI1 
(excess), both ex-nihilo, to occur. Therefore, in what is termed ribii a1-nasl'athe "effect" 
is <'facjJ" (excess), exactly like the "effect" of <'facjJ" (excess) in what is caUed ribii a1-
façIl This point is fully supported by al-Sarakhsl, who has explained the meaning of the 
two kinds of ribiiby elaborating the meaning of facjl, as already seen above: 
[The words] "fatjJ is ribii" imply fàtjJ through qadr and they imply fàtjJ through a period of 
delay, and both are intended. This was elaborated in the tradition of 'Ubâdah ibn al_~âmit.1018 
Therefore, by definition, ribii is only fàçI1. The difference between what is 
currently termed as ribii a1-fàçI1 and ribii a1-nasl'a lies only in what causes each. Ribii, as 
1015 An expression borrowed from Hallaq in his "Introduction", l~lamic Law and Society, 2 (1996), 136. 
1016 Hans Wchr, Arabic-Engli~h Dictionary, 374, g40. 
1017 Scc IV. 2. i. a., pp. 244-245, abovc. 
1018 al-Sarakhsl, a/-Mabsiï,t, XII , III. 
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posited above, is caused either by intra-action (fi'l al-nafs or mithllya) or by ex-nihilo 
action (fi '1 al-'adamor 'adamiJYa)triggered by de1ay (nasl'a). 
Consequently, the "effect" being common, the terms adopted, in order to be truly 
distinguishing, must de scribe the different "causes" accurately. Accordingly, to coin two 
new composite terms, the correct and accurate designation for what is currently 
improperly termed ribi al-farIl would be ribi aJ-mith1iya (ribi from homogeneity) to 
describe the fadl (excess) created in homogeneous exchange by intra-action, and that for 
what is currently inconsistently termed ribi al-nasl'a would be ribii aJ- 'adamiyya (ribi 
from nothingness) to describe the fadl (excess) created by ex-nihilo action triggered by 
delay (nasl'a) in both homogeneous and heterogeneous exchanges. This also implies that 
it is not accurate to term these as ribi al-Qur'in, and ribi al-Sunna. 
In the light of the research findings in chapter IV and the terminological 
clarification above, the following new definitions emerge. 
V.l.i. Generic Ribii- New Definition 
Ribii is any growth (faql), actual or attempted in method, real or imitated in 
character, intended or unintended in object, explicit or implicit in appearance, 
certain or probable in result, financial or non-financial in application, small or 
large in quantum, occasioned by intra-action (ex-sui creation: khalq min al-nafs) 
and/or ex-nihilo creation (khalq min al- 'adam) in any field of human activity, 
proscribed, in a11 monotheist religious pristine traditions, as an act of idolatry 
(Arabic: shirk). 
V.l.ii. Financial Ribii(Interest/Usury) - New Definition 
Financial Ribi (interest/usury) is any increase, small or large in quantum, fixed or 
variable in rate, simple or compounded in incidence, pre-determined or unknown in 
certitude, consumptible or productive in purpose, occasioned by intra-action 
and/or ex-nihilo-action of money in a financial transaction, pro scribe d, in a11 
monotheistreligious pristine traditions, as an act of idolatry(Arabic: shirk). 
V.l.iii. Ribii al-Nasl'a or Ribii al- 'AdamiJYa- New Definition 
Ribii al-Nasl'a is that type of ribii (façll: excess), defined above, which is the result 
of two acts of ex-nihilo creation (khalq min al- 'adam) triggered by delay (nasl'a) 
in any field of human activity, proscribed, in aIl monotheist religious pristine 
traditions, as an act of idolatry (Arabie: shirk). Tt may, therefore, more 
appropriately be re-Iabe1ed as ribii al- 'adamiyya (ribii from nothingness). 
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V.1.iv. Ribii al-FaqJ or Ribii al-Mithliya- New Definition 
Ribii al-Faql is that type of ribii (faql: excess), defined above, which is the result 
of an act of intra-actionlex-sui creation (khalq min al-nafs) in any field of human 
activity, proscribed, in a11 monotheist religious pristine traditions, as an act of 
idolatry(Arabic: shirk). It may, therefore, more appropriately be re-Iabeled as ribii 
aJ-mithliya (ribiifrom homogeneity). 
V.1.v. Bay'- New Definition 
Bay' is any exchange in any field of human activity occasioned by inter-action! 
ex-alio creation (kha1q min a1-ghayr) and not by intra-action and/or ex-nihilo 
action, permitted as an act of compliance with the design and purpose of human 
creation. 
V.2. Shaii'a- Identification 
The SharTa is the Divine Law, the concrete embodiment of the Divine Will. The 
word SharTa itself is derived etymologically from the root, sh. r. '., meaning "road" or 
more specifically "way to the weIL" Very significantly, the Divine Law, or Sharl'a, and 
the Spiritual Way, or Tarlqa, which is the esoteric dimension ofIslam, are both based on 
the symbolism of the way or joumey. The SharTa guides man towards an understanding 
of the Divine Will by indicating which acts/objects are from the religious point of view 
obligatory, a dut y (wiijib, farq), which are meritorious or recommended (mandiïb, 
mustaJ;ab), which are forbidden (J;ariim), which reprehensible, disapproved (makriïh), 
and which indifferent, permissible (mubiiJ;p019 This, however, raises the question: What, 
if any, is the criterion for the classification of acts/objects into these five categories? 
The Qur'an declares " ... We have made for each ofyou [Le., Muslims, Christians 
and Jews] a law and a normative way ta follow. If God had willed, He would have made 
aIl of you one community."J020 But, "of course, God did not wish to do so, and He thus 
created three communities with three sets of laws, so that each community could foIlow 
ifs own law."J021 
In addition to the above question about the criteria of classification of acts/objects, 
another question now arises: What are these three different sets of laws or normative 
ways? In an attempted answer to the second question, Sa'1d al-'Ashmawl posits that the 
1019 Schacht, Introduction, 121. 
1020 Q. 5 :48 [italies mine]. 
1021 Hallaq, History, 5. 
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law or normative way for the Jews was "righteousness," for the Christi ans "love," and 
for the Muslims "mercy" (righteousness plus love).1022 Now, as already mentioned above, 
AŒih declares in the Qur'an: " ... This day, l have perfected your religion for you, 
completed My Favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion ... " 1023 
[italics mine]. As 'Ashmawl has shown, righteousness and love were already the 
normative ways. So where is the element of perfection in Islam rightly claimed by the 
Qur'an? How can the summing up of two already known ways constitute the perfection 
of the third way? The perfection must involve something additional, something 
different, something new, and above aU, something complete as a code. Righteousness 
and love are the divinely desired attributes for humanity, prescribed by true religion 
since time immemorial. These two human attribut es are merely the normative modus 
operandi on the way; they are not the way itself. Ribii (marbJt/neshekh for Jews, and by 
extension for Christi ans) was proscribed for the Jews and the Christians. But they were 
not told of the alternative, other than the obvious lending without ribii. They were told 
to operate on the way with righteousness and love, but were not given the complete 
coordinat es of the way, which constituted an element of incompleteness in their 
ordained ways. For Judaism, the path of righteousness consisted of the simple 
prohibition of neshekh with no prescription of the permitted alternative. For 
Christianity, the path of love consisted of an exhortation to kindness. Both paths thus 
constituted an incomplete prescription. The complet ion/perfection of the way, or 
SharJ'a, came in the form of Islam, which, for the first and the last time, gave the 
complete coordinat es of the way and complete system of conduct to humanity: it not 
only reiterated the earlier proscription of divine ribii (intra-action),I°24 but also gave its 
human alternative, bay' (inter-action),I°25 in all spheres of human activity. This 
proscription of intra-action and permission of inter-action is, therefore, the answer to the 
two questions raised above. It is the criteria of classification of acts/objects into the five 
categories, and it is the identification of the prescribed perfected normative way - what 
may be called the two-track, or dual, highway to the well. 
1022 Carolyn Fluehr-Labban. Ed. Against l,'lamie Extremism: The Writings of Sa 'Id al- 'Ashmawl (Gainesville, Florida: University 
Press of Florida, 2001), 54. 
1021 Q. 5:3. 
1024 Q. 4:161. 
10'5 Q. 2:275. 
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In the light of this completionlperfection of religion through Islam and in the light 
of the oft-ignored distinction between SharJ'a and fiqh, a new definition, Le., a new 
human perception of the divinely ordained Sharl' a may be posited: 
V.2.i. Islamic Shaii'a- New Definition 
Islamic Sharl'a, as a statement of legal principle, is the Divine Law of illicitness of 
divine intra-action and ex-nihilo creation (ribii) and licitness ofhuman inter-action 
(bay') in all spheres ofhuman activity. 
The definition of fiqh as a human understanding of the Divine Law remains 
unaffected: 
V.2.ii. Fiqh Definition 
AlI efforts to elaborate details of the law, to state specifie norms, to justify them 
by reference to revelation, to debate them, or to write books or treaties on the law 
are ex amples of fiqh. The word connotes human and specifically scholarly activity. 
By contrast, sharl'a refers to God's law in its quality as divine . ... Practitioners of 
fiqh try to discover and give expression to the sharJ'a. For Muslims, the sharJ'a 
evokes loyalty and is a focus of faith; fiqh evokes at best respect for juristic 
scholarship and for a literary tradition [italics mine] .1026 
V.3. Maq~id al-Shaii'a - Identification 
To be of immediate relevance, the divine SharJ'a (way) must have humanly 
cognizable content, purpose (maq~ad. pl. maqii~id), positive enabling mechanisms and 
punitive protective mechanisms. In terms of the "way" metaphor, what is required for a 
complete definition of Sharl'a is: (a) a road; (b) a destination; (c) road signs; and finally 
(d) road regulations/punishments. Not known directly from the Qur'an, the content of 
the SharJ'a, Le., the road, is subject to interpretation and has been dealt with above,1027 
culminating in a new posited definition as the divine law of ribii and bay'. The purposes 
(maqii~id) of the SharJ'a, Le., its destination, also not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an, 
have been posited by al-Ghazali and al-Shatibl, but both expositions are subject to 
serious eritieism, bclow. The positive enabling meehanisms, Le., the road signs, again 
not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an, have been confused with the maqii~id of the 
SharJ'a by al-Ghazali and al-Shatibl. AlI that is known definitive1y from the Qur'an and 
1026 Nonnan Calder, "Law", in The Oxford Encyclopedia ofthe Modem lslamic World, cd. J. Esposito, (Oxford University Press, 
1995), Il,450. 
1027 Sec V.2., above. 
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the Sunna are the punitive protective mechanisms of the Sharl'a, Le., the iJudiid 
punishments. 
al-Shatibl, like al-Ghazal1, offers a taxonomy of the existential purpose or maqii~id 
al-Shari'a comprising three legal categories of qariiriyyiit (necessities), iJiijiyyiit (needs), 
and taiJsiniyyiit (improvements). In the qariiriyyiit (necessities) category, he includes the 
five fundamental univers ais (al-kulliyyiit al-khams) ofpreserving life, property, progeny, 
mind and religion as the maqii~id al-Shari'a. 1028 The conceptual difficulty with this 
exposition is that these so-called fundamental universals are not ends in themselves. If 
they were, they would invite a model of eternity in this life, which is contrary to the 
divine declaration that man is on this earth only for a specified period.1029 These 
fundamentals, therefore, cannot be the purpose of the Shari'a. The preservation of life, 
for one, can not be a purpose of the Sharl'a. If it were, it would negate the divinely 
declared inevitability of individu al death and collective Doomsday (yawm al-qiyiima). 
AIso, if it were, there would be no provision for capital punishment in Islamic law. The 
crime ofmurder, which runs counter to preservation oflife, is not even a iJaddcrime. For 
another, the preservation of property cannot be a purpose of the Sharl'a. If it were, it 
would negate the clear and repeated divine requirement of ~adaqa/ zakiit that apparently 
diminishes rather than preserves property. It would also negate the divine requirement of 
abstinence from ribi that promotes the preservation of property. Similarly, the 
preservation of progeny can not be a purpose of the Shari'a. If it were, it would again 
negate the divine requirement of abstinence from ribi that, among others, promotes the 
preservation ofprogeny. In sum total, these fundamentals are not the maqii~id al-Shari'a. 
They are only the enabling mechanisms to achieve the maqii~id al-Sharl'a. What, then, 
are the maqi~id al-Shari'a? 
Sharl'a, as seen above,1030 is the Divine Law of illicitness of divine ribi (intra-
action and ex-nihilo creation) and licitness ofhuman bay' (inter-action) in all spheres of 
human activity. The maqii~id al-Sharl'a, therefore, are the preservation and successful 
operation ofthese two models of divine intra-activity and human inter-activity. A living 
1028 Abiî Is~aq Ibrahim Shalibl, al-Muwiifàqiit fi lf,çiïl al-A1;kiim, cd. M. Mu~yl al-Dln 'Abd al-l:famld, 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba'a! 
Mul)ammad 'An Subay~, 1970), Il, 4 ff, quotcd in l:Iallaq, Hiçtoryoflslamic Legal Theories. 168. 
1029 Q. 2:36. 
1030 Sec V.2.i. p. 295, abovc. 
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human being, until death, requires only the remaining four of the five fundamentals, Le., 
the provision at his disposaI of his property, progeny, mind and religion in order to 
operate successfully, and of his own free will, the human inter-active model and avoid 
the divine intra-active model. These four fundamentals are thus only the enabling 
mechanisms to achieve the maqii.sid al-SharJ'a which, as posited, consist in the 
preservation and successful operation of these two models in their proper spheres. 
Significantly, the protective mechanisms of the SharJ'a - lJudiid punishments - also 
cater only to these four enabling mechanisms, to the exclusion of the preservation of life 
itself (murder is not a lJadd, but a qi~ii~ - retaliatory punishment - crime). 
Accordingly, the following definitions emerge: 
V.3.i. Maqii~id al-Shaii'a- New Definition 
The maqii~id al-SharJ'a are the preservation and successful operation of the two 
models of divine intra-activity and human inter-activity. 
V.3.ii. Enabling Mechanisms of Maqii~id al-Shaii'a- New Definition 
The enabling mechanisms to achieve the maqii~id al-SharJ'a are the provision of 
property, progeny, mind and religion. 
V.3.iii. Protective Mechanisms of Maqii$id al-Shaii'a- Traditional Definition 
The protective mechanisms to achieve the maqii~id al-SharJ'a are the lJudiid 
punishments. 
V.4. Insiin K8mil(perfect/Universal Man) - New Definition 
The above observations on the SharJ'a, its purposes, and its enabling and 
protective mechanisms, also throw a new light on the concept of The Perfect Man. 
The Perfect Man has been variously defined in terms of the pantheistic monism of 
the Creator (al-lfaqq) and the creature (al-khalq) as complementary aspects of Absolute 
Being,1031 or specifically as unit y of existence (walJdat al_wzljiid),1032 or again specifically 
as a copy (nuskha) of God,1033 in terms of man's divine and human traits,I034 in terms of 
1011 l;Iussain b. Man~ür al-l;IaIlaj (d. 309/922), Kitiïb al-Tawiisln, cd. L. Massignon, p. 129, quotcd in Shortcr Encyclopcdia ofl.~/am, 
170. 
1032 Mul)yl al-Dln b. al-' Arabi (d. 638/1240), Fu,~ii.\· al-Ifikam, ch. 1, quotcd in Shortcr Encyclopcdia of/sIam, 170. 
lOB, Abd al-Karim al-JiIi, quotcd in Encyclopcdia ofl~/am (New Ed.), 1241. 
1034 David B. BurrcIl and Nazih Daher (tr.), al-Ghaziï/J: The Ninety-Ninc Bcautiful Namcs ofGod. AI-Maq,l'ad al-A.miï fi SharlJ Asmiï' 
Alliih al-Ifusniï (Cambridge: Thc Islamic Texts Society, 1992), vii-vii. 
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his centrality in and superiority over aH creation,1035 in terms of his innate superiority 
over animaIs and his innate outer and inner human qualities (a1;san al-taqwlmj,1036 and in 
terms of his innate or individually gifted divine qualities. This Perfect Man has been 
equated with Adam, Mu4ammad,1037 the ~ufi saint (kamil al-tamm)/038 the prophet and 
the messenger. Is the title of Perfect Man limited to these individuals, or, as posited by 
Ibn al-' ArabI, is every man capable of becoming a Perfect Man, and, if so, what makes a 
man the Perfect Man? 
Although the specifie term Insiin Kamil does not occur in the Qur'an, the closest 
Qur'anic description of "perfection" is "best of moulds" or "fairest of stature" (a1;san al-
taqwlm),1039 which refers more to "excellence" than "perfection." The Qur'an, on the 
contrary, speaks of the "imperfections" of man, describing him as, weak,1040 helpless but 
ungrateful,1041 un jus t, unthankful and sinful,l042 hast y, impatient/043 rebellious,l044 and 
argumentative. I045 These traits, together with the etymology of ''insan''which equates it 
with "oblivion and forgetfulness," clearly negates any concept of the physical perfection 
of man. On the other hand, The Qur'an speaks ofman's leading and preferential position 
over aH creation by referring to his tashkJr (placing everything in the service of man),1046 
to his khilafa (his choice as vicegerent on earth),1047 and to his amana (his acceptance of 
responsibility for trusting of the faith).1048 But these processes refer to man's mastery of 
the universe, and not in any way to his own perfection. 
Empirically, man has qualities of perception and the use of reason/judgment not 
possessed by animaIs. He also has sorne divine qualities: he has the Divine Spirit 
breathed into hi m, he is created in the image of God, and the chosen ones among men 
have been blessed with the exalted station of sainthood (walaya), prophethood (nubiïwa) 
and messengership (risala). But all these qualities are an indication of divinely bestowed 
"ns MUQy1 al-D1n ibn al-'Arab1, Jnshii' al-Dawii'ir, 22. 
")),, Fakhr al-D1n al-Raz! (d. 60611209), quoted in Encyclopcdia of'l~/am (New Ed.), 1239. 
1037 Mul)yi al-Dln ibn al-' Arabi, FutïilJiit, quoted in Encyclopcdia ofl~/am (New Ed.), 1240. 
"no Abu Yazld aH3ispiml (d. 2611!l74), quotcd in Shortcr lJl1cyclopcdio ol'J,.lom, 170. 
1039 Q. 95:4. 
1040 Q. 4:28. 
1041 Q. 10:12; 39:8, 39:49. 
1042 Q. 14:34. 
1041 Q. 17:11; 70:19. 
1044 Q. 46:6. 
104' Q. 18:54. 
1046 Q. 22:65. 
1047 Q. 2:30. 
1048 Q. 33:72. 
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superiority and not of completeness or perfection. On the other hand, as Ibn 'ArabI also 
puts it "it is not necessary for one who is perfect to be superior in everything and at 
every level."'049 Conversely, it can be said that it is not necessary for one who is superior 
to be perfect. 
By definition, a thing is said to be "perfect," not necessarily when it is superior to 
something else, but only when it conforms to certain specifications and requirements, 
both by design and by action. In the case of man, he has been created with certain 
physical and spiritual traits (design specifications) and with a purpose (requirements). 
The concept of perfection (of man), therefore, has to be viewed not in the context of 
physical and lor spiritual superiority over other creation, but in the context of man's 
recognition of, and his ability to comply with, the design and the purpose of his creation. 
Man can become the "Perfect Man" only when, acting in consonance with his design, he 
complies fully with the purpose of his creation. Perfection is conformity and the Perrect 
Man is the Conforming Man. Contrary to al-Razl's idea,1050 man has a purpose and a 
determined function (wa-?llà mu'ayyana), which is to conform fully to the purpose ofhis 
creation. The Qur'an only specifies what not the purpose of creation is: the universe, 
including man, is created: "not in vain,"1051 "not in play,"'052 "not as pastime,"I053 and 
"not for naught."1054 Moreover, the Qur'an also says that man could be replaced by 
sorne new creation with ease. I055 It does not reveal what is the purpose of creation 
beyond stating generally "creation in truth,"I056 "creation for His worship"1057 and 
specifically "creation in pairs."1058 Based on all Qur'anic evidence, it was posited above 
that the purpose of the creation of man is conformity with the inter-active, duality mode 
of action and the avoidance of the intra-active, singularity mode of action. Therefore, 
1049 Ibn' Arabi, Fu,~ii,~ al-f:likam, cd. Abiï al- 'Alii 'Afifi(Cairo: 1946),62-63, quotcd in Masataka Takeshita, Ibn 'ArabJ:~ Thcory of 
Thc Perléct Man And Its Placc in Thc History oflçlamic Thought (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia 
and Africa, 1987),5. 
1050 As quotcd in E1~ew Ed.), p. 1238, il was Fakhr al-Dln al-Razî's idea that man, unlike the angcls and the beings which arc 
infcrior to him, has no dctcrmincd function (wE1?Jfà mu'ayyana). This conforms to thc anthropological vicw that whilc man's 
knowlcdgc is acquircd in slow dcgrccs, his progrcss is unlimitcd, in supcriority 10 the animais whose knowledgc is acquircd by 
instinct (iIIJiim) and evcn to the angels whose knowlcdgc and actions are limitcd (mahJdiïd). 
1051 Q. 38:27. 
1052 Q. 21:16. 
lOS) Q. 21:17. 
1054 Q. 23:115. 
1055 Q. 14:19-20. 
1056 Q. 44:39. 
1057 Q. 51:56. 
1058 Q. 6:144; 13:3; 20:53; 26:7; 31 :10; 36:36; 39:6; 42:11; 43:12; 50:7. 
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perfection being conformity, the Perfect Man is the one who conforms to this purpose of 
his creation. 
Perfect Man - New Definition 
The Perfect Man is one who conforms to the design and purpose of his creation, 
and to the princip le of divine law (Sharl'a), Le., to protect and implement the 
concept of divine walJdiiniyya (singularity) and human tathniya (duaHty), through 
abstention from rubiibiyya and observance of bay'iyya. This Perfect Man is also 
the Univers al Man. 
V.5. Islamic Civil Law - Modifications 
Five items of Islamic civil law - lfaliil and lfariim Criterion, Fiqh Repertoire on 
Ribii and Bay~ lfiyal, J?ariira and lfiija, and Ribii in Diir aJ-lfarb require 
identification/modification: 
V.5.i.lfalii1 and lfariim Criterion - Identification 
While indisputably the ultimate judge of iJalil / iJarim distinction is the Divine 
Legislator and His Prophet, as ordained in the Scripture and the Sunna, for purposes of 
juridical extrapolation and to cater to post-revelationary, newly emerging needs, the 
broadened human understanding of this criterion emerges to be conformity with the 
intra-action/ ex nihilo-action (ribawJ) and inter-action (bay'awJ) models - the former 
prohibited (iJarim) and the latter permitted (iJalil). 
V.5.ii. Fiqh Repertoire on Ribii and Bay'- Additions 
The posited new definitions of ribii and bay' suggest additions to the repertoire of 
Islamic fiqh on ribii and bay'. 
Any excess, continuation, or creation, in any sphere of human activity, resulting 
from an act of "divine imitability," manifesting itself through intra-action (leading to 
facjl - excess) or through ex nihilo-action (leading to khalq - creation from 'adam, 
triggered by nasJ'a - delay), falls under the rubric of the prohibited ribii and covers at 
least the following categories. 
300 
Categories of Ribii 
• Financial: 
• Commercial: 
• Economie: 
• Agricultural: 
• Labor: 
• Religious: 
• Political: 
• Social: 
• Cultural: 
• Biological: 
• Psychological: 
• Nutritional: 
AH Financial lntra-action (including contemporary notions 
of interest/usury (simple or compound, on consumption or 
production loans, benign or exploitative) regardless of the 
differentiations of quantum, purpose and consequence 
• Profit-Determination 
• Delayed Settlement of Transfer ofOwnership in any 
transaction, e.g., credit sale 
• Artificial luridical Corporate Personality 
Capitalism 
Ruman Claim to Agricultural Growth 
Delayed Wage Settlement 
P(M)atrilineal (Father-to-son) Leadership 
P(M)atrilineal (Father-to-son) Rulership 
• P(M)atrilineal Tribal, Feudal, Communal Leadership 
• lntra-Family Marriage 
• Master-Slave & Mother-Child Relationship 
Artistic Reality Reproduction 
• Masturbation 
• Romosexuality (gay and lesbian); 
Same-Sex Marriage 
• lncest 
• Adultery 
• Animal and Ruman Cloning 
• Cancer 
Demonstration of Oedipus Complex 
• Wine Consumption 
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• Engineering: 
• Virtual Reality: 
• Architectural: 
• Conceptual: 
• Philosophical: 
• Intellectual: 
• Literary: 
• Academic: 
• Post Modem: 
• Pork Consumption 
• Cannibalism 
Self-replicating Machines/Robots 
Virtual Reality Living Organism Replication 
Multi-Storeyed Structures 
Self-ness and Egoism 
Ra y, Personal Opinion 
Assumed Self-Emanation of Literary Work 
Scholarly Dogmatism 
Self-Consciousness 
By deduction, the permitted alternative, in a11 spheres of human activity, is bay', 
or inter-action. Accordingly, for the above named prohibited ribawl actions, the 
permitted bay'awl alternatives are: 
Divine-Simulation Models 
(Prohibited Ribawl Intra-Action) 
• Financial Intra-action (Interest/Usury) 
• Profit-Determination 
• Delayed Settlement: Ownership Transfer 
• Corporate luridical Personality 
• Capitalism 
• Human Claim to Agricultural Growth 
• Delayed Wage Settlement 
• P(M)atrilineal Caliphate/lmamate 
• P(M)atrilineal Political Rulership 
• P(M)atrilineal Tribal/Feudal Leadership 
• Intra-Family Marriage 
• Master-Slave/Mother-Child Relationship 
Human-Attuned Models 
Œermitted Bay'awl Inter-action) 
Financial Inter-action (MuriibaiJa) 
Need-Fulfillment 
Instantaneous Settlement 
Individual Human luridical Personality 
Islamic FinanciallEconomic System 
Divine Claim to Agricultural Growth 
Instantaneous Wage Settlement 
Random Merit-Based Seiection1059 
Random Merit-Based Selection 
Random Merit-Based Selection 
Inter-Family Marriage 
RibawlMode Permitted 
1059 System of wiliiyat al-faqJh (rule of the religious seholar) adopted in Iran. 
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• Artistic Reality Reproduction Imaginary Production 
• Masturbation Religiously Authorized Marriage 
• Homosexuality/Same-Sex Marriage Religiously Authorized Marriage 
• Incest Religiously Authorized Marriage 
• Adultery Religiously Authorized Marriage 
• Animal and Human Cloning Natural Reproduction 
• Uncontrolled Cell Multiplication No Human Alternative (Yet) 
• Demonstration of Oedipus Complex Licit Fantasies/ Associations 
• Wine Consumption Non-Fermented Drinks Consumption 
• Pork Consumption lfaliilMeat Consumption 
• Cannibalism Licit (i}aliil / kosher) Food Consumption 
• Self-Replicating Machines/Robots Heterogeneous-Production Machines 
• Virtual Reality Life Replication Virtual Reality Non-Life Replication 
• Multi-Storeyed Structures Single-Storeyed Structures 
• Self-nesslEgoism Self-Renunciation 
• Personal Opinion (Ra y) Consensus (Ijmii); Consultation (Shiïra) 
• Self-Emanating Literature Inter-active Literature 
• Scholarly Dogmatism Scholarly Concession 
• Self-Consciousness Se1f-Effaci veness 
The above listing is obviously an open-ended collection of Models to be 
continually expanded to accommodate newly identified ones. 
V.5.iiLlfiyaJ (Stratagems) - Permissibility 
Legal stratagems purportedly to evade the spirit but not the letter of the law (i}lla; 
pl. i}iyaJ, ai}iiyll), such as the fictitious acknowledgement of a larger than actual loan, 
double sale, and even the doctrines of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, were 
widespread in varying degrees in classical, medieval and contemporary Muslim financial 
practice, with I:Ianafi, Shafi 'i and even Malik! school sanction. 1060 
1060 Scc, for cxamplc, Vesey-Fitzgerald, Muhammadan Law, 197: "Numerous deviccs havc bccn sanctioned by the l;Ianafi and Shafi'I 
schools to cvadc thc prohibition [of usury]; and thc later l:Ianafi law cven shows traces of the doctrines of dammun cmcrgcns and 
lucrum ccs,~ans, Even the Miilikllaw of today recognizes the bai' bi'! walà under the name of thania. Commonest of ail devices, a~ 
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The commonest of aIl areas of application being ribii, these stratagems, particularly 
the so-called i}Jla of "double sale," are popularly claimed to have rendered the traditional 
interpretation of ribii almost obsolete. But, on the contrary, based on what has been 
posited in this study, as far as the essence of the Qur'anic injunction itself is concerned, 
the so-called stratagems (i}iyal) may in fact have served to implement rather than thwart 
the Qur'anic injunction. The Qur'anic juxtaposition of the prohibited ribii with the 
permitted bay' emphasizes the point that a particular process of increase (intra-active) 
is being prohibited as against a particular process of increase (inter-active) which is 
being permitted. Therefore, in the case of ribii, it is the underlying intra-active process of 
increase and not the manifest increase per se that is the focus of the prohibition. The so-
called stratagems (i}iyal), to the extent that they arduously and meticulously avoided the 
intra-active process of increase in generating the increase, actuaIly served the Qur'anic 
purpose rather than flouted it. The i}lla (trick) should, therefore, more appropriately be 
re-named as waslla (means). This is fully supported by the evidence of the Prophetic 
ai}iidJth where, with the expressly stated purpose of obtaining better quality dates, the 
Prophet prohibited their direct exchange with inferior quality dates (intra-activity), 
emphatically declaring it to be ribii, and recommended the sale of the inferior dates for 
money (inter-activity) to finance the purchase of those very superior dates with the 
received money (inter-activity).1061 The method or process of the transaction(s) was 
changed from intra-activity to inter-activity to comply with the Qur'anic requirement, 
but still to achieve the same statedpurpose. 
Based on the new definitions of ribii and bay', posited in this work, which are 
supported by the notion of the process of intra-activity and inter-activity, respectively, 
methods like double-sale that traditionally appear to circumvent the spirit but not the 
letter of the law, become perfectly and fully legitimate because they do not in fact 
circumvent the re-stated spirit of the law, which consists in the prohibition/observance 
everywhere, is a fietitious aeknowledgement by the borrower of a larger sum than he aetually rceeives. Sueh an iqriiris conclusive." 
Sec also, ibid., p. 214, n.3: "The l:Ianafi sehool (Imam Mul)ammad) permitted the waqfof anything sanetioned by eustom, including 
things only capable of a fictitious perpctuity, C.g., a chest of money for loans to the poor (to be rcpaid with other money). Such a 
waqfwas allowed to take interest if so direeted by the wiiqif, beeause the law against usury appHes between man and man, but 
obvious1y not between man and God." 
1061 The Baml- and Khaybar--dates a1;iidith. 
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of specified methods and not the rejection/acceptance of the results (excess in both 
cases) per se. This so-called l]JJa (trick) becomes a wasJJa (legitimate me ans) instead. 
V.5.iv. IJariïra (Necessity) and lfiija (Need) Doctrines - Inapplicability 
The doctrines of qariira (necessity) and J;ifja (need), with the general sanction of 
the Qur'an, have been applied as a source of law (u~iiJ al-fiqh). In relation to the 
prohibition of ribiï, various fatiiwii have been issued by modern jurists sanctioning 
different forms of ribiiin differing cases ofnecessity and need. 1062 
If the ration ale (J;ikma) of ribii prohibition is exploitation and/or injustice, as 
conventionally albeit indefensibly held, the application of the doctrines of necessity and 
need to the injunction of ribii-prohibition may be justified. But, when the ration ale 
(l]ikma) of ribii-prohibition is shirk (idolatry/polytheism), as is being posited in this 
study, there cannot be any justification whatsoever for sanctioning the human practice 
of ribiï, for shirkis the only sin that Allah will never permit, tolerate or pardon.1063 
The doctrines of qariira and J;iija, as applied to ribii-permissibility thus become null 
and void. Therefore, any human act/thought resulting from intra-action and/or ex-nihilo 
creation in any field cannot be condoned on grounds of qariiral J;ifja. And, in any case, 
the relaxation of prohibition on account of qariiral l]ifja - that too without will fuI 
disobedience or transgressing due limits - is restricted specifically only to the eating of 
dead animaIs, blood, flesh of swine and slaughter in any name other than that of 
Allah. 1064 The juridical extrapolation of this specifie concession into a general 
concession, covering ribii as weIl, is questionable in the first place. The identification 
of shirk as the rationale of ribawJ-proscription makes this questionable extrapolation 
absolutely out of the question. 
V.5.v. Ribiiin Diir aJ-lfarb - Impermissibility 
The permissibility of ribawl dealings in the diir al-J;arb (enemy territory) between 
its inhabitants and Muslims, opined by Imam Abu I:Ianlfa and al-Shaybanl on the 
1062 Vesey-Fitzgcrald, Muhammadan Law, 13: "[a] ... revolutionary doctrine [in l:Ianafi law] is that ofneeessity. There arc Qoranie 
[sic] texts whieh show that nccessity is sometirncs a valid excuse for the non-performance ofrcligious duties .... ifthere is no other 
rncans offinaneing our livclihood cxcept sueh an infraction of the rule against usury as the baj' br! walà wc may borrow and 
c conversa Icnd on such terms .... this subversive doctrine has been but sparingly applied." 
1063 "Verity! Allah forgives not (the sin of) setting up partners in worship with Him, but He forgivcs whom He plcascs sins other than 
that, and whocver sets up partners in worship with Allah has indced straycd far away." - Q: 4:116. 
1064 Q. 2:173. 
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authority of Mak4iil,I065 and later also by Shah 'Abdul 'Azlz and contemporaneously by 
Dr. Tahir Qadri in Canada, would automatically stand annulled with the identification of 
shirk as the ration ale (iJikma) of the divine prohibition of ribawl dealings. If ribii is shirk, 
it is simply prohibited regardless of location - exceptions being inadmissible outright. It 
is beyond comprehension how such stalwarts of Islamic law could have sanctioned this 
exception in the face of the Prophetic iJamth equating ribii with shirk They were, in 
effect, inadvertently of course, sanctioning the practice of shirk by Muslims in the diir 
al-lJarb. The inhabitants of diir al-lJarb may be mushrikiin, but who can permit Muslims 
to join that club? These authorities at least owe an explanation for not seeking to 
discover the true iJikma of rib&-prohibition. 
V.6. Islamic Criminal Law 
Islamic criminal law requires justification for lJudiid punishments and extended 
application for Qur'anic and ta'zJr punishments for indulgence in ribiï, as outlined 
below: 
V.6.i.lfudiid Punishments - Justification 
In Arabic terminology, /limii (lit. sanctuary) is the grazing ground reserved for 
one's cattle, where grazing by others' cattle is prohibited. The Prophet is reported to 
have said: "Every king has a iJimii [sanctuary]and the iJimii of Allah are those of His 
boundaries (iJudiid), the stepping into of which has been declared illegal (iJariimj."1066 
Now, as has been postulated above, this iJimii of Allah is the divine domain of 
singularity (ribawl intra-activity), while the iJimii of man, so to speak, is his divinely 
ordained domain of duality (bay'awl inter-activity). Man is supposed to operate strictly 
within the bounds of his domain. The maqii$id aJ-SharJ'a and its enabling and protective 
mechanisms are in fact designed, as shown above,1067 to enable man to operate within 
this domain. Moreover, the very test of the temporal success of man on this Earth is his 
willingness, capability and actual performance in negotiating this domain. Just as the 
traditionally posited maqii$id aJ-Sharl'a are in fact the enabling mechanism, the iJudiïd 
punishments are the prohibitory or protective mechanism to enable man to negotiate his 
10(,5 al-Sarakhsl, a!-Mabsii!, XIV, 56, Bab a!-,~arffJ dar a!-IJarb. 
I(lM Sahih BukharJ [ hadith no. 49. 
I!l67SC'C V.3., p. 295' if., abovc. 
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domain successfully. Any thing which denies man his domain and forces him into the 
only alternative divine domain, J;imii or J;udiid of Allah, has to be stopped through the 
severe st of punishments, which are the essence and content of the Islamic J;udiid laws. 
Just how the J;udiid punishments perform this dual role of promoting immersion in the 
human domain and preventing transgression into the divine do main will be shown below 
presently. 
There are seven named J;udiid crimes, and associated severe punishments, in 
Islamic law: Siiriqa (theft), lfiriiba (armed robbery, terrorism, corruption), Shurb 
(drinking intoxicants), Zinii' (illicit sexual intercourse), Ridda (apostasy), Qadhf(false 
accusation ofillicit sexual intercourse) and Baghy(rebellion).1068 
The general SharJ'a raison d'être is held to be the preservation and supremacy of 
the rule of law. The special raisons d'être of the J;udiid are held to be incapacitation, 
moral education and retribution. The Qur'an specifically provides for the punishment of 
execution, crucifixion, amputation of hands and feet, and exile for those who wage war 
against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land. 1069 
The question arises: How exactly do the offences behind the named punishments 
disrupt the human domain and at the same time infringe upon the divine do main? How 
can, for example, theft - a social offence - be connected with the l;udiïd (l;imii) of Allah? 
The standard explanation for theft being a J;add is that theft disrupts societal peace, 
harmony and well-being. While this explains how the human domain is disrupted, it does 
not explain how the divine domain (l;imii of Allah) is infringed upon. The full 
explanation lies elsewhere. 
The crime of theft (siiriqa) and armed robbery (l;iriiba) prevent or restrict man 
from his economic capability to indulge in bay' (inter-action) by depriving him 
completely or partially of resources to work with. Operation of the duality model 
(bay'awl mode) on earth and its promised introduction in the Hereafter, after its earthly 
successful operation based on human free will, is the Divine Will. Therefore, anything 
that disrupts the divinely willed but humanly free-willed duality model is a transgression 
in both the human and divine domains. Moreover, disruption of the l;aliil bay'awl order 
10", Octailcd in Appcndix 9. 
1069 Q. 5:33. 
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may lead to a purely lJariim ribawlorder. Hence the lJadd crime and the seemingly severe 
punishment oftheft and robbery. 
It may be argued that the moral crimes of theft and robbery also prevent man from 
indulging in the sin of ribiiby depriving him ofresources to lend usuriously. But a moral 
crime cannot be permitted because it prevents another crime or sin. Therefore, in spite of 
this possible beneficial effect, theft and robbery continue to be classed as lJadd 
Similarly, the act of drinking intoxicants (shurb) could deprive man of an his 
capabilities to distinguish between bay'awl and ribawl modes of living, thus disrupting 
both domains. Moreover, fermentation inherent in khamr renders it intra-active and 
therefore ribawl - an incursion in to the divine domain. Hence its classification as a 
lJadd 
Likewise, illicit sexual intercourse (zinii') and false accusation thereof (qadhf) 
interfere with the integrity of the biological bay'awl mode of living. Hence their 
classification as lJadd 
Similarly, although rebellion (baghy) is not a unanimously agreed upon lJadd 
among the madhiihib, its justification as lJadd could be the general disruption it causes to 
societal order, including foremost the bay'awl order. 
Lastly, apostasy (ridda) is a total retraction of belief, both in the divine ribawl 
order and the human bay'awlorder, and hence a dent in both, and therefore a lJadd As in 
the case of shirk and ribii, the Qur'an does not provide any lJadd punishment for ridda. 
The lJaddpunishment of death for ridda is only Sunnaic. The Qur'anic rationale could be 
that the "rebel of the system" would be meted out other-worldly punishments more 
severe than the temporallJudiid 
More pertinently for this thesis, the question is why the sin of ribii itself, which is 
tantamount to operation in the divine domain of intra-activity, does not attract any of 
the lJudiid punishments? The answer could be that if man chooses to attempt to operate 
in the divine domain, he has signed off any connection with his own human domain. He 
is no longer a participant in the temporal test of successful operation of the duality 
model. He no longer needs any preventive or protective measures to keep him in his 
do main and out of the divine domain. He has already thrust himself into the divine 
domain. He has already failed the test of successful operation of the duality model by 
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not participating in it in the first place. TemporaliJudiïd punishments - preventive and 
protective - do not apply to him at a11. God will deal directly with this "rebel of the 
system"1070 through something more severe and appropriate: total annihilation through 
war from God, Satanic insanity, and eternal He11fire. Hence the special Qur'anic and 
Sunnaic treatment of the sin of ribii, and its non-inclusion in the iJudiïd punishments. 
Although exempted from iJudiïd punishments, however, the sin of ribii not only attracts 
the other-worldly punishments, but even after repentance, it carries with it 
accountability and possible punishment for the past, as declared in Q. 2:275 - "their 
matter [past ribiiJ is for Allah to judge." This stipulation of accountability and 
punishment for both the pre- and post- Revelation actions is a unique feature of the sin 
of ribii. 
In commenting upon what he ca11s "minimal Islam" (the five pillars) and "negative 
or punitive Islam" (the iJudiïd punishments), Fazlur Rahman states: "actua11y there was 
nothing theoretical at a11 to link these various items together."1071 Obviously, he was 
completely missing the theoretical and unifying theme ofthis dissertation. 
V.6.ii. Ribii Punishments - Application 
The acts/thoughts in various human fields named in V.5.ii., above, are aIl intra-
active, Le., ribaw1. Therefore, a11 of them attract not only the Qur'anica11y ordained 
punishments for ribii - evil touch of the Devil equating to insanity (Q. 2:275), 
deprivation of A1Iah's blessing equating to destruction and extermination (Q. 2:276), 
war from Allah and His Messenger (Q. 2:279), loss of beHef (kufT) (Q. 2:276), and 
Eternal He11fire (Q. 2:275) - but also accountability for the pasto 
Additiona11y, by the same token, the minority opinion-based ta "zJrpunishments for 
financial ribii - dissuasion, imprisonment, and eventual death - also become equa11y 
applicable to a11 the other above-named ribawJ actions. 
1070 Sura 74 is very specifie and graphie about it: After stating: "And give not a thing in order to have more" (74:6), il continues very 
pointedly: "Leavc Mc Alone with whom 1 created Alonc (74:11); And then granted him resourees in abundance (74: 12); And children 
to be by his sidc (74: 13); And made life smooth and comfortablc for him (74: 14); Afier ail that he dcsires that 1 should give more 
(74:15); Nay! Verily, he has bcen opposing Our iiyiit (74: 16); 1 shaH oblige him to (climb aslippcry mountain in the Hellfire callcd al-
sa'ud, or) faee a severe torment (74: 17); 1 will cast him into Hell-fire (74:26); And what will make you know what Hell-fire is? 
(74:27); Over it arc ninetcen (74:30); And Wc have set nonc but angc\s as guardians of the Fire. And Wc have fixed thcir number 
(nineteen) only as a trial for the disbelievers ... (74:31). 
1071 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modcmity, 31. 
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V.7. Islamic Commercial Law - Reconsideration 
The basis of Islamie financial law and four specifie items, Le., Financing Modes, 
Credit Sales, Profit-Determination, and Corporate Legal Personality require 
reeonsideration in the light of the researeh findings. 
V.7.i. Basis ofIslamic Business and Finance - Reconsideration 
A conceptual research problem, affecting both theory and practice, is the question: 
What is the positively ordained basis of Islamic business and finance? What is clear is 
that the stated Qur'anie requirement is not that of a form of "business organization," 
e.g., partnership, but of a form of "business transaction," Le., bay' (exchange ).1072 It is 
genera11y held that the implementation of Islamic banking and finance requires 
profit/loss-sharing as a replacement for interest and as the basis for interest-free 
banking.1073 But the repeated use of the foundational terms "interest-free" and 
"profit/loss-sharing" creates imprecision in the contemporary literature on the 
requirements of the Islamic financial system, both for the "prohibited" and the 
"permitted" components. Calling it "interest-free" narrows down the scope, and 
"profit/loss-sharing" confuses the "me ans" with the "ends" of the system. A review of 
the relevant Qur'anie verse and Prophetie iJadith clarifies this very crucial point: 
Q. 2:275, declaring ribii (excess from intra-action and from delay) to be iJariim 
(prohibited) and bay' (sale, exchange) to be iJaliil (permitted), and the famous ribawl-
commodities iJadith, elaborating the prohibited and the permitted methods of exehange, 
represent the most complete enunciation of the Islamie eommercial/finaneial theory. But 
both these rich sources have been misinterpreted so far. 
The foundational term "interest-free" as the sole goveming basis of the Islamic 
financial system is problematic because, first of a11, Islam requires the prohibition of 
ribii, and as explained lexically and eontextually, not just ofwhat is termed as "usury" or 
"interest" in modem parlance. This distinction is also a11uded to in the hermeneutical 
analysis above. Islamie finance is not synonymous with, but is indeed mueh wider than, 
interest-free finance. As already explained above, in the Arabic language, from the root 
1072 Q. 2:275. 
J073First suggested by Dr. Mul)ammad 'Uzair, a contcmporary scholar, Islamic financc thcorist, and formcr Profcssor of Business 
Finance and Dircctor of the Institutc of Business Administration, Karachi University, and a senior collcaguc of this writcr at this 
Institutc, in his An Outlinc offntcrcst-Icss Banking (Karachi: Raihan Publications, 1955). 
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r.b. W., the definite noun al-ribii means "excess" (which partially incorporates financial 
excess), and the derived verbal Form III, riibii, with the associated verbal noun 
muriibatun, is assigned the lexical and technical meaning of practicing usury .1074 But the 
other derived verbal Forms l, II, IV and V have the lexical meaning of "to grow," "to 
rear, bring up, educate," "to make grow," and "to be brought up, bred, raised," 
respectively.1075 lnterestingly, in the ribii-prohibitory verses,1076 the Qur'an employs the 
definite noun al-ribii, or the indefinite noun ribii, both nouns meaning "excess"; but the 
derived verbal Form III, riibii, and its associated verbal noun muriibatun, meaning "to 
practice usury," has no t, specifically and exclusively, been used in any of the ribii-
prohibitory verses. However, it does not mean usury/interest is not prohibited. The 
message is rather unmistakably loud and clear: ribii-prohibition goes beyond usury or 
interest. 
Not clear is the real source for the contention that the other foundational term 
"profit/loss-sharing" is the permitted basis of lslamic financial system. The above-
quoted Qur'anic verse clearly specifies bay' (sale, exchange) as the permitted (iJaliil) 
mode of exchange. Bay' is a mode of exchange of counter values. It means "to sell, or 
buy, something from someone for a priee," "to make a contract" and "to agree on the 
terms of a sale, conclude a bargain."I077 From this lexical meaning of bay' it is clear that 
the Qur'anic verse makes no reference to profit or loss or its sharing. After all, in a 
sale/purchase transaction, who will make a contract to incur a loss or to share a profit? 
Bay', by definition, is not a process of sharing; on the contrary, it is a process of 
negotiation, of exchange, of inter-action of counter values. Historically, it is true that 
participation (profit/loss-sharing) has been in use since pre-Islamic times in 
juxtaposition to lending as a business practice. But this has nothing to do with the 
essence of the Islamic business requirement, which is simply bay'. Again, it is reported 
that the Prophet himself and his Companions engaged in participation 
(mushiirakalmucjiiraba), profit/loss-sharing, as a business practice. But il must be pointed 
out that, if at all, they used this business practice not as an end in itself, but simply as a 
In74 Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictionary, 374. 
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Q. 2:275, 276, 278, 279, 3:130, 4:161, 30:39. 
1077 Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictiollary, 105. 
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means to enable the participation of individual non-trader savers in the ultimate goal -
the final sale transaction (bay'J with the buyer, dealing in permitted commodities of 
exchange. 
The Prophetie ribawl-commodities 1;.adJth makes the prohibited and the permitted 
foundation of the Islamic financial system absolutely clear. The gist of the 1;.adJth is that 
the Islamic financial system prohibits the realization of "excess" from an exchangc of 
similar commodities, and permits the realization of "excess" from an exchange of 
dissimilar commodities. But the first part of the 1;.adJth, "like for like [same quality] , in 
equal weights [same quantity] , from hand to hand [simultaneously, without delay: 
nasl'aJhas caused much scholarly confusion. Apparently, the instruction is to exchange 
the same quality, the same quantity, at the same time. Legitimately questioned is the 
incentive for any one for this kind of exchange of absolute similarity. But, as already 
explained above,1078 the point being missed is that, in fact, the 1;.adJth is not instructing, 
but rather prohibiting this exchange, not by a direct negative command of "do not do 
this," but by the indirect positive command of making the exchange meaningless and 
purposeless. Instead of saying, for ex ample, "do not smoke," it is saying "smoke without 
lighting the cigarette." This prohibition includes but is not limited to interest/usury -
excess from exchange of money (gold/silver) for money (gold/silver). 
The second part of the 1;.adJth is clear. It is permitting the exchange (sale/purchase) 
of dissimilar commodities, in any manner, i.e., with excess. (profit), without excess 
(break-even), or with negative excess (loss). But still, the stipulation of hand to hand 
exchange (simultaneously, without delay: nasJ'a) applies, raising serious negative 
implications for the generally regarded permissibility of the practice of credit sale and 
advance purchase. 
One implication of this prohibited and permitted mode is that the ideal situation 
would be for each economic agent to have his own sale/purchase of services and traded 
or manufactured commodities. While both sale and purchase of services but only 
purchase of commodities is a common practice for every one, the sale of commodities 
(trading) may, however, not be suitable or even possible for every one. An obvious 
conclusion from the 1;.adJth analysis, above, is that, in order to refrain from the 
lO78 Sec p. 247, above. 
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prohibited exchange of similar commodities (including money), and, if necessary, to 
participate in the permitted mode of economic behavior, Le., exchange of dissimilar 
commodities in any manner, the individu al saver (investor), the mobilizer of savings 
(bank) and the seller of the non-monetary traded or manufactured goods (seller) must 
constitute one single economic and legal entity. The depositor relationship with the 
bank and the lender relationship with the commodity seller must disappear. Even a 
partnership relationship between the depositor, the bank and the seller, where each one 
retains its legal entity, is not sufficient. The money flow between these three 
independent parties - placing of savings with the bank, the bank's provision of the 
pooled savings to the seller, and the reverse flow of profits from the seller to the bank 
and then to the depositor - would constitute an exchange of money for money and any 
realized excess in this process would thus come within the ambit of prohibited ribii. The 
only permissible method that avoids riba would be for the three parties to be one legal 
and economic entity, so that each would be a direct party to the ultimate sale transaction 
between the seller and the ultimate customer and so that any realized profit would 
emanate from the exchange of non-monetary commodities for money - the requirement 
of the pristine Islamic financial system - and not from exchange of money for money as 
in the actuaJ currently implemented system. 
In the current versions of Islamic fin anci al theory and practice, the main 
recognized commercial investment mechanisms comprise (1) the murabaiJa contract, (2) 
the gara contract, (3) the mucJaraba contract and (4) the mushiiraka contract. 
The first two contracts, murabaiJa and gara, do not involve any exchange of 
homogeneity: in both, a commodity or property, or its usufruct, is exchanged for money. 
Renee, these contracts, when implemented in both letter and spirit, are purely non-
ribawl 
But in the last two contracts, mucJiiraba (or qiriicJ) and mushiiraka, both of which 
are profit-sharing contracts, and both of which certainly pre-date Islam (to the Roman 
commenda and the Jewish heter isqa contract), as will be elaborated below, an exchange 
of homogeneity takes place under the present Islamic legally recognized set up in which 
the fin anci al institution, acting as one participant in the mucJiiraba or mushiiraka 
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contract, is recognized as an independent artificial legal personality in juxtaposition 
with the other participants. 
There is no direct Qur'anic reference to muçfiiraba, though its linguistic root çf.r.b. 
is used fifty-eight times in the Qur'an. I079 The Qur'anic verses with admittedly a distant 
bearing on muçfiiraba denote "travel" or "travel for the purpose of trade."1080 But the 
Prophet and his Companions are said to have engaged in muçfiiraba ventures. I08l Saeed 
notes that "[a]ccording to Ibn Taymiyya, Muslim jurists declared the lawfulness of 
muqiiraba, on the basis of certain reports attributed to sorne Companions but there is no 
authentic iJadith on muçfiiraba attributed to the Prophet."lo82 Ibn ijazm (d. 45611064), of 
the Ziihir1 school, made the same point: "each chapter of fiqh has a basis in the Qur'an 
and Sunna except muçfiiraba for which we did not find any basis whatsoever."lo83 
According to Sarakhsl (d.483/l 090), the ijanafi jurist, muqiiraba was permitted "because 
people have a need for this contract."1084 Ibn Rushd (d.595/1198), the Miiliki jurist, 
"regards it as a special concession."1085 According to Qureshi, "[a]1though muqaraba is 
not directly referred to in the Qur'an or Sunna, it is a tradition sanctioned and practiced 
by the Muslims, and this form of commercial association appears to have continued 
throughout the early period of Islamic era as the mainstay of the caravan and long 
distance trade."1086 
Mushiiraka contract is commented upon by Saeed as follows: 
Mushiiraka (partnership) is the second basic Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) concept in Islamic 
Banking. The Qur'an has used the root of the term mushiiraka, that is, sh.r.k., approximately 170 
times, though none of these verses has used the term strictly in the sense of partnership in a 
business venture. Nevertheless, on the basis of several verses of the Qur'an, particularly the 
verses 4: 12 and 38:24, as well as sorne reports attributed to the Prophet and his Companions, 
jurists have justified the validity of mushiraka in business ventures.1087 
Tracing the Islamic usage of the mushiiraka contract, Saeed continues: 
Several sayings attributed to the Companions indicate that sorne form of partnership was 
practiced by the earliest Muslim community. These sayings merely refer to the existence of a 
1079 Sec, e.g., Q. 2:273; 3: 156; 4: 101; 5: 106; 73:20, quoted in Saccd, Islamie Hanking, 51-52. 
IOS0 Asad, Me.~;~·age orThe Qur'iiIl, 92, 905. 
1081 Ibn Hisham, al-Sirat al-Nabawiyya, Mu~tafii al-Sagga ct. aL (cds.). (Cairo: Mu~tafii al-Babî al-l;Ialabî, 1955),1, 188; Sarakhsî, 
Mabsüf, XXII, 18; Ibn Qudama, Mughnl, V, 26. 
1082 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmii' Fatiiwii Shaykh al-lsliim, XXIX, 101, quoted in Saeed, lslamic Banking, 52. 
1083 Shawkiinl, Nayl al-Aw!iir. V, 267. 
1084 Sarakhsl, Mabsüt, XXII, 19. 
lORS Ibn Rushd, Bidiiyat, II, 178, quoted in Saeed, lvlamie BllI1king, 52. 
1086 D.M. Qurcshi, "Modaraba and its Modem Applications." Joumalollslamie Banking llI1d Finance, Winter 1985, 7-24, quotcd in 
Saced, ll-Jamie Banking, 52. 
1087 Ibn Qudama, Mughnl, V, 3 ; Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnll, III, 355, as cited in Saccd, Mamie Banking, 59. 
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form of partnership, without indicating any terms, cOl).ditions or concepts which may have been 
associated with this partnership. Given that the se reports do not provide any details as to the 
valid terms and conditions of such partnership contracts as came to be known later in Islamic 
law, such terms and conditions as elaborated in fiqh would be the product of ijtihiid by Muslim 
juristS.1088 
This non-Qur'anic and non-Sunnaic origin and the indirect Qur'anic and Sunnaic 
construction of the muqiiraba and mushiiraka contracts, coupled with the absence from 
classical and medieval Islamic fiqh of the modern concept of artificial corporate legal 
personality casts serious doubts on the Islamicity of these contracts in their present 
form. 
As can be seen, in the CUITent muqiiraba and mushiiraka contracts, notwithstanding 
the contractual jargon, the basic business flow runs as follows: 
Money- Money - Goods -
DEPOSITOR ~ BANK ~ SELLER ~ CUSTOMER 
+-- Money +-- Money +-- Money 
This flow chart shows that only the relationship between the ultimate Customer 
and the Seller is one of an exchange of heterogeneity (goods for money). The 
relationships between the Seller and the Bank and between the Bank and the Depositor 
are both exchanges of homogeneity (money for money). Only the relationship between 
the Customer and the Seller is truly bay'awl. Even in the presence of the muqiiraba and 
musharaka contracts, the other two relationships are ribawl as they both involve an 
excess from exchanges ofhomogeneity, which is prohibited. And these two relationships 
will remain ribawl so long as each participant - the Seller, the Bank and the Depositor -
are recognized as separate legal entities. As long as they are separate legal entities, there 
will be an actual exchange of homogeneity among them, regardless of their stated paper 
contracts to share profit/loss and not charge or pay interest. As explained above, the only 
solution is to merge the three separate legal entities - the Seller, the Bank and the 
Depositor - into one legal entity as shareholders and not to recognize the corporation as 
a separate legal entity apart from the shareholders. This way, while intemally 
1088 Saccd, Islamic Banking, 59, rc1ying on Shawkanl, Nayl al-Aw.tiïr, V, 264-5, whieh posits that sorne forrn of partnership was 
praetieed by the earliest Muslim eommunity. 
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performing their own separate roles of provider of money, mobilizer of money and trader 
of goods, extemally they will act as one legal entity in their dealing with the ultimate 
Customer. This is the only way each one of them can directly share in the ultimate bay' 
with the Customer. And this is the only way to achieve internaI "revenue realization" 
rather than external "revenue distribution." The avoidance of external "revenue 
distribution" is the only way to avoid the exchange of homogeneity - investment and 
dividend between the bank and the depositor, and between the bank and the seller. 
This implies that the present participation arrangements between the investor, the 
bank and the business unit will have to be transformed into shareholding arrangements. 
It further implies that the concept of the separate legal entity of the corporation, as 
distinct from the shareholders, will have to be re-examined for its permissibility in the 
Islamic financial system and done away with. 
It is evident from the above analysis, that the simple replacement of interest by 
profit-sharing is not sufficient for the establishment of the Qur' aniS unna ordained 
Islamic financial system. The underlying concepts have deeper metaphysical, 
philosophical, social, economic, financial and legal connotations. A transformation on aU 
these fronts will be required for the implementation of this Divinely ordained system, 
both in letter and spirit. 
V.7.ii. Islamic Financing Modes - Reconstruction 
The contemporary Islamic financial theory and practice treats ijiira (leasing, 
renting), mushiiraka (active part nership) and mucjiiraba (sleeping partnership) as 
approved business/financing modes/contracts, whereas murabaiJa (cost-plus financing), 
though in extensive actual use, is juridically regarded at best as suspect and at worst as 
an outlawed mode/contract. 1089 But in the light of the findings above, only the murabaiJa 
and ijara contracts meet the requirement of exchange of heterogeneity and are therefore 
structurally bay'awl. The only constraint is that, to preserve the integrity of the 
heterogeneous exchange, the murabai}a contract must represent a genuine purchase and 
a genuine resale, and not just be a paper transaction. On the other hand, in the present 
1089 Outlawed altogether by the Judgment of the Shari'ah Appellate Bench of Pakistan Supremc Court of Dcccmber 23, 1999 
(Islamabad: Advanced Legal Studics lnstitute,www.nyazcc.eom" 2000), 532. 
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legal setting of artificial corporate legal personality of the seller, the bank, its 
shareholders, and its depositors, the contracts of mushiiraka and muqiiraba between these 
parties reflect an exchange of homogeneity and are thus rendered ribawl. Needless to 
say, these findings pose a serious challenge of re-evaluation and re-structuring for 
contemporary Islamic finance theory and practice. 
In contemporary scholarship, the attempted legitimizing argument for the 
mushiiraka and muqiiraba contracts, Le., that these were utilized by the Prophet and his 
Companions, is rebutted by the fact that in classical and medieval Islam there was no 
legal notion of the separate artificial corporate personality and therefore there was no 
exchange of homogeneity in these contracts at that time. The essential structural unit y 
of the trading caravan ensured that each participant of the venture participated virtually 
directly in the ultimate sale to the ultimate foreign customer - an exchange of 
heterogeneity: goods for money or goods for other goods, which then was truly bay'awl. 
But in the colonially implanted legal structure, the artificial legal personality notion 
renders the mushiiraka and muqiiraba contracts ribawi by introducing an exchange of 
homogeneity between separate legal entities into these contracts. 
The suspect nature of the muriibaiJa contract in contemporary scholarship derives 
from the apparent similarity of the end results of the loan contract and the muriibaIJa 
contract for the bank. It is argued that in both contracts, the bank's initial cash outlay is 
repaid in cash in excess and frequently in installments (with delay: nasi'a), thus 
allegedly rendering the muriibaIJa contract ribawl as well. But what is overlooked in this 
simplistic analysis is that in an interest-bearing loan contract there is direct exchange of 
homogeneity with excess, whereas in the muriibaIJa contract there are two constituent 
exchanges of its opposite, heterogeneity: first money for goods (between bank and 
supplier) and then goods for money (between bank and customer). If practiced 
genuinely, the muriibaIJa contract is truly bay'awl The Prophetie Baml-and Khaybar-
dates aIJiidith not only fully corroborate the muriibaIJa contract but also sanction what 
has erroneously been dubbed as the IJlla of double sale. However, as shown above, the 
provision of delayed payment (lump sum or in installments) in the muriibaIJa contract 
constitutes ribii al-nasJ'a through the process of ex-nihilo creation. 
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Furthermore, if the Islamic economic doctrine does not admit of the profit motive 
as discussed below, a11 three contracts - muriibai}a, mushiiraka and muqiiraba -will have 
to be re-worked to conform to the alternative need-fulfi11ment motive. 
V.7.iii. Credit Sales - Impermissibility 
Due to the occurrence of two instances of the prohibited ex-nihilo creation in 
delayed settlements of transfer of ownership, credit sales/purchases, which also involve 
delayed settlements, automatica11y stand prohibited for humans as ribawl Figuratively 
speaking, credit purchase is the prerogative of God alone Who has "purchased" from the 
believers their selves and their belongings in return for Paradise Jater. 1090 
V.7.iv. Profit-Determination - Impermissibility 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as currently visualized and formuJated admits the 
notion of profit (ribi}). Without direct Scriptural support, it posits this notion as the 
permitted alternative to the prohibited institution of interest (ribii). It regards profit-
sharing as the mainstay of Islamic finance. It recognizes the muqiiraba and mushiiraka 
contracts as the lega11y acceptable mechanisms of profit-sharing. But the muqiiraba and 
mushiiraka contracts certainly pre-date Islam and are not Qur'an/Sunna-sourced and 
based. The Qur'an and Sunna neither expressly permit nor prohibit profit and most 
certainly do not mention muqiiraba and mushiiraka as permitted profit-sharing 
mechanisms. The question, then, is: What is the legitimizing source and authority for the 
notion of profit and its sharing in Islamic law? 
The very derivation of the concept of profit from the concept of bay', in Islamic 
legal scholarship, is at best problematic. We are informed by the disciplines of 
Economics and Accounting that bay' (sale or exchange) per se does not generate a 
profit/(loss). For the determination of any profit (or conversely, 10ss), the sale has to be 
measured against an earlier purchase, using a single common measuring medium. Thus, a 
sale of a commodity for, say, 100 currency units, compared with the earlier purchase of 
that commodity for, say, 80 of the same currency units, generates a gross profit of 20 
currency units. The point to be noted is that it is the comparison of the currency units in 
the sale with the same currency units in the earlier purchase that determines a profit (or 
JO?O Q. 9:111. 
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loss). Had the sale of this commodity been for currency units, as in the above example, 
but the earlier purchase of this commodity been for another currency (foreign purchase) 
or for another commodity (bart er), the comparison of this other currency or other 
commodity with the currency of sale will not provide any measurement of profit/(loss). 
In other words, homogeneity of the transacting medium, in sale and earlier purchase, is 
essential for profit/(loss) determination. This condition makes profit/(loss) absolutely 
dependent, if not on a direct exchange of homogeneity, at least on a comparison of 
homogeneity. This comparison ofhomogeneity also requires singularity of the object of 
comparison, i.e., either a single object of comparison or, in case of multiplicity of 
homogenous objects of comparison, a physical identification of a single object of 
comparison. The absence of such physical identification gives rise to the accounting 
theory problem of applying costing assumption methods known as Last-in-First-Out 
(LIFO), or First-in-First-Out (FIFO), or Average-Costing. Whether it is the exchange or 
the comparison of homogeneity, in either case, however, profit/(loss) generation 
constitutes an intra-active process, Le. one agent acting upon or being compared with 
itself (same genus): money vs. more or less money, or an apple vs. a bigger or sm aller 
apple ofthe same variety. But a sale, by definition, is an exchange of one commodity for 
money or for another commodity (different genus). Thus, sale is an inter-active process, 
i.e., two different agents (human as weIl as non-human, in their own separate spheres) 
acting on each other. Therefore, in rebuttal of contemporary scholarship, it may be 
questioned as to how can an inter-activeprocess (sale) be synonymous with, or lead to, 
its diametrically opposed intra-active process (profit/loss)? In fact, this intra-activity of 
profit-generation raises a serious question about the very legitimacy of the concept of 
"profit" in Islamic law, because profit generation shares this feature of intra-activity 
with the prohibited ribi-generation. Profit-generation, by definition, is a growth of 
similarity, the process ofwhich is ribii and the product ofwhich is ribIJ. 
As already discussed above, Q. 2:275 dec1ares ribiito be iJariim (out ofbounds for 
human application) and bay' to be 1;aliil (permissible). Now, ribii (self-emanation) by 
definition has the quality ofboth intra-action and guaranteed excess generation, whereas 
bay' (exchange) by definition has the quality of inter-action and no provision, let alone 
guarantee, of excess generation. Bay~ by itself, can never generate growth. The quantum 
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of the exchanged commodities is always equalized in value by the "Just Price," whose 
setter, according to a Prophetie IJadith, is Allah (Alliih al-musii'ir).1091 However, if the 
Just Price is tampered with artificially (by hoarding), or ignorantly (by lack of market 
intelligence), or fraudulently (by unethical practices of short weights and measures, 
etc.), the equilibrium of the exchange is disturbed; hence the strict prohibition of such 
sharp market practices in Islam. Plausibly, therefore, this verse is prohibiting not only 
interest but also profit and permitting simple exchange for need-fulfillment. As against 
ribii, the process of bay' is not self-emanating because there can never be a true increase 
in an exchange transaction with Just Price in effect. The exchange is not self-
perpetuating because it is a process of replacement, not of an increase upon itself. 
Arguably then, in the context of sole divine ownership and mere human agency of aIl 
property, the governing principle of Islamic Economics and Finance is the motive not of 
profit-generation but of need-fulfillment. In this need fulfillment economy, devoid of 
profit, the incentive for the capitalist to provide his capital will come from 
compensation to him according to the complexity of the as set si services provided by his 
capital. Just as the handler of the assets/services is compensated for his manual labor, 
the technician for his technical skills, and the manager for his managerial skills, the 
capitalist will be compensated for the complexity of the asset/service provided by his 
capital. 
V.7.v. Corporate Legal Personality - Reconstruction 
As already pointed out above, classical and medieval Islamic fiqh did not 
recognize the concept of separate legal personality of the corporation as distinct from 
the shareholders. As Bernard Weiss states: 
Baber Johansen has emphasized the fact that in Islamic law the individual proprietor is the 
prototype of the legal person. 1092 .•. The proprietors are the human beings. ... [And] The 
proprietor is always an individu al. Islamic law does not know the concept of the corporate person 
and therefore do es not allow property to be owned by legal entities presided over by a changing 
personnel. It does provide for joint ownership, although it treats this arrangement strictly as a 
convergence of rights of individuals. 1093 
1091 Sunan Abii Diiwiid, Book No. 23, fjamth No. 3444: "Narrated Anas ibn Malik: The people said: Apostle of Allah, priees have 
shot up, so fix priees for us. He said: Allah is the one Who fixes priees, Who withholds, gives lavishly and provides, and 1 hope that 
when 1 meet Allah, none ofyou will have any c1aim on me for an injustice regarding blood or property;" also fjamth No. 3443. 
1092 Baber Johansen, "Secular and Religious Elements in Hanafite Law: Function and Limits of the Absolute Charaeter of 
Govemment Authority." In Islam ct Politiquc au Maghreb, edited by E. Gellner and J. Vatin (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1981),283-289. 
1093 Weiss, Spirit orlslamie Law, 159. 
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Weiss points out that joint ownership was the basis of a type of partnership called 
sharikat al-milk (proprietary partnership ).1094 
It was only with the imposition of Western legal regimes that contemporary 
Islamic jurists half-heartedly came to accept this notion of corporate pers on as 
permissible in Islamic commercial/financiallaw.1095 But as has been shown above,1096 this 
legal notion, by recognizing the corporation as a legal entity separate from the individual 
legal entity of each shareholder, makes financial transactions between them - the initial 
investment by the shareholder through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and the 
subsequent dividend distributions by the corporation - exchanges of homogeneity with 
ultimate excess between two independent parties, which according to Islamic law is a 
prohibited ribawJ transaction. Therefore, as explained above,1097 for purposes of Islamic 
commercial/financiallaw, the legal separation of the corporation from the shareholders 
will have to be discarded and prohibited so as to achieve internaI "revenue realization" 
rather than external "revenue distribution. " 
V.8. Suggested Elaborations 
There are many e1aborations of a foundational nature for the understanding of the 
dogma and law of Islam issuing from this research, given its finding that prohibition of 
intra-actionlex-nihilo action and permission of inter-action is the divine law for 
humanity and the essence of the dJn of Islam. The most significant of these elaborations 
are presented below. 
V.8.i. Perfection of Religion - Elaboration 
The Qur'an dec1ares the perfection of religion and choice ofIslam for mankind: 
... This day, 1 have perfected yOUf religion for you, completed My Favor upon you, and have 
chosen for you Islam as yOUf religion ... 1098 
Exactly what constitutes this "perfection of religion" is not elaborated either in the 
Qur'an or in the Sunna. An attempt was made above1099 in the context ofIslamic Sharl'a, 
to explain the understanding of this perfection as the first-ever and the last-ever 
In94 Ibid., n. 9, 159. Sec also Udovitch, Partnersbip and Profit, 17-39. 
11195 For a detailcd trcatment of the issue, sec Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazec, lslamie Law of Business Organization: Corporation 
(Islamabad: Intcmationallnstitute ofIslamic Thought and Islamic Rcscarch Institutc, 1998). 
1096 Scc p. 315, abovc. 
11197 Ibid. 
In9' Q. 5:3. 
In99 Sec V.2., above. 
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complete prescription: proscription of intra-action (ribawl action) and permission of 
inter-action (bay'awl action) in aIl fields ofhuman activity. 
V.8.ii. Islamic Articles of Faith - Elaboration 
The first article of faith in Islam, i.e., to profess belief in the absolute unit y and 
singularity of AŒih, is the comerstone of the religion. From the divine perspective, this 
profession of faith in the absolute unit y and singularity of AŒih is essential and has been 
constantly and prominently emphasized in Islamic scholarship as the concept of tawiJld 
But from a human perspective, the question is: How does this beHef in the singularity of 
Allah manifest itself in, and guide, the affairs of man? In light of this belief, how is man 
supposed to behave temporally? The only possible answer is that the essential beHef in 
the singularity of Allah operates in the human domain not directly but through its 
corollary and opposite: beHef in the duality of man (tathniya: creation in pairs). This 
beHef in the duaHty of man, which practically translates itself as bay'awl inter-activity, 
continually guides man in the conduct of aIl his affairs and thus continually reinforces 
his beHef in the singularity of Allah, which translates itself as ribawlintra-activity. This 
conclusion is based on the direct Qur'anic evidence wherein the Qur'an treats abstinence 
from riba as a matter of faith. 1100 
This first article of Islamic faith thus actually incorporates not only beHef in the 
singularity of Allah (tawiJld) but also beHef in the duality of man (tathniya). The 
statement of this first article of faith, as formulated by the theologians, might even be 
considered for rendering in an expanded version in order to specifically mention both 
divine tawiJld and human tathniya. 
V.8.iii. Islamic Pillars of Religion - Elaboration 
There are five, and according to one reckoning six, pillars of Islam, namely: 
(1) the shahiida (confession ofbeHefin AŒïh and His Messenger MUQammad), 
(2) faJat (ritual prayer), (3) fawm (Ramaqiin fasting), (4) zakiït (ritual charity), 
(5) iJajj (Mecca pilgrirnage), and, according to sorne, (6) jihad (struggle in the way of 
Allah). 
I!OO Q. 2:276, 278; 3:130; 4:161. 
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It might be asked that, if zakiit is indeed the antithesis of ribii (Q. 30:39) and 
therefore giving of zakiit and abstaining from ribii are synonymous in effect, why 
abstention from ribii is not even mentioned (as a pillar) and only zakiit accorded the 
status of a pillar of Islam? Surprisingly, the answer is that abstention from ribii, far from 
being absent from the list, is already a pillar of Islam and that too at an even loftier 
hierarchallevel than zakiit, since it forms part of the first and most fundamental pillar of 
shahiida. The first pillar reads partly: lii iliiha illii Alliih ... There is no god but God. This 
denial of gods is a denial of, among others, the exclusively Divine aUributes or essence 
of intra-activity, self-subsistence and self-emanation to any entities/concepts other than 
God. Ribii, being the essence of intra-activity, self-subsistence and self-emanation, is 
thus denied to anything other than God in this first pillar of shahiida. Not only is the 
ribii-prohibition thus embedded in the first pillar, but its divinely identified alternative 
bay'- permission is also, by extension, included therein. After all, as already explained 
above, this notion of the permissibility of bay' and the prohibition of ribii represents the 
completion, and selection, of the din ofIslam for mankind. lIOI 
Another point of elaboration is that, as borne out by the antithetical juxtaposition 
in Q. 30:39, zakiit is the negation of self-emanation inherent in ribii: it is the demolition 
of the base which could enable self-emanation. But, based on the limited technical 
meaning of ribii as a "financial increase," its opposite zakiit has also been rendered in 
the scholarship in its limited technical meaning of "financial extraction" - so much so 
that the fourth pillar of religion is expressed bluntly in Orientalist scholarship as a "2.5% 
financial tax." A financial tax, per se, has no place in matters religious. As demonstrated 
above,1I02 ribii applies to aIl spheres even beyond the financial. Hence, its antithesis, 
zakiit, also necessarily applies to aH spheres even beyond the financial. Just like 
abstinence from ribii, indulgence in zakiit is not limited to the financial domain: both are 
the practical denial of self-emanation in any domain - whether economic, social, 
cultural, political, even biological. The lexical meaning of zakiit is purification. Hence, 
even Muslim scholarship ho Ids that extracting (from the wealth) the 2.5% purifies the 
remaining 97.5%. This is at best a symbolic explanation. The purification inherent in 
1101 Q. 5:3. 
1102 Sec IV.4.i., abovc. 
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ribi-abstinence and zakit-indulgence is purification of the human soul through negating 
any attempt at self-emanation which is an act of shirk. Qur'anic frequent juxtaposition 
of ~aliit (prayer) with zakiit (purification) also supports this broader interpretation of 
zakit. Otherwise, why would the Qur'an put a spiritual matter and a non-spiritual 
temporal matter on the same level of prescription? 
V.9. Implications 
There are several broad implications of this new critical theory of normative 
behavior. However, only three most significant ones are examined here: 
V.9.i. Inter-Faith Understanding - New Basis 
The idea of inter-faith unit y is well put in this saying of Goethe: "If Islam means 
submission to God, we alllive and die in Islam's domain."II03 Likewise it may be said 
that if Islam means "conformism" to the divine law of ribii (divine intra-activity: 
tawlJJd) and bay' (human inter-activity: tathniya). then we aU live and die in Islam's 
domain. 
For it is c1ear that the prohibited intra-action (ex-sui creation and ex-nihilo 
creation) applies to aU human actions in aU faiths. Similarly, in the financial domain, 
interest-free finance rather than just being "Islamic Finance" is more appropriate1y 
"Monotheist Finance," while interest-based finance rather than just being "Western 
Finance" is "Polytheist Finance." 
Thus, it can be posited that, on a substantive non-ritualistic level, there is the 
possibility of common understanding among the revealed monotheist religions of the 
world on the divine proscription of aU forms of intra-active growth and ex-nihilo 
creation that is not the outcome of inter-active and instantaneous processes. In the 
economic sphere, this common understanding could provide the basis for an inter-active 
"Divine Economy"ll04 as a substitute for the contemporary intra-active Western financial 
system and the rather ùnproperly-structured Islamic financial system. In other spheres 
ofhuman activity, this common understanding could also provide a lit mus test ofhuman 
actions and thus be the foundation oftruly inter-active systems. 
1103 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832). 
1104 A tenu borrowed from D. Stephen Long, Divine Eeonomy: the%gy and the market (London; New York: Routlcdgc, 2000). 
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V.9.ii. Islamic Universality and Eternity- Implications 
This work has demonstrated that the prohibition of ribi and permission of bay' in 
Islam - and by backwards projection in Judaism and Christianity - is not a mere 
contextual or hence an outmoded historical prohibition/permission. It has also been 
demonstrated that this divine injunction is not restricted only to the financial domain 
but applies to aIl conceivable spheres of human activity. The eschatological dimensions 
of the resulting models of Divine Singularity and Human Duality have also been dilated 
upon. The divine prohibition of ribi and permission of bay' is, therefore, not a financial 
formula of limited contextual and antique import, but rather a univers al formula of 
eternal import to guide the totality of human existence - both here and in the Hereafter. 
This is a comprehensive demonstration and proof of the eternity of the laws of the 
Qur'an, which poet-philosopher Iqbal was seeking for the tajdid(renewal) ofIslam. II05 
V.9.iii. Modernity - Implications 
The response of modernity to the usury discourse essentia11y is that modem day 
bank interest is benign and there are State laws in a11 civilized countries to limit usury 
and prosecute the offenders. This is essentia11y what may be ca11ed a Limitation Model 
of usury based on exploitation as the rationale of usury prohibition. But, it has been 
demonstrated abovell06 that the rationale of usury (neshekh, tokos, ribi}prohibition is 
not exploitation but idolatry/polytheism (Arabie: shirk). In a monotheist milieu, one can 
not simply limit idolatry/polytheism; one has to outright prohibit it. 
Moreover, the precursors of modem Western banks, the Christian Loan-Banks (the 
montes pietatis) were origina11y meant to work on a non-profit basis; they were only 
forced to charge a small amount for maintenance of their administration. 1107 The 
modification to the Christian doctrine on usury only came first with Calvinism, then 
with Protestantism (both with the support of rich middle c1ass lenders) and fina11y with 
the Catholic Church. Il08 Therefore, ev en in the Western civilization - the cradle of 
modernity - usury/interest was equa11y prohibited as the gravest of sins initia11y and 
could regain that status prospectively. 
1105 "My beliefis that a person who eritically reviews the present system ofjurisprudenee from the Qur'anie point ofvicw and would 
thus prove the etemity of the laws of Qur' an will be the Mujaddid ofIslam" - Muhammad lqbal 
1106 Sec lV.2.ii.a., above. 
1107 Encyc/opacdia Judaica, CD ROM, s.v. "Moncy Lending", 5-6. 
1108 Nelson, ldca of UslllY, 73 ff. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The concept that appears today to be "the supreme of all Quaestiones Vexatae of 
Islamic law" - the Arabic ribii (growth), the Hebraic neshekh (bite/sting) and tarblt 
/marblt (growth/increase), the Syriac rebitha (growth), the Greek tokos (offspring), the 
Latin usura (use/enjoyment), the English usury/interest (usage charge), the Sanskrit 
/Hindi biyiij/vraddhi (increase), the Persian/Urdu sud (profit), the Egyptian ms (birth), 
the Sumerian mas (calves) - has indeed traversed a checkered path in the annals of 
human thought. After a very promising conceptual birth, its practical application has 
involved widespread acceptance, toleration, limitation, regulation, prohibition, 
modification, restriction, neglect, confusion, suppression, and finally revival. But one 
underlying theme that has remained constant throughout is that the conceptual 
application has been confined to the financial context only. 
The linguistic wisdom of antiquity provided a very fertile ground of "reproduction" 
for the development ofthis concept. But the first known Ancient Law Codes - including 
Greek and Roman law - ignored this underlying wider linguistic context and were 
structured exclusively around the financial context of the concept, merely taking a 
utilitarian approach by only regulating financial usury for the common good. Likewise, 
the philosophical formulations of the Greeks did reiterate this wider linguistic context of 
"reproduction" inherent in the concept and did theorize about the "(in)fertility" of 
money on grounds ofnaturallaw. But these venerable Greek philosophers wasted a very 
promising opportunity by confining themselves in their usury discourse, firstly, to the 
narrower concept of money only and, secondly, to the secular fortress of natural law, 
never stepping out into the ri cher pastures of theology. This early Greek restrictive 
approach that steered much of the course oflater Western thought on the subject served 
to stifle the logical growth of this concept. 
The ancient religions, again, in spite of a promising start of treating usury with 
contempt, in a demeaning manner, and as among the worst, if not the worst of sins, were 
limited by the lack of universal development and spread of their tradition and of the 
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notion. The usury concept, for them, thus remained confined to a mundane financial 
limitation paradigm. 
On the other hand, the Judeo-Christian tradition, although not constrained by any 
lack of univers al development and spread, and in spite of being blessed with divine 
revelation and occasional rabbinical/patristic/scholastic forays touching extreme 
theological heights, still did not contribute to the full development of the concept, 
constrained as it was by several other factors. In its potential contribution, this 
otherwise rich tradition was constrained primarily by the fact that the divine revelation 
of this concept in the Bible (marblt only) was only a partial stipulation of the ultimate 
complete religious code on the concept (ribii vs. bay' in the Qur'an). This scriptural 
restriction of the scope of the discourse to marbl! only was compounded by confining 
even the meaning ofthis sole guideline, marbl!, to its financial context only, to the utter 
exclusion of its broader meaning of "growth." Even the sole Biblical juxtaposition of the 
act of incest with the practice of interest - a pointer to a broader philosophical context 
for the seemingly limited financial notion - was not explored in later exegetical thought. 
A further constraint to potential development of the usury concept in this tradition came 
from the very nature of its scriptural prohibitions: their absolute concreteness and 
absence of universality - a case approach. This localized, less than universal, focus was 
further sharpened by an exegetical failure to link the Biblical usury texts with the 
Genesis texts that speak of "self-creation" ("making in awn kind; its seed in il; by their 
kind; in His image "J. Potential conceptual development was further hampered by the 
scriptural and exegetical adoption of an approach that represented an "extrinsic effect-
oriented" rather than "intrinsic cause-oriented" treatment of the concept. 
The potential development of the concept was initially further circumscribed by 
the Jewish notion of the "chosen community" and the Old Testament application of the 
usury prohibition to only the "brother" and not to the "ather." New Testament teaching 
did broaden this initial narrow focus by extending the application of the usury rule from 
"brother" to "other," but this was merely a communal extension and not a conceptual 
development of the notion in any depth and spread. Christian potential contribution to 
the usury discourse, initially, was structurally hampered by the nature of the usury 
teachings in the New Testament: unlike the prohibitory stance of the Old Testament 
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about usury, the mere recommendatory stance of the New Testament about its binary 
opposite charity. The absence of punitive measures in the Judo-Christian script ure and 
jurisprudence further hampered the potential flourishing of the usury discourse. 
Operating under these multi-pronged constraints, rabbinical thought did broaden 
the scope of the Torah prohibition from usury proper to the semblance of usury also, and 
did scale, albeit occasionally, theological peaks by associating neshekhlmarblt with 
idolatry. In the process, it broadened its treatment of the discourse from mere extrinsic 
effect-analysis to intrinsic characteristic-analysis. But the extent of further theological 
deve10pment of this usury-idolatry juxtaposition and its ultimate reflection in Jewish 
positive law, both in its depth and spread, requires further research. 
Patristic thought, on its part, faced with the absence of specifie New Testament 
usury-prohibitory guidelines and the apparent Deuteronomic double-standard of 
prohibiting usury to the "brother" but not to the "other," still had to re1y on the Old 
Testament teachings. But in the process, it did more than compensate for the initial 
handicap by not only re1ying on but even exceeding the Old Testament teachings, not 
just on moral but on theological plane as we1l. This influential thought stream denied the 
usurer eternallife, branded usury itse1f as a diabolical act, dilated on the inherent theme 
of eternal reproduction of usury, deemed usury to result from an "ev il union" unknown 
to nature which has the power to make sterile things fecund, and, in a very pointed 
incestuous equivalence, denounced usurers as a breed ofvipers that gnaw the womb that 
bears them. It deemed usury to be forbidden by the law of God and even associated, 
albeit metaphorically, usury (interest) with paganism. 
Conciliar legislation extended a he1ping hand to patristic thought by legislating 
against the sin of usury, not just for the c1ergy but also the laity. But these impressive 
and almost half a millennium long intellectual and legal strides by the Fathers and the 
Councils were ultimate1y halted by the onslaught of financial pressure generating from 
the Church's own immense, accumulating but un-invested, wealth. The Church thus 
ultimately gave up on the usury question altogether by succumbing to liber al and 
capitalistic pressures to incorporate "interest" - the modern equivalent of Biblical usury 
- as an accepted way of religious and secular life. This c10sed the door on any further 
theological development of the usury discourse. 
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This closure of the theological gates was also accentuated by the failure of the 
medieval scholastics to formulate the usury discourse into a unified theory, 
notwithstanding their long moral and intellectualleadership of Europe - in the pers on of 
such towering figures as Thomas Aquinas - and in spite of their theological, legal and 
economics input in the discourse. They could not even match, let alone exceed, the 
earlier rabbinical and patristic theological heights, in spite of the domination of theology 
over reason in their scholastic theory of usury that merely required their a posteriori 
proofs for the Church's a priori decisions, even with flimsy and fatuous argumentation. 
At best, they could only contribute a sound and valid but narrow and technical case 
against usury that fell short of a unified theory. 
Even this imperfect medieval scholastic theory of usury was served a fatal blow, 
inspired by Reformation and Protestantism, at the hands of the medieval non-scholastic 
Calvinist new theory of licitness of not only moderate but, according to sorne staunch 
Calvinist classicists, even of all usury. This permanently sealed the already closed doors 
on any further theological development of the usury discourse. 
This sealing of the theological doors is currently reflected in the neutrality and 
even outright opposition of contemporary Western economic thought to any prohibition 
of the notion of interest on money which today has become purely a matter of economic 
theory, quantum of desirable rate of interest and its state regulation to promote 
economic growth. What was a sin has become a utility. 
Finally, despite being endowed with a "completed religion" including, inter alia, a 
complete and fertile code on ribii along with its never-before ordained permitted 
alternative of bay' and its rich albeit esoteric Prophetic explication, the Islamic tradition 
has not fared any better either. Other than the commendable effort of the scholars of 
lJadlth science, the mul;1addithiïn, in assembling an impressive list of Prophetic aftiidlth 
on the subject, there is no outstanding productive contribution to the ribii-bay' 
discourse, either exegetical or juridical. Classical and medieval exegetes, 
notwithstanding their comparative diachronie proximity to the source of revelation, 
consigned this fertile field to utter waste by confining their narrative, legal, textual and 
even allegorical exegesis on ribii to a downright non-descript contextual, non-
philosophical and non-theological level. They left this task uncompleted for 
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contemporary exegetes, who, in tum compounded the problem by succumbing either to a 
reverence for tradition, or fascination for modemity, or penchant for Economics, or 
methodological insensitivity to cohesion of the discourse. 
The early jurists did not contribute anything to the discourse by adopting a posture 
of mere ritual obedience of the divine commando True to the demands of their juridical 
tradition, the later classical and medieval Muslim jurists, for their part, were victims of 
casuistry, concentrating on the exoteric, neglecting the esoteric, and thus complacently 
oblivious of any deeper truths or univers al, etemal principles in the ribii discourse. In 
spite of the central role of analogical reasoning in the living Islamic jurisprudence 
through the employment of the science of logic, the monumental jurisprudential output 
on the ribii discourse is simply inconclusive. Their perceived juristic premises on ribii do 
not logically lead to their own posited conclusions. The modem Muslim jurist, on the 
other hand, is tom by the powerful conflict between caU of the conscience and lure of 
utility. The religious courts and juridical academies are increasingly driven by 
compulsions of State politics. The role of the State legislators is no different either. 
Modem Muslim State legislation has, in many forms, essentially diluted the initial 
pristine prohibition of ribii, according it the status of "also ran" in the national economy. 
Given this total complex and even confusing scenario, modem Muslim theorists 
and practitioners of Islamic Finance are in a rather unenviable position. Faced with the 
lack of identification of the definitive ration ale of the scriptural prohibition of ribii and 
with the presence of a myriad of inconclusive occasioning factors of the injunction, their 
ribii discourse lacks cohesion. Rather than systematically building on, or demolishing, 
the others' work, each theorist goes his own way, rather repetitiously on the whole. 
Similarly, the Orientalists contribution to the Islamic ribii discourse is rather disjointed, 
perfunctory and even self-contradictory. While the contemporary Liberal theorist is 
constantly and even successfully on the lookout for escape-routes for softening or even 
evading the prohibition altogether, the TraditionalistlNew-Revivalist thcorist is 
rationally defenseless on account of inability to posit a plausible prohibition-rationale, 
other than the obvious but analogically unhelpful rationale of ritual obedience. On the 
whole, rather than breaking new ground, the theorists - each in his own way - have 
sunk deeper and deeper into naïve compliance, ignorant evasion, sheer neglect or even 
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intellectual bankruptcy. On the other hand, the contemporary practitioner of Islamic 
Finance is under constant business pressure to develop ever-new lslamic financial 
instruments for survival and growth of the nascent industry and the individu al financial 
institution, each under the guidance of a separate, independent Shar1'a Board. In the face 
of lack of common understanding and juridical precision, these Boards pronounce 
conflicting opinions and guidance on many crucial underlying concepts. 
To fill this lacuna - both in theory and practice - a pioneering philosophically and 
theologically-oriented hermeneutical investigation at the core of this work has yielded a 
set of postulates that not only solve the famous enigma of ribii but also furnish a 
universally applicable basis of normative human behavior that constitutes the essence of 
aIl monotheist law. Focusing sharply on the true core binary opposites, ribii and bay', 
applying rigorously and precisely Qur'anic semiotic methodology, exploring exclusively 
causality rather than teleology, and meeting meticulously the demands of analogy has 
provided answers to the specifie thesis questions that have steered the course of this 
study. 
Briefly put and cast in terms of the research task set forth initiaIly, the research 
answers are: 
• Ma'nii: The meaning of ribii was found to be not just any excess, and that of bay' 
not just any exchange, but intra-active excess and inter-active exchange 
respectively, as delimited by their tamylz(distinction). 
• Tamylz: The distinguishing/determining characteristic (tamylz) of ribii was 
discovered to be "divine imitability" operating through the modes of an ex-nihilo 
creation process and an intra-active growth process. Tamylz - the distinguishing 
/determining characteristic - of bay' was discovered to be an inter-active exchange 
process. lntra-action was defined as the process of an agent acting on a 
homogenous agent. Inter-action was defined as the process of an agent acting on a 
heterogeneous agent. Therefore, the meaning of ribii was found to be an ex-nihilo 
creation and/or an intra-active growth, and that of bay' an inter-active exchange. 
lntra-action was found to be a recognized divine attribute or essence. Inter-action 
was discovered to be a human attribute or essence. Ribii, therefore, was found to be 
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the inherent exclusive domain of the Creator. Bay' was found to be the structured 
exclusive domain ofthe Creation. 
• lfikma: The rationale of ribi-prohibition was discovered to be shirk (idolatry, 
polytheism), and that of bay'-permission to be a test of compliance with the design 
structure and purpose of creation. Ribibeing the inherent exclusive do main of the 
Creator, indulgence in ribi by humans was found to be a transgression (.rulm) in 
the divine domain - an act of shirk(idolatry). Bay'being the structured exclusive 
domain of the Creation, indulgence in bay' by humans was found to be a test of 
compliance with the human domain (structure and purpose of creation) - an act of 
'ibida (worship). 
• '/Jal: The rationes legis or occasioning factors of the iJukm (injunction) of ribiï, for 
the purposes of analogical extrapolation, were discovered to be "intra-action" and 
"ex-nihilo action. "Both these factors were found to be the modes of the single 
di stinguishing and determining characteristic of "divine imitability" 
[imitativeness], leading to the same iJikma (rationale) of shirk(idolatry). The first 
mode termed as "intra-action" (creation ex-sui), was found, by definition, to 
operate in exchanges of homogeneity. The second mode termed "ex-nihilo action" 
(creation ex-nihilo) was found to operate in aU exchanges of homogeneity and 
heterogeneity which incorporate the element of "delay" in settlement. The tilla of 
bay'- permission was found to be "inter-action." 
• Scope: The application scope of riba-prohibition and bay'-permission was found to 
extend beyond the conventionaUy restricted financial sphere. Having the inherent 
but neutral defining characteristics of intra-activity and inter-activity, ribi and 
bay~ respectively, were found to be applicable to aU spheres of human activity, 
with specific identification of financial, commercial, economic, agricultural, labor, 
religious, political, social, cultural, hiological, psychological, nutrition al, 
scientific/engineering, virtual reality, architectural, philosophical, intellectual, 
literary, academic, and post-modern applications. 
These research findings were formulated as a new critical theory of normative 
behavior which might hest he referred to as "natural conformism" - respective 
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conformity with the divine and human modes of operation. Man must not transgress on 
the divine mode, and must operate strictIy within the parameters of his own prescribed 
mode by conforming to the structural design and purpose ofhis creation. The theory was 
encapsulated in the divine law for humanity: impossibility, and hence proscription and 
even sacrosanctity, of non-action, i.e., ex-nihilo creation (khalq min al- 'adam), and of 
intra-action, i.e., ex-sui creation (khalq min al-nais) - both ribawJ - and permission of 
inter-action, i.e., ex-alio creation (khalq min al-ghayr) - bay'awI AlI this in turn was 
encapsulated in the concept of waJ;dat al-khiiliq wa tathniyat al-makhliiq; or waJ;dat al-
miijid wa tathniyat al-mau:jiid; or waJ;dat al-rabbiinlya wa tathniyat al-insiiniyya (aIl 
reducible to the concepts of Divine Singularity and Ruman Duality). The theory may 
also be recast as: singularity is the prohibited (sacred) divine model and duality the 
permitted human model. 
The notion of divine singularity (tawlJ1d) is obviously not new. What is new in this 
theory is the never before positioned juxtaposition of the commonly recognized notion 
of human duality with the sacrosanctly held notion of divine singularity, and the 
association of ribii with the divine singularity model and that of bay' with the human 
duality model, with total human conformity as a pre-requisite. Ribii and bay', far from 
being the generally he Id "narrow technical" concepts, thus come out as the most 
integrative of concepts in religious studies. Ribii and bay' become the ultimate criteria 
and distinguisher of "monotheist" vs. "polytheist," of "Islamic" vs. "non-Islamic," in alI 
disciplines, whether thought, institutions or practices, and the developer of the Islamic 
discipline - the ultimate catch-aH criteria of Islamic knowledge. These central concepts 
serve to add juridical definitional precision to ribii and bay~· clarify the Islamic dogma; 
pinpoint the Islamic SharJ'a, its objectives and mechanisms; adjust the u~iil al-fiqh; 
supplement the fiqh repertoire on ribii and bay'; justify the J;udiid punishments in 
Islamic cri minaI law; and fine-tune the Islamic civil and commercial law (legitimizing 
basis for J;iyaI; illegitimizing basis for qariira and Ipija, ribii in diir aI-fJarb, credit sales, 
and profit-determination; and reconstructing basis for Islamic corporate business and 
finance legal structure and modes). 
Compliance with the monotheist scriptural ribii-bay' injunctions is the totality of 
normative human behavior in its simplest form, devoid of technical jargon and religious 
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ritual, and justifies the designation of the new theory as a critical theory of normative 
behavior - the elusive Grand Unifying Theory (GUT) of religion. This encapsulation 
responds to the Quranic declaration: 
This day, 1 have perfectedyour religion for you, completed My Favor upon you, and have chosen 
for you Islam as your religion ... - Q. 5:3. 
This formulation also conforms to the requirements of the Prophetic J;adlth: 
Prophet MlÙ).ammad said: Make things easyfor people (conceming religious matters), do not 
make it hard for them, give them glad tidings, and do not make them run away (from faith) --
$alJih al-Bukhari l, i}adith no. 69. 
This new Grand Unifying Theory does provide the much sought after answer to 
"the supreme of aU Quaestiones Vexatae of 1slamic law," yet at the same time raises an 
even more perplexing and perilous question: Are the modern monotheists disguised yet 
oblivious polytheists? 
Today the world-systems, even of the professed monotheist persuasion, are 
wittingly or unwittingly submerged in the ribawJ mode. The likely consequences of 
operating under complete, partial or paraUe1 ribawJ systems - financial, commercial, 
social, economic, or political - without any scriptural sanction and justification, 
particularly in an Islamic state, are not difficult to visualize, keeping in view the fate of 
the earlier professed 1slamic states in the face of the Divine warning: 
G" ·'1 4]1 v •. 
. Y ~
"'00 Allah biots outribii 00'" - Qur'an 2:276 
This Grand Unifying Theory also raises the question of its proof: 1s there a 
"supporting text" for the central thematic elements of this theory: intra-activity and 
inter-activity? It must be recognized that there is no such direct evidential text, only 
sorne indirect textual indicators and exegetical formulations that have been fully utilized 
and incorporated in the deve10pment of this theory. There is no evidence (daJJl) of 
soundness or proof (burhiin) because, in the words of the eleventh-century exegete al-
Qushayrl, "the most powerful kinds of knowledge are those which are farthcst from 
evidence (daJJl)." (al-Qushayrl, La!ii'if al-lshiiriit, IV, 79-80). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the posited legal formulations - flowing from bestowed 
knowledge and awaiting dissemination for formaI consensus - have nevertheless been 
accorded informaI recognition as a logical addition to the CUITent fiqh repertoire by this 
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dissertation's supervisor who is a leading contemporary expert of Islamic law and 
accords the underlying theory the status of a new creed that could prove to be a major 
contribution to the field of Islamic law. 
The ultimate formaI adoption of this creed that the practice of ribii / neshekh 
/ tokos/siid in aH shapes and forms - whether conceived narrowly as interest/usury or 
broadly otherwise - is an act of shirk (idolatry, polytheism) could have a phenomenal 
effect both negatively and positively. On the one hand, it could pose a daunting 
challenge to aH individu ais and institutions indulging in this practice in any of its 
manifestations, and on the other, it could promote univers al harmony. Shlr1n Ebiidi was 
awarded the 2003 Noble Peace Prize for a "new interpretation of Islamic law compatible 
with human rights." Complementarily, this thesis offers a new interpretation of Islamic 
law, indeed of aH monotheist law, compatible with human obligations. This renewed 
posited perception of divinely ordained human conformity with normative behavior -
divine: ribawl (intra-active) vs. human: bay'awl (inter-active) - as the common 
Abrahamic heritage could promote inter-faith understanding, harmony and peace, and 
fumish the basis of a New World Order. 
Wa Alliihu A 'lam - And God knows best 
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Appendix 1 (a) 
MORPHOLOGY OF RIBA l109 
Root: r.b.w. 
Root Type: Defective1l10 
Derived Noun: 
Adjective: 
ribi(indefinite) and al-ribi(definite) meaning interest, usurious interest, usury 
ribawl, meaning usurious 
Verbal Forms (3PMS) 
FORM 1 (Basic): 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle: 
Passive Participle: 
Qur'anic Usage in RibiVerses: 
FORM II (Causative) 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect T ense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Intransitive 
rabi 
yarbuw 
rabi' or rubiiw 
to increase, to grow, to grow up, to exceed, to be more than 
ribin 
None (intransitive verb) 
Imperfect tense verb yarbuwin Q. 30:39 
Transitive 
rabbi 
yurabbl 
tarbiyya 
to make or let grow, to rai se, to rear, to bring up, to educate, to teach, 
to instruct, to breed, to rai se, to grow, to cultivate, to develop 
Active Participle (Do er/ Actor): murabbin 
Passive Participle(Done To/Acted Upon): murabban 
Qur'anic Usage in RibiVerses None 
FORM III (Reflexive) Transitive 
Perfect T ense: riibi 
Imperfect Tense: yuribl 
Verbal Noun: muribitun 
Meaning: to practice usury 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): muribin: taker of usury (usurer) 
Passive Participle (Done To/ Acted Upon): muriban: giver of us ury 
Qur'anic Usage in RibiVerses: None as verb, active/passive part ici pIe, or verbal no un 
FORM IV (Causative) Transitive 
Perfect Tense: a 'rbi 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
yurbl 
i'rbi' 
to make grow, to augment, to increase, to exceed 
murbin 
Passive Participle (Done To/ Acted Upon): mU/ban 
Qur'anic Usage in RibiVerses: 
FORMV 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
Imperfect tense verb, yurbl, in Q. 2:276 
Intransitive 
tarabbi 
yatarabbi 
tarabbin 
to be brought up, to be educated, to be bred, to be raised 
mutarabbin 
Passive Participle (Donc To/Acted Upon): None (intransitive verb) 
None Qur'anic Usage in RibiVerses: 
1109 Ail lexical meanings taken from Hans Wehr, Arabic-Eng/ish Dictionary, 374-375. 
1110 Defective root is the third sub-class ofthe weak class ofroots/vcrbs which consists of(l) assimilated root/verb, with the weak 
letter yor was the first radical, (2) hollow rootlvcrb, with thc weak lctter yor was thc middle radical, and (3) defcctive rootlverb, 
with the wcak Ictter yor was the final radical. 
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Appendix 1 (b) 
MORPHOLOGY OF RABB 1111 
Root: r.b.b. 
Root Type: Doubled Sound 
Derived Noun: 
Adjective: 
rabb (indefinite) and a/-rabb (definite) meaning lord, master, owner 
rabbinl meaning divine 
Verbal Forms (3PMS) 
FORM 1 (Basic): 
Perfect T ense: 
Imperfect T ense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Transitive 
rabba 
yurabbu 
rubiibiyya 
Meaning: 
Active Participle: 
to be master, be lord, have possession, control, command or authority 
ribbun 
Passive Participle: 
FORM II (Causative) 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active ParticipJe (Doerl Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/Acted Upon): 
FORM III (Reflexive) 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfeet Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doerl Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/Acted Upon): 
marbiibun 
Transitive 
rabbaba 
yurabbibu 
tarblbun 
to raise, to bring up (a child) 
murabbibun 
murabbabun 
Transitive 
ribba 
yuribbu 
muribbatun/Iibibun 
to deifY, to idolize 
muribbun: maker of idols (idolater) 
(also) muribbun 
1111 Ail lexical rncanings arc frorn Hans Wchr, Arabic-English Dictionary, 370-371. 
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MORPHOLOGY OF BA Y'Ill2 
Root: b.y. '. 
Root Type: HolloWll13 
Derived Noun: 
Qur'anic Usage: 
Coined Adjective: 
bay' (indefinite) and a!-bay' (definite): lexical meaning 'sale' 
bay' in Q. 2:254, 9: III, 14:31, & 24:37; al-bay'in 2:275 & 62:9 
bay'awl, meaning contractual 
Cognate Noun: bay'a (indefinite) &al-bay'a (definite): lexical meaning conclusion of a bargain, business deal, 
commercial transaction, bargain, sale, homage, profession ofloyalty, pledge of allegiance 
VERBAL FORMS (3PMS) 
FORM 1 {Basic) 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle: 
Passive Participle: 
Transitive 
bii'a 
yabl'u 
bay'un 
to sell 
bii'i'un 
mabii'un 
FORM III Transitive 
Perfect T ense: biiya 'a 
Imperfect Tense: yubiiyi'u 
Verbal Noun: mubiiya'atun 
Meaning: to make a contract, to pay homage, to acknowledge as sovereign or leader, pledge allegiance 
Active Participle (Doer/Actor): mubiiyi'un 
Passive Participle(Done To/Acted Upon): mubiiya'un 
FORMIV 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfeet Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/Acted Upon): 
FORMVI 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfeet Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Transitive 
, abii'a 
yubJ'u 
ibii'atun 
to offer for sale 
mubJ'un 
mubii'un 
Transitive 
tabiiya'a 
yatabiiya 'u 
tabiiyu'un 
Meaning: to agree on the terrns of a sale, conclude a bargain [de al] 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/ Acted Upon): 
FORM VII 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfeet T ense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/ Acted Upon): 
FORM VIII 
Perfect Tense: 
Imperfect Tense: 
Verbal Noun: 
Meaning: 
Active Participle (Doer/ Actor): 
Passive Participle (Done To/ Acted Upon): 
mutabiiyi'un 
mutabiiya 'un 
Transitive 
inbii'a 
yanbii'u 
inbiyii'un 
to be sold, be for sale 
munbii'un 
(also) munbii'un 
Transitive 
ibtii'a 
yahtii'll 
ibtiyii'lln 
to buy, to purchase 
mubtii'un 
(also) mubtii'un 
1112 Ali lexical meanings takcn from Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionmy, \05,375. 
III] Hollow root is the second sub-elass of the weak class of roots/verbs which consists of (1) assimilated rootlverb, with the weak 
letter yor !Vas the first radical, (2) hollow rootlverb, with the weak \ctter yor was the middle radical, and (3) defcetive root/verb, 
with the weak letter yor was the final radical. 
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LEXICAL DEFINITION OF RIBA 
mNMANZUR 
Ribi as Excess or Benefit: 
There are two kinds of ribii, and prohibited is every loan on which an excess is charged or sorne benefit is obtained 
out ofthis loan. 1114 
ParaUel between Iiyi/(cement) and ribi: 
Ribi is calIed Iiyi! because Iiyif is that thing which does not dissolve and remains attached to something else and 
ribi also remains similarly attached to the principal. .. In this lJadith as weil by Iiyi! is meant ribi which the people of 
Jiihiliya used to collect. Alliih forced them to take their principal and leave the extra. 1115 
AL-ZUBA YDI, guoting linguist ZAJJAJ 
Ribi as Excess: 
Every loan from which an excess is drawn is ribii. 1116 
PATRAS BASTAMI 
Definition: 
Ribi(root r.b. w.) as "raba, yarbu, multiply, increase, swell, expand as in Q. 22:5; excess such as surplus that cornes to 
the surface like scum, as in Q.13:17; rabiyun, increased ho Id that overpowers, as in Q. 69:10; arba, more than the 
other, as in Q. 16:92." 1117 
AL-AZHAIU 
Ribi as Excess: 
Every loan from which an excess is drawn or a benefit obtained is ribii. 1118 
RAGHm AL-ISFAHANI 
Ribi as Excess: 
Ribiis the excess on the principal. 1 1 19 
JA WHAIU (d. 393A.H.), and mN MANZR AFRï6î (d. 711A.H.) 
Ribi as manifestation of growth. 1120 
mNFARIS 
Ribi Definition Not Required: 
"Ribiin wealth (miil) is well-known".1121 
P.T.HUGHES 
Juridical Definition of Ribii as an excess in a homogenous exchange without a counter-value: 
A term in Muslim law defined as an excess according to a legal standard of measurement or weight, in one or two 
homogenous articles opposed to each other in a contract of exchange, and in which such ex cess is stipulated as an 
obligatory condition on one ofthe parties without any retum. 1122 
1114 Ibn Man~iir, Lf;'iin al- 'Arab (Beirut : Dar Sadir li al-Talî'a wa al-Nashr, 1968), XIV, 304-7. 
1115 Ibn Manzur, Lisiin al- 'Arab, IX, 273. 
1116 Murtaqa 'al-Zubaydi, Tifj al- 'Arus (Cairo: al-Ma~ba'a al-Khairiyyah, 1306), X, 142-144. 
1117 Patras Bastami, Muhit al-Muhit. 
Ill" Abu Man~iir al-Azharl, Tahdhlb al-Lugha, cd., Ibrahim al-Ibyarl (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-' Arabi, 1967), XV, 473. 
1119 Raghib al-Isfahani, al-MufTadiit fi Gharb al-Qur'iin (Cairo : Mu~~afii al-Babl al-l:falabl, 1961), 185-7. 
1120 AI-$alJiilJ al-Jawhar/(Bcirut, n.p., 1984), VI, 3349;Lisiin al- 'Arab li'I-Arr/qJ (Beirut, n.d.), 1Il, 4. 
1121 Ibn Faris al-Qazwlnl, Mujmal al-Lugha, 1, 417, 
1122 Hughes, Dictionary of/sIam, 544. 
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Arabie Ribii as Hebrew term neshekb: 
The word ribii appears to have the same meaning as the Hebrew neshekh, whieh inc\uded gain, whether from the loan 
of money, or goods, or property of any kind. In the Mosaie Law, conditions of gain for the loan of money or goods 
were rigorously prohibited. 1123 
EDWARDLANE 
Ribii, in its juridical meaning, as Slightest Addition: 
In Sharl'a it means an addition, however slight, over and above the principal. 1 124 
Ribii as an Addition in a Particular Manner: 
Legally ribii signifies an addition obtained in a pa/tieu/ar manner in buying, selling, lending or giving. 
Kinds of Ribii: 
Ribiihas two kinds: unlawful (increase over principal in a loan) and lawful (gift with expectation of voluntary retum 
gift).1125 
HARITH SULAYMAN F ARUQI 
Ribii as 'Danism': 
Lexically, ribi also translates as 'danism')126 whieh means lending money on usury' and which is derived from the 
Greek word Daneisma meaning a loan.\\27 Danism has been translated into Arabie to mean "Ioans with fil}ish 
[excessive] ribii" 1 128 
1123 Hughes, Dietionaryofl~/am, 544. 
1124 Edward William Lane, Arabie-English Lcxieon (London: William and Norgate, 1863). 
1125 Lane, Lexieon. 
1126 Harith Su1ayman Faruqi, Faruqi's Law Dietionary - Arabie English (Tripoli: Libyan Publishing House, 1962). 
1127 E. Cobhan Brewer, Dietionary of Phrase & Fable (1898),329-330. 
1 m Faruqi, Faruqi 's Law Dietionary - Arabie English. 
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QUR' ANIe RIBA EXPOSITIONS 
The Qur'inic usage of derivatives from the root r. b. w. conveys at least six different shades of meaning: 
(1) to grow: 
~ [J) ~ lJ,o ~l:, ~J:' b:fol çWI ~ Ul)\ Ij)! oi,.\A ~:}ll LSY:' 
And thou beholdeth the earth barren, then when We send down water upon it, it quickens and grows ... " - Q. 22: 5 
(2) to prosper; to increase: 
;"'\!~I ~ y:J1 4.1\1 ~ 
"God destroys riba, but makes alms prosper" - Q. 2: 276 
"And what you invest in riba so that it may increase upon the people's wealth, it increases not with God" - Q. 30: 39 
(3) to rise ( e.g. of a hill): 
~:, J) ;..,Ij ~ ~l W.~:,i:, 
"And We gave them refuge upon a height" - Q. 23: 50 
~ij~~ 
" ... As the likeness of a garden upon a hill" - Q. 2: 265 
(4) to swell (e.g. foarn): 
" ... Then the torrent carried a swelling scum ... " - Q. 13: 17 
(5) to nurture; to raise (a child): 
"Have mercy upon them as they raised me up when 1 was a child"- Q. 17: 24 
"He said, did we not raise thee amongst us as a child?" - Q. 26: 18 
(6) augmentation, increase in power: 
"He seized them with a surpassing grip"- Q. 69: 10 
~t (>. ~) ~ ~t (,jfo ü\ 
" ... That one nation be more powerful than another nation ... " - Q. 16: 92 
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QUR' ANIC RIBA PRESCRIPTIONS 
The conventionally recognized ribii prohibitory verses of the Qur'an, presented below, are spread over four chapters 
(suwar; sing.: sura) of the Qur'an. The conventional understanding is that a review of these verses, quoted by ail 
exegetes and jurists, with minor differences of emphasis in interpretation, and translated below, indicates that 
chronologically the Qur'anic prohibition of ribii came in what the conventional scholarship calls the four stages of 
revelation: Disapproval, Initial Prohibition, Reiteration of Prohibition, and Comprehensive/Final Prohibition. 
Four Stages of Revelation: 
• First Stage of Revelation: Disapproval 
u~1 Î'Â ~:.,t! ~I 4J éJJ~;' ~\Sj J.. ~ï L..J ~I ~ J;:i ll! U"ûll JI;'\ ~ :;;~ ~:,; J.. ~ï L..J 
That which ye lay out from ribii for increase through the property of (other) people, will have no increase 
with God: but that, which ye lay out from zakiit, seeking the countenance ofGod, (will increase): it is these 
who will get a recompense multiplied. 
- Q. 30:39 - (c.6l5 CE) 1129 
Conventional exegesis holds that ribiiis declared to be deprived ofGod's blessing in this verse of Surat al-Rum 
which is Meccan and believed to be chronologically the first in the ribii -prohibition process, having been revealed 
around 615 CE. Here ribiiis regarded as simply disapproved, and not yet prohibited. 
• Second Stage of Revelation: Initial Prohibition 
'.~ ,~~ ·,l::t.I4..ll11 "l' ~~ \.!~\ Li' .I11 1ttî)ll ''\' ~I L~\ Li UJ""":"-' r--' Ji' J .Y.,.....J'A 0.1. ~ , 
0, ye who believe devour not al-ribii, doubled and redoubled, and fear Allah so that you may (really) 
prosper. 
-Q. 3:130-(c.625 CE) 1130 
Ribii is unequivocally prohibited for the first time in this verse of Surat AI 'Imran which is Medinan and 
believed to be chronologically the second in the ribii -prohibition process, having been revealed around 625 CE after 
the baUle of UIJud 
• Third Stage of Revelation: Reiteration of Prohibition 
W\ C;I~ '" '. '\S1l û:ill:J n lilL, ûll JI' . \ ',. 11::\' ~ 1 "~' Li"I' ~:;J 
,'. ('+';" U:l~, J>..H" .• U" Y' ("'t"'" J "* J.Y~, J 
And they took al-ribithough they were forbidden; and they devoured peoples wealth wrongfully. We have 
prepared for those among them who reject faith, a grievous punishment. 
-Q.4:161-(c.626CE) 
Ribiiis reiterated as a prohibited Jewish practice and declared grievously punishable in this verse of Surat al-
Nisii' which is also Medinan and believed to be chronologically the third in the ribii -prohibition process, having been 
revealed around 626 CE. Prohibition and punishment though specifically for the Jews, apply to the Muslims as weil, 
not directly but by implication. 
• Fourth Stage of Revelation: Comprehensive/Final Prohibition 
The following Surat al-Baqara verses, which are also Medinan, are believed to be chronologically the fourth 
1129 Dating is based on the internaI evidenee of the Qur'an. See Rahman, Riba, 3. 
1130 Dating based on report in Ibn Hishiim, al-Sirat al-Nabawiyya, Il,122-9. 
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set of verses in the ribii -prohibition process, having been revealed around 632 CE. These verses present a 
comprehensive and final prohibition of ribii and permission of bay'. Their late revelation before the death of the 
Prophet, not enabling him to expound them, has been commented upon by Caliph 'Umar in his tradition. 
Consequently he is reported to have advised the community, in the absence of Prophetie exposition, to shun both ribii 
(usury/interest) and riblJ (profit). 
Those who devour aJ-ribii will not stand except as stands one whom the Satan by his touch hath driven to 
madness. That is because they say: "sale [bay']is Iike ribii, but Allah hath permitted sale and forbidden ribii. 
Those who after receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their case is for 
Allah to judge. But those who repeat (the offence) are companions of the Fire: they will abide therein for 
ever. 
- Q. 2:275 - (c.632 CE)I131 
.\ ill;' Il' W ':J ~..111' ü\!~1 ." \.J"I ~I '-' • ' ~.J U'>. ' _ J ' -.r.~J.Y ~ 0 
Allah deprives al-dbii of all blessing but blesses al-:;adaqiit with growth, and Allah loveth not those who are 
ungrateful and wicked. 
- Q. 2:276 - (c.632 CE) 1132 
' .. ',' ,~:t: '1 \.J'.\I '. '-' L. l '~' ..nI 1 "11 .' l '. ~I L ~\ \.J ~Y' r-- u . . Y '-"" ~ Jj J Y-' Jo'A ut ~ _ 
0, ye who believe! Fear Allah and give up all outstanding ribii ifye are indeed believers. 
- Q. 2:278 - (c.632 CE) 1133 
'·'.\1·~ \1' '·'t1·~ \1 ',t:W' t' ',' ',t:u ..... '1' .u ' » 4..ll1 '.' Loo;' 1 .~t! 1 .L~~ ',1 '1j U"........,... J U~ ("""'Y' iY'JJjr-~u.J"Y"'jJ, ù"'o.">=>-: >' J""""(""u. 
lfyou do it not [not give up all outstanding ribii], take notice ofwar from Allah and His Messenger. But if 
you repent, you shall have your capital sums; deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. 
- Q. 2:279 - (c.632 CE) 1134 
1131 Dating based on reports in Tabari's Commentary on the Qur'an. 
1132 Ibid. 
liB Ibid. 
1134 Ibid. 
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SUNNAIC RIBA PRESCRIPTIONS 
Annulment of Ribi a/- Jiihiliya: 
Jabir ibn' Abd Allah, giving a report on the Prophet's Farewell Pilgrimage, said: The Prophet addressed the people and 
said" Ali of the riba of JahiIiya is annulled. The first riba that 1 annul is our riba, that accruing to 'Abbas ibn' Abd al-
Muttalib [the Prophet's uncle]; it is being cancelled completely."1135 
Universality of Ribi Prohibition: 
Sha'biyl said that the Prophet wrote to the Christians of Najran that whoever ofyou indulges in transactions with ribi 
would render void our protection for him. I136 
Actual RibawJ Practices of Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians (Companion .fJaditb): 
'Abd Allah ibn' Abbas advised people not to do business with Jews, Christi ans and Zoroastrians. Upon questioning 
why, he said that these people indulge in ribawltransactions and ribais not pennitted. l !37 
Gravit y ofthe Sin of Riba: 
Great Sin 
Narrated Abu f.lurayrah: The Prophet sai d, "Avoid the seven great destructive sins." The people enquired, "0 Allah's 
Messenger! What are they'?" He said, "(1) To join others in worship along with Allah (2) to practice sorcery (3) to kill 
the life which A11iih has forbidden except for ajust cause (4) to eat up riba(usury) (5) to eat up an orphan's wealth (6) 
to show one's back to the enemy and fleeing from the battlefield at the time of fighting (7) and to accuse chaste 
women who never even think of anything touching their chastity and are true believers,,1138 
Ribi= Sbirk 
'Abd Allah Ibn Masud has reported that the Prophet said: "Ribihas over seventy kinds and shiIk(associating partners 
with Allah) is like (as bad as) that." - Reported by al-Bazzar, with the same transmitters as those ofthe $aIJIIJ, in Ibn 
Maja with sound isnid ll39 
Ribi > Adultery 
From' Abd Allah ibn f.lan?alah: The Prophet said: "A dirham of riba which a man receives knowingly is worse than 
committing aduItery thirty-six times."1140 
From 'Abd Allah ibn f.lan?alah: The Prophet said: "A dirham of riba which a man receives knowingly is worse than 
committing aduItery thirty-six times. Hell befits him whose flesh has been nourished by the unlawful." Reported by 
Bayhaql in Shu'ab al-lmin. 1141 
Ribi = Ineest with Own Mother 
From al-Mustadrak: The Prophet said, "Ribi is of seventy kinds, the least of which is as bad as marrying his own 
mother." [Incest] 1142 
From Abu Hurayrah: The Prophet said: "Riba has seventy segments, the least serious being equivalent to a man 
eommitting adultery with his own mother." [Ineestt43 
Riba= Attaek on Muslim Honor 
Reported by al-Bara'I bin 'Azib that the Prophet said: "Ribahas seventy two kinds, the lowest (adna)ofwhich is man 
eommitting adultery with his mother, and the highest (arbiï) is attaeking the honor of a Muslim. 
Denial of Temporal and Heavenly Blessings: 
From Ibn Mas'ud: The prophet said: "Even when [riba}is much, it is bound to end up into paltriness."1144 
1135 ;;aIJIIJ Muslim, Kitiib al-f:Iajj, Biib f:Iajjati al-Nabl, also in Mu.mad Al]mad. 
1136 Ala' al-Dln 'An al-Muttaql. Kanz al- 'Ummiil (Hyderabad: Da'ira al-Ma'rif, 1312), Il,234. 
1137 Ibid., II, 233. 
113. Sahlh al-Bukhiiii, IV, Hadith no. 28. 
1\39 M~,,~af 'Abd al-Razziiq, VIII, 315; Masnad al-Bazziirwith reference to Kashf al-Asriir, l, 64, chapter of al-shirk, lJadIth no. 91; 
Sunan Ibn Mijja, Kitiib al-Tijiiriit, Biib al-taghli?1 fi al-ribii, fJadIthno. 2275. 
1140 Mishkiit al-Ma"iibilJ, Kitiib al-Buyü', Biib al-ribii, on the authority of Al)mad and Daraqutn1. 
1141 Ibid. 
1142 Mu.\'fadrak Hiikim. 
1143 Ibn Maja, 1àtiib a1- Tijiiriit, Biib al-taghli?l fi al-ribii. 
1144 Ibid. ; also in Musnad Al}mad. 
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From Abii Hurayrah: The Prophet said: "God would be justified in not allowing four persons to enter paradise or to 
taste its blessings: he who drinks habitually, he who takes ribii, he who usurps an orphan's property without right, and 
he who is undutiful to his parents."1145 
Graphie Punishment: 
Reported by 'Ubadah ibn al-Samit that the Prophet said: "By him in whose authority my Iife is, sorne ofmy followers 
would spend their night in a state of pride, a false sense of greatness and self-conceit and in sport and pastime. In the 
moming they will be tumed into monkeys and swine. This will befall them because they considered Iegitimate 
something which was prohibited, employed women to sing, consumed Iiquor, devoured ribi and wore fabrics made of 
silk". 
Narrated by Samura bin landab: The Prophet said: "Tonight l dreamed that two persons came to me and took me to a 
sacred land until such time that we reached a canal full ofblood. A person who was standing in the middle of the canal 
approached the end. As he attempted to get out of it, the person already standing at the end hit him with a stone so 
that he was again pushed back to the middle. This was repeated every time the person in the middle wanted to come 
out of the canal. The Prophet was asked by his companions who the person in the middle was? He said he was one 
who devoured ribi. 1146 
From Abu Hurayrah: The Prophet said: "On the night of Ascension 1 came upon people who se stomachs were Iike 
houses with snakes visible from the outside. 1 asked Gabriel who they were. He replied that they were people who had 
received ribi." 1147 
From Abii H urayrah: The Prophet said that when he reached the seventh stage of the heavens on the night of Ma 'rij 
(ascension) and looked overhead, he saw lightning and heard thunder. He then said that 1 passed on a people whose 
stomaehs were large as if they were houses and they were full of snakes. l asked Gabriel as to who are these people. 
He said that these are the on es who devour ribi.. 1148 
RibiPunishment = Lüt and 'Ad Punishment: 
Reported by Abii 'Umama that the Prophet said: "A group of people from my followers would spend their night 
eating, drinking and engaged in sport and pastime. Their condition in the moming would be that their faces would be 
looking Iike that of monkeys and pigs. Sorne of the people from among them would be affected and buried due to 
landslides or would be hit by stones falling from the sky. So much so that when people wake up in the moming, they 
would say that last night such and such family has been buried due to landslide and such and such houses were buried 
due to landslide. They will have stones showered on them from the sky Iike these were showered on the people of Liit· 
Their localities and their houses and their persons will experience windstorms Iike the ones which annihilated the 
people of 'Ad. Landslides and showering of stones would be due to their consumption of liquor, wearing of silk, 
devouring of ribii, breaking of relations and due to another trait which the person who has reported this tradition 
forgot." 49 
RibiPunishment = Pharaoh Pwishment: 
al-Asbahanl has recorded on the authority of Abii Sa'ld al-Khudri that on the night of Ma 'rij (ascension), the Prophet 
saw sorne people on the heaven of the world whose stomachs were intlated Iike they were the rooms of a building, and 
these people could not stand upright. They were lying one upon another on the path which Pharaoh and his men are 
made to walk every day in the momings and evenings leading to Hell. The people lying over one another are subjected 
to stampede by Pharaoh and his men. They pray that the day judgment may never come. This is because they know 
that on this day they will be sent into Hell. The Prophet said, 1 asked Gabriel who are these people. He said these are 
those who devoured ribifrom amongst your followers. They will not stand except Iike one whom Satan has maddened 
by his touch. 
1145 Mustadrak a/-ljiikim, Kitiib a/-Buyu'. 
1146 Rcportcd by Bukhiirl. 
1147 Ibn Maja, Kitiib a/- Tijiiriit, Biib a/-taghli~/ fi a/-ribii, I;adith nO.2273 ; aiso in Musnad Al)mad. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Reportcd by Imam Al)mcd. 
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Temporal Curse for Riba Indulgence: 
Ibn' Abbas reported that the Prophet instructed not to sell any edible fruits before they are fully ripe. He also said that 
when ribii and adultery come in vogue in any society then it is like that they have invited Allïih's wrath on 
themselves. 1150 
Reported by 'Amr bin al-'A~ that he heard the Prophet say: "If ribiibecomes common in a people, they surely start 
facing draught and food scarcity. And when bribery becomes common in a people, they live under constant fear of 
their enemy.1151 
Eschatological Implications of Ribii: 
Narrated by 'Abd A11lih Ibn Mas'iid on the authority of the Prophet that he said: "as the Day of Judgment cornes 
c1oser, ribii, adultery and consumption ofliquor will become very common". 
Condemnation of and Curse on Ribii Practice (both taking and giving): 
Narrated Abu Juhayfa that he had bought a slave whose profession was cupping and he said: The Prophet forbade 
taking the price of blood and the price of a dog and the eaming of a prostitute, and cursed the one who took or gave 
ribii (us ury), and the lady who tattooed others or got herself tattooed, and the pict ure-maker [artist]. 1152 
Condemnation of Ali Participants of Riba Transaction: 
From Jïibir, who said: "The Messenger of Allah has cursed one who charges ribii, he who gives it, one who records it, 
and the two witnesses; and he said, 'They are ail equal.'" 1153 
RibaWi- Commodities AlJaditb: 
From 'Ubiidah ibn a~-&iimit, who said, "The Messenger of A11lih said, 'Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, 
barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, in equal weights, from hand to hand. Ifthese species differ, 
then, sell as you like, as long as it is from hand to hand.' " 1154 
"The Messenger of Allïih said, 'Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt 
for salt, like for Iike, from hand to hand. He who gives in excess or acquires an excess has charged ribii.; the person 
giving and acquiring have the same Iiability [guilt] in this." 1155 
From Abii Sa'ld al-Khudii, who said: "The Messenger of Allah said, 'Do not sell gold for gold, except when it is like 
for Iike, and do not misappropriate one through the other; and do not sell silver for silver except when it is Iike for 
Iike, and do not misappropriate one through the other; and do not sell things absent for those that are present" Agreed 
upon by both al-8ukhiiii and Muslim. 1156 
From Abu Hurayrah, who said: "The Messenger of Allïih said, 'Gold for gold, weight for weight, like for Iike. Silver 
for silver, weight for weight, like for like. If one gives in excess or acquires an excess, it is ribii.' " Reported by 
Muslim. 1157 
'Abd al-RaI,man ibn Ab1 8akrah from his father, who said: "The Prophet proscribed the sale of silver for silver, gold 
for gold, except equal for equal, and he ordered us ta sell gold for silver as we liked, and silver for gold as we Iiked." 
Ma'mar ibn 'Abd Alliih said, "1 used ta hear the Messenger of A11lih say, 'Food for food, Iike for Iike,' and our food in 
those days was barley." 
From Façïilah ibn 'Ubayd al-An~ïir1 who said, "On the day of (the conquest of) Khaybar, 1 bought a go Id necklace with 
gems in it for twelve dinars. On separating them 1 found that the gold itself was worth more than twelve diniirs. 1 
mentioned this to the Prophet and he said, 'Tt [jewellery] is not to be sold unless it is separated.''' 1158 
1150 Reportcd by al-l:Iaklm. 
"51 a/-Fal{l a/-Rabbiïnl li-larllb Malillad A{lInad a/-Shaybiïnl, XV, 70. 
1152 Sahlh al-BukhiirJ, Vll, Hadith no. 845. 
1153 $a~l~ Muslim, Kitiib al~Musiiqat, Bab la'ni akili al-ribii wa mu'kilihl; and $alJllJ al-BukhiirJ, similar tradition from Abii JlÙ)ayfah; 
also in Tirmidhl and Musnad Ahmad. 
1154 $alJllJ Muslim, Kitab al-M~saqat, Bab al-al~arfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan; also in Tinnidhl; al-$an'anl, Subul al-
Saliim SharlJ Buliigh al-Mariim, III, 72. 
1155 $alJllJ Muslim, Kitiib al-Musiiqat, Biib al-aJ,~arfi wa bay'i al-dhahabi bi al-waraqi naqdan. 
1156 Bukharl, Kitiib a-Buyii~ Biib bay'i al-ficjcjati bi al-ficNah; also Muslim, Tinnidhl, Nasa'! and Mu.mad A~mad; Al-$an'anî, Subul 
al-Saliim Sharl; Buliigh al-Mariim, III, 71. 
1157 Al-$an'iinl, Subul al-Salim SharlJ Buliigh al-Marim, Ill, 73. 
Il'" $alJllJ Mus/im, Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib bay'i al-qiliidah fihii kharazwl wa dhahab; also in Tinnidhi and Nasa'!. 
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BamI-and Khaybar-dates Aqitfith: 
Narrated Abu Sa'ld al-Khudr1: Once BilaI brought Bami (a superior kind of) dates to the Prophet and the Prophet 
asked him, "From where have you brought these?" BilaI replied, "1 had sorne inferior kind of dates and exchanged two 
$i's of it for one $i' of Bami-dates, in order to give it to the Prophet to eat." Thereupon the Prophet sai d, "Beware! 
Beware! This is definitely dbi(usury)! This is definitely ribi(usury)! Don't do so, but ifyou want to buy (a superior 
kind of dates) sell the inferior kind of dates for money and then, buy the superior kind of dates with that money." 1159 
Abu Sa'ld al-Khudri and Abu Hurayrah reported that the Messenger of Allah appointed someone to colleet revenue 
from Khaybar. He brought him dates of high quality [janibJ The Messenger of Alliih said, "Are ail the dates of 
Khaybar Iike this'?" He replied, "By Allah, no. 0 Messenger of Allah, we get a ~i' of these in exchange for two ~i' s 
(of our dates) and two ~i' s in exchange for three. "The Messenger of Allah said, "Do not do this, but sell the mixed 
dates for dirhams, and then buy the good quality dates [janibJwith the dirhams. "1160 
Delay (o89l'a) = Ribi: 
It is narrated by al-Zuhn from Malik ibn Aws that he heard 'Umar ibn Khattab saying that the Messenger of Allah 
said, "Gold for silver is ribi, except 'here you are,' and 'here you are' (from hand to hand), wheat for wheat is dbi, 
except 'here you are,' and 'here you are' (from hand to hand), dates for dates is ribi, exeept 'here you are,' and 'here 
you are' (from hand to hand), and barley for barley is ribi, except 'here you are,' and 'here you are' (from hand to 
hand)"[ salt not mentioned]. 
From Miilik ibn Aws from ibn 'Umar that the Prophet said, "Wheat for wheat is ribi, except 'here you are,' and 'here 
you are' (from hand to hand), barley for barley is dbi, except 'here you are,' and 'here you are' (from hand to hand), 
and dates for dates is ribi, except 'here you are,' and 'here you are' (from hand to hand)"[salt not mentioned]. 
Samurah ibn Jundub reported that "the Prophet proscribed the sale of an animal for an animal with delay." 
Tradition ofUsama: 
From Abu $iiliQ al-Zayyiit that he heard Abu Sa'ld al-Khudn saying: 'A diniir for a diniir and a dirham for a 
dirham.'[He said] 1 said to hi m, 'Ibn 'Abbiis does not uphold this view.' Abu Sa'ld said, "1 asked him about it saying, 
'Did you hear it from the Prophet or did you find it in the Book of Alliih?' He replied, 'Ali this 1 do not claim, and you 
know more than me from the Messenger of Allah, but 1 was informed by 'Usamah ibn Zayd that the Prophet said, 
'There is no ribi, except in oasi'a. ,1161 
Other Versions: 
"Verily, ribi is in nasi'a ... 1162 
"There is no ribi in what is from hand to hand."1163 
Tradition of al-Barra' ibn' Azib and Zayd ibn Arqam: 
First Version: 
al-Bukhiiri records the tradition of Ibn Jurayj from 'Amr ibn DInar and 'Amir ibn Mu~'ab from Abu al-Minhiil, who 
said: "1 asked al-Barrii' ibn 'Azib and Zayd ibn Arqam about ~arf [transaction in met aIs with currency value or in 
currencies] and both said, 'We used to trade during the period of the Messenger of AlIiih, so we asked the Messenger 
of Allah about ~arf, and he said, "If it is from hand to hand there is no harm, but if it is with a delay, then, it is not 
proper.'" 
Second Version: 
On the authority of MUQammad ibn l:liitim, on the authority of Sufyan ibn Uyaynah, on the authority of' Amr ibn 
DInar, on the authority of Abiï al-Minhal, who said: ShurayQ sold silver to me with a delay up to the pilgrimage 
(mawsim) or up to the IJajj. He came to me and infonned me, and 1 said to him, 'This matter is improper.' He said, '1 
1159 $a1;171;1 Bukhiiii, 1II, lfadlth no. 506; Muslim, $aI;171;1. Kitiib al-Musiiqat, Biib al-,ta'iimi mi/hlan bi mithlin. III. 48; also Musnad 
Ahmad. 
1160 Bukharl, Kitiib al-Buyii', Biib idhii ariida bay'a tamrin bi tamrin khayrun minhu; also Muslim and Nasa'i. 
1161 $a1;171;1 Bukhiiii, Kitiib al-Buyii~ Biib Bay' al-dlniiri bi al-dlniir nasa 'an; also $a/;I71;1 Muslim and Musnad A~mad. 
1162 Ibid II 138 
1163 $a1;171;1 MuslÎm, Kitiib al-Musiiqiit, Biib bay'i al-,ta'iimi mithlan bi mithlin; also in Nasa'i. 
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sold it in the market and no one objected to my act.' 1 then went up to al-Barra' ibn' Azib and asked him. He said, 
"The Prophet came to Mamnah and we used to engage in this transaction, so he said, 'There is no harm in what is 
from hand to hand, but that which is with a delay amounts to libii..' Go to Zayd ibn Arqam, who is a bigger trader 
than 1." 1 went up to him and asked him, and he said the same thing to me. 
Indirect Incidence of Ribii.· 
Am1r al-Mumin1n 'AIT has reported the Prophet to have said: "Every loan which brings a benefit is libiï ".1164 
On the authority of Anas ibn Malik: The Prophet said: "Wh en one ofyou grants a loan and the borrower offers him a 
dish, he should not accept it; and if the borrower offers a ride on an animal, he should not ride, unless the two ofthem 
have been previously accustomed to exchanging such favours mutually." 1165 
On the authority of Anas ibn Malik: The Prophet said: "If a man extends a loan to someone he should not accept a 
gift."1166 
On the authority of Abu Burdah ibn Ab1 Musa: 1 came to Madinah and met' Abd Allah ibn Salam who said: "Y ou live 
in a country where libiïis rampant; hence if anyone owes you something and presents you with a load of hay, or a load 
ofbarley, or a rope of straw, do not accept it for it is ribii 1l67 
FaQalah ibn 'Ubayd said that "The benefit derived from any loan is one of the different aspects of libiï ':1168 
(This IJadith is regarded as mawqiïf which means it is discontinued, implying that it is not necessarily from the 
Prophet; it could be an explanation provided by Faq.alah himself, a Companion of the Prophet.1169) 
On the authority of Abu Umamah: The Prophet said: "Whoever makes a recommendation for his brother and accepts a 
gift offered by him has entered ribiïthrough one ofits large gates." 1170 
On the authority of Anas ibn Malik: The Prophet said: "Deceiving a mustarsa/[an uninformed entrant into the market] 
is ribii " 1171 
On the authority of 'Abd Allah ibn Ab1 Awfa: The Prophet said: "A niijish [one who serves as an agent to bid up the 
price in an auction] is a cursed taker of libii" 1 172 
Universal Spread of Ribii' 
From Abu Hurayrah: The Prophet said: "There will certainly come a time for mankind when everyone will take libii, 
and ifhe does not do so, its dust will reach him."1173 
Companion AlJiidith on the Ambiguity of RibiïProvisions: 
On the authority of 'Umar ibn al-Khagab who said in a sermon: "Do you think that we do not know categories of ribii. 
No doubt if 1 could know them, 1 would love it better than my acquiring Egypt and its adjoining areas. In fact there 
are categories of libiï which are not hidden from anyone. Among them is deferred sale of animaIs, sale of fruits before 
they ripen, and exchange of gold with silver with deferred settlement."1174 
1164 Ibn J:lajar, al-Mu,tiilib al- 'Aliyya (Beirut: n.p., n.d.), 1, 411, Ijadith no. 1373; 'Ali Mutaqql, Kunz al- 'amiil, VI, 238, fjadith no. 
15516; Suyu!l, al-Jiimi' al-$agh7r, II, 94. 
1165 Sunan al-Bayhaq7, Kitiib al-Buyu~ Biib kulli qad,rinj81Ta manlà'atan fa huwa riban. 
1166 Mi~hkiit al-Ma,çiibilJ, Kitiib al-Buyu: Biib al-ribii, on the authority of Bukharl's Tiir7kh and Ibn Taymiyyah's al-Muntaqii. 
1167 Mishkiit al-Ma:~iibiI;, Kitiib al-Buyii~ Biib al-ribii, on the authority of Bukharl. 
116' Sunan al-Bayhaq7, Kitiib al-Buyu', Biib kulli qad[injalTa manlà'atan là huwa riban. 
1169 M. Umer Chapra, Toward~ a Just Monetary System (Leicester: The Islamie Foundation, 1986),238. 
1170 Bulugh al-Mariim, Kitiib al-Buyu~ Biib al-ribii, report cd on the authority of Al)mad and Abu Dawud. 
1171 Suyu!l, al-Jiimi' al-$agh7r, s.v. ghabn; Muttaql, Kanz al-'Ummiil, Kitiib al-Buyu', al-Biib al-thiinl, al-fa:~1 al-thiinl, on the 
authority of Sunan al-Bayhaq7. 
1172 Cited by Ibn I;lajar al-'Asqalanl in his eommentary on al-Bukhari ea\led FatlJ al-Biirl, Kitiib al-Buyu', Biib al-naj"h ; also in 
Suyu!1, al-Jiimi' al-$agh7r, s.v. al-nifjish and Muttaql, Kanz al- 'Ummiil, Kitiib al-Buyu', al-Bib al-thiinl, al-fà:~1 al-thiinl, both on the 
authority of Tabaranl's al-Kab7r. 
1173 Abu Dawud, Kitiib al-Buyu', Biib fi ijtiniibi al-shubuhiit; also in Ibn Maja. 
1174 Muttaql, Kanz ul- 'amiil, II, 232. 
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On the authority of 'Umar ibn al-Khagab who said: "Three issues are such where 1 wish the Prophet had explained 
them to us. Included among these are inheritance, kilila, and certain categories of ribii."1175 (Khilifa! and Kalila! 
according to Yusuf Ali). 1 176 
Sha'biyt has reported that 'Umar b. KhaHab said: "We have given up ninety percent oflegitimate (lJalil) transactions 
for fear of ribi.""77 
On the authority of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab: "The last verse to be revealed was on ribii. And the Prophet was taken 
without explaining it to us; so give up not only ribi but also rlba (doubt)."1178 
1175 Rcportcd by Ibn Kathlr and Ibn Maja. 
1176 Yusuf Ali, Ho/y Qur'iin, n. 324, III. 
1177 Muttaql, Kanz u/- 'amiil, Il, 231. 
1 m Ibn Maja, Kitiib al- Tijiiriit, Biib a/-taghli:{1 fi a/-ribii. 
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RIBA IN SIRA / T ARIKH WORKS 
SIRAT RASUL ALLAH by ffiN ISHA.Q (d. 150/767) 
It contains sorne purely exegetical sections (e.g. Slra III, 112-2& on Q. 3: 121-179). This exegesis confines itselfto 
a kind of lexical paraphrase found in the early commentaries. 1179 
PACTSILETTERS OF THE PROPHET WITHffO V ARIOUS TRillES 
Pact of the Prophet with Juhayna Tribe: 
It stipulates " ... As regards pawned property, ofthe payable loans only the amount of the principal shall be payable, 
after (debtor's) conversion to Islam. Ribiion the pawned amount shall stand cancelled ... "1180 
Pact ofthe Prophet with Christians ofNajriin: 
lt stipulates "(9) Whoever from the people of Nltiran takes ribii after the conclusion of the pact, shall be excluded 
from my assurance."1181 
Pact orthe Prophet with Thaqlf(Ta'it): 
lt stipulates "(8) Whatever debt of the people of Ta'if may be due for payment on a pawned article and whatever 
debt on a pawned article may be payable till after the 'Ukaz season, should be paid by 'Ukaz. Allah has no 
responsibility regarding ribii. ... (1 &) No ribii shall be charged on the pawned articles. If they are in a position ta 
pay the amount of the pawn, they should pay it. Ifthey are not able to pay immediately, they should pay up to the 
JamiidJ al- 'iilii of the next year. And one whose time is up and does not pay, he has no doubt tumed it into a ribii 
transaction. (19) If the people ofThaqlfare in debt, the amount of principal only shall be paid to the creditor."1l82 
Letter ofthe Prophet to 'Amr Ibn M'abad al-Juham: 
It states " ... whoever from amongst the Muslims, whom payment of a debt is due from somebody, shall receive the 
amount ofthe principal only and ribii on the pawned amount shall not be admissible."1183 
1179 V erstcegh, Arabic Grammar and Qur'iinic Excgesis, 71. 
1180 Ibn Sa'd, Kitiib al-Tabaqiit al-KabIr, Ill, 24-25, 27, trans. Sultan Ahmad Qureshi, Letters orthe Holy Prophet, (Lahore: Muslim 
Edueational Trust, n.d.), 43. 
1/R1 Al)mad ibn YaI)ya Baladhurl, FutiiI; al-Buldan, l, 64-65, as translated in Sultan Ahmad Qureshi, Lcttcrs orthc Holy Prophct, 
(Lahore: Muslim EducationaJ Trust, n.d.), 50. 
1182 Abii 'Ubayd, Kitiib al-AmwiiJ, J 9,92, as transJatcd in Sultan Ahmad Qurcshi, Lettcrs orthe Holy Prophet, (Lahore: Muslim 
Edueational Trust, n.d.), 53. 
1183 Ibn Sa'd. Kitiib al-Tabaqiit al-KabIr, 1lI, 24-25, in Qureshi, Lcttcrs ofthe Holy Prophet, II X. 
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MUSLIM T AFSIR ON RIBA AND BA Y' 
PROPHETIC T AFSIR 
See alJidith in Appendix 5. 
NARRATNE TAFSIR 
Representative Excerpts: 
MUJAHID (d. 104/722) 
Doubling and Redoubling Ribi: 
Mul}ammad b. 'Amr reported to us, he said that Abu 'A~im related to him from 1sa, he from Ibn Abu Najll}, who 
said that conceming the Qur'anic verse '0 you who believe, do not devour ribi with continued redoubling: 
Mqjihid said, 'This is the ribi of JahiIiya' .1184 
DAHHAK (d. 105/724) 
Contextual Commercial Ribiiin Buying (Q. 2:278): 
Ribi with which buying was done in the JahiIiya 1185 
QATADA(d.117/735 
Contextual Expansion of l)a1).l).ak Definition: 
The ribii of the JahiIiya consisted in one person selling to another and fixing a time for priee settlement. Upon 
maturity, upon inability ofbuyer to settle, the seller extended the time limit for an increase in payment due. 1186 
Comment on Q. 2:279: 
In this verse Allah has given the threat of murder for the indulgers in ribi. 
SUDDI (d. 127/745), a Qur'iinic scholar 
Sabab aJ-nuzm as Explanation for Q. 2:278: 
This verse was revealed in the context of 'Abbas b. 'Abd al-MuHalib and a member of Bant Mughlra who, in the 
JahiIiya, were partners and had advanced interest-bearing loans to BanI 'Umru of Thaqlf. Wh en Islam came, 
substantial amount oftheir capital was employed on interest. 1187 
ZAYD b. ASLAM (d. 130/747) 
Doubling and Redoubling Ribii: 
The ribii of the JahiIiya consisted in its doubling and redoubling (al-tltf'l/j in terms of cash in case of borrowed 
money] and in age (al-sin) [first-ever reference to borrowed cattle].1188 
AL-T ABAIU (d. 310/923), Exegete and Historian 
Historical Perception of Ribii Conforming to Ribii al-J8hiDya: 
Prohibited was ribii which means the excess whieh accrues to the owner of the capital due to extension of the 
maturity and deferral ofpayment for the debtof. 
Comment on Q. 2:275: 
Tabarl interprets 'the touch of Satan' in this verse as madness. 1189 According to Ayoub, this interpretation is 
accepted by all commentators and lexieographers. \190 
1184 Tabar1, TafJ;lr (Cairo : n.p., 1374 A.H.), VII, 204. 
1185 Ibn Jarlr, III, 71. 
1186 Ibid., Ill, 67. 
1187 Ibid., III, 71. 
1188 Report reeorded by al-Tabari 
1189 al-Tabarl, Jami', VI, 8-12. 
1190 Mahmoud M. Ayoub, The Qur'iin and ils Intcrpretcr..;~ 2 vols. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984),1,273. 
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AL-ZAMAKHSHAIU (d. 528/1144), Persian-Arab Exegete 
Mu'tazalite Commentary But No Ana1ytical Insights on RibiBeyond Semantics. 
Al1eged Analogica1 Equivalence of Ribi and Bay' and its Nullification by an Explicit Statement (N~$), Without 
Defining Their Distinction: 
Shall not rise again: when they are awakened out of their graves. Exeept as one arises whom Satan has prostrated: 
that is, (as one) who is cast down to the ground .... That is the punishment beeause they have said: Bargaining is 
the same as interest [sic]. One may now ask: Why is it not said that interest and bargaining are just the same 
(reversing the order of bargaining and interest), since (in the present context) the discussion is about interest and 
not about bargaining? It should have been said that those who charge interest liken it to bargaining and thus regard 
interest as permissible. Their (misleading) argument apparently consists in saying that: If someone were to 
purchase for two dirhams something that is worth only one dirham, then that would be permissible. It is the same if 
one sells one dirham for two. To this 1 reply: This is a kind of exaggeration (mubilagha), namely, in the direction 
that, in their firm be\ief that interest is justifiable, they have reached such a stage that they charge interest as the 
basis (a~l) and standard of what is allowable, in order to liken it to bargaining. Even though God has pennitted 
bargaining but has forbidden interest : Through these words of God it is denied that they may be treated as the 
same, and it is shown that a conclusion from analogy (qiyis) (as is represented by the apparent argument of those 
who charge interest) is nullified through an explicit statement (na~$). For these words of God show that their 
conclusion from analogy conceming what is permitted and what is prohibited by God is invalid .... 1191 
liN KATlfIR (d. 774/1373) 
Classica1JMedieval Methodological Tradition of TafSIr of the Qur'iin by the Qur'iin and by the Ifaditb (tafSir bi/-
ma 'thw: interpretation by tradition), Discouraging Search for IfiJana: 
Alliih's saying : "That is because they say: 'Trading is only like Ribi', whereas Alliih has permitted trading and 
forbidden Ribi," meaning: they have made Ribi lawful and opposed Allïih's shan'ah laws. And, "whereas Allïih 
has permitted trading and forbidden Ribi" is probably a perfect answer to their claim and their opposition to 
Allïih's law, even though they know that Allïih has legally distinguished between trade and usury. He is AII-
Knower, Ali-Wise, no one ean reverse His Judgment, and He cannot be questioned about His aets, but they will be 
questioned about theirs. He knows the true nature ofthings and what is useful for His slaves, and He guides them 
to it; He also forbids them what is harmful to them ... 1192[italies and underlining mine] 
Difficulty ofUnderstanding Ribi: 
As cited by Mahmoud Ayoub, Ibn Kathlr1193 observes "that the problem of understanding usury and what may lead 
to it has been one of the most difficult problems for jurists. He cites a statement of 'Umar ibn al-KhaHïib, who said 
'There are three things eonceming whieh 1 wish the Apostle of God had left us a clear injunction to follow.' Among 
these were the problems of usury."1194 
LEGAL T AFSIR 
ABU L-HASAN MUOATIL liN SULAYMAN AL-BALKHI (d. 150/767) 
Following the requirements of the genre deals with, among others, the legal topie of ribiï as a separate eategory. 
But the text of the talSk follows the narrative genre in Hne with the c1assical/medieval tradition, explaining ribiï 
prohibitory verses are explained with the help of eaeh other in the context of the JïihiTIya tinancial praetice. 1195 This 
exegesis offers no clues to the 'illa and {likma ofthe prohibition. 
1191 Jar Allah Ab1 al-Qasim Mal)miid ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhshar1, al-Kashshiif 'an Ifaqii'iq Ghawiimùj al-Tanz71 wa buyiin al-aqiiw71 fi 
wujiih a/-tiiw71 (Riyadh: Maktabïit al-'Ubaykan, 1998), l, 319-323, as translatcd in Helmut Glitjc, The Qur'iin And fts Exegesis, 
translated and edited by Alford T. Welch (Oxford: One World Publications, 1996; Reprint 2000), 193-194. 
1192 Ibn Kath1r, TafSlr, abridgcd by Shcikh Mul)ammad Nas1b ar-Rata'i (London: al-Firdous Ud., 1999),74-75. 
119' 'Imad al-Dln Ab1 al-Fida' Isma'il Ibn Kath1r al-Qurayshl al-Dimashq1, Taf?,.lr al-Qur'iin a/- 'Arlm, 7 vols. (Bcirut: Dar al-Fikr, 
1389/1970), 1,581. 
1194 Ayoub, Qur'iin and its Interprctcrs, 1,272. 
1195 Muqatil b. Sulayman, Kitiib TafSlr a/-Khams Mi'at Aya min al-Qur'iin, 139-140. 
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ABU ZAKARIYYA' YAHYA b. ZIYAD AL-FARRA'(d. 207/822) 
Comment only on the SÜTat aJ-Baqara and SÜTat aJ-RÜIn Verses on Jübi: 
Appendix 7 (contd.) 
Contrary to the genre, comments on Q. 2:275 and 2:278 offer a contextual (tribal practice) and sabab nuzul 
(occasion of revelation) explanation, without any variant reading and grammatical analysis. However, conforming 
to the genre, comments on Q. 30:39 give both variant readings of one word: (' A~im, A 'mash and YaIJya b. 
Waththab: liyarbuwa; vs. Ahl al-J:Iijaz: litarbuwa, both of which he regards as correct) and Iimited grammatical 
variation therefrom which at any rate do es not contribute to analytical enterprise. 1196 
ALLEGORICAL T AFSfR 
MUHYI AL-DIN ffiN 'ARABI (d. 638/1240), Andalusian ~üfi 
In his TalSJr Ibn al- 'ArabI, the most widely known $iifi talSIr, Ibn al- 'ArabI, offers a conventional exposition of ribii 
without any allegorical meaning. 
CONTEMPORARY TAFSiR 
OAZI SANAULLAH PANIPATI, Indian exegete: 
The dictionary meaning of ribii is increase or excess. That is why the Qur'an says that Allah increases charity 
which means that Al\ah has forbidden taking back any excess over the amount lent. 1197 
DR. ISRAR AHMAD, Contemporary Pakistani Popular Exegete 
Deals with ribi mainly in its economic connotation and, dilates considerably on the ribii-incest equivalence lJadIth, 
but explains it in the context of social evil. 1198 
SIR SA yym AHMAD KHAN, 19th century Indian Educator, Scholar and Exegete 
Opinion: 
The ribawI commodities lJadIth deals with the issue of void sales and this does not enter into the exegesis of that 
ribii which is mentioned in the ribii prohibitory verse of Surat al-Baqara [Q. 2:275 ff1.1199 
ABUL KALAM AZAD (d. 1958), 20th century Indian Political Activist, Scholar and Exegete 
No DefinitionlAnalysis of Jübiin magnum opus, TaIjumiin al- Qur'iin,I2Oo an explanatory translation of the Qur'an, 
CommentslTranslation ofQ. 2:275-276: 
Ribiimentioned in Siirat al-Baqara is that ribiiwhich is taken from a person in need [alluding to exploitation as the 
prohibition rationale]. 
Conventional Moral and Economic Approach: 
Ribi equates to lack of fellow-feeling, selfishness, exploitation, tyranny, and concentration of wealth in a few 
hands. 
Conventional Contextual Approach: 
The greedy behavior of sorne Muslims in the matter of booty at the Battle of UIJad was the sabab nuzul of Q. 3: 130 
which prohibits the doubling and re-doubling ribifor believers 
Further Unsupported Claim: 
Q. 2:275-276 "dwells on the evils ofusury." 
Novel Medical Approach: 
He renders "yatakhabba!uhu ash-shaYliinu min al-massi'; in Q. 2:275, as epilepsy"which the superstitious Arabs 
regarded as the toueh of Satan." 
1196 Abiï Zakariyya' Yai)ya ibn Ziyad al-Farra', Ma'iinl al-Qur'iin. ed. by Mui)ammad 'Ali an-Najjar. 3 vols. (Cairo: ad-Dar al-
Mi~riyya, 1955-72), 182. 
Jl97 Qazi Sanaullah Panipati, TafSk M~haii. (DihIi: Idarat Isha'at al-'Uliim Ii-Nadwat al-Mu~annifin, 195-'1) 
1l9R Israr Ahmad, Miim ka Ma'ashl Ni{!iim. [in Urdu) (Lahore: Markazi Anjuman Khuddam al-Quran, 1985),22. 
1199 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Ta[~kQur'iin (Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Publie Library, 1995),237. 
1200 Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumiin al-Qur'iin. cd. and rendered into English by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif. 2 vols. (Bombay; Calcutta; 
New Delhi; Madras; Lucknow; London; New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), Il, 131 ff. 
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Criticism of Medieval and Contemporary Exegetes: 
Medieval and contemporary exegetes have missed the exact message and plain simplicity of the Qur'an for 
centuries due to their intellectual environment which bred "a graduai decadence in the quality of the Muslim mind . 
... When the commentators found that they could not rise to the heights of the Qur'anic thought, they strove to 
bring it down to the level oftheir own mind."1201 
AHMED ALI, 20th century Pakistani Translator and Commentator 
Quotation frOID Taj aI-'Urus by Murta4a az-Zabidi (d.l205 H) and from Mubit aI-Mubit by Patras Bastami, a 
definition of ribi(root r.b. w.) as "raba, yarbu, multiply, increase, swell, expand (beyond the natural or original size), 
as in [Q.] 22:5; excess such as surplus that cornes to the surface Iike scum, as in [Q.] 13: 17; rabiyun, increased hold 
that overpowers, as in [Q.] 69: 10; arba, more than the other, as in [Q.] 16:92." 
Further Explanation: 
Ali this points to unnaturalor artificial increase. lt is first mentioned in a Makki sura, 30:39, as lending money at 
interest to increase one's capital through others' wealth; and is explained at 2: 275 as the opposite oftrade, and at 
3: 130 as doubling and redoubling. By suffocating a person's freedom of action and independence - another meaning 
of riba being asthma - it results in oppression, and is condemned in strongest possible tenns and forbidden. Since 
other possibiIities of exploitative manipulations of people's needs and constraints exist, the word acquired a special 
significance in the Quranic order, so that its conceptual ramifications extend to other forms of lending and 
borrowing, even such lending ten pounds of grain and demanding eleven on return. But today, in the clash of 
Islamic thought and Western practice, the word has become a subject ofpolemics, mainly through corruption in the 
process of translation. The Arabie of the Qur'an is pre-Quranic in its etymological and historical perspectives, and 
the sense of many words is altered when rendered in terrns of modern Arabie. The same is true of the Bible where 
'usury', the exact equivalent of riba in English, had originally, and forrnerly, meant "interest of any kind on money 
lent," has been changed, by accident or design, to mean "iniquitous or iIIegal interest on a loan," (Chambers 1901 
edn.), and 'usurer' has been changed from its original Biblical sense of "money-Iender for interest;" and altered in 
modern (American) versions of the Bible including that of King James Version of 1611 to "money-changer" as in 
Mark: 11:15; orto "exchangers", as in Matthews: 25:27.1202[italics mine]. 
AL T AF GAUHAR, 20th century Pakistani Translator and Commentator 
Conventional Definition of Ribi: 
The increase or excess pertaining to loans, with the "correct English equivalent" as usury. 
Traditional Prohibition Rationales: Economic, social and moral standpoints. 
Distinction between 'Usury' and 'Interest': 
Originally the word usury meant 'the fact or practice of lending money on interest'. It came to mean in later use, 
'the practice of charging, taking, or contracting to receive, excessive or iIIegal rates of interest for money upon 
loan'. "The crime of usury, before Reformation, consisted in the taking of any interest for the use of money; and 
now in taking higher rate of interest than is authorized by law." Bentham defined usury as: "1 know of but two 
definitions that can possibly be given of usury: one is, the taking of a greater interest than the law allows of ... the 
other is the taking of a greater interest than it is usual for men to give and take." lt is clear from this that where 
money is loaned on interest, it amounts to usury in the original sense ofthe word. Subsequently laws were enacted 
specifying the Iimit within which usury was tolerated. This legal or customary Iimit oftolerance came to be known 
as interest. ln the Encyclopaedia Britannica us ury is explained as "compensation for the use of money regardless of 
amount according to earlier English law ... The laws against usury are of ancient origin. Early laws of China and 
India prohibited usury. The Mosaic law Iimited the exaction of interest; the Roman law prescribed or regulated such 
charges. ln England during the Middle Ages the practice of charging interest was maligned by the Church and 
outlawed by the State. But the credit requirements of modern commerce caused the removal ofthese restrictions in 
England and elsewhere." The exaction of oppressive interest is no longer iIIegal under the common law of England 
or the United States though debtors are protected from over-reaching lenders by the statute law. t203 
1201 Ibid., Il. 2, ix-x. 
1202 Ahmcd Ali, al-Qur'an, 50. 
1203 AltafGauhar, Translations trom the Quran (Lahore: Sang-e-Mecl Publications, 1989), 128-129. 
354 
Appendix 7 (contd.) 
MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, Qiidiyanl (A1}madiyya) 20th century Pakistani Diplomat, International Jurist and 
Translator of The Qur'an,1204 
No exegesis in his work and his translation conforms to traditional renderings. 
MOHAMMAD BAOIR BEHBUDl, 20tb century Shl'ite Qur'anic Scholar 
Seminal Work, Ma'ni al-Qur'in, translated by Colin Turner and rendered as 'exegetically-Ied' reading i.e. a 
combination of translation and exegesis, posits the following innovative interpretations of the libii prohibitory 
verses: 
Q. 2:276 [275]:Those who accept usury, and resort to sophistry in order to justity their wrong-doing, shall not rise 
from their place in the market unless it be like a madman whom Satan has rol/ed in the dust and the mud; only 
them, completely abased, shall they rise. This wretchedness is on account of the fact that those who practice usury 
c1aim that usury is simply another form oftrade. But God has allowed trade and forbidden usury. Those who have 
given or received usury, but who now heed the words oftheir Lord on this matter, they shall be forgiven for their 
illicit transactions and dealings in the past: their case is for God to deal with and no-one else. But whoever hears 
God's directives on this matter, yet persists in dealing in usury, he will abide in the Fire forever. 1205 
Q. 2:277 [276]: God will make usury a burden on those who deal in it; never will it bring them good fortune. 
Charity, however, He will bless, and with it allow the community to prosper. God does not love those who are 
ungrateful and oppressive, even ifthey are apparently good-natured l206 
Q. 2:279 [278]: 0 you who believe: fear God's wrath! And if you are believers, give up what remains of your 
usurious gainsto those who are in your debt. 1207 
Q. 2:280 [279]: If you do not carry out this just act, beware lest God and His Prophet wage war against you and 
deprive you of your wealth and livelihood. But if you repent and retum to God's law, your capital will be yours: 
deal not unjustly with your debtors and you shall not be dealt with unjustly.1208 
Q. 3:131 [130]: 0 you who believe! Do not aUempt to fight against God Do not practice usury, doubling your 
profits and then doubling them again. Fear God's wrath and put aside usury so that you may aUain salvation. 1209 
Q. 4:162 [161]: And they accepted usury, even though they had been forbidden to do so; and they devoured and 
misappropriated the goods and monies of others in their greed. And it is on account of ail these misdeeds of theirs 
that We have prepared for them a painful punishment. 12lo 
Q. 30:40 [39]: That which you entrust to commercialorganizations, companies and bankswith a view to making a 
profit will not be increased by God; nor will it increase your sustenance. lt is that which you give as zakat which 
will win God's favour and find increase by His leave. Those who pay zakat wi\1 find their outlay multiplied by 
their Lord as recompense. 1211 
MUHAMMAD ASAD, 20th century exegete 
Conventional Financial Interpretation of RibiiVerses. 
Social and Moral Approach: 
Exploitation of the economically weak by the strong and the resourceful as the prohibition rationale. 
Linguistic and Qur'anic Meaning of Ribii - An "unlawfu1 addition", without an agreedjuristic definition: 
This [Q. 30: 39] is the earliest mention ofthe term and concept of ribii in the chronology of Qur'iinic revelation. 
ln its general, linguistic sense, this term denotes an "addition" to or an "increase" of a thing over and above its 
original size or amount; in the terminology ofthe Qur'an, it signifies any unlawful addition, by way of interest, to 
a sum ofmoney or goods lent by one person or a body ofpersons to another. Considering the problem in tenns of 
1204 Zafrulla Khan, The Qur'an. 
1205 Behbiidi and Turner, The Quran, 26. 
120" Ibid 
1207 Ibid. 
!2O' Ibid. 
1209 Ibid., 36. 
1210 Ibid., 57. 
1211 Ibid., 244. 
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the economic conditions prevailing at or before their time, most of the early Muslim jurists identified this 
"unlawful addition" with profits obtained through any kind of interest-bearing loans irrespective ofthe rate of 
interest and the economic motivation involved With ail this - as is evidenced by the voluminous juridical 
literature on this subject - Islamic scholars have not yet been able to reach an absolute agreement on the definition 
of ribi, a definition, that is, which would coyer ail conceivable legal situations and positively respond to ail the 
exigencies of a variable economic environment. In the words of Ibn Kathlr (in his commentary on 2:275), "the 
subject of ribi is one ofthe most difficult subjects for many ofthe scholars (ahl al- 'ilm). " 
Lack ofProphetic Explication ofthe Prohibition: 
It should be borne in mind that the passage condemning and prohibiting ribi in legal terms (2:275-2R 1) was the 
last revelation received by the Prophet, who died a few days later [according to the uncontested evidence of Ibn 
'Abbas; Bukhar1; also, Fatl} aI-BarI, VIII, 164 f.]: hence the Companions had no opportunity to ask the Prophet 
about the shar'l implications ofthe relevant injunction - so much so that even 'Umar ibn al-KhaHab is reliably 
reported to have said: "The last [of the Qur'an] that was revealed was the passage [lit., "the verse"] on ribi; and, 
behold, the Apostle of God passed away without [lit., "before"] having explained its meaning to us" (Ibn l:Ianbal, 
on the authority ofSa'id ibn al-Musayyab). 
Rationale (Qikma) of Ribi-Prohibition (Moral and Socio-Economic Exploitation) and Plea for ContinuaI 
Diachronie Economie Renewal and Reinterpretation: 
Nevertheless, the severity with which the Qur'an condemns ribi and those who practice it fumishes - especially 
when viewed against the background of mankind's economic experiences during the intervening centuries - a 
sufficiently clear indication of its nature and its social as weil as moral implications. Roughly speaking, the 
opprobrium [disgrace] of ribi (in the sense in which this term is used in the Qur'an and in many sayings of the 
Prophet) attaches to profits obtained through interest-bearing loans involving an exploitation of the economically 
weak by the strong and resourceful: an exploitation characterized by the fact that the lender, while retaining full 
ownership of the capitalloaned and having no legal concem with the purpose for which it is to be used or with the 
manner of its use, remains contractually assured of gain irrespect ive of any losses which the borrower may suffer in 
consequence ofthis transaction. 
With this definition in mind, we realize that the question as to what kinds of financial transactions fall within 
the category of ribi is, in the last resort, a moral one, closely connected with the socio-economic motivation 
underlying the mutual relationship of borrower and lender; and stated in purely economic terms, it is a question as 
to how profits and risks may be equitably shared by both partners to a loan transaction. It is, of course, impossible 
to answer this question in a rigid, once for ail manner: our answers must necessarily vary in accordance with the 
changes to which man's social and technological development - and, thus, his economic environment - is subject. 
Hence, while the Qur'anic condemnation of the concept and practice of ribi is unequivocal and final, every 
successive Muslim generation is faced with the challenge of giving new dimensions and a fresh economic meaning 
to this term, which, for want of a better word, may be rendered as "us ury" . 
In the present instance [Q. 30:39] (which, as 1 have mentioned, is the earliest in the history of the Qur'an), no 
clear-cut prohibition is as yet laid down; but the prohibition appearing in 2:275 ff. is already foreshadowed by the 
reference to the immoral hope of increasing one's own substance "through [other] people's possessions", i.e. 
through the exploitation of others. 1212 
Near-Philosophical Approach: 
"The subject of usury [ribiJ connects logically with ... the subject of charity because the former is morally the 
exact opposite of the latter: true charity consists in giving without an expectation of material gain, whereas usury 
is based on an expectation of gain without any corresponding effort on the part ofthe lender. l213 
ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, 20th century translator and commentator 
Traditionalist Explanation But a Liberal Financial Definition of Ribi: 
Usury is condemned and prohibited in the strongest possible terms. There can be no question about the prohibition. 
When we come to the definition of usury there is room for difference of opinion. Hadhrat 'Umar, according to Ibn 
Kathlr, felt sorne difficulty in the matter, as the Apostle left this world before the details of the question were 
settled. This was one of the three questions on which he wished he had had more Iight from the Apostle, the other 
two being Khilafat and Kalalat. Our 'ulama', ancient and modem, have worked out a great body of Iiterature on 
us ury, based mainly on economic conditions as they existed at the rise of Islam. 1 agree with them on the main 
principles, but respectfully differ from them on the definition ofusury. As this subject is highly controversial, 1 
1212 Asad, Message of The Qur'an, n. 35, 622-623. 
lm Ibid., n. 262, 61. 
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shall discuss it, not in this Commentary, but on a suitable occasion elsewhere. The definition 1 would accept would 
be: undue profit made, not in the way oflegitimate trade, out ofloans of gold and si!ver, and necessary articles of 
food, such as wheat, barley, dates, and salt (according to the Iist mentioned by the Holy Apostle himself). My 
definition would include profiteering of aU kinds, but exclude economic credit, the creature of modern banking and 
finance. 1214 
Ribi - Bay' Contrast in Q. 2:275 - an "apt simile" in an economie-moral approach: 
Whereas legitimate trade or industry increases the pros perit y and stabiIity of men and nations, a dependence on 
usury would merely encourage a race of idlers, cruel blood-suckers, and worthless fellows who do not know their 
own good and are, therefore, akin to madmen.12l5 
Ribi -Charity Contrast in Q. 3:130: 
The last verse [Q. 3: 129] spoke of forgiveness, even to enemies. If such mercy is granted by God to erring sinners, 
how much more is it incumbent on us, po or sinn ers to refrain from oppressing our fellow-beings in need, in matters 
of mere material and ephemeral wealth? Usury is the opposite extreme of charity, unselfishness, striving, and 
giving of ourselves in the service of God and of our fellow-men. Real prosperity consists, not in greed, but in 
giving, - the giving of ourselves and of our substance in the cause of God and God's truth and in the service of 
God's creatures. 1216 
Expanded but still Economie Version of Ribi, the result of illegal means, economic selfishness, exploitation and 
self-interest (Q. 30:39): 
Ribi is any increase sought through iIlegal means, such as usury, bribery, profiteering, tTaudulent trading etc. Ali 
unlawful grasping ofweaIth at other people's expense is condemned. Economie selfishness and many kinds of sharp 
practices, individual, national, and international, come under this ban. The principle is that any profit which we 
should seek should be through our own exertions and at our own expense, not through exploiting other people or at 
their expense, however we may wrap up the process in the spacious phraseology ofhigh finance or City jargon. But 
we are asked to go beyond this negative precept of avoiding what is wrong. We should show our active love for our 
neighbor by spending of our own substance or resources or the utilization of our own talents and opportunities in 
the service ofthose who need them. Then our reward or recompense will not be merely what we deserve. It will be 
multiplied to many times more than our strict account. 121 ? 
MAWLANA SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAWDUDI, 20th century Journalist, Religious and Political Activist, Writer 
and Exegete (Coined the expression "Islamic Economies') 
Virtual FinanciallEconomic Treatise in Arab Historical Context in Interpretation of Ribi-Bay'Injunctions: 1218 
The tenn riba [sie]in Arabie means 'to grow, to exceed, to increase'. Technically, it denotes the amount that a 
lender receives from a borrower at a fixedrate ofinterest [what about variable rate ofinterest?] At the time ofthe 
revelation of the Qur'an several fonns of interest transactions were in vogue and were designated as riba [sie]by 
the Arabs. Ofthese onel219 was that the vendor sold an article and fixed a time limit for the payment of the priee, 
stipulating that if the buyer fai!ed to pay within the specified period of time, he would extend the time Iimit but 
increase the priee of the article. Another1220 was that a man loaned a sum of money to another person and 
stipulated that the borrower should retum a specified amount in excess of the amount loaned within a given time 
limit. A third fonn ofinterest transaetion l221 was that the borrower and vendor agreed that the former would repay 
the loan within a certain Iimit at a fixed rate of interest, and that if he fai!ed to do so within the Iimit, the lender 
would extend the time limit, but at the same time would inerease the rate of interest. It is to transactions such as 
these that the injunctions mentioned here apply.1222 
Translator Ansari's Comment on Q. 2:275 (yaqiimiin as 'behave' and 'yatakhabbaluhu'as 'insane'): 
The Arabs used the word majniin (possessed by the jinn) to characterize the insane. The Qur'an uses the same 
expression [where?] about those who take interest. Just as an insane person, unconstrained by ordinary reason, 
1214 Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur'iin, n. 324, Ill. 
1215 Ibid., n. 325, Ill. 
1216 Ibid., n. 450-451, 156. 
1217 Ibid., n. 3552, 1062. 
121' Mawdüdi Siid ISO 
1219 Accordin~ to Qatad~, as quoted by MawdûÜt in his Siid, ISO. 
1220 According to Mujahid, as rcportcd in Ibn Jar1r, lll, 62, and according to thc rcscarch of Abû Bakr al-Ja~~iis, in his AlJkim al-
Qur'in, l, quoted by MawdûÜt in his Siid, 151. 
1221 According to the researeh of Imam Raz!, in his Ta[yJr Kablr, Il, 351, quoted by MawdüÜt in his Siid, 151. 
1222 Sayyid Abul A'lii Mawdüdi, Tafhlm al-Qur'in. English version, Towardy Understanding the Qur'iin. trans. and cd. Zafar Ishaq 
Ansari. (Leicester: Thc Islamic Foundation, 1988), l, n. 315, 213. 
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resorts to ail kinds of immoderate acts, so does one who takes interest. He pursues his craze for money as ifhe were 
insane. He is heedless of the fact that interest cuts the very roots ofhuman love, brotherhood and fellow-feeling, 
and undermines the welfare and happiness of human society, and that his enrichment is at the expense of the well-
being of many other human beings. This is the state of 'insanity' in this world: since a man will rise in the 
Hereafter in the same state in which he dies in the present world, he will be resurrected as a lunatic.\223 
Detailed Economie Explanation of Ribi-Bay' Distinction (Q. 2:275): 
The unsoundness of this view [equating ribi and bay' by the Kuffiir] lies in not differentiating between the profit 
one gains on investment in commercial enterprises on the one hand, and interest on the other. As a result ofthis 
confusion, the proponents ofthis view argue that ifprofit on money invested in a business enterprise is permissible, 
why should the profit accruing on loaned money be deemed unlawful? \224 
Standard Lexical Meaning of Root r.b. w.: 
'Excess', 'Growth', 'Increase' and 'Rising'. 
Restrictive Definition of Ribi: 
Ribi is from this same root and its connotation is 'excess in wealth' and 'addition to principal'; the Holy Qur'an 
uses the word ribito denote interest."\225 
RationaIe {?likma)ofRibi-Prohibition: Purely economic and moral grounds 
Injustice as the raison d'être of the prohibition: 
The contention that ~u/m (injustice) is the reason why interest on loans has been disallowed and hence ail such 
interest transactions as do not entail cruelty are permissible, remains yet to be substantiated.\226 
Punishment for the Sin of Ribi: Drastic and unparalle\ed, inc\uding "seventy times worse than incest with one's 
own mother." \227 
lfiman (I:Iudüd: boundaries, sanctuary) of AlI8h: 
Initial Inclusion: only the Qur'anic prohibition ofusurious dealings in loans (ribii nasl'a) 
Later Expansion: addition of preventive measures around this /Jimi of Allah, by the Prophet, through 
condemnation of ail participants ofthe interest-bearing loan transaction, and by the prohibition of ribi al-farjl 
Definition of Ribi al-FarjJ - the protective wall around the lJimi of Alliih: 
The prohibited 'excess in an exchange of similar genus in an instantaneous transaction'. 
Prohibition RationaIe of Ribi al-FarjJ: 
Ribi a/-Farj/ is 'the prompter to exaction of excess and the promoter of that mentality in humans which ultimately 
leads to usury generation' .\228 
Fiqh Exemption of AnimaIs from Ribi al-FarjJ: The reason for exemption of animais from the prohibition of excess 
in exchanges of similar genus is purely economic: the wide disparity in value and price of animais of the same 
genus permits their unequal exchange.1229 
Rationale for Permissibility ofExcess in Exchanges of Different Genus with Requirement of Instantaneity - Purely 
Economie Approach: 
Excess in instantaneous exchanges of different genus is bound to be the result of current market priees; but excess 
in such delayed transactions runs the risk ofbeing tainted with ribi due to the inability of accurately forecasting 
future market priees. \230 
Ribii-Bay'Contrast in Q. 2:275: 
The contrast is of ribii with profit resulting from a sale transaction,l23\ thereby the Qur'an prohibits any form of 
interest. 
1223 Ibid., l, n. 316, 213. 
1224 Ibid., 1, n. 317, 214. 
1225 Ibid., Siid, 147, 149. 
1226 Ibid., "Prohibition of Interest in Islam" al-Islam, June 1986,6-8. 
1227 Ibid., Siid, 157. 
1228 Ibid., 164- 166. 
1229 Ibid., 181. 
1230 Ibid., 177. 
1231 Ibid., 82-5. 
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Ribi as MujmaJ (unelaborated) - not elaborating ail constituent parts of the matter and thus giving rise to 
c1assificational uncertainty about ribawJ commodities, based additionally on the tradition attributed to Caliph 
'Umar about the absence of Prophetic explication of the subject. This mujmal character of ribi alJidith is the 
source ofthe development of juristic differences on the determination of ribawJ commodities and the ratio legis of 
their prohibition. 1232 
Need for Updating ofClassical Fiqh: 
According to Mawdiîdi, commercial, financial and economic laws in our ancient fiqh books now require much 
updating. In Islamic law, based both on revealed texts and fiqh, there is ample provision for softening the strietness 
ofinjunctions, including those on ribii, according to circumstances and necessity: 
• There can be compulsion in paying interest but not in taking interest 
• Every necessity does not quality as compulsion for obtaining interest-bearing loans 
• Even in case of dire necessity, interest-bearing loan can be obtained only in required amount and only on 
condition of prompt repayment upon ability to repay. 
MUFTI MUHAMMAD SHAFI'(d. 1976), Former Grand Mufti of Pakistan 
Difference between Ribi and Bay': 
Divine command - the former dec1ared lJarim and the latter I}alil- no investigation required. 
Alleged Ambiguity ofMeaning: related not to the Qur'anic ribi nasJ'a, but only to the Sunnaic ribi farjl 
Rationale of Ribi- Prohibition: moral and economic. 
Correspondence between Crime and Punisbment: 
(\) between the crime of Satanie greedy behavior of usurers on this earth, and the punishment of Satanic state in 
whieh they will be resurrected, and 
(2) between the crime of disbelief (kufT) of denying the divinely ordained polarity of ribi and bay' and opposing the 
ribi- prohibition, and the punishment of eternal Hellfire and threatened war from Allah. 1233 
SA yym QUTB (d. 1966), Ideologue of Muslim Brotherhood 
Tafslr Ayit aJ-Ribi: 
Moral Stance: Condemnation of bank interest and accusation of modern banks for "eating the bones and flesh" of 
the poor borrowers and "drinking their sweat and blood" under the umbrella of the interest-based system. 1234 
Fi ?i1i1 aJ-Qur'in: 
Intrinsic Incompatibility of Ribi and Islam: 
Ribi and Islam are intrinsieally incompatible. Ribi clashes with mankind's ethics, belief and worldview, and is an 
economie evil. In spite ofappearances to the contrary, it interferes with the balanced growth of man. It destroys the 
morallife by promoting greed, jealousy, meanness, and fraud. Allah would not have prohibited any thing if it were 
essential for human growth, and that no evil thing can ever be essential for human Iife. 1235 
1232 Ibid., 178-179. 
1233 Muft1 Mu1:tammad Shafi, Ma'iirifal-Qur'iin (Karachi: Idara al-Ma'arif1969), l, 585-622. 
1234 Sayyid Qutb, Taf5'Jr Ayiit al-Ribii (Dar al-Bu\1üth al-'lImiyya, n.d.), 12. 
1235 Ibid., Fi ?iliil al-Qur'iin (Urdu) (Lahore: Islami Acadcmy, n.d.), 70. 
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Second CaIiph 'Umar ibn Khattab (d. 22/644) 
Reported Lamentation: Absence of sufficient Prophetie explication ofthe ribi-prohibiting verses. 
Third Caliph 'Ali ibn TaIib (d. 40/661) 
Purely Economic Context: 
Appendix 8 
"He who ventures transactions without observing the concerned lslamic rules has surely run into Iibi while he is 
not aware ofit."1236 
Narration from the Prophet: 
"He who is in business and buys and sells things must avoid five traits, otherwise he should not buy or sell 
anything: usury (ribi), taking oath, concealing the fauIts or defects of the goods, praising it wrongly when selling it, 
and finding faults in it when buying it."1237 
Companion 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Abbiis (d. 68/686) and Companions Usama Ibn Zayd, 'Abd Allah Ibn Mas'üd, 'Urwa Ibn 
Zubayr, and Zayd Ibn Argam 
Initial Opinion: 
Ribi al-JiibiIiya as the Only Unlawful Riba: 
Ribi al-jihillya ~ the Iibi conjectured to have been practiced in the pre-Islamic age ~ to be the only unlawful Iibi 
which involved increase in the debt for extension in the period ofrepayment. 
Imam Malik (d. 179/795) 
Muwa.t!a' Entry: 
Ribi a1-JiihiIiya Exclusivelyas a Debt Transaction (on the authority of Zayd b. Aslam): 
ln the JahiIiya, ribi operated in this manner: if a man owed another a debt, at the time of its maturity the creditor 
would ask the debtor: 'Will you pay up or will you increase?' ["turbi"from the root: r.b. w.]. If the latter paid up, 
the credit or received back the sum; otherwise the amount due was increased and the term was extended. 1238 
Tabarl (d. 310 A.H.) 
Prohibited Ribi as Increase for Extended Maturity (In line with the above version of the Jahiftya practice): 
Prohibited ribi is intended to coyer that increase which is stipulated for the owner of the principal, mil (Iender) 
because he has extended the maturity for his borrower and postponed the recovery ofhis loan. 1239 
Tahawl (d. 321 A.H.) 
Ribi as Increase for Extended Maturity (corroborating Tabaii's definition): 
Ribi takes the form of the borrower asking the lender to extend the maturity of the loan for which the borrower 
will increase the amount of the loan.124o 
Abü Bakr al-Jassas (d. 370/980), I:Ianafi jurist and commentator 
Ribi a1-JiihiIiya as a Financial Charge for the Initial Maturity of the Loan: 
The Iibi that was known to the Arabs and was practiced by them was the lending (qarcf) of dirhams and dinirs for a 
period with an excess in proportion to what was lent and on which they had agreed. They were not acquainted with 
the spot sale when it contained an excess ofthe same genus!241 
Further Definition of Ribii al-JBhiHya: 
... a loan given for stipulated period with a stipulated increase on the principal payable by the loanee. 1242 
1236 Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisî, BiIJiir uI-Anwar(Tchran: al-Matba'at ul-Islamiyyah, 1387), cm, 89. 
1237 al-Shaykh u~-Sadiigh, aI-Khi!.aI (Qum, Iran: Mu'assisat un-Nashr ul-Islami, 1403), 1,286. 
1238 Malik, Muwaf.ta; Kitab al-buyu', Biib al-ribii. 
1239 TafJiir Ibn Jadr(Bcirut: n.p., 1988), II, 103 and IV, 90. 
1240 SharIJ Ma 'iini al-Athiir li '1- TaIJiiwl, II, chapter on ribii, 223. 
1241 Abii Bakr Al)mad ibn 'Ali al-Ja~~as al- Razl, AIJkam al-Qur'iin (Beirut: Dar al-Kitiib al-'Arabl, n.d.), l, 465. 
1242 Ibid., 1,469. 
360 
Appendix 8 (contd.) 
Extended Definition of Ribii: 
Ribiiis that transaction of loan in which a maturity is fixed and an increase over the principal amount of the loan is 
stipulated on the borrower. 1243 
Divergence between the Literai Meaning and the Sbaii'a Connotation of Ribii and Its Diverse Meanings: 
The literaI meaning of ribii is increase ... but in the SharJ'a it has acquired a connotation that its literaI meaning 
do es not convey. The Prophet, peace be on him, termed the increase [which is a condition] for waiting, as ribi as is 
evident from the lJadith narrated by Usama ibn Zayd in which the Prophet said: "Ribii is in waiting ... " Hence God 
abolished the ribi which was being practiced at that time. He also invalidated sorne other trade transactions and 
called them ribii. Accordingly, the Qur'anic verse "God has prohibited ribii" covers aIl transactions to which the 
connotation applies in the Shan'a even though the indulgence of the Arabs in ribi, as mentioned above, related to 
loans in dirhams and diniirs for a specified period with the increase as a condition. The term ribii hence signifies 
different meanings. One is the ribii prevalent in JahiIiya ; the second is the disparity or differential (tafii.dul) in 
the volume or weight of a commodity [in spot transactions] ... ; and the third is postponing (al-nasii'); this implies 
that it is not permitted to sell a commodity against future delivery of the same volume, weight or other measure of 
the given commodity.1244 
al-Bayhaql (d. 459/1066) 
Extensive Traditions on Ribii.· 
Subject of ribii in more than fort Y chapt ers in his work on the traditions, al-Sunna al-Kubra, under the heading of 
"Collection of Chapt ers on Riba"presenting about two hundred various sound and weak traditions on ribii. Value of 
his contribution historical rather than analytical. Classifications treat ribii very broadly covering not only the highly 
condemned category of usury on loans but also usurious ex changes, sales of future values, speculation, hoarding, land 
lease, sharecropping and many other exploitative practices causing impoverishment ofneedy by stronger groups. 1245 
al-Sarakhsl (d. 490 or 495/1096 or 1101), l:Ianafite jurist 
aJ-Mabsii! Definition: 
Literai and Technical Definition of Ribii, as a particular form of bay' [the prohibited form]: 
Ribii in its literaI meaning is excess ... and in the technical sense (in the Shan'a), ribii is the stipulated excess 
without a counter value in bay' (sale/exchange).1246 
Two Types of Ribii.·: 
[The words] 'fàcj/ is ribii' imply fàcjl through qadr and they imply fàcj/ through a period of delay, and both are 
intended. This was elaborated in the tradition of 'Ubadah ibn al_&amit I247 
Abü Hiirnid al-Ghaziili (d. 50511111) 
Function of Money and Condemnation of Ribii.· 
And whoever makes a transaction of ribi in dirhams and dinars he indulges in denial of blessings and conduct of 
oppression because these have been created for obtaining other things. There is no purpose or benefit in their very 
selves. Whoever makes them products oftrade, makes them the object, against the purpose oftheir creation. 1248 
Elaboration of the Distinction: 
When someone is trading in dirhams and dinars themselves, he is making them as his goal, which is contrary to 
their functions. Money is not created to earn money, and doing so is a transgression. The two kinds of money are 
means to acquire other things: they are not meant for themselves. In relation to other goods, dirhams and dinars are 
Iike prepositions in a sentence - used to give proper meaning to words; or like a mirror retlecting colors but having 
no color of its own. If a person is permitted to sell (or exchange), money with money (for gain), then such 
transactions will become his goal, and thus money will be imprisoned and hoarded. Imprisonment of the ruler or 
postman is a transgression, for then they are prevented from performing their functions; same with money. 
124' Ibid 1 429 
1244 Ibid:: 1: 551 ~2. 
1245 Ziaul Haquc, Riba: The Moral Eeonomy of U~UJy, Interest and Profit (Selangor, Malaysia: Ikraq, 1995), 8. 
'246al_Sarakhsl, al-Mabsiit, XII, \09. 
1247 Nyazcc, Ribii and l~/amie Banking, Ill. 
1248 Abii l;Iamid al-Ghazali, IlJyii' al- 'Uliim al-Dln (Bcirut: n.p., 1986), IV, kit ab al-shukr al-rukn al-awwal, 96-97. 
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Selling a dirham with equal amount of it with late payment is also not a\1owed. This can be done only by a 
generous person who is trying to be benevolent. In the case of a loan, an act of generosity such as this conveys the 
person gratitude here and reward in the Hereafter. But, if someone exchanges dirhams for a bigger amount, there is 
no question of thanks or reward. Further, it is an injustice because it is destroying the qualities of generosity and 
putting it into compensatory exchange. [Italics mine]1249 
lfikma of Ribii Prohibition (For Ghaziifi, as for many other Jewish, Christian and lslamic scholars): 
Sinfulness (absolute scriptural prohibition); possibility of economic exploitation and injustice in transactions. 
lfikma in a purely Economie Context: 
Ribii is prohibited beeause it prevents people from undertaking real economic activities. This is because when a 
person having money is a\1owed to earn more money on the basis of interest, either in spot or in deferred 
transactions, it becomes easy for him to eam without bothering himself to take pains in real eeonomie activities. 
This leads to hampering the real interests of the humanity, because the interests of the humanity cannot be 
safeguarded without real trade skills, industry and construction. 1250 
Permitted and Prohibited Disguised Ribii: 
Other than lending and borrowing, Ghaziifi diseusses transactions where ribii may arise in disguised form, 
sometimes consistent and sometimes inconsistent with the scriptural prohibition. Notably, similar arguments were 
developed later by Thomas Aquinas. 1251 
Detailed Position on Disguised RibiiGeneration (Ghaziifi/other Arab and European Seholastics): 
[He] genera\1y assumed that the value of a good was independent of the lapse of time. On this assumption, he 
argued, there are two ways in which interest [ribii] can arise in disguised form: it can happen wh en there is an 
exchange of gold for gold, wheat for wheat, etc., but with differences in quantity or in the time of delivery. If the 
time of delivery is not immediate and excess quantity of the commodity is ca\1ed for, the excess is riba al-nasiah 
[sic] Onterest due to late payment or delivery). If the quantity exchanged is not equal but the exchange takes place 
simultaneously, the excess given in exchange is ca\1ed dba al-fadl [sic] (interest due to extra payment). Both are 
forbidden, according to Ghaziifi. That is, for either kind of interest not to occur, ex change should be with equal 
quantity and ownership transfer should be simultaneous; otherwise, "disguised" interest could occur. However, if 
the exchange involves the same types of commodities, such as met ais (gold or silver) or foodstuffs (wheat or 
barley), only riba al-nasiah is prohibited, whereas riba al-fadl is permissible. If ex change is between different types 
of commodities (met ais and foodstuffs), then both kinds are permissible. 1252 
Baghawl (d. 516 A.H.) 
Reiteration of above version ofthe J3.biliya praetiee: 
In the Jahifiya, when a repayment became due from a borrower, and the lender demanded repayment, the borrower 
asked for an extension ofmaturity in return for an increase in the loan. So they both agreed accordingly.1253 
Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn al-' Arabi (d. 543/1148), Miiliki jurist and Qur'an eommentator: 
Upheld Traditional view of Tabarf: J3.biliya Finaneial Exeess Levied Not For Initial But For Extended Maturity: 
Ribiiwas wel\-known among the Arabs. A person would sel\ something on a deferred payment basis. Upon maturity 
the credit or would say [to the debtor]: 'Will you pay [as agreed] or will you add an amount (tarb;) to the [original] 
debt?' ... And A\1iih declared ribii lJariim. Ribii was we\1-known to them. Those who consider this verse to be 
unelaborated i.e. ambiguous, vague (mujmal) do not understand this cross-section of Sharl'a. A\1iih sent His 
Prophet towards a nation to which he himself belonged and whose language he himself spoke. A\1iih's book was 
also revealed in their language so that it was easy for them to understand. The dictionary meaning of dbii is excess 
and the intention in the verse is al\ excess without any counter-value. 1254 
Broad Definition of Ribii: every increase without an 'iwiid or an equal counter-value is dbii. 
1249 Ibid 192 
1250 Ibid:: 4. . 
1251 Karl Pribram, A HistOly of Economie Rcasoning(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), 15; Bernard W. Dempsey. 
Inferest and U~U1y. (Washington DC: Amcrican Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 139. 
1252 S. M. Ghazanfar, cd., Medievallslamie Economie Thoughf: Filling the "Great Gap" in European Economies. (London; Ncw 
York: RoutlcdgcCurzon, 2003), 36. 
1253 Mu'iilim al-fanzllli 'I-Baghawl (Riyadh: n.p., 14(9),1,341. 
1254 Ibn a1-' ArabI, AlJkiim al-Qur'in, (Bei rut: n.p., 1988), 1, 241, 320-321. 
362 
Appendix 8 (contd.) 
Ribi literally me ans increase, and in the Qur'anic verse (2:275) it stands for every increase not justified by the 
ret urn. 1255 
Abii Bakr al-Kasiinl (d. 587/1189), a l:Ianafi authority 
Non All-Encompassing Technieal (Legal) Definition of Ribi: 
Ribi in the jargon of the law is of two types: ribi al-faç/I and ribi al-nasi'. As for rib8 al-faç/I, it is the ex cess over 
the substance of the wealth that has been stipulated in the contract of bay' according to a legal criterion, which is 
[realized through)measure and weight in the genus, while aeeording to al-Shafi'I, it is the absolute exeess 
specifically in food with uniformity of genus. As for ribi al-nasi', it is the difference (excess) between the 
termination of delay and the period of delay and the differenee (exeess) between the possession ('ayn) and its non-
possession (dayn) in things measured and weighed with different genera as weil as in things measured and weighed 
with the uniformity of genera. This is according to us, and according to al-Shafi'I, it is the difference between the 
termination of the period and the delay in foodstuff and precious met ais (with currency-value) specifically.1256 
al-Marghinânl (d. 593/1196) 
Definition of Ribii (echo of Ibn' Arabi definition): 
Ribiis the excess due to one ofthe contracting parties as a stipulated condition without any retum. 1257 
Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) 
Definition: Both Ribi of Sales and Ribi of Debt 
Elaboration: Only Ribi of Debt 
Existing Element: Premium for Late Repayment (positive Ribi of JiihiIiya) 
New Element: Discount for Early RepaymentfRcvCLYc RibiJ' 
The jurists agreed that usury is found in two things: sales and that which is established as a Iiability through sale, 
credit, or other transactions. Ribi which is incurred as a Iiability is of two kinds. First is that about which there is 
an agreement, and this is the ribiofthe period of JahiIiya (the pre-lslamic age) which is prohibited, as they used to 
stipulate excess in loans and then delay the period (ofrepayment). They used to say, "Grant me further delay and 1 
will increase it (the amount)." This is what the Prophet (God's peace and blessing be upon him) meant wh en he 
said at the farewell pilgrimage, "Take heed, verily the ribi of JahiIiya is annulled and the first (claim) of ribi 1 
cancel is that of 'Abbas ibn al-Muttalib." The second kind is "loss for hastening the period" [discount for early 
repayment: reverse ribi). This is controversial and we will describe it in what follows. 1258 
Fakhr al-DIn al-Riïzl (d. 606/1209) 
Reinforeement ofBasis for Compartmentalization of Ribii 
Definition of Ribi al-JiibiRya: Financial Charge for Initial maturity (like al-J~~~ but contrary to traditional 
historieal aecounts) Plus Finaneial Charge for Extended Maturity (in accordance with traditional historical 
aceounts): 
Know that ribi is of two kinds: ribi al-nasJ'a and ribi al-faç/l Ribi al-nasJ'a was weil known and familiar during 
the JiihiIiya. This was so because they used to give wealth on the condition that they would take a fixed amount 
each month, while the principal amount still remained. Thereafter, when it was time for the repayment of the debt, 
they demanded the principal from the debtor. Ifhe was unable to pay, they increased the claim and the period. This 
is the ribithat they used to practice ... As for the ribi through spot transaction (ribi al-naqd), it is the sale ofwheat 
for fiour made from it, or what is similar. [alternate version of ribi al-naqd: the exchange of one mann (a measure 
ofweight oftwo ra.t/) ofwheat for two mann ofwheat and what resembles that). 1259 
Rebuttal of Ibn 'Abbas (that prohibited ribiis ribi al-Dasi'a alone): 
The evidence for Ibn' Abbas is that the words of the Exalted, "Allah has pennitted sale," include the spot sale of 
one dirham for two dirhams and His words, "prohibited ribiï," do not include it, because ribi is an expression of 
excess and each excess is not prohibited. On the other hand, His words, "prohibited ribiï," include a specifie type of 
1255 Ibid 1 242 
1256 Abu"B~kr ai-Kasanl, Badii'j' al-$anii'i'(Bcirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabl, 1982). V, 183. 
1257 Burhiin al-Dln al-Marghinanl, al-Hidiiya (Karachi: Qur'iin Mai)al, n.d.), Kitab al-Buyu', chapter on ribii, III, 78. 
12,. Ibn Rushd, Bidiiyat (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 1995). Il, 96. 
1259Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl, al- TalSJr al-Kabir, 32 vols. (Beirut: Dar Il)ya' al-Turath al-' Arabi, 1980), VII, 91. 
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contract that they used to conc\ude as ribii. This was ribii aJ-nasJ'a. Thus, His words, "prohibited ribii," apply 
exc\usively to nasJ'a and it is, therefore established that His words, "Allah has permitted sale," inc\ude the spot sale 
and His words, "prohibited ribii," do not include it, which necessarily implies that it is permitted. Further, it is not 
possible to say that it is prohibited by the IJadith as it implies the restriction of the apparent meaning of the Qur'an 
with an individu al narration (khabar wiiIJid), which is not permitted. This is what Ibn 'Abbas (appears to have) 
conveyed and its essence lies in whether the restriction of (the text of) the Qur'an is permitted or not? As for the 
majority of the mujtahids, they agreed about the prohibition of ribii in both kinds: the first kind by the Qur'an, and 
the second by the Sunna. 1260 
Ibn aI-AthIr (d. 1209 CE) 
Definition of Ribi: 
The original meaning of ribi is excess and in the terminology of the Shad'a it means increase in the principal 
without any contract of sale having taken place. 1261 
al-Nawawl (d. 676/1278) 
Rejection of "Exploitation" as Prohibitory Rationale as it could equally weil apply to legitimate profit 
generation.1262 
Ibn Oayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) l;Ianbalite theologian and student of Ibn Taymiyya 
Definition of Ribi by Degree ofIts Hiddenness: 
Ribii is of two kinds: Jali and Khafiy. The Jali has been prohibited because of the great harm it carries and the 
Khafiy has been prohibited because it is an instrument for the Jali. Hence prohibition of the fonner is deliberate 
while that of the latter is precautionary[against exploitation and wrongful acquisition of other's property]. The Jali 
is ribii al-nasJ'a and this is what was engaged in during the Jahiftya, like allowing the postponement of repayment 
of principal against an increase, and every time there was a postponement, there was an increase ... However, ribii 
al-facjl has been prohibited to close the access to ribii aJ-nasJ'a. 1263 
RationaIe: Early practice of Arab and Latin Scholastics and their Greek Predecessors of couching their discussions 
ofinterest in terms ofprecious metals and foodstuffs: 1264 
The secret behind the prohibition of unequal exchange of the same kind of precious metals is that their purpose of 
"moneyness" (thamaniya) will be destroyed; and the reason behind the prohibition of unequal exchange of the same 
kind of foodstuff is that it will destroy their purpose of serving as di et. 1265 
Ibn KathIr (d. 774/1373) 
Definition of Ribi: 
Ribiihas been mentioned in aIJidith repeatedly and the source of it is excess on the principal without any contract 
of sale. 1266 
aI-'Aynl (d. 855/1451) 
Definition of Ribi: 
In the fiqh terminology, ribii -Iiterally an increase - is an addition to the principal sum without any contract of an 
eq uivalent payment. 1267 
SevhüUsJam Ebu's-su'ud Efendi, Ottoman Mufti ofIstanbul (1545-1574) (with the sanction of Sultan Suleyman) 
First-ever Fatwa in Islamic History declaring cash trusts (awqif pious foundations) deriving income from lending 
at interest as valid, without the support of any l:lanafi authority ever, manipulated by Ebu's-su'ud with the help of 
legal stratagems (IJiyil) calling the income payments not by the actual name of interest but by the commonly used 
euphemism of"legal transaction" (mu'iimala shari'iyya), and in spite of the juristically correct opposition of the 
1260 Ibid., VII, 92. 
1261 Majd al-Dln al-Mubarak Ibn MuI)ammad Ibn al-Athlr, al-Nihiiya fi Gharlb al-ijadJth wa al-Athiir (Cairo: n.p., 1322H. ), Il,66. 
1262 Nawawl, al-Majmii', 390-404. 
1263 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, J'Iiim al-muwaqqi7n, Il, 154ff. 
1264 Ghazanfar, cd., Medieval ll'lamie Economie Thought, 136. 
1265 Ibn Qayyim a1-Jawziyya, l'liim al-muwaqqi7n, Il, 140. 
1266 Ibn Kathlr, al-Nihiiya (an authcntic book cxplaining J;adJth tcrminology). 
1267 Sadr al-Dln al-' Aynl, Umdiit al-Qiii! (Constantinople: Malba'a al-Amlra, 1310 AH), V, 436. 
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fundamentalist scholar Mehmed of Birgi, guided not by juristic texts but only by the doctrines of necessity and 
public interest. 1268 
Shiih Wali Alliih of Delhi (d. 1176/1762), Traditionalist Indian Scholar 
Support for Liberal Viewpoint: Further Stress on Distinction between 'Actual' and 'Figurative' Ribi: 
Know that ribihas two aspects: actual [iJaqlqJj and figurative. The actual form is in debts, and we have mentioned 
that it has a central place within the topic of mu'imalil. The people in Jahiftya were intensely occupied with it, and 
it was the cause of continuous wars, and a \iUle of it used to Icad to more. It became necessary to seal its door as a 
who le, therefore, what is revealed in the Qur'an about it was revealed. The second type is ribi al-faql, the source of 
it being iJamth ... and this was called ribi by extension and as a metaphor for the true form of ribi ... It was then 
that ribiin this meaning was practiced widely till the true legal form came to be realized in this too. 1269 
Shiih 'Abd al-' Az1z (d. 1824 A.D.) Traditionalist Scholar and son of Shiih Wali Alliih of Delhi 
DiT aJ-/farb Fa/wa: Permitted Ribi for Muslims in Dealings with non-Muslims in Dir al-Ifarb, which to hi m, 
British India was. I27O 
'Abd al-Havv Farangl Mahfi Lakhnawl (1847-1886) 
Opinion: Interest-taking was allowed in India - a dir al-iJarb. 127 1 
Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) 
Opinion: Modem-day bank interest permitted even between and among Muslims even in diir al-Islam. 
Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), Grand Mufti ofEgypt and bis disciple Rashld Rida (d. 1935) 
Defence of Modern Bank Interest: Modem Bank Interest is different from ribi al-jihiHya to which only the ribi-
prohibition applies, even subject to the doctrine of dire necessity. Ribi al-faql and ribi al-nasJ'a are both Sunna-
based and therefore not prohibited - only makriïh. 
Reliance: Ibn Qayyim's Distinction between "Manifest Ribi" (Ribi Ja/J) and "Hidden Ribi" (Ribi KhaRy) 1272 
(a) The only disallowed ribiis ribii al-jiihiHya (pre-Islamic riba), which is the manifest OaH) ribi and consequently 
is prohibited not as a way of performing an usurious transaction but as an usurious transaction in itself. As for the 
two other sorts of ribi, namely ribi al-fàql and ribii al-nasJ'ah (both provided for in Ifamth and not in the Qur'an), 
their prohibition tends to close the loopholes which otherwise might permit manifest ribii (ribijali). Thus ribi al-
fitql and ribii al-nasl'a are under a presumption of prohibition and this presumption is not conclusive but rebuttable. 
Thus again the sale of any of the six articles mentioned in the iJamth, with an increase and whether in a hand-to-
hand transaction or in a deferred one, is disallowed only if it is intended to lead to manifest ribi (ribi jaH), which 
takes place when interest accrues on interest already accounted by the time the transaction was concluded. 1273 
(b) As a result, the first increase on the termed loan is lawful, even though agreed in consideration of the delayed 
term of payment. But if, on maturity date, it is decided to postpone that maturity date against a further increase, 
that is the unlawful dbi al_nasJ'a. 1274 
(c) The consequence which cornes to mind is that whereas ribija/J, the manifest dbii, can be deemed lawful only in 
case of pressing necessity, such as the one which aHows the eating of carrion, the two other sorts of ribii, namely 
ribii al-fàql and ribii al-nasJ'a (both provided for in lfamth and not in the Qur'an) are regarded with aversion 
(kariihiya) but not as under a rule of prohibition. 1275 
1268 Colin Imber, Ebu:~-su'ud' The ülamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997),37, 145-146; J. R. 
Mandaville, "Usurious piety: the eash waqf controversy in the üttoman Empire", Illtcmatiolla' Joul1la' oFMiddlc C"stcm Studics, 10 
(1979), 289-308; Ebu's-su'ud, Bida'at al-qiiiIi, Sü1eymaniye Library, Istanbul, MS Laleli 3,711, chap. 1; Rcv. M. MeColl, "Arc 
Reforms Possible Under Mussulman Rulc?" (mimeo, 1 881), quotcd in EI-Gamal, "Interest and the Paradox ofContemporary Islamie 
Law and Finance", 2. 
\269 Shah Wall Allah, Ijujjat Alliih al-Biilighah, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Turath, 198'1). Il,106-107. 
1270 Mushir-ul-Haq, "Shah' Abd al-' Azlz al-Dihlawl and his Times", Hamdard Islamicu\; Vll, No.l, 78. 
\27\ Ibid., VU, No.l, n. 99, 95. 
1272 Salch, Unlawful Gain, Second Edition, 35-36. 
1273 Fatiiwi al- Imiim MuIJammad Rashld Rirjii. cds. S. Munaljid and Y. Khiïr1. 5 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kit ab al-Jadid. 1970), II. 606. 
1274 Ibid., Il, 608-609. 
1275 Sanhiïr1, Ma,~idir al-Ijaqq, Ill, 220. Kariihiya is a rcligious censure with no practical effect on the transaction itself. 
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(d) Finally, it is aUributed to Shaikh Mu4ammad 'Abduh that he found ways to show that under lslamic law both 
interest generated by savings bank accounts and that generated by insurance policies were admissible. 
Chibli Mallat Opinion on 'Abduh-Ri4ii Position:(in his discussion of early 201h c. Egyptian Saving Funds Scheme): 
Neither Mul).ammad 'Abduh nor Rashld Ri4ii were comfortable about the interest yielded to the depositors on their 
monies, but they seem to have tolerated it if a scheme of murjiiraba could be devised to legitimize the interest on 
the employees' deposits. 1276 
Abü Zabrah (d. 1974), Egyptian FaqIh 
Distinction: Ribiiofthe Qur'iin and Ribiiofthe Sunna (echo Shah Wall Allah): 
Before we put down the pen, we will discuss the legal issue related to ribii, which is that the ex cess in lieu of the 
period [of repayment] is the ribii of the Jahiliya . It is also called ribii al-nasl'a, because the excess in it is in lieu of 
the period, that is, the duration of delay. The scholars are ail in agreement about its prohibition, and it is the ribii of 
the Qur'an. There is a technical form of ribii or that ofthe Islamic usage. This is the ribii of sales (ribii al-bu yu ').\277 
Abül A'lii Mawdüdi (d. 1979), Traditionalist and Neo-Revivalist 
Support of Liberal Position (unwitting but clear): Positing Distinction between Ribii a/-Nasl'a as the ribii of 
(prohibited by) the Qur'iin, and Ribii a/-Farj/ as the ribii of (prohibited by) the Sunna: 
We have stated earlier that ribii, in fact, is that excess or fii'ida which a credit or receives from the debtor as a 
stipulated excess over and above the principal amount. In the tenninology of the law, this is called ribii al-nasl'a. 
Thus it is ribii that is paid and received in a loan transaction. lt is this ribiithat has been prohibited by the Qur'an. 
The whole Umma agrees about its prohibition. l278 ... Ribii a/-Farjlis the excess that is found in the spot exchange of 
two things of the same genus. The Messenger of Allah (p.b. u.h.) has prohibited this form. 1279 
'Abd al-Razziig Sanhüii, the contemporary Egyptian authority on Islarnic law 
Position on Ribii: 1280 Prohibition of ribiiis the rule, and - unlike the position of' Abduh and Riga - is not under the 
presumption of aversion (kariihiya).1281 Only compound interest is first and foremost prohibited in verse Q. 3: 130; 
and based on the testimony of the reports on pre-Islamic ribii and also by implication, simple interest would not be 
prohibited.1282 
Distinction between Ribii a/-Jiibiliya, Ribii a/-Farj/ and Ribii a/-Nasl'a: 
Ribii a/-fàrj/is a way to achieve ribii a/-nasl'a which is a way to achieve ribii al-jiihiliya. It is sufficient, as far as ribii 
al-nasl'a is concerned, to allow payment to be postponed once the debt has matured, charging further interest, so as 
to attain ribii al-jiihiliya. Consequently, ribii al-farjl and ribii a/-nasl'a are not under a direct prohibition (contrary to 
pre-lslamic ribii, which is), but under a prohibition of illicit means - a prohibition designed to close the loopholes 
which might lead to pre-lslamic ribii. 1283 The result of such degrees of prohibition is that ribii al-jiihiliya is allowed 
only in case of pressing necessity (darura mulihha), while ribii al-fàrj/ and ribii al-nasJ'a are deemed lawful in case of 
need (/Jiija;.t284 
Ibrahim Zaki al-Badawi, Egyptian Scholar 
Argument: Strict prohibition of ribii should apply only to the pre-Islamic form, which is, "the increase in debt 
principal at the time ofthe accrual in order to receive a new loan. 1285 
1276 Chibli MaHat, "The Dcbate on Ribii and lntcrest in Twcntieth Century Jurisprudence," Mamic Law and Financc, SOAS, 
London, 1988,74. 
1277 Abii Zahrah, Foreword to Zakl al-Dln Badawl, N8?arlyat a/-Ribii a/-Mu/Jarram Fi a/-Shaii'a a/-/s/iimiyya. (Cairo: Dar wa -Malabi' 
al-Sha'b, 1940), trans. Nyazee, quoted in his, Ribii and /s/amic Banking, 13. 
1278 Syed Abul A'iii Mawdiidi, Siid (Intcrcst) [in Urdu]. (Lahore: Islamic Publications Privatc Ud., 1989),163. 
1279 Ibid 165 
1280 Salell, U;/awfu/ Gain, Second Edition, 36-37. 
1281 Sanhiirl, Ma,5iidir a/-fjaqq, 111,222-234. 
1282 Saeed, Es/amic Banking, 43. 
1283 Sanhiirl, Ma,"idir a/-fjaqq, III, 222-237. 
1284 Ibid., III, 237. 
1285 Quoted in Chibli MaHat, "Thc Dcbatc on Ribà', 80. 
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Doualibi, Contemporarv Syrian Politician 
Modernist DitIerentiation between Consumption Loans and Production Loans: Legality of interest on production 
loans and the iIlegality ofinterest on consumption loans, on the grounds that, based on the concem for the poor, the 
Qur'anic prohibition applies to consumption loans only.1286 
Modernist Contention 1287 
Prohibition of Ribi Individualistic Only: 
Prohibition of ribi covers only individuals, not the giving or taking of interest amongst corporate bodies, such as 
companies, banks, or govemments (institutional credit), or the taking of interest from corporate bodies by 
individuals (individual deposits), because an individu al cannot exploit a larger organization like a bank. m8 
Corroborating Opinion of Pakistan Council oflslamic Ideology on Institutional Credit: 
The Advisory Council oflslamic Ideology agrees that 'riba' [sic] is forbidden but is in disagreement as to whether 
'interest in the form in which it appears in public transactions' which in the opinion of the Council includes 
'institutional credit' as well, would also be covered by riba [sic] [as] specified in the Holy Qur'an. 1289 
'Abd al-Rahmiin al-Jazm 
Elaboration of Ribi: (in a compendium on the juristic opinions of the four Sunnt schools of Islamic jurisprudence): 
Definition and Classification: 
Ribi is one ofthose unsound tmsidJtransactions which have been severely prohibited (nahyan mugha/la:{an). It 
literally means increase ... However, in fiqh terminology, ribii means an increase in one of two homogenous 
equivalents being exchanged without this increase being accompanied by a retum. It is classified into two 
categories. First, ribii al-nasi'a where the specified increase is in retum for postponement of, or waiting for, the 
payment; for example, buying an irdabb (a specifie large measure) ofwheat in winter against an irdab and a half of 
wheat to be paid in summer. As the half irdab which has been added to the priee was not accompanied by an 
equivalent value in the commodity sold and was merely in retum for the waiting, it is called ribii al-nasl'a . The 
second category is ribii al-fàql, which means that the increase mentioned is irrespective of the postponement and is 
not offset by something retum. This happens when an irdab of wheat is exchanged hand to hand for an irdab and a 
kilah (another measure) of its own counterpart, the buyer and the seller both taking reciprocal possession; or when 
ten carats of gold produce [sic] are exchanged for twelve carats of similar gold produce [sic]. 
Ribi aJ-Nasi'a: 
There is no difference among Muslim jurists about the prohibition of ribii al-nasi'a. It is indisputably one of the 
major sins. This is established by the Book of God, the Sunna of His Prophet, and the consensus of the umma. The 
Qur'an says: ... (verses 2:275-9). 
This is the Book of God which has prohibited ribii vehemently and has reprimanded the taker so severely that it 
makes those who believe in their Lord and dread His punishment tremble with fear. Can any reprimand be harsher 
than God equating the takers of ribii with those who have risen in revoit against Him and are at war with Him and 
His Prophet? What will be the state of that feeble human being who fights with the Almighty and Overpowering 
God, Whom nothing on earth or in Heaven can frustrate. There is no doubt that by resorting to ribii such a person 
has adopted the course of self-destruction and deprivation. 
The obvious meaning of ribii to be understood from this noble verse of the Qur'an is the ribiiknown by the Arabs in 
the JahiITya period as explained by the commentators of the Qur'an. More than one of them has mentioned that 
when a loan extended by an Arab matured, he would ask the borrower for the retum of the principal or for an 
'increase' in retum for the postponement. This is also the 'increase' that is known to us. This increase was either in 
quantity, like postponing the retum of a came! now for two in the future, or in age, Iike postponing the retum of a 
camel aged one year against a camel aged two or three years in the future. Similarly, the Arabs were familiar with 
situations where a lender would advance money for a period and takc a spccificd amount of dbii cv cry month. If the 
borrower was un able to repay the principal when the loan matured, he would be allowed an extension in the time of 
repayment [rescheduling] with the continuation of the ribii he has been receiving from the borrower. This is the 
1286 Mu~ammad Abiï Zabra, BuJ;iith fi al-Ribii (Kuwait: Dar a1-B~iïth a1-'Ilmiyya, 1970),52-57. 
lm Saeed, l51amic Banking, 45-46. 
1288 Abdul Jabbar Khan, "Divine Banking System." Journal ofl51amic Banking and Finance. Summer 1984, 24-44. 
1289 Decision taken on January 13, 1964, in responsc to a question from the Pakistan Ministry of Finance, as quoted in Nawazish Ali 
Zaidi, "ls1amic Banking in Pakistan" Journal ofl51amic Banking and Finance. Summer 1988,21-30. 
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ribii which is prevalent now and charged by banks and other institutions in our countries. God has prohibited it for 
Muslims ... 
The noble verses have decisively prohibited ribii al-nasJ'a which involves what is generally understood in our times 
as the giving of a principal amount on loan for a given period against the payment ofinterest in percent age terms on 
a monthly or annual basis. Sorne people try to justify this kind of ribii in spite of its conflict with Islam. 1t is far 
removed from Islam and is in discord with its basic philosophy in form as well as meaning. Sorne ofthem claim that 
what is prohibited is the charging of ribii many times the principal amount as stated by the Qur'an: "0 believers! 
Charge not doubled and redoubled interest, and fear God so that you may prosper" (3: 130). This claim is however 
absolutely wrong because the objective of the verse is to express a repulsion against interest ... 
Ribii al-Fa(f./: 
Ribii al-Faç/l ... is prohibited according to the four schools of jurisprudence. But sorne of the Prophet's companions, 
among them Sayyid 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abbas, allowed it. Nevertheless, it is reported that he recanted his opinion 
afterwards and talked about its prohibition. Ribii al-fàç/l does not have substantial effect on transactions because of 
the rarity of its occurrence; it is not the objective of people to buy or sell one thing in exchange for the same thing 
unless there is something extra from which each of the parties may benefit. Notwithstanding this, it has been 
prohibited because it might lead to the defrauding or deception of less sophisticated persons .... 
The authority for the prohibition of ribii al-faç/l lies in what the Prophet said: ... (six commodities lJadith). This 
lJadith indicates that it is neither proper to sell these homogenous commodities against themselves with addition 
nor is it proper to delay the reciprocal taking of possession. Hence it is not proper to se\l a gold guinea against a 
go Id guinea and ten quriish, neither on a hand-to-hand, nor on a deferred basis, just as it is not right to sell a gold 
bar weighing ten carats [sic] against a go Id bar weighing twelve carats [sic]. Similar is the case with wheat and 
barley and other items mentioned in the IJadith. 
And if such is the case, then does ribii enter into every commodity or is it confined to just the commodities 
mentioned in the lJadith, namely, gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt? There is no difference of opinion among 
the four schools of jurisprudence that analogica\ly ribii enters into other commodities not mentioned in the lJadith. 
If there is any difference it is in the analogy ('illa) used to arrive at the conclusion that the 'addition' is prohibited 
for all commodities wherever the analogy holds. Only the Z:ahiriyya confined ribii al-fàç/lto only the commodities 
specified in the lJadith. 1290 
This long excerpt from al-Jazlr1 iIIustrates what may be called a descriptive and concrete style of fiqhl 
presentation on ribii, as opposed to an analytical presentation. 
1290 al-Jazlrl, a/-Fiqh 'a/a a/-Madhiihib a/-Arba'a, 6th cd. Il,245-8. 
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IfUDUD CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 
HaddCrime 
• Siliqa (theft) 
• lfiriba 
(armed robbery, terrorism, corruption): 
• Without Murder 
• With Murder 
• Shurb (drinking intoxicants) 
• Zini'(iIlicit sexual intercourse): 
• Ghair al-mulJa$$an (unmarried) 
• MulJa$$an (married) 
• Ridda (apostasy) 
• Qadhf (false accusation 
of iIlicit sexual intercourse) 
• Baghy (rebellion) 
1291 Q. 5:38, 39. 
1292 Q. 5:33. 
129' Sahlh al-Bukhiifi "Kitab al-Hudiid" VIII. 8 13, 14 15. 
1294 O. 24:2. ' . '" 
HaddPunishment & (Source) 
Rand Amputation (Qur'anic)1291 
Rands and feet Amputation 
Execution/Crucifixion/Exile(Qur'anic) 1292 
Lashing - not fixed (Sunnaic)1293 
-Lashing - 100 times (Qur'anic)1294 
-Lashing (100) + One Year Exile (Sunnaic)1295 
Lashing (100) & Stoning to Death (Sunnaic)1296 
Death (Sunnaic)1297 
Lashing - RO times (Qur'anic)1298 
None (Qur'anic or Sunnaic) 
1295 Sahlh al-BukharI, "Kitab al-Hudiid", VIII, Hadith No. 819, rcpcaling Q. 4: 15, 16. 
1296 S~~n al-Tinnidlii, "Kitab al~f:ludiid", IV, j2, rcpcaling Q. 4:15,16. 
1297 Sahlh al-Bukhari, "Bab Hukm al-Murtad wa al-Murtadah', VlIl, 50, 163. 
1298 0.24:4,5. . 
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ANCIENT USURY LAW CODES 
The ancient Law Codes, Iimiting the usury rate, inc1ude the Ur-Nammu Code (c. 2050 B.e.), the Code of Eshnunna 
(c. 1925 B.C.), the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1860 B.C.), the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700 B.C.), the Hittite Code 
(c.1450 B.C.), the Assyrian Code (c. 1350 B.C.), and the Covenant Code (c. 1000 B.e.), 1299 and Bocchoris' Law from 
Egypt around the time of the twenty-fourth dynasty (c. 725-709 B.C.).1300 But the extant codes are only those of 
Eshnunna, Hammurabi and Bocchoris. 
Pre-Legal Code Reforms: 
Aim: Protect the widow and the fatherless against the rich man. Debtor protected only indirectly by guaranteeing 
the rights of his family after his death. I301 
• Reform of Urukagina, King of Lagash, Ur 1 Period (c. 2350 B.C.); 1302 
• Reform of Gudea of Lagash, Beginning of Ur III Period (c. 2060-1950 B.C.);1303 
• Code ofUr-Nammu (c. 2060-2043 B.C.).1304 
Extant Law Codes: 
• Code of Eshnunna (c. 1925 RC.): Discovered between 1945 and 1949 at Tell Abu l;Iarmal, an out post of the 
Kingdom of Eshnunna, this code is the first extant legal source dealing directly with loans at interest, in Laws 
18A to 21, Iimiting rates to 20% for money and 33 1/3 % for grain: 1305 
18A. Per 1 shekel (of silver) he will add one sixth of a shekel and 6 grains as interest; per 1 kor (of barley) he will 
add 1 (pan) and 4 seah ofbarley as interest. 
19. The man who gives (a loan) in terms ofhis retake shall make (the debtor) pay on the threshing flooT. 
20. If a man lends out money to the amount recorded, but has the corresponding amount ofbarley set down to his 
credit, he shall at harvest time obtain the barley and its interest, namely 1 (pan) (and) 4 seah per 1 koT. 
21. Ifa man lends out money in terms ofits initial (amount), he shall obtain the silver and its interest, (namely) 
one sixth (of a shekel) and 6 grains per 1 shekel. 
• Code of Hammurabi (1728-1686 RC.):1306 It deals extensively with interest-taking and resuItant problems in the 
following pertinent prescriptions: 
48. If a debt is outstanding against a seignior and Adad has inundated his field or a flood has ravaged (it) or 
through lack ofwater grain has not been produced in the field, he shaH not make any return of grain to his 
creditor in that year; he shall cancel his contract-tablet and he shall pay no interest for that yeaT. 
49. When a seignior borrowed money from a merchant and pledged to the merchant a field prepared for grain or 
sesame, ifhe said to him, "Cultivate the field, th en harvest (and) take the grain or sesame that is produced," ifthe 
tenant has produced grain or sesame in the field, the owner of the field at harvest-time shaH himselftake the 
grain or sesame that was produced in the field and he shaH give to the merchant grain for his money, which he 
borrowed from the merchant, together with its interest, and also for the cost of cultivation. 
1299 Quoted in, George Mendenhall, Law and Co venant in [srael and Aneient Near East (Pittsburgh: Biblical Colloquium, 1955),9. 
J300 Maloney (Background, 28) regards this as a rather unsatisfaetory legal source as it is known only through Diodorous of Sicily 
who wrote in the 1'( cent ury A.D. and was thus far removed from Bocchoris' time, and no corroborating Eh'Yptian sources have yet 
been 1bund. 
1301 Maloney, Background, 14. 
1302 Alexander Scharff and Anton Moorgat, Agypten und Vorderasien im Altertum (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1950),242-3, quotcd in 
Maloney, Background, 8. 
1303 Ibid., 278, quoted in Maloney, Background, 14 .. 
1304 Charles F. Fensham, "Widow, Orphan and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal and Wisdom Literature," Journal ofNear 
Eastern Studies, XXI, (1962), 129-39, P 129; E. Szlechter, "Àpropos du Code d'Ur-Nammu," Revue d'Assyriologie ct d'Archeologie 
Orientale, 47 (1953), 6; Szlechter, "Le Prêt dans l'Ancien Testament et dans les codes mésopotamiens d'avant Hammourabi," Revue 
d'Histoire ct de Philosophie Réligieuses, 35 (1955), 18-19, quoted in Maloney, Background, 8 and 14. 
1305 Albrccht Goetzc, The Law.I· of EI'hnunna ("Annual, American Schools of Oriental Rescarch," 31 [1956]), 64f. 
1306 Code of Hammurabi, tr. T. J. Meck, in Aneient Near Eastem Texts(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955). 
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50. Ifhe pledged a field planted with (grain) or a field planted with sesame, the owner ofthe field shall himself 
take the grain or sesame that was produced in the field and he shaH pay back the money with its interest to the 
merchant. 
51. Ifhe does not have the money to pay back, (grain or) sesame at their market value in accordance with the 
ratio fixed by the king he shaH give to the merchant for his money, which he borrowed from the merchant, 
together with its interest. 
66. When a seignior borrowed money from a merchant and his merchant forec\osed on him and he has nothing to 
pay (it) back, ifhe gave his orchard after pollination to the merchant and said to him, "Take for your money as 
many dates as there are produced in the orchard," that merchant shaH not be aHowed; the owner of the orchard 
shaH himself take the dates that were produced in the orchard and repay the merchant for the money and its 
interest in accordance with the wording ofhis tablet and the owner ofthe orchard shaH in turn take the remaining 
dates that were produced in the orchard. 
88. If a merchant (lent) grain at interest, he shaH receive \00 ID! of grain per kur as interest. Ifhe lent money at 
interest, he shaH receive one-sixth (shekel) six ~ (i.e., one-fifth shekel) per shekel of silver as interest. 
89. If a seignior, who (incurred) a debt, do es not have the money to pay (it) back, but has the grain, (the 
merchant) shall take the grain for his money (with interest) in accordance with the ratio fixed by the king. 
90. Ifthe merchant increased the interest beyond (100 ID!) per kur (of grain) (or) one-sixth (shekel) six ~ (per 
shekel ofmoney) and has coHected (it), he shaH forfeit whatever he lent. 
91. If a merchant (lent) grain at interest and has coHected money (for the full interest) on the grain, the grain 
along with the money may not (be charged to the account?). [8adly damaged text; meaning not clear] 
93. If a merchant has given corn or silver on loan (and) has not taken the capital but takes the interest for so 
much corn (or silver) (as he has lent), whether he has then not caused so much corn (or silver) as he has received 
to be deducted and has not written a supplementary tablet or has then added the increments to the capital sum, 
that merchant must double so much corn (or silver) as he has taken and give (it) back. 
94. If a merchant lent grain or money at interest and when he lent (it) at interest he paid out the money by the 
small weight and the grain by the smaH measure, but when he got (it) back he got the money by the (large) 
weight (and) the grain by the large measure, (that merchant shall forfeit) whatever he lent. 
95. If (a merchant) has given (corn or silver) on loan without witness (or contract), he forfeits (what)soever he 
has given. 
96. If a seignior borrowed grain or money from a merchant and does not have the grain or money to pay (it) back, 
but has (other) goods, he shall give to his merchant whatever there is in his possession, (affirming) before 
witnesses that he will bring (it), while the merchant shaH accept (it) without making any objections. 
101-107. These prescriptions deal with credit transactions between a merchant and a trader, where the merchant 
is much more than a credit or: beyond his loan, he has a considerable interest in the result of the trading. He is 
repaid at the end of the transaction, not as straight interest but as a share in the profits, the proportion varying 
from contract to contract and not fixed by law, making the transaction both a credit-contract and a partnership. 
101. It protects the money-Iender against the negligence ofthe borrower who must pay double ifhe fails to 
make a profit during the trading journey. 
102-103. These provide for the borrower not being burdened with paying penalties or interest or even at times 
the capital in certain exceptional CÎrcumstances. 
104-105. These prescriptions require formalities to guarantee against fraud. 
106-107. These prescriptions specify penalties for fraud. Prescription # 107 provides that the money-Iender 
who seeks to multiply profit on his loans by denying receipt of payment must pay six-fold if convicted. 
Bocchoris' Law from Egypt arOlmd the time orthe twenty-rourth dynasty (c. 725-709 B.e.); It Iimited the 
accumulation ofinterest to double what was lent and restricted responsibiIity for debts to the goods ofthe debtor, 
excluding his person. 130? 
1307 Diodore of Sicily, Bibliothcca Historica, cd. Fridcrieus Vogel and CUrlius Theodorus Fischer. (Leipzig: Teubncr, 1888-1906), l, 
79. 
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GREEKIROMAN LEGAL REGULATIONS1308 
CLASSICAL GREEK CIVIL LAW 
SOLON (638-558 BCE), Athenian law-giver 
[n a time of great economic di stress he cancelled outstanding debts and introduced sorne democratic changes, but 
although his [aws did contain many provisions for the poor debtors, they did not prohibit us ury nor did they impose 
maximum rates."J309 
ROMAN LAW 
TACITUS (c. 55A.D.-after 115A.D): 
Beginnings of Roman Legal Involvement in the Usury Problem as a Political and Social Issue: 
The curse of usury, it must be owned, is inveterate in Rome, a constant source of sedition and discord; and attempts 
were accordingly made to repress it even in an older and less corrupt society. First came a provision of the Twelve 
Tablets that the rate of interest, previously governed by the fancy of the rich, should not exceed unciario f8enore; 
later a tribunician rogation lowered it to one-half of that amount; and at length usufruct was unconditionally 
banned. ,,1310 
The Famous Twelve Tablets (Leges Duodecim Tabularum), c. 451- 449 B.C. 
• Foundation for the whole fabric of Roman Law 
• Codification and promulgation at the behest of the plebeians of what had fonnerly been customary law 
administered and interpreted by the patricians. 
• First legal intervention on usury 
• The question of exorbitant rates ofinterest is regulated in the eighth tablet of the Twe\ve Tablets thus: 
... No person shall practice usury at a rate ofmore than one-twelfth. \311 
LEX LICINIA SESTIA (c. 375 B.C.): 
It had sought, more comprehensively [than the Twelve Tablets], to reduce the debtor's burden by providing that 
what had been paid as interest should be deducted from the original sum, and the remainder discharged in three 
an nuaI installments of equal size. 1312 This and similar accounts are retlective of a political movement, seeking to 
alleviate the debtor's mi sery through legal action, culminating in the complete abolition ofusury. J3J3 
LEX DUILLIA MENENIA (357 RC.): 
It simply reaffinned the Twelve Tablets prescription on the rate ofinterest. 
LEX GENUCIA (342 B.C.): 
It prohibited usury altogether. However, the [aw fits in poorly with the conditions of the time, and was "honored 
more in the breach than in the keeping. The law-maker had tried, and failed, to eliminate what was already a 
necessary part of the Roman economy."1314 
LEX FLAMINIA MINUS SOLVENDI (217 B.C.): 
It allowed borrowers to pay off their debts with money of reduced value. \315 
LEX CORNELIA DE SULLA (88 B.C.): 
It returned to the rate ofinterest set by the Twelve Tablets. 1316 
1308 The excerpts are from the doctoral dissertation of Rev. Robert P. Maloncy (Maloncy, Background, 98-112), which ineorporatcs 
original rcscarch. 
1309 T.W. Taylor and J.W. Evans, "Islamic Banking and thc Prohibition of Usury in Wcstern Economic Thought," Nat. West 
Quarter/y, Nov., 1987, 16, quotcd in Buckley, Theologieal Examination, 82. 
1310 Maloney, Background, 100. 
1311 AC. Johnson, P.R. Coleman-Norton and F.C. Borne, Ancicnt Roman Statutes(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 16. 
1312 Livy, VII, 16 and VI, 35,1-5 (Locb transl.), as quoted by Maloncy, Background, 101-102. 
1313 Maloncy, Background, 102. 
1314 Ibid., 103; P. Louis, Aneicnt Rome at Work, trans. E. Warcing, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965),87. 
1315 Adolph Berger, "Lex Flaminia," RE, Suppl. VII, 412-413. 
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LEX VALERIA (86 B.C.): 
It a110wed bankrupt debtors to liquidate the debt by paying one quarter of the debt. 1317 
CATO THE ELDER (234-149 BC), his grandson CATO THE YOUNGER (95-46 BC), CICERO (106-43 BC), and 
SENECA (c. 4 BC-65 AD): 
They ail also condemned usury.1318 
PLINY THE YOUNGER (c. 112 A.D.) 1319 and EMPEROR CONSTANTINE (in April 325 A.D.):1320 
Attempted to lower the interest rate. Anatocism (compound interest) was forbidden at least in sorne cases in 
Rome. 1321 A reform law put a ceiling on interest accumulation, restricting it to the amount ofthe capital. 1322 
DIOCLETIAN (In 284 A.D.): 
lmposed the penalty of infamy on those who took iIIegal interest. 1323 
THEODOSIUS THE GREAT (In 386 A.D.): 
Decreed that usurers must paya penalty offoUT-fold the amount ofillegal interest charged by them. 1324 
JUSTINIAN (483-565 A.D.): 1325 
Justinian (483-565) renovated the whole legal treatment of loans at interest, incorporating much previous 
legislation into his Corpus and showing far-reaching kindness toward the debtor. Without going so far as to 
suppress interest-taking, as other-worldly prohibition might have suggested, he reduced the rate of interest to 6% 
for ordinary loans and even 4% if the borrower was a persona iIIustris. Those involved in commercial transactions 
could ask 8%. For maritime loans and loans ofproduce (where terms were often shorter and the risks were greater), 
12% or 12Y2 % was permitted. 1326 Justinian again forbade that interest mount higher than capital,1327and he 
strengthened the law against anatocism [compound interest ].1328 
CHRISTIAN ERA: 
Legal Compliance with, but Later Abrogation of, Other-Worldly Prohibition ofUsury: 
BASIL THE MACEDONIAN (867-886) Decree in his ProcbiroD Legum, XVI, 14: 
"Even though many emperors before us deigned to a110w interest-taking, perhaps because ofthe i ncorrigibi lit y and 
crassness of creditors, nevertheless we judge that it ought to be repudiated as unworthy of our Christian state 
because it is prohibited by divine law. Therefore, Our Majesty decrees that no one has the power to receive interest 
for any reason whatsoever, lest, while we seem to keep the law ofGod, we should transgress his precept. But if 
anyone should receive anything, let it be imputed as a debt to the creditor." 
lnterestingly, when this other-worldly prohibition of USUry fina11y entered oriental imperial law, it was a disaster, 
and caused such havoc that Basil's successor, Leo the Wise (886-911), abrogated it (with great delicacy). 
LEO THE WISE (886-911): 
Abrogated Basil's decree and set the maximum rate ofinterest at 4%: 
"Certainly it would be excellent and salutary if the human race, being conformed to the laws of the Holy Spirit, 
had no need for human regulations. Nevertheless as it is not granted to a11 to be raised up to the heights of the Holy 
Spirit and to hear the echo of the divine law, but actually there are very few who arrive there through the practice 
ofvirtue, we ought to be quite happy if men at least live comfortably to human laws. The judgment of the Holy 
Bl6 Adolph Berger, "Law Cornelia," Encyclopedie Dietionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophie al Society, 1953), 
550. 
1317 E. Weiss, "Leges Va\criae," RE, 12,2417. 
111R Dimic, lntcrcst. 
1319 Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, cd. M. Schuster (Leipzig: Teubner, 1958), X, 55 (Loeb transl.). 
1320 Codex Theodosianus, cd. & trans. by Clyde Ph arr, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), II, 33, 1. 
1321 Codex Justinianus. cd. P. Krucger, (Berlin, 1880), IV, 32, 28. 
1322 Codex Theodosianus" IV, 19,2. 
1323 Codex Justil1ial1us., Il, 12,20. 
1324 Codex Theodosianus, II, 33, 2. 
1325 Ma1oney, Background, 110. 
1326 Codex Justinial1/1S. ed. P. Krueger, (Berlin, 1880), IV, 32, 36. 
11271bid., IV, 32, 27. 
132. Ibid., IV, 32, 28. 
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Spirit condemns in an absolute fashion what is called interest on loans ofmoney, and knowing that, the Emperor of 
eternal memory, our father, decided to forbid, by a special measure, the receiving of interest. But that prohibition 
became, because of extreme poverty, a cause, not ofbetterment, as was the legislator's aim, but ofperversion ... " 
Leo explained that those who would formerly have lent to the poor, because they could no longer make gains 
from their loans, became hard and inhuman toward those who needed their help. Moreover, the law led to perjury 
and, because of the perversity ofhuman nature, to increased misery. 
Leo concluded: "Without wanting to condemn the law in itself (something which would not please God), 
granted (as 1 have said) that human nature cannot attain the sublimity of the law, we abrogate this enactment 
which was too perfect, and we permit, on the contrary, a return to the practice of loans of money at interest, as the 
ancient legislators had authorized. 1329 
1329 Lco the Wise, Novcllac, 83, translated by Maloney in his, Background, n. 110, 112-113. 
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OLD TESTAMENT USURY PRESCRIPTIONS 
PENTATEUCH TEXTS ON USURY: 1330 
Ifyou lend money to My people, to the poor among you, do not act toward them as a creditor; exact no interest from 
them. 
- Exodus 22 :24 
You shaH not deduct interest from loans to vour countrymen, whether in money, or food [victuals], or anything else 
that can be deducted as interest; but vou mav deduct interest from loans to foreigners. Do not deduct interest from 
loans to your countrymen, so that the Lord your God may bless you in aH your undertakings in the land that you are 
about to enter and possess. 
- Deuteronomy 23:20-21 
Ifyour kinsman, being in straits, cornes under your authority, and you hold him as though a resident alien, let him live 
by your side: do not exact from him advance or accrued interest,1331 but fear your God. Let him live by your si de as 
your kinsman. Do not lend him vour monev at advance interest, or give him vour food at accrued interest. 1 the Lord 
am your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be your God. 
- Leviticus 25:35-38 
BmLICAL WISOOM LITERATURE TEXTS ON USURY: 
(1) 0 Lord who may abide in your tent? Who may dweH on your holy hill? (2) Those ... 
(5) who do not lend money at interest. 
- Psalms 15: 1-5 1332 
(5) If a man is righteous and do es what is lawful and right ... (7) do es not oppress anyone, but restores to the 
debtor his pledge ... (8) does not take advance or accrued interest ... such a one is righteous; he shaH surely live, 
says the Lord God ... (13) takes advance or accrued interest; shaH he then live? He shaH not. He has do ne aH these 
abominable things; he shaH surely die; his blood shaH be upon himself. 
_ EzekieI18:5-13 1333 
(11) One commits abominations with his neighbor's wife; another lewdly defiles his daughter-in-Iaw; another in 
you defiles his sister, his father's daughter. ... (12) In you, they take bribes to shed blood; you take both advance 
interest and accrued interest, and make gain of your neighbors by extortion; and you have forgotten me, says the 
Lord God. 
- Ezekiel 22: 11-12 1334 
OTHER HEBREW BffiLE TEXTS ON USURY: 
Then 1 consulted with myself, and 1 rebuked the nobles, and the rulers, and said unto them, Ye exact usury, every one 
ofhis brother. And 1 set a great assembly against them. 
- Nehemiah 5:7 
1 likewise, and my brethren, and my servants, might exact of them money and corn: 1 pray you, let usleave off this 
usury. 
- Nehemiah 5:10 
He that by usury and unjust gain increaseth his substance, he shaH gather it for him that will pit Y the pOOf. 
-Proverbs 28:8 
mo Translations trom The Torah: The Five Books of Moses: The New JPS Translation of The Holy Script ures accoruil1g {() tbe 
Traditional Hcbrcw Tcxt (Philadelphia: The Jcwish Publication Society, 1999). Underlining mine. 
1331 Interest deducted in advance, or interest added at the time of repayment. 
1332 This text was used by the Council of Nicaea (325 AD) in its condcmnation of usurious clerics, though Iiterally it rcfcrs to any 
Israelite. Jt has also becn elaimed that the usury prohibition, cxcluding foreibrners in Dcuteronomy, is given absolutcly in this tcxt. 
Maloney, Background, 72, quoting the text of Nicaca's scvcntcenth canon. 
1333 This text was cxtcnsively used by the Church Fathers. St. Jerome, in his commentary on Ezekicl, claimed that Ez. 1 X: 13 
extcnded the usury prohibition to every case. Maloney, Background, 72. 
1334 The abovc text was al80 cxtensively used by the Chureh Fathers. Maloncy, Background, 72. The reference to incest along with 
interest is very significant and parallels the inccst-ribi equivalcnee lJadith ascribed to Prophct Mu~ammad. 
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Behold, thy Lord maketh the earth empty, and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down, and scattereth abroad the 
inhabitants thereof. And it shall be, as with the people, so with the priest; as with the servant, so with his master; as 
with the maid, so with her mistress; as with the buyer, so with the seller; as with the lender, so with the borrower; as 
with the taker of us ury , so with the giver of usury to him. 
- Isaiah 24:1- 2 
Woe is me, my mother, that thou hast borne me a man of strife and a man of contention to the whole earth! 1 have 
neither lent on usury, nor men have lent to me on usury; yet every one ofthem doth curse me. 
-Jeremiah 15:\0 
He that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, that hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, 
hath executed true judgment between man and man. 
- Ezekiel18:8 
Hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shaH he then live? he shaH not live: he hath done aH these 
abominations; he shaH surely die; his blood shall be upon him. 
- Ezekiel 18: 13 
That hath taken off his hand from the po or, that hath not received usury nor increase, hath executed my judgments, 
hath walked in my statutes; he shall not die for the iniquity ofhis father, he shall surely live. 
- Ezekiel 18: 17 
In thee have they taken gifts to shed blood; thou hast taken us ury and increase, and thou hast greedily gained of thy 
neighbours by extortion, and hast forgotten me, saith the Lord God. 
- Ezekiel22: 12 
GENESIS TEXTS ON BROADER INTRA-ACTIVE CONNOTATION OF RlBA: 
And God said, "Let the earth generate plants, vegetation that produces seed, fruit trees, each making fruit of its own 
kind, which has ifs seed in if, on the earth." And it was so. 
- Genesis 1: II 
The earth brought out plants, vegetation that produces seeds of its own kind, and trees that make fruit that each has 
seeds ofits own kind in if. And God saw that it was good. 
- Genesis 1: 12 
And God created the big sea serpents and aH the living beings that creep, with which the water swanned, by their 
kinds, and every winged bird by ifs kind And God saw that it was good. 
- Genesis 1 :21 
And God said, "Let the earth bring out living beings by their kind, domestic animal and creeping thing and wild 
animaIs of the earth by their kind." And it was so. 
- Genesis 1 :24 
And God made the wild animais of the earth by tbeir kindand the domestic animais by tbeir kindand every creeping 
thing ofthe ground by tbdT kind And God saw that it was good. 
- Genesis 1 :25 
And God said, "Let us make a human, in our image, aeeording to our likeness ... 
- Genesis 1 :26 
And God created the human in His image. He created it in the image ofGod; He created them male and female. 
- Genesis 1 :27 
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Philo (c. 30 B.C.- 45 A.D.) 
Commendation of Interest-Free Loans: 
Appendix Il (h) 
For along with the capital, in place of the interest which they determine not to accept, they receive a further bonus 
of the fairest and most precious things that human life has to give: mercy, neighborliness, charity, magnanimity, a 
good report and good fame. And what acquisition can rival these? No, even the Great King will appear as the 
poorest of men if compared with a single virtue. For his wealth is soulless, buried deep in store-houses and recesses 
of the earth, but the wealth ofvirtue lies in the sovereign part of the soul, and the purest part of existence, heaven, 
and the all-creating God claim it as their own. 1336 
Generosity in Lending: 
He [God] forbids anyone to lend money on interest to a brother, meaning by this name not merely a child of the 
same parents, but anyone ofthe same citizenship or nation. For he does not think it just to amass monev bred from 
monevas their calves are from cattle. And he bids them not to take this as grounds for holding back or showing 
unwillingness to contribute, but without restriction of hand and heart to give free gifts to those who are in need, 
reflecting that a free gift is in a sense a loan that will be repaid by the recipient when times are better, without 
compulsion and with a willing heart. 1337 
Rabbi Simeon b. Eleazar 060-190 A.D.) 
Praise for Lending Without Interest and Condemnation ofThose Who Refuse. 1338 
Tosephta to Baba Mczi'a 
Promise of reward to those who lend freely.1339 
Talmud and the Medieval Jewish Codes1340 
Prohibition extended to coyer far more than the taking of interest. Four main types of "increase" [=Hebrew marbit 
and Arabic ribiï] are distinguished: (1) fixed increase, denoting the ordinary transaction where interest on money is 
paid directly on a loan [in violation of the express command of Script ure, known as 'Increase un der the Mosaic 
Law']; (2) "the mere dust ofincrease", denoting some indirect form ofinterest connected with bargain or sale, even 
if given more or less gratuitously; also covered is anything given by a borrower in anticipation of a loan [known as 
'Rabbinical Increase']; (3) "the semblance of increase", referring to interest paid out of gratitude for a past loan or 
out ofthe desire to induce a future one; (4) increase payable by means other than money, including many disparate 
cases, like, when a borrower honors his creditor hy allowing him to perform sorne religious dut y in connection with 
synagogue worship. \34\ 
Siphre on Deuteronomy 
Declared all interest, including anything that looks like interest to he forhidden. \342 
lBS This presentation of carly rabbinical tcachings draws hcavily and Iiberally on the work of Maloncy (Maloncy, Background, 1 \3-
135) which incorporatcs original rcscarch. 
1B6 Philo, De ViJ1utibus, XIV, 84-85 (Locb transl.). 
13)7 Ibid.,82-83 (Locb transl.). 
1338 Baba Mczi' a, 71 a. 
IJ39 Tosephta' to Baba Mqi'a, VI, 18. 
1340 Code of Maimonidcs (12'h c,); Turim Code of Jacob ben Asher (1248-1340); Code of Joseph Caro, the Shulchan Arukh (16'h c.) 
1341 Maloney, Background, n. 125, 117; J. Abelson, "Usury (Jcwish)", EneycIopedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 557. 
1342 Siphre on Dcutcronomy, XXIII, 20, 262. 
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Baba Mezi'a 
Extension of usury prohibition to cover a very broad range of rather common commercial activities: 1343 
The credit or may not dwell without charge in the debtor's court yard or hire it from him at a reduced rate, since that 
counts as usury.1344 
If a man soId his field and was given a part of the price and said to the buyer, "Pay me (the rest of) the price when 
you will, and then take what is yours," this is forbidden. 1345 
None may set up a shopkeeper on the condition ofreceiving halfthe profit, or give him money to buy produce with 
on the condition ofreceiving haIfthe profit, unless he is paid his wage as a Iaborer. 1346 
Tosephta to Baba Mezi'a 
Deals extensively with the broadened concept of us ury, by forbidding not just interest-taking but also what looks 
like, though may not be, usury.1347 The former was known as ribbit ke~u~ah (interest proper), and the latter as avak 
ribbit (dust ofinterest).1348 
Baba Bathra 
Further Illustration of Possible Extension of the Understanding, and Subtle Use, ofthe Usury Principle: 
Come and hear! It has been taught: In the case where a man hired a laborer to work for him at the harvesting season 
for a denarius [lower value currency] a day, and paid him his wage in advance, but at that season the laborer was 
worth a se/a' [higher value currency] a day, he must not derive any benefit from it. If, However, a man hires a 
laborer to commence work at once and to continue through the harvesting season for a denarius a day, although at 
the harvesting season he was worth a scIa: he is permitted to pay in advance and to have the benefit of the 
di fference. 1349 
Maloney Explanation of the incidence ofUsury in the above passage: 
In the first case there is a difference between the salary given and the price of labor: hence there is usury involved, 
since the laborer is paying a scIa' [higher value currency] in labor for every denarius [lower value currency] he has 
received. In the second case the whole period of the contract is considered as one long day [note the oblique 
similarity with the concept of "unit y of session": majlis in Islamic law]. Since during the first days of the period 
labor was only a denarius a day, no higher price need be paid for the other days; hence no usury is involved. 1350 
BabaKamma 
Application ofBroadened Concept ofUsury to Sales Transactions1351 as stated by the Gemara: 
Advance payment at present prices may be made for the future delivery of products, but no advance payment at 
present may be made ifthe value of the products will subsequently be paid in actual money in lieu of them. 1352 
Maloney Elaboration: 
The latter transaction is condemned because it could involve the handing over of a sum of money now in ex change 
for a larger one later, [and] the Gemara views this as contrary to the spirit of the usury prohibition".1353 
Mishna 
Notion and Scope ofGuilt in Usurious Transactions :1354 
These transgress a negative command: the lender, the borrower, the guarantor, and the witnesses. And the Sages 
say: The scribe also. They transgress the command "Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury," and 'Take 
1343 Maloney, Background, 118; Baba Mqi'a, V, 4. 
1344 Baba Mczi'a, V, 2. 
1345 Ibid., V, 3. 
1346 Ibid. This passage refers to a fonn of business organization known historieally as the medieval commcl1da eontraet and 
contemporancously as thc Islamic profit-sharing mucjiïraba contract, with the additional stipulation of a condition of wage for thc 
working partner in addition to thc profit share. 
1347 Tosephta to Baba Mqi'a, IV, 3. 
1348 El1cyclopacdia fudaica- CD-ROM Editiol1. cf. Usury. 
1349 Baba Bathra, 86b-87a. 
1350 Maloney, Background, 119-120. 
1351 This later carne to be known as bay' al-salam in Islamic law. 
1352 Baba Kamma, 103a. 
1353 Malo~ey, Background, 120. This pa~sage ha~ ail the clements ofwhat later devcloped as the lslamic law concepts of ribii al-&41. 
(excess) and ribii al-l1a,,1'a (delay). 
1354 Mishl1ais one of the two constituent parts ofthe Talmud. The other is Gemara. 
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thou no us ury ofhim," and "Thou shalt not be to him as a credit or," and "Neither shaH ye lay upon him usury," and 
"Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy God. 1 am the Lord."1355 
Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud 1356 
Blindness ofthe usurer who hires a notary and witnesses to attest to his sin,1357 
Men/lba on Exodus 
Condemnation of Ali Participants ofUsury and Deniai of the Usurer Any "Share in Divinity": 
So far 1 know only of a waming to the lender and to the borrower. But how would 1 know of a waming to the 
guarantor, to the witness, and to the notary? Therefore, it says here: "Neither shaH you lay upon him interest" ... in 
any capacity at aIl. In this connection the sages said: He who lends on interest transgresses ftve commandments, 
namely: "Not to give" (Lev. 5:37), and not to take (Lev. 5:36), "Thou shalt not be to him as a usurer (Ex. 22:24), 
"Neither shall you lay upon him interest (Ex. 22:24), and "nor put a stumbling block before the blind (Lev. 19: 14). 
And just as the lender and the borrower transgress ftve commandments, so also do the guarantor and the witnesses 
and the notary. R. ludah would exempt the notary. R. Meir says: He who lends on interest, saying to the scribe: 
"Come and write", and to the witnesses: "Come and sign", has no share in Him who decreed against taking 
interest. 1358 
Baba Mezi'a N, 7ff.l. Tosephta to Baba Mezi'a (4, 4-5, and 9-25), 'Araldn (IX, 2-4). and Baba BalbIa (86b-87a) 
Ali available in translation and give further applications of the usury principle by applying it to priees, wages, sale 
of inheritances, partnerships, advance payments, rents, etc. 1359 
Tosephta to Baba Mezi'a 
Rabbinical Permission of Exceptions to the Law ofUsury on the Rationale ofCharityy60 
A man can borrow at interest from a woman and her children only to aid them by the interest. 1361 
Gemara of BabY/oman Talmud (Quotation of Rabbi Jose) 030-160 A.D. )y62 
Lending at Interest as Deniai of God: 
Come and see the blindness of the man who lends at interest: ... if someone gets together witnesses, a notary and 
ink, and writes and signs (a contract), he denies the God of Israel. 1363 
Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud 
Interest-taking as Deniai of Y ahweh: 1364 
Come and see the blindness ofthose who lend at interest: if anyone caUs another an idolater, an incestuous man or a 
murderer, the other seeks vengeance on his Iife; but doesn't one who hired a notary and witness and tells them to 
attest (a usurious contract) deny the Place? This brings out that everyone who lends at interest denies the Principle. 
[of divine authority] 1365 
Maloney Explanation: 
Maloney explains that these two texts, read with the Gemara on Sanhedrin 1366 and the Tosephta to Aboda Zara,1367 
bring out the extreme gravit y assigned by the rabbis to the sin of usury: 
A Jew was permitted to violate the ordinances of the Torah if he were threatened with death, but he was forbidden 
to do so in cases ofidolatry, immorality and bloodshed. The text given above from the Jerusalem Talmud alludes to 
these three special cases and connects usury with idolatry, the most serious of sins. So grave was the prohibition of 
idolatry that it was regarded as "equal in weight to the whole Torah.,,1368 To drive home their general teaching on 
1355 Baba Mez j'a, V, Il. 
1356lbid V i Id 
1357 Mal~nc~, Ba~kground, 121. 
1358 Mekiltha on Exodus, XXII, 24. This passage has a striking rescmblance to the later Islamic Prophetie traditions which also 
similarly condcmn ail the participants - the takcr, giver, guarantor, witnesses, and scribe - in a usurious transaction. 
1359 Maloney, Background, 121. 
1360 Ibid 124 
1361 Tos~phta 'to Baba Mqi'a, V, 15. (Maloney transI. from Bonsirvcn, 472). 
1362 Maloncy, Background, 125. 
1363 Baba MC? j'a" 71 a. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirven, 46\). 
1364 Maloney, Background, 125. 
1365 Gcmara of Jcrusalem Talmud, Baba MC? i'a, V, Il d (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 462). 
1366 Sanhedrin, 74a. 
1367 Toscphta to Ahoda Zara, 1, 10. 
1368 Sanhedrin, 74a; Horayoth, 8a. 
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idolatry the rabbis fonned practical regulations which aimed at lessening the likelihood that Jews would be 
contaminated with pagan practices. To the modern reader their measures might seem extreme, but they worked 
from the principle that prevention was better than cure. A book like Aboda Zara gives flesh to this principle 
through multiple minute regulations. The Gemara expresses its working philosophy with an aphorism: \369 "Keep 
off, we say to the Nazirite; go round the vineyard and come not near to it." Just as the Nazirite could avoid the fruit 
of the vine by avoiding the vineyard itself, so also could the Jew be preserved from idolatry by being preserved from 
any idolatrous object. The Tosephta to Aboda Zara applies this principle to us ury by forbidding business dealings 
that involved any money that had fonnerly been gained from usury. \370The connection of usury to idolatry makes 
rabbinical efforts to avoid even what looked like usury much more understandable. 137 \ 
Gemara of Sukkah and Siphra on Levi/feus 
Communal Punisbment for Usury: 
In spite of the gravit y of the sin of usury (equivalence with idolatry), there is no mention in the Torah of any 
temporal or other-worldly punishments for the sin on an individual level. lt is only on a community level that the 
rabbis connected, among other things, usury prohibition with Israel's covenant with Yahweh: the "exodus" as 
punishment for indulgence in, and the "return" on the condition of avoidance of, usury. The Gemara of Sukkah and 
the Siphra on Leviticus draw this conclusion: 
The homes of the Israelites have been delivered to the empire because of four faults: on account of those who 
retain in their possession bills which have been paid (in the hope of c1aiming them again); on account of those 
who lend money on usury; on account of those who had the power to protest against wrongdoing and did not 
protest; and on account ofthose who publicly declare their intention to give specified sums for charity and do not 
give. \372 
1 have brought you out of Egypt on the condition that you accept the commandments on usury. Whoever 
professes them professes the exodus from Egypt, and vice-versa. \373 
Punisbment for Usury: 
The prohibition of interest being of a charitable nature, its violation was not treated as a criminal offense to which 
any penal sanctions attached. It was only a moral transgression. It was only in the prophesies of Ezekiel that usury 
came to be identified with the gravest of crimes: it is mentioned in the context of larceny, aduItery, homicide and 
other such "abominations" which are worthy of death (Ez. 18: 11-13). The threat of death for usury was later 
interpreted as the divine sanction against irrecoverable and iIIegitimate self-enrichment (BM 61 b)."1374 
Furthennore, moneylenders who take interest are likened to apostates who deny God (Tosef., BM 6: 17) and to 
shedders ofblood (BM 61b) and they have no share in the world to come (Mekh. Sb-Y 22:24).\375 
Maloney Summary of Jewish Outlook towards Usury during the Early Rabbinical Period: 
Contemporary with early Christianity, Talmudic legislation far outdid the Old Testament in discouraging interest-
taking. Conversely, it strongly emphasized the obligation to lend freely to the poor man. The rabbis at the same 
time extended the prohibition against usury to much more than interest-taking; they forbade even what looked Iike 
usury. But pennission to take interest from the gentiles remained in effect; sorne even regarded it as a commando 
Casuistry, moreover, did provide for interest-taking in a few cases even among Jews, so that in practice the 
prohibition was not absolute. Violation of the prohibition was considered very grave; at times it was seen as 
equivalent even to the shedding of men's blood and the denial of Yahweh. Like the Old Testament, rabbi nie 
literature did not pose the usury question in tenns of justice; it saw it in tenns of charity towards the poor, 
especially where the bond ofbrotherhood united the poor man with his brethren.\376 
1369 Aboda Zara, 58b. 
1370 Tosephta to Aboda Zara, 1, 10-11. 
1371 Maloney, Background, 125-126. 
1372 Sukkah. 29 a, b. 
lm Siphrc on Leviticus, XXV, 38. (Maloncy transI. from Bonsirvcn, 46). 
1174 Encyc/opacdia Judaica- CD-ROM Edition .s.v. Usury. 
1375 Ibid. 
1376 Maloncy, Background, 135. 
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PATRISTIC TEACHINGS - CHURCH FATHERS/CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS 1317 
Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 A.D.), of the Greek Church 
Among the earliest extant sources denouncing usury, he holds that Ez. 18:4-9 is a prophetie description of the 
Christian life: by following the prohibition of usury, the newly baptized will attain eternal happiness. 1378 Treating 
the Mosaic Law as the source for aU the moral teaching of the Greeks, he cites the prohibition of usury as an 
example of the Old Testament teaching on generosity and feUowship.J379 He treats piety, liberality, justice and 
humanity as the ration ale for the prohibition of usury. 1380 
Tertullian (c. 155-c. 220) 
He only gives indirect reference to the prohibition of usury in his attempt to show the harmony between the J udaic 
Law and the Gospel. According to him, the Old Testament (Ez. 18:8) prohibited interest in order to prepare people 
for the habit of losing the principal itself (Lk. 6:34). He does not view the new law as abolishing the old, but as 
surpassing it: the prohibition of usury remains and is expanded - not even to seek the principal from one who is in 
need. 138l [This bears a striking resemblance to the later Qur'anic exhortation in Q. 2:280 to grant facilitating 
extension and even charitable remission to the needy debtor]. 
Apollonius (dates uncertain), an Asian bishop 
Another early indirect witness to the prohibition of usury, he reproved Montanists for their practice of us ury while 
claiming to be prophets. The scriptural prohibition of usury is not restricted, but only applied a fOitiori, to the 
prophets by him. 1382 
St. Cyprian (c. 200-258) 
Witnessing the extensiveness of the usury problem, he deals with the morality of usury in an intluential 
compendium of the moral and disciplinary duties of the Christian. 1383 He quotes Old Testament texts to prove that 
usury is immoral. 1384 
Homilies of the Fathers 
Condemnation of usury as immoral finds support not only in the Scripture (Old Testament), but also in its 
incompatibility with Christian love as expressed in poetic thought in the homilies of the Fathers. 1385 
Commodianus 
In an early poem, he castigates the usurer for wounding the poor, stealing from the wretched, and giving to others 
only in order to impoverish them: 
Why do you sensclessly pretend to be good as you wound others? From what you bestow, another is daily wecping. Do you not 
believe that the Lord sees thosc things from heaven? Seripturc says, "The Most High does not approvc of the gifts of thc 
wieked." You break the wretchcd when you gct a chance. Docs a man givc gifts that he might makc anothcr poor'! Or, ifyou 
lend at interest, taking twenty-four percent, you want to givc alms that you might cxpiatc evil with that which is also cvi!. Thc 
Almighty absolutcly rejects such works as these. Your donation has been wrung from tears ... O wieked one, you deccive 
yoursclf, but no onc cIse. 1386 
Lactantius 
He makes a similar attack on usury, using justice and iII-effects on the poor as the rationale. 1387 He catalogues the 
prescription to be followed by the man who sincerely seeks God and strives after truth. 1388 
St. Athanasius (c. 295-373) 
Treating usury briefly, he lists ten special precepts - the ninth being not lending at interest - that must be fol\owed 
to be worthy of dwelling with the Lord in His eternal tabernacle. To him, violation ofthe charitable lending precept 
excludes man from eternallife. 1389 
1377 This section on thc tcachings ofChurch Fathers also draws heavily and liberally on the doctoral dissertation ofRev. Robert 
P. Maloney (Maloncy, Background, 136-179) which incorporatcs original rescarch. 
1378 Pacdagogus, 1,10. 
1379 Stromatcis, Il, 19. 
DMO Maloncy, Background, 13~H39. 
1381 Ibid., 140-141. 
1382 Ibid 141-142 
1383 Tes/jmonjoru~ Libri iii: ad Quirinum, lib. iii, 48. 
1384 Maloney, Background, 142-143. 
1385 Ibid., 143. 
1386 Commodianus, lnstruetione.,; 65. (Maloncy trans!.), Unecrtain dating. 
1387 Lactantius, lnstitutioncs Divinac, 18 (bcforc 311 A.D.). 
m. Ibid., Epitome, 64 (Maloncy trans!.) (aftcr 314 A. O.): "He will not stcal nor will hc cven covet anothcr's goods. He will not give 
money at usury (for this is to make a profit from the ill-fortune of others), nor will he tUID down anyonc whom necessity forces to 
borrow." 
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Cyril ofJerusalem (c. 315-387) 
In a famous catechetical lecture,1390 he wams his catechumens (Christian converts under instruction before 
baptism) about us ury, treating it as a diabolical action along with intemperance and avarice. 1391 [In the Judeo-
Christian tradition this is the first reference to usury as an act of the Devil, and a close parallel to the later Qur'anic 
categorization of usury (ribii) as "Satanic insanity" (Q. 2:275)]. 
Hilary of Poitiers (c. 315-c. 367) 
In his Tractatus in Ps. XiV,1392 he treats usury as an injury to Christ in the person of the poor man. He states that 
lending, which should be virtuous, becomes damnable when interest is demanded, increasing the need of the poor 
man instead ofhelping himy93 
Basil the Great (330-379) 
A Cappadocian, and one of the two greatest opponents of usury among the Greek Fathers, he viewed interest-
taking as oppression of the poor and a violation of a scriptural prohibition. For him "the struggle against usury is 
part of a more general battle against the evil practices ofthe rich ... " He berates the cold creditor who is not moved 
to see a debtor on his knees begging help, who is not swayed by tears and pleas, but only by the hope of interest. 
Deceitfully the credit or pretends to lend at lower rates than usuaI, because of friendship, whiIe seeking to take 
away even the debtor's liberty (through "voluntary servitude" in case of failure to pay the debt).1394 In a very apt 
passage, Basil dissuades both the rich and the poor from borrowing, positing "freedom from care" as the rationale. 
1395 
Echoing Aristotle, Basil states1396 that usury must be called tokos (offspring) because of all the evils it engenders. 
But other offspring grow only unti! they reach maturity, whereas usury never ceases to grow, bringing with it ever-
increasing sorrow. 1397 
Gregory Nazianzen (330-389) 
He denounces usury like his master, Basil, in words reminiscent of Aristotle and the New Testament (Mt. 25:27 
and Lk. 19:23): 
Another man defiles the earth with usury and interest, gathering where he did not sow and harvesting where he 
did not p/ant- reaping his gain not from the earth, but from the need of the poory98 
Gregory ofNyssa (335-394) 
The most versatile of the Cappadocians, he attacks usury in a multi-pronged way. "Like the other Fathers, he 
considers usury a violation of charity, but interestingly, he gives a brief statement of the same argument which St. 
Thomas will later borrow from Aristotle and which will become standard in the Middle Ages ... Gregory argues 
that usury results from an evil union unknown to nature ["intra-active"?] which has the power to make sterile 
things bear fruit, even though nature itself has made only animate things fecund."1399 Gregory sums up the theme 
thus: 
But you, copper and go/d, things that cannot usually bring forth fruit, do not seek to have offSpring.1400 
This line of argumentation, based on the [Aristotelian concept of] sterility of money, was revived a millennium 
later to support the already long-standing prohibition on usury.1401 Gregory systematically outlines the evils of 
usury for the usurer, the debtor, and society. He condemns interest-Ioans not just to the poor but to the rich;1402 he 
condemns not only exorbitant interest but even that allowed by civillaw. 1403 He also aUacks usury from the 
1389 Maloney, Background, 145. 
1390 Catecheses, IV, 37. 
1391 Maloncy, Background, 145. 
1392 TractatuI' in Ps. xiv, 15. 
1393 Maloney, Background, 145. 
1194 Ibid 146 
m' Ho~ilia Îi, 3: "Arc you rieh'! Do not borrow. Are you poor'! Uo not borrow. If you arc prospcring, you have no need ur a luan; ir 
you havc nothing, you will not rcpay the loan. Do not givc your Iifc ovcr to regret, lest at sorne lime you may esteem as happy the 
days beforc the loan. Let us, the poor, surpass the rieh in this one thing, namcly, freedom from carc." 
1396 Ibid. 
1397 Maloney, Background, 148. 
1398 Oratio xvi, 18 (Maloncy trans!.). 
1399 Maloney, Background, 150. 
1400 Contra U~urarios (Maloncy trans!.). 
1401 Noonan, Scholastic Analysi.\; 56. 
1402 Homilia iv in Ecclcsiastcn and Ep. Ad Lctoium, quoted in Maloney, Background, 151. 
1403 Ep. Ad Lctoium. 
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ereditor's point of view, equating the ereditor with a thief and robber: both the thief and usurer take away what 
belongs to others, whether men eall that robbery or interest-taking or anything else.\404 He repeats another common 
patristie theme, that the money-Iender increases the need ofthe borrower rather than diminishing iL\405 "If there 
were not sueh a great multitude of usurers, there would not be sueh a erowd of poor people."\406 He outlines the 
grave social consequences that usury entails: multiplication of the poor, ruin of homes, occasion for deceit and 
debauchery.\407 For hi m, the sacred scripture forbids the taking of any surplus over and above capital, no matter 
what pretenee at legality is made.\408 [This is a perfeet parallel to the later Qur'anic stipulation of "Iakum ru'ifs 
amwilikun/' (you are entitled to your principal)]. 
"Interest-taking was legal ail through the patristic period, but Gregory, Iike Ambrose, Chrysostom and Augustine, 
condemned it nonetheless. Like other Fathers, Gregory saw the Old Testament prohibition as clearly still binding. 
The law had not been destroyed, but fulfilled. No matter what the laws of the empire might say, the law of God 
still forbade usury."\409 
In another very significant reference, Gregory, like Basil earlier, denounced usurers as 'a breed ofvipers that gnaw 
the womb that bears them'. [A close paTaUel is to be found in the later Islamic Prophetie lJadith which equates Iibi 
(usury) with incest with one's own mother]. 
St. Ambrose (339-397) 
He deals exc\usively with usury in detail. Far from original but comprehensively covering ail scriptural evidence, he 
condemns usury practice as contrary to divine positive law. He also condemns it as against nature.\4\O Like 
Aristotle, Ambrose utilizes the theme of tokos (offspring) for usury-generation and compares its rapid generation to 
the birth of hares.\4\\ But, Ambrose do es not elaborate what is the "divine positive law" and "nature" which are 
violated by the practice ofusury. 
He castigates the lender for oppressing the poor.\4\2 He disapproves of aU kinds of interest, whether of money, 
produce, or anything else.\4\3 He exhorts to a generosity which goes beyond the law.\4\4 He condemns the legal 
centesima [percent age rate]\4\5 as weil as the iIIegal anatocism [compound interest]:\4\6 
The first of the month arrives, the capital brings forth its hundredth; each month cornes, interest is bom, evil 
offspring of evil parents. This is the generation of vipers. The hundredth has developed; it is demanded, it is not 
paid; it is applied to the principal.. .And therefore it begins to be no longer interest, but principal, that is to say, 
not a hundredth ofinterest, but interest on a hundredth. 
He admits that the Deuteronomy permission to take interest from enemies (nokri: foreigner) is applicable even in 
the Christian era. He c\early allows interest-taking in cases where warfare is justifiable. "Where there is right of 
war, there is also right ofusury."\4\7 [This Christian position is similar to the later Islamic fiqh ruling of Imam Abu 
HanIfa and, later, Shah' Abdul 'Azlz which permitted interest-taking in the dir al-lJaTb (enemy territory)]. 
Ambrose considered interest-taking serious sin, being deeply aware of the presence of Christ in the poor man.\4\X 
To exact usury from the poor man was to rob him,\4\geven to kill him.\420 He classifies us ury among the sins that 
lead to death. \42\ 
St. John Cbrysostom (344?-407) 
He uses a very varied phiIosophical and theological approach in his attack on us ury. He regards usury as hannful to 
the lender and the borrower, openly opposed to sacred scripture and threat to eternal salvation. For him, the 
1404 Homilia iv in Eeelcsiasten and Ep. Ad Lctoiwn. 
1405 Homilia iv in Eeelesiastcn. 
1406 Contra U.-urarios (Maloney trans!.). 
1407 HomiIia iv in Eeelcsiastcn. 
1408 Ep. Ad Lctoiwn. 
1409 Maloney, Background, 153. 
1410 Ambrose, De Oflieiis, III, 3. 
1411 Maloney, Background, 161. 
1412 Ibid., De Tobia, 16, 17,28. 
1413 Ibid., 49. 
1414 Ibid., 9, 10. 
1415 Ibid., 34, 40, 42, 50. 
1416 Ibid., 42, 45. 
1417 Benjamin N. Nelson, The Idea of UmlJ' iTom Tribal Brotherhood to Univcrsal Othcrhood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1969),4. 
1418 Ambrose, De Tobia, 55. 
1419 Ibid., De Nabuthe, 4, 15. 
1420 Ibid De Tobia 46 
1421 Ibid:, De Bon; M;rlis, 12,56: "If anyone takes usury, he eommits robbery and no longer has Iife." 
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rationale of usury prohibition is its injuriousness to the poor and hence a sin on the part of the rich: the scriptural 
prohibition flows from the evils inherent in the practice. Here Chrysostom is dealing with the immanent values 
that, for him, the usury prohibition seeks to safeguard. But this necessarily raises the perennial question: what if 
these values are not at stake in a transaction? This question demolishes the inherent evil theory ofusury. 
St. Jerome (344-420) 
He sees a progression in the laws prohibiting usury: the Old Testament (Lev. 25:35 and Dt. 23:20-21) forbade 
interest only among the brethren; in the Prophets (Ez. 18:8) ail interest-taking is prohibited; the New Testament 
takes another step by stipulating: "Lend to those from whom you can expect nothing in retum" (Lk. 6:34). Thus, 
for Jerome, the Deuteronomic prohibition had been universalized by the Prophets and the New Testament, as 
Christi ans had been enjoined to treat everyone as 'brother' .1422 
St. Augustine (350-430) 
Resting his argument on the identification of Christ with the poor man, he affirms the universal prohibition of 
usury}423 For him, the usureT will be received into the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: he is 
excluded from the kingdom of heaven:424 [This is the first ever reference, in the Judeo-Christian traditions to a 
punishment of etemal heH fire for the usurer, later articulated repeatedly in the Qur'an, and the second reference to 
the equivalence of usury with devilish act, again articulated pointedly in the Qur'an]. TemporaHy, St. Augustine 
placed usury in the category of crime, cIassif)ring it as theft under the seventh commandment. 142S 
Loo the Great (390?-461) 
Adding nothing new, he only gives the weight of his considerable authority to the patristic teaching on us ury. His 
famous letter, Nec hoc quoque, the single most important document of the early Church on usury, is the c1earest 
general prohibition enunciated by supreme other-worldly authority before 1179, when the Third Lateran Council 
(canon 25) declared that usury was condemned by both Testaments, and excommunicated and denied Christian 
burial to manifest usurers. 1426 The letter Nec hoc quoque forms the comerstone of later usury legislation including 
other-worldly and secular state legislation for Charlemagne's empire. As background material to the letter, Leo 
emphasizes that Christ came to fulfiH the Law, not to destroy it; matters, among which is us ury prohibition, which 
are in harmony with both Testaments, therefore, remain unchanged. He underlines the gravit y of the sin of usury by 
decIaring that usury, no matter what its resuIts might be, is sinful. He declares us ury taking, by laymen, as seeking 
a shameful gain (turpe Jucrum).1427 The fuH text of the letter, as given in Nec hoc quoque, reads: 
"This point, too, we have thought must not be passed over, that ccrtain men, possessed with thc love of base gain, lay out their 
money at interest and wish to enrich themselves as usurers. For, we are gricved that this is practieed not only by thosc who 
belong to the clergy, but also by laymen who dcsire to be ealled Christians. And we deeree that those who have been eonvieted 
be puni shed sharply, that ail occasion of sinning bc removed. The following waming, also, we have thought fit to give, that no 
clcric should attempt to make moncy in another's name any more than in his own: for it is unbecoming to shicld one's crime 
under anothcr man's gains. No, wc ought to look at and aim at only that usury whereby what wc bcstow in mercy here wc may 
recover from the Lord, who will restore a thousand-fold what wil1last forever. This admonition of ours, thcrefore, proclaims 
that if any of our brethren endeavor to contravcnc thcse rules and dare to do what is forbiddcn by them, he may know that he 
is Hable to deposition from his office, and that he will not be a sharer in our communion who refuses to be a sharer of our 
disciplinc." 1428 
Jacob ofSaroug (c. 451-521) 
ln an oblique reference to the connection between paganism and usury as a possible rationale for its prohibition, the 
Syrian Monophysite Bishop, in an interesting sermon in Syriac, states: 
Satan was lamenting the collapse ofhis authority as a result of the recent disappearance of paganism. In order to 
recover his power, he is going to make use of lending af inferesf (rebifha): priests and monks will indulge in this 
practice, and it will be their undoing. Once they have begun it, their orthodoxy, their cult of the true God, will 
matter little. '1 do not mind', excIaims the Devil, 'if the priest uses the interest he draws from his money to buy 
an axe with which to smash the temples ofthe gods! The love of gold is a greater idol than any idol of a god ... lt 
is worth as much to me as ail those idols put together. They have cast down the idols, but they will never cast 
down the coins that we shaH put in their place ... " 1429 
1422 Buckley, Theological Examination, 83. 
1423 Augustine, Ennarationes in Ps. xxxvi, sermo 3, 6. 
1424 Ibid., lJc Baptismo contra Donati~tas, 4, 9. 
1425 Buekley, Theological Examination, 83. 
1426 Noonan, Scho/astic Ana/ysis, 15. 
1427 Ibid., Scholastic Ana/ysis, 15. 
1428 Ncc hoc quoquc, tr. by C.L. Feltoe, in The Niccnc and Post-Niccne Fathers, cd. by P. Schaff and H. Wace. (New York: The 
Christian Litcrature Co., 1895), v, XII, 3-4. 
1429 Trans. and cd., Abbe Martin, in Zcitschritt dcrdeutschen morgcn/andi.l'chc Gcsell"chatt, 1875, pp. 107-147, quoted in Maxime 
Rodinson, Is/am and Capitalism, 239. 
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MEDIEVAL CHURCH TEACHINGSl430 
Source of Influence for Medieval Thought: 1431 
• Universally applicable text ofPsalm 15. 
• Fathers' writings against usury. 
• Earlier conciliar condemnation of clerical usurers. 
• Not founded upon the doctrine of Aristotle. 
• Theologieal motivation. 
• Not Iinked to Church's own financial interests. 
• Indirect causal connection between usury theory and prevailing economic conditions. 
Rationale of Prohibition of Sin of Usury: Justice, leading to distinction between commercial business loans, 
generating profits for the borrower-merchant, and consumption loans, not generating any profits for the needy 
borrower. 
St. Anselm ofLucca (quoting St. Augustine), Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Comester and Peter Lombard: 
They c1assified usury, which was synonymous with interest till early 17th cent ury, as theft under the seventh 
commandment. Ivo of Chartres, emphasizing the unjust character of their acquisition, pointed out that the usuries 
as stolen goods may not be given as charity.1432 
The Second Lateran Council: 
With absolute authority of an 'infallible' ecumenical council, for the first time, it issued an explicit decree of 
universal prohibition against usury for aB, without, however, explicitly declaring justice as the rationale. 1433 
Gratian: 
In 1159, in his collection of canons forming the Church law till the new Code in 1917, he gave definitive shape to 
the legal form of usury prohibition whose authority directly govemed ail medieval scholastic writers. This 
collection quotes St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose and the Nynweger statute to prove that usury is 
'whatever is demanded beyond the principal', and cites 'Nec hoc quoque' of Leo the Great as the most general 
other-worldly condemnation ofusury, and uses Psalm 15 as the only biblical reference. The obligation of restitution 
is emphasized; otherwise usury is no more than theft,1434 
Pope Alexander III (1159-1181): 
In a vigorous action climaxing the early medieval campaign against us ury, Alexander declared credit sales at a 
higher priee than cash sales as usury - the first extension of the us ury prohibition from loan transactions to sales 
transactions. [This conceptual extension, in Christian thought, seems to have occurred rather late, as this extension 
had already been made in Islamic thought as far back as 632 CE in the Prophetie six-commodities I;adith]. For 
Alexander, usury was not admissible even for worthy causes, because usury is a crime detested by both Testaments. 
Therefore, usury is not merely a matter of a simple other-worldly rule, though it is not yet regarded as against 
naturallaw. In 1179, the Third Lateran Council, under Alexander, declares us ury condemned by both Testaments, 
excommunicates and denies Christian burial to 'manifest usurers', and prohibits the reception of offerings made by 
them. 1435 
Pope Urban III (1185-1187): 
Continuing and confirming the vigorous actions of Alexander III, in an immensely important move, he cites Luke 
6:35 for the prohibition of usury. "For the first time in the entire tradition, a specifie command of Christ is 
authoritatively interpreted by a pope as prohibiting usury. Luke 6:35 wi\l stand, effectively unquestioned, as an 
absolute divine prohibition of gain from a loan until questioned by Dominic Soto in the sixteenth eentury ... 
Whether it [the gain from a loan] has been stipulated or not, the lender is guilty of 'mortal usury' because this is 
prohibited by Luke 6:35."1436 
1430 These teaehings are extraeted from the work of Susan L. Bucklcy in her doctoral dissertation on the thcologieal aspeets of 
usury (Buekley, Theologieal Examination). 
1431 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 14. 
1432 Buckley, Theological Examination, 88. 
1""lbid. 
1434 Ibid., 89; Noonan, Schola.l·tic Analysis, 19. 
1435 Bueklcy, Theologieal Examination, 89. 
1436 Ibid., 90. 
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MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTIC THEORY 
Sources of Scholastic Theory: 
• Religion 
• Religious authority contro11ed development 
• First attempted Western economic theory 
• Legal concepts as tools of the theory 
• Casuistry 
Rationale ofUsury Prohibition: 
The rationale was the ideal of justice as opposed to the earlier concept of charity or greed. For three centuries they 
"engaged in an idealistic effort to frame the inte11ectual and moral conditions under which credit might justly be 
extended."1437 They treated usury as a pressing problem and argued against it, distinguishing it from lawful profit. 
Their theoretical structure lacked consistency but encouraged risk-sharing investment and charity to the poor. 
Their modellacked simplicity, neat and consistent logical pattern, a single lesson and a universal prescription. 1438 s: 
Noonan's View on Rationale: 
It is clear that almost a11 the historical errors about the scholastic analysis of us ury theory arise from a single 
failure: a failure to consider the theory broadly enough, to take into account either the multiple character of its 
foundations, theological, economic and legal, or the multiple aspects it presented in practice ... 1439 
Buckley's View on Source and Rationale: 
The source of the scholastic theory is neither economics nor law but theology. It is a natural-Iaw analysis of usury: 
The scholastics were primarily disciples of the Roman law; economics in their view was always secondary. 
Neither economics nOI" /aw, however, is at the origin of the scho/astie theory - origina//y and primari/y it is a 
the%giea/ creation. That usury is a sin was the dogma of the Catholic Church. It was because it was part of the 
content of Christian revelation that the prohibition of us ury became the object of detailed, rational exploration; 
therefore, throughout the scholastic treatment of it other-worldly authority plays a dominant role. It is the effort 
of the scholastic writers to explain, to expand, and to apply the positive teaching of the Church which results in 
the natural-law analysis of usury. They do not rely on authority, or revelation, or Roman law alone, but they 
make a determined effort to rest their case against usury on the nature of man and the nature of things in 
themselves, whilst at the same time they try to determine what forms of credit are naturally lawful and just - a 
point which is often neglected.1440 
Individual Contributions of Scholastic Writers 
William of Auxere (1160-1229), the Deacon of Beauvais: 
Probably the most influential scholastic writer on usury before St. Thomas Aquinas, and among the first pioneering 
theologians treating usury from the perspective of natural law, he advanced five contributive arguments in the 
usury discussion: conflict of usury with the naturallaw; intrinsic evil of usury; distinction between the absolute and 
conditional voluntariness of the debtor; general rule for detection offrauds on the usury laws; and new argument on 
sinfulness of selling time. These arguments became incorporated in the general medieval teaching on usury.1441 
Pope Innocent IV (r.1250-126I): 
An eminent canonist, he attempted a revolutionary departure from the tradition of the past two centuries in 
ignoring the old 'justice arguments' on usury completely, and developing his own entirely new arguments to show 
that usury is a social evil, resulting in famine, poverty and greed. 
Cardinal Hostiensis (appointed 1261): 
As a canonist, he advanced, as his chief argument against usury, the familiar notion that, in a loan transaction, the 
ownership of the loan passes to the debtor: hence there is no justification for usage charge on it. But he was the 
tirst to unmistakably and fully approve a case of /ucrum cessans wherein , as stated above, by handing money over 
to another the lender deprived himself of the gain he might have made, and was, therefore, entitled to compensation 
from the beginning ofthe originalloan, with the proviso that the merchant's principal motive must be a charitable 
1437 BuckJcy, Thcological Examination, 90. 
1438 Ibid 90-91 
1439 Noo~an, ScilOlastic Analysis, 407. 
1440 BuckJcy, Theological Examination, 91. 
1441 MiIIs, Intcrcst in Intcrest. 15. 
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one and the penuission was not for habituaI lending. "For the first time the honest business man is given lawful 
reason for charging beyond the principal even though his debtor is in no way at fault. This authoritative canonist's 
recognition of pure lucrum cessans, however much restricted in its practical conditions, is of the greatest 
importance."1442 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): 
Because of his pre-eminence as a theologian and the intrinsic weight of his arguments, he holds a special place in 
the development of the usury theory. He expanded upon the thought of Aristotle on usury. But due to a glitch in 
the translation of Aristotle's Politics- the Greek tenu for retai! trade was rendered by the translator as 'campsoIia' 
which specifically means money-changing - Aristotle's case against usury which rests on his case against alltrade, 
is accepted by St. Thomas as simply a case against money trade - making money from money.1443 
Arguments Against Usury: 
(1) Roman law point that in a mutuum (loan) ownership is absolutely transferred to the debtor - not merely a case 
of possessio but of dominium. 1444 For him, "the process of exchange had the quality of a sale, and to sell an 
article and then charge for the use ofit was unjust." 
(2) Aristotle's "utility" argument from natural law against usury presented as treating money as a fixed value 
measure: 
(3) 
Ali other things from themselves have sorne utility; not so, however, money. But it [money] is the measure of 
utility of other things, as is clear according to the Philosopher in the Ethics V:9. And therefore the use of 
money does not have the measure ofits utility from this money itself, but from the things which are measured 
by money, according to the different persons who exchange money for goods. Whence to receive more money 
for less seems nothing other than to diversifY the measure in giving and receiving, which manifestly contains 
iniquity.1445 
The major argument of St. Thomas against usury goes beyond the 'money as measure' to 'money as 
consumptible' argument: 
In those things whose use is their consumption, the use is not other than the thing itself; whence to whomever 
is conceded the use of such things, is conceded the ownership of those things, and conversely. When, 
therefore, someone lends money under this agreement that the money be integrally restored to him, and further 
for the use of the money wishes to have a definite priee, it is manifest that he sells separately the use of the 
money and the very substance of money. The use of money, however, as it is said, is not other than its 
substance: whence either he sells that which is not, or he sells the same thing twice, to wit, the money itself, 
whose use is its consumption; and this is manifestly against the nature of natural justice!446 
The final argument of St. Thomas against usury is based on "metaphysical rather than legal grounds. It is the 
real distinction between accidentaI and essential change which fonus the foundation ofhis reasoning."1447 He 
argues that, through use, an item like a house might undergo accidentaI change, but money undergoes essential 
change. The use and substance of money are the same - an essential change. The use and substance of money 
cannot be sold separately. In itself, therefore, the loan of money did not justifY a charge for its use. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, the great theologian, relies on an argument from metaphysics rather than theology for his 
case against usury: he does not posit any divine law argument for the prohibition. 
Burudian (d. 1358), Prof essor at the University of Paris: 
"Usury is evil. .. because the usurer seeks avariciously what has no finite limits. This places its results outside of 
nature." 
Giles of Lessines, Theologian: 
He rejects lucrum cessans, allowed for the first time by canonist Hostiensis, and allows interest only in delay, never 
even mentioning the possibility of interest due from the beginning of a loan. 
1442 Buckley, Theological Examination, lOI. 
1443 Ibid., 95-96. 
1444 Hastings, Eneyclopaedia, 551. 
1445 Noonan, Seholastic Analysis, 52. 
1446 St. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia - Quaestiones disputate de Malo vol. xiii (cd. P. Marc and S.E. Frette, Paris, 1871 - 1 880), Q. 
13, art. 4c, citcd in Noonan, Seholastic Analysis, 54. 
1447Suckley, Thcological Examination, 99. 
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Scotus, Theologian: 
He adopts the position of St. Thomas against interest of any kind from the beginning of a loan. 
Astesanus, Theologian: 
He is the first theologian as distinct from a canonist, who admits fucrum cessans - interest without fault by the 
debtor - on the authority of canonist Hostiensis. He also allows damnum emergens wherein, as stated above, the 
lender was entitled to compensation for the 'Ioss emerging' from his having lent but being compelled himself to 
borrow at high rate of interest due to debtor's default. He held that interest is licit compensation for damages 
experienced. 
John Major, or Mair, (16th c.), Scottish Theologian: 
He is regarded as the last distinguished scholastic and is known for his casuistry. In examining various cases, he not 
only legitimated, but even accorded moral superiority to, /ucrum cessans, by distinguishing usury, a profit for the 
loan itseIf, from compensation for the profits forgone by the 1ender. He upheld the licitness of the complicated 
triple contract which eventually became the paradigm for licit financialloans. 
Conceptual Transformation of"Interest" by the Scholastics: 
The scholastics transformed the concept of interest from its original version of compensation upon and for default 
(interesse) to the new version of compensation trom the start of a loan forforgone benefit (fucrum cessans): 
The acceptance of 'interest' so far has only involved fauIt on the part of the debtor ... Did the original law 
concept of interesse, as the 'difference' due to failure to fulfill an obligation, prohibit the admission of such 
payment without any failure on the part of the debtor? The right to interest ... where the debtor was at fault ... 
was the original conception of interest. The scholastics would have to take a huge step to admit that interest 
might be due from the start of a loan. To do this seemed to many of them to abandon the foundation for the 
usury prohibition, the normal gratuitousness of a loan, and it was certainly to go weil beyond the Roman notion 
of interesse. But the leap was finally taken. 1448 
With this scholastic rationalization of interest, came to an end any search for the rationale of its (usury's) 
Scriptural prohibition, and the Church revised its teaching on usury because conscientious Christians were involved 
in financing. 
1448 Ibid., 100. 
388 
Appendix 12 (d) 
MEDIEVAL NON-SCHOLASTIC "NEW THEORY" 
Martin Luther: 
Although preaching against usury on grounds of oppression of the poor, venting Christian fury against Jewish 
usurers, and tending to swing back to the strictest standards of the early Church Fathers, he did allow the charging 
of rent on land and interest to compensate for actual los8 (damnum emergens and /ucrum cessans) provided the 
charge was moderate and was not against the poor. 
John Calvin (1509-1564): 
The most notable Protestant contributor to a new theory of usury, he unintentionally opened the flood gate in favor 
of usury. "Calvin deals with usurie as the apothecaire doth with poison" wrote Roger Fenton. Calvin abandoned the 
detailed scholastic analysis and re-defined usury by proposing one general principle of the 'Golden Rule': "usury is 
sinful only ifit hurts one's neighbor." Biting usury ... will always be condemned by God's law; but a modest profit 
on a loan under any circumstances is by no means forbidden. The only arguments against taking profit on a loan are 
drawn from Scripture. Ofthese, Calvin maintains that Luke 6:35 had been twisted from its original sense. 1t merely 
commands generous lending to the poor. Jesus merely wished to correct the vicious custom of the world whereby 
men readily lent to the rich who could pay back, and not to the poor. Deut. 23: 19 was political. The passages in the 
Old Testament are to be interpreted as requiring only the observance of charity and equity toward the poor, or, if 
they are to be interpreted more strictly, they still may be considered only as positive political law appropriate for 
the Jewish economy, but no longer binding today."1449 Calvin has only contempt for Aristotle's argument of 
sterility of money: when money buys a field, from which is yielded a yearly revenue, money then bears money. 
Interest also proceeds from money as naturally as rent from a field or house. 1450 
Charles du Moulin (Molinaeus) (1500-1566), Distinguished French Lawyer: 
He is "the first Catholic writer to urge the licitness of moderate usury. He demolished with meticulous detail the 
old arguments ofthe canonists, although he is careful not to oppose the Church itself."1451 
Claude Saumaise (Salmasius) (1588-1653), a Calvinist classicist: 
In 1630 he made the hardiest defense of usury yet undertaken. His works are principally directed against the ilIogic 
of the Calvinist communities which would not condemn usury outright, but which persisted in exc\uding 
professional usurers from communion.1452 "His general position is that selling the use of money is a business like 
any other business. If it is licit to make money with things bought with money, why is it not licit to make money 
from money? The seller ofbread is not asked whether he sells to a poor man or a rich man, why should the usurer? 
... The question to be asked was: is there any law against usury? Salmasius argues that in the Bible it is true that 
Jews were forbidden to take usury from any other Jew, poor or rich. But its prohibition was political, and given 
chiefly because Jews were united in a b/ood brotherhood After the destruction of the Jewish state, argues 
Salmasius, it no longer held. As for the gospel, Jesus Christ means to teach nothing of civil polit y or economic 
transactions. The only other-worldly law against usury that Salmasius knows of is the papal law, and why should 
anyone obey the Pope? In Salmasius, aIl religious scruple against us ury is brushed aside, and the secular law alone 
sets a limit to profits."1453 
Scipio Maffei (181b c.), a Veronese count and a Catholic writer: 
He was able to expound the Calvinist theory of the licitness of moderate usury without his orthodoxy being 
challenged. "His main theses had all been stated before in Calvin, Molinaeus, and Salmasius: the Old Testament 
prohibited us ury only from the poor; the New Testament simply required one to be charitable in a general way; the 
Fathers and Councils only condemned excessive usury; the only usury condemned by any law is usury that hurts 
one's neighbor; money is not sterile but the instrument of business, and therefore fruit fui; loans at interest are 
necessary for commerce; and the State not only tolerates, but actively enforces, loans at usury; us ury is already 
permitted by the personal census [an obligation to pay an annual retum from a fruit fui property - imperfectly 
translated into English as 'annuity'], the triple contract [three different permitted contracts with three different 
persons: a contract ofpartnership; a contract ofinsurance against loss of capital; and a contract ofinsurancc against 
fluctuation of profit], and /ucrum cessans [compensation for forgone profits], which are understood broadly to 
inc\ude the loss of aIl future investment opportunity. The natural law argument, Maffei asserts, is that ownership 
passes in a loan, but he denies that this happens. The lender is still the owner because he can still bequeath or 
1449 Jean Calvin, Consilia De Ususrisin Opera, X, cols. 248-249, citcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 127-128. 
1450 Buckley, Thcological Examination, 128. 
1451 Ibid., 132. 
1452 Noonan, Seholastic AnalysÎs, 370, citcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination,132. 
1453 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, \32-\33. 
389 
Appendix 12 (d) (contd.) 
donate the value ofthe loan. He alienates only the physical quantity, not the value of the money."1454 "Therefore, if 
the lender is still the owner, he can collect rent, as any owner does on property given to another for use."1455 
1454 Noonan, Schola.l'tk AnalY.I'iY, 373, citcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 1 33. 
1455 Buck\cy, Thcological Examination,133. 
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EARLIER CONCILIAR LEGISLATION1456 
COUReil of Elvira (306): 
!t forma1\y prohibits usury among both clerics and laymen, and imposes severe penalties of degradation and 
excommunication for the violating cleric, and first persuasion and in case ofpersistence, later excommunication for 
the layman. 1457 
COUReil of Arles (314): 
In the twelfth canon, it dealt with usury exclusively for the clerics, providing the threatened penalty of 
excommunication only. 
First General Couneil ofNieaea (325): 
In its seventeenth canon, it condemns usury quoting Ps. 15:5. !ts legislation was not merely preventative. It 
stipulates degradation and name removal from ehureh album as the penalty for the many cleries guilty of interest-
taking. It clearly outlaws the centesima, the legal rate for money-Ioans in the eastern empire. While the Nicene 
prohibition itself is specified for clerics only, [who in lending require their twelve percent J, its use of Ps. 15:5, with 
its unrestricted and absolute rejection of usury, bore important influence on later ali-inclusive prohibitions. 1458 
The Council of Carthage (348): 
The earliest African eouncil from which a collection of canons survive, in its thirteenth canon, it forbade usury 
strongly, treating it as a flagrant violation of script ure and against the prophets and the gospel - reprehensible for 
laymen and prohibited for the clergy a fortiori 1459 
The Council of Laodicea (4th c.): 
In its fourth cannon, it contains another prohibition of us ury both in money and in kind for the clerics only.\460 
The Sixth COUReil of Carthage (401): 
In a re-working of Nicaea's seventeenth canon, with a few omissions, it again pronounced against usury, invoking 
Ps. 15:5 against the usurer and threatening him deposition and removal ofhis name from the album ifhe persists in 
his erime.\46\ 
Rabbula, the Bishop of Edessa (412-435) enacted the following canon extending beyond the clergy also to monastic 
communities, but without the usual penalties: 
Priest s, deacons, and male and female religious will not demand interest or usury or any type of profane profit. 1462 
COUReil of Tours (461) again condemned usury.1463 
The Couneil of Aix-la-Chapelle (789): 
Under Charlemagne (742-814), it repeated the earlier views of the Couneils of Elvira, Nicaea and Carthage in 
declaring usury reprehensible equally for the clerics and laymen.\464 
1456 This Appcndix also draws hcavily and Iibcrally on thc doctoral dissertation of Rev. Robert P. Maloney (Maloney, Background, 
180-203) for its original research. 
14'7 "Canons of the Council of Elvira, c. 303", in A New Eusebius: Doeumelll.'· i/lU.,UlIIÜlg {be M.,·tory of {be Church {() AD JJ7 
(London: SPCK, 1987), revised cdition, 291 Canon 20: "If any cleric be found taking us ury, he shaH be deposed and 
excommunicated. If, moreovcr, a layman be proved to have taken usury, and promise, on bcing rcproved for it, to ceasc to do so and 
not exaet il further he shaH be pardoned; but that, ifhe persist in that inequity, he must bc cast out of the Church." 
1458 Noonan, Scho/astic Analysis, 15. 
\459 Mansi, lll, 158, quoted in Maloney, Background, 186. 
1460 Mansi, Il, 564-565 as quoted in Maloney, Background, 187. 
1461 Patr%gia Latina, cd. lP. Migne (Paris, 1844-1865),84:223, quotcd in Maloncy, Background, 193. 
1462 Di;'Ciplina Antiochcna Antica Siri II, in Fonti, Series Ill, fase. 26, p. 415 (Ma10ney trans.), quoted in Maloney, Background, 194. 
1463 Maloncy, Background, 199. 
\464 Buck1cy, Theological Examination, 84. 
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CONTEMPORARY WESTERN MILIEU 
Western Economie Thought ofthe 1 i b and lStb centuries: 
ft did not contribute to the theological perspective on usury. ft approached the question purely in tenns of 
economic theory, quantum of desirable interest rate and its state regulation. Prominent contributors were 
William Petty,1465 John Locke,1466 Dudley North,t467David Hume (\ 711_1776)/468 and Adam Smith.1469 
Western Theological Thought: 
Jeremy Bentham: 
In 1781, he recommended the repeal of even the legal Iimit on usury and the abandonment of the old Christian 
prohibition of usury and the scholastic theory. He took the position ofSalmasius that money-Iending is a trade Iike 
any other and price control is as inapplicable to money as to any other commodity. For him, the law against us ury 
is 'foolish and ancient', and is sourced in: a Christian opposition to temporal prosperity; an anti-Semitic distrust of 
Jewish methods; an ignorant reverence for Aristotle's maxim ofbarrenness ofmoney; and a worldly love of present 
pleasure and hatred for the abstemious lender. 1470 "These four motives combined to set in motion the whole 
fonnidable machinery against usury, vestiges of which still plague Britain today. Bentham dismisses aIl scruples 
against usury: usurers are men as honest as other tradesmen.,,1471 
The Roman Catholic Holy Office: 
In a series of decisions during 1822-1836, it "ended aIl doubts and practical difficulties by public\y decreeing that 
interest aIlowed by law may be taken by everyone." Thus, in spite of theoretical controversy, "the Iicitness of the 
rent ofmoney as a fruit fuI good, at least in production loans, is asserted ... The biblical and conciliar prohibitions 
of usury are explained as prohibitions only of excessive usury and Calvin, Molinaeus, and Maffei become the new 
authorities. The scholastic defenders of the new theory assert that only in its tenns can the general pennission to 
take interest be understood and modern commerce be justified. On the other hand, the champions of the old theory 
reassert the familiar arguments against aIl usury, pointing out that the general pennission to take interest can be 
understood as an extension of the titIe of lucrum cessans, and need involve no abandonment of the old 
principles."1472 
William César, Cardinal de la Luzerne: 
He asserted in 1822 in his French workl473 that no dogma of the Church is at risk by aIlowing moderate profit on 
loans to businessmen and the rich. Through an extensive review of papal, conciliar, patristic, and scholastic 
teaching on usury, he conc\udes that the only dogma on usury, which ever existed, is the evil nature of excessive or 
oppressive profit on a loan. He caIls the medieval scholastic position 'transient and local opinion' incapable of 
being elevated above the rank of positive law, and ascribes it to the economic conditions of the time, to the tyranny 
of Aristotle, and to the ignorance of the Fathers.1474 
Mark Mastrofini, Member ofthe Papal Court in Rome: 
In his French workl475 in 1828, he forcefuIly presented the theses of Molinaeus and Maffei. "Its most original part is 
its fonnulation of their theory in tenns of money's 'applicability', by which Mastrofini means both the power of 
being able to use money and its actual use. This applicability is separate from money itself and may always be 
charged for. A worker cannot be asked to work for nothing simply because he is idle. Similarly, nor can a lender 
with idle funds be asked to surrender their applicability freely."1476 
1465 William Petty, Political Arithmctick(l690); Sir William Pctty's Quantulumcumquc Conccming Moncy (1 695). 
1466 John Locke, Somc Considerations ofthe Consequences of the Lowering offntercst and Raising the Value of Money (1691). 
1467 Dudley North, Discourscs upon Tradc(1691). 
1468 David Hume, Oflnterest (1752). 
1469 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1 776). 
1470 Jeremy Bentham, Dcfèncc ofUsury 1818, in Economie Writing,~, cd. W. Stark, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1952),9-13; 53; 
96-106. 
1471 Buckley, Theological Examination, 136. 
1472 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 377, citcd in Buckley, Thcological Examination, 137. 
1473 William César, Dissertations sur le prêt-de-commercc (1822). 
1474 Buckley, Theologieal Examination, 138. 
1475 Mark Mastrofini, Discy.\;sion sur l'usure (1828). 
1476 Buckley, Theological Examination, 138. 
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Francis Funk (mid_19th c.), German Theologian: 
He justified the new theory of legitimate interest by linking the fruitfulness or sterility of money to the underlying 
economy: unlike the present economy where money is fruHful, in the static medieval economy, the feudal and 
guild systems, war, theft, and trade barriers made investment and capital accumulation difficult, rendering money 
immobile and sterile. He he Id that law, particularly on usury, does not remain 'abstractly motionless', but develops 
with economic change. As the economic structure of Europe changed and money became capable of fruit fuI 
employment, the Church aItered the law to meet the new conditions, broadening the exceptions into general 
permission and allowing the taking of interest. The only dogmatic princip le, which remains unaltered though 
applied differently in different conditions, is the sinfulness of exploiting one's neighbor. He criticizes the early 
scholastic theory for its abstract legalistic approach which ignored the economic significance and the moral 
essence of the usury law. The proper theoretical approach, set out in the new theory, is to abandon the legal 
technicalities of contracts and titles and adopt one general moral principle that no contract should injure an 
impoverished neighbor. 1477 His defense arguments for the licitness of rent of money as a fruitful good are muIti-
pronged: no scriptural or natural reason to contradict this new approach; biblical disapproval only of exploitation 
of the poor; absence of justification, in the old scholastic theory, of the advantageous present day economic 
operations; the transference of ownership in a loan is a determination of positive, not natural, law; and money is no 
longer sterile. 1478 
Joseph Ernest Van Roey (early 20th c.), Belgian Theologian: 
He defended the old theory on the grounds that the consumptibility ofmoney, not its productivity, is the essence of 
the old theory. The modem practice of interest is not the rent of money but the universal cIaiming of lucrum 
cessans, which legalizes interest. In spite of change in practice with economic change, the scholastic princip les - a 
part of Catholic doctrine - remain unchangeable and equally good in their new application.1479 
Adam Tanquerey (early 20tb c.), Popular French Theologian: 
ln a syncretistic defense of usury doctrine, he held that money in his age was virtually fecund (new theory) and 
could be rented at a profit because of the lender's universal suffering of lucrum cessans (old theory).1480 
Jerome Noldin (early 20th c.), German Jesuit: 
In his defense of interest-taking he also appealed equally to lucrum cessans and the fecundity of money .1481 
The new Codex Juris Cll11oniciof1917: 
Replacing ail earlier collections of canon law and becoming the sole statute book of the universal Church, it took 
the final formaI step in the acceptance of general interest-taking by combining ail responses, decrees and buUs of 
the old canon law into a single rule: 1482 
If a fungible thing is given someone, and later something of the same kind and amount is to be retumed, no profit 
can be taken on the ground of this contract; but in lending a fungible thing it is not itself iIIicit to contract for 
payment of the profit allocated by law, unless it is cIear that this is excessive, or even for a higher profit, if a just 
and adequate titIe be present. 1483 
Summary of Diachronic Development of Christian Attitude towards Usury since Inception: 
Despite its Judaic roots, the critique ofusury was most fervently taken up as a cause by the institutions of the 
Christian Church where debate prevailed with great intensity for weil over a thousand years. The Old 
Testament decrees were resurrected and a New Testament reference to usury added to fuel the case. Building on 
the authority ofthese texts, the Roman Catholic Church had by the fourth cent ury AD prohibited the taking of 
interest by the cIergy; a rule which they extended in the fifth century to the laity. In the eight century under 
Charlemagne, they pressed further and decIared usury to be a general criminal offence. This anti-usury 
movement continued to gain momentum during the early Middle Ages and perhaps reached its zenith in 1311 
when Pope Clement V made the ban on usury absolute and decIared ail secular legislation in its favour null and 
void. 1484 
1477 F. X. Funk, Zins und Wuchcr trans. and citcd in Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 386. 
1478 Buckley, Theological Examination, 140. 
1479 Cardinal Ernest Joseph Van Rocy, De justo auctario ex contractu crcditi (Louvain, 1903),226, quotcd in Noonan, Scholastic 
Analysis, 389, and in Bucklcy, Theological Examination, 141. 
1480 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 141. 
1481 Ibid. 
1482 Ibid. 
1483 Codcxjuris canonici (Rome, 1920). 
1484 Birnie, Intcrest. 
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Increasingly thereafter, and despite numerous subsequent prohibitions by Popes and civil legislators, loopholes in 
the law and contradictions in the Church's arguments were found and along with the growing tide of 
commercialization, the pro-usury counter-movement began to grow. The rise of Protestantism and its pro-capitalist 
influence is also associated with this change;485 but it should be noted that both Luther and Calvin expressed sorne 
reservations about the practice of usury despite their belief that it could not be universally condemned. Calvin, for 
instance, enumerated seven crucial instances in which interest remained "sinful", but these have been generally 
ignored and his stance taken as a wholesale sanctioning of interest. 1486 
As a result of ail these influences, sometimes around 1620, according to theologian Ruston, "us ury passed from 
being an offence against public morality which a Christian govemment was expected to suppress to being a matter 
of private conscience [and] a new generation of Christian moralists redefined usury as excessive interest".1487 
This position has remained pervasive through to present-day thinking in the Church, as indicative views of the 
Church of Scotland suggest when it declares in its study report on the ethics of investment and banking: "We 
accept that the practice of charging interest for business and personal loans is not, in itself, incompatible with 
Christian ethics. What is more difficult to determine is whether the interest rate charged is fair or excessive.,,1488 
Similarly, it is iIIustrative that, in contrast to the clear moral injunction against usury still expressed by the Church 
in Pope Leo XIII's 1891 Rerum Novarum as "voracious usury ... an evil condemned frequently by the Church but 
nevertheless still practiced in deceptive ways by avaricious men", Pope John Paul Il's 1989 Sollicitude Rei Socialis 
lacks any explicit mention ofusury except the vaguest implication by way of acknowledging the Third World Debt 
crisis. 1489 
Christian Perspective on Usury at the Beginning of the 20th Century: syncretistic: 
"The usury rule, sapped of its vitality in modem economic conditions, is not abandoned, but so Iimited in the 
Iikelihood ofits applicability that profit on credit transactions is made the norm, and us ury the exceptional case of 
unjust extraction." The canonist doctrine, as Roll points out, was steadily weakened with commercial expansion 
and finally faced with complete collapse of its power to regulate economic Iife. 149o She maintains that "after the 
Reformation, the Church was no longer able to stand in the way of the growth of commercial capitalism, and 
whether Protestant and Puritan doctrines were themselves conducive to the development of the capitalist spirit is 
an area of discourse, already much debated ... What is important is that the harmony between Church dogma and 
feudal society, between theological and economic thought, responsible for the all-embracing quality of the Canon 
Law, came to an end with the decline of feudal society. This harmony had enabled the institutionalized Church, 
with its spiritual and secular power, to claim the right to order the whole of human relations and conduct on this 
earth as weil as to provide the precepts which would le ad to spiritual salvation."1491 But: 
Canonist thought was essentially an ideology, in economic matters it was an iIIusory representation of reality. lt 
was successful so long as the conflicts of reality had not become very acute. With the sharpening of these 
conflicts, the antithetical elements in this ideology were seized upon by the contending parties, and the original 
universal character was lost ... A separation was effected by which religious dogma ceased to Ic:present an 
analysis of existing soeiety as weil as a eode of eonduet ... Though attempts were again to be made to introduce 
ethical e\ements into the main stream of economic thought, it remains henceforth independent of religion. The 
foundation for a secular science of economy was laid. 1492 
1485 A.E. McGrath, A Lifè of John Calvin (London: Blackwell Press, 1990). 
1486 Bimic, Interest. 
1487 R. Ruston, "Does It Matter What Wc Do With Our Moncy?", Priests and People, May 1993, 171-77. 
1488 Church of Scot land, Report of Special Commission on the Ethies oflnvestment and Banking (1988). 
1489Yisscr and Mclntosh, Usury, 3-4. 
1490 Roll, Economie Thought, 53, citcd in Buckley, Thcological Examination, 142. 
1491 Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 142. 
1492 Roll, Economie Thought, 53, citcd in Bucklcy, Thcological Examination, 143. 
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CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM SCHOLARL y CONTRIBUTION 
MUHAMMAD RASHID RIDA (d. 1935) 
Elaboration of Ribi: 
The particle 'al'in the tenn riba [sic] indicates knowledge and famili arity, which means, 'Do not consume riba [sic] 
which was familiar to you and that you used to practice in the pre-Islamic period. 1493 
RationaIe (IfiJana) of Ribi Prohibition: 
• Ribiiis prohibited because it is an injustice.1494 
• Ribii, which was an exploitation of the need of their [Meccans and Medinans] brothers, was prohibited. 1495 
SA'ID AL-NAJJAR AND' ABD AL-MUN'IM AL-NAMIR 
• Emphasis on Moral Prohibition of Ribi (injustice) as fonnulated in the Qur'anic statement, "Iii ta?limiina wa-lii 
tu?lamiiri' (Do not commit injustice and no injustice will be committed against yoU).1496 
• Relegation ofIslamic Legal Form' of Ribito Secondary Position 
HAFNI NASIF AND 'ABD AL-' AZIZ JA WlSH, early 20tb century Egyptian Scholars 
Islamic Prohibition: 
Prohibition of 'Usury' not 'interest'; consensually prohibited ribii is interest equal to or more than the principal, 
any lower amount of interest being unlawful is debatable. 1497 
Similar Position of the Egyptian Civil Code: 
It is not pennitted under any circumstances for the creditor to receive interest which exceeds the amount of the 
principal. I498 
SHA WOI DUNY A, 20th century Egyptian Scholar 
Justification of Interest for Inflationary Indexation of Loans: 
ln an inflationary economy an element of interest, by means of indexation of loans, is justified to compensate the 
creditor for the inflationary loss suffered through decline in the purchasing power of money.1499 
Mufti Mohammad Shafi 
Characterization of Ribi: Evil in an exoteric economic context. 
Meaning of Riban in Q. 30:39: "Gift" and not ''ribii'; based on a first-ever reference to Q. 74:6 "wa-lii tamnun 
tastakthir" (do not favour anybody in the hope that he wiJ/ retum you more to cause your wealth to increase). " 
Quotation (without comment) of Ifaditbreported by Ibn Maja: 
Parallel between more than seventy types of ribii and shirk (idolatry).150o 
F AZLUR RAHMAN (d. 1988), Pakistani Scholar 
Literai and Lexical Meaning of Ribii: 
'Excess' in ail its Qur'anic manifestations,!50! 
TechnicaI Meaning of Ribi: Financial context only. 
Characterization of Ribi: "Economic Evil.,,1502 
140' Riga, M. Rashld. Tali;lr al-Maniir(Cairo: Dar al-Manar, n.d.),llI, 94. 
1494 Ibid 1II 103 
1495 Ibid:: III: 108: 
1496 Saccd, JsIamie Banking, 41. 
1497 Ibid., 46; Quoted in Drïiz, Ribii, 9. 
149' Egyptian Civil Law, Article, 9, quoted in Saeed, I~Iamie Banking, 46. 
1499 Quotcd in Saccd, I~Iamie Banking, 47. 
1500 Mufti Mohammad Shafi, and Mufti Mohammad Taqi Usmani, trans. Anwar Ahmed Mccnai, The l~'sue of Inferesf. (Karachi: 
Daru1 Ishaat, 1997). 
1501 Q. 22:5; 2:276; 30:39; 23:50; 2:265; 13:17; 27:24; 26:18; 69:10; and 16:92. 
1502 Rahman, Riba, 3. 
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Classification of Ribi ("two distinct categories" with the claimed support of "aIl the fuqahi' '): 
(1) Ribiprohibited by the Qur'an, "ribi al-Qur'an", and 
(2) Extension of the Qur'anic ribi to different forrns of exchange and transactions, "ribi al-IJadith" or "ribi al- faç/I 
(excess)."1503 
Classification of Qur'anic Ribi-Prohibitory Verses: 
(1) central" Q. 3:130, (2) prologue: Q. 30:39, and (3) epilogue: Q. 2:275 ff.,1504 
Ratio Legis (Shari'ab-value OT 'iUat al-IJukm) of Ribi -Prohibition: 
"Becoming doubled and redoubled." explicitly mentioned in 'central and fundamental' verse Q. 3: 130. 1505 
Categorically lJarim Ribiin the Qur'an: The atrocious Ribi al-jihiliya only. 
Reason for Abolition of AlI Interest HistoricaIly: 
Ali types ofinterest [usurious or mild] were a part of the ribisystem which was by nature exorbitantly usurious 
and had to be banned as a whole, without any exceptions, thus banning milder interest as weil. This prohibition of 
the ribi-system's constituent mild interest do es not cover modern bank interest because modern bank interest is a 
separate kind of system. 1506 
SpecificaIly: 
"Many well-meaning Muslims with virtuous consciences sincerely believe that the Qur'an has banned ail bank 
interest for ail times, in woeful disregard ofwhat riba [sic] was historically, why the Qur'an denounced it as a gross 
and cruel forrn of exploitation and banned it, and what the function ofbank interest ris] today.1507 
Emphasis on Moral Prohibition of Ribi (injustice) as forrnulated in the Qur'anie statement, "Ii ta~/imiina wa-li 
tu~Jamiid' (Do not commit injustice and no injustice will be committed against you). 
Relegation ofIslamic Legal Form' of Ribito Secondary Position. 1508 
Rationale (lJikma) of Ribi Prohibition: 
The absence of an early Meccan condemnation of ribi would have been contrary to the "wisdom of the Qur'an", 
whose only expression is in economic and moral contexts,1509 
Reformist Stance on Ribi Issue: 
In a truly Islamic order, if and when established, there will not be any need for bank-interest and the present 
banking system, and thus the issue of ribi would disappear, but any pre-mature abolition of bank-interest would be 
suicidai for the economy.15l0 
MUHAMMAD UZAIR. Pakistani Islamic Banking Theorist 
Posited Consensus on Prohibition of Interest in AlI Forms, Kinds and Purposes: 
By this time, there is a complete consensus of ail five schools of Fiqh ... and among Islamic economists, that 
interest in ail forrns, of ail kinds, and for ail purposes is completely prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days wh en 
people were apologetic about Islam, and contended that the interest for commercial and business purposes, as 
presently charged by banks, was not prohibited by Islam. 1511 
MUHAMMAD UMER CHAPRA, Pakistani-Saudi Islamic EconomicslFinance Expert 
Characterization of Ribi: 
Ribirepresents, in the Islamic value system, a prominent source ofunjustified advantage. 
LiteraI Meaning of Ribi: 
Increase, addition, expansion or growth (not every increase or growth is prohibited in Islam). 
1503 Ibid., 2. 
1504 Ibid., 5. 
1505 Ibid., 6. 
1506 Ibid., 7. 
1S07 FazIur Rahman, "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities", in AIford T. Welch and Pierre Cachia (cds.), Islam: Past Innuenee and 
Present Challenge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), 326. 
1508 Saeed, Islamie Banking, 41. 
1509 Rahman, Riba, 3. 
1510 Ibid 41 
1511 Muh~m~ad Uzair, "Impact of Interest Free Banking." Joumalof/slamie Banking and Finance, Autumn 1984, pp. 39-50,40. 
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Appendix 13 (h) (contd.) 
Shaii'a Technical Meaning of Ribii: 
Based on Ibn Man?ur's definition, the 'premium' that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the 
principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its maturity. 
Therefore, based on al-Jaz!r1,1512 ribihas the same meaning and import as interest in accordance with the consensus 
of ail the fuqahi' without any exception. 
Focus of Prohibition: 
Ribi al-Nasl'a: The predetennined positiveness of the retum. 
Ribii al-Farfl.' The requirement of equality in exchanges ofhomogeneity is to ensure '~ustice and fair play in spot 
transactions." 1513 
Rationale (/:IiJana) of Ribi -Prohibition: Establishment of socio-economic justice and prevention of exploitation. 
ABDULLAH SAEED 
Ribii Investigation: Moral not the prevalent legalistic. 
Traditional Interpretation of Ribii: Unsuitable and inadequate 
Required Approach to Issues ofBanldng and Finance: Ijtihidnot taqlid" 1514 
Qur'iinic Contrast of Ribi and Bay~ 
Not a contrast of ribi with profit arising out of a sale transaction. 
Reasons: 
(1) Qur'an does not go on to exhort trade (bay'), but merely states its lawfulness, in 2:275. 
(2) The very next 'verse, Q. 2:276, contrasts ribi and ~adaqa, as the Qur'an does in verse 30:39, where the tenn 
zakit appears to be synonymous with ~adaqa.' Exegete Raz! (d. 606/1209) supports this contrast. 1515 
Rationale (/:IiJana) of Ribii -Prohibition: 
Qur'an specifically mentions injustice as the rationale of prohibition in the final verses prohibiting ribii. 1516 
Explanation: 
The vast difference between a modem debtor and a pre-Islamic debtor [in terms of borrowers regular incomes and 
borrower protection laws] should not be ignored ifwe are to have a meaningful discussion on the issue of riba [sic] 
... riba [sic] was prohibited primarily to protect the economicalIy and socialIy disadvantaged in the 
community."1517 Qur'anic prohibition was based on moral and humanitarian considerations, not legalistic ones. The 
Qur'an basically prohibited exploitation of the needs of a person in financial difficulty, rather than an 'increase' 
accruing to the credit or in a loan transaction as SUCh. 1518 
From this perspective [moral principles of the Shari'a such as faimess, justice, and equity], within the context of 
banking and financial transactions, it would be the injustice factor which would ultimately determine what is riba 
[sic]and what is not. An 'increase' in a financial transaction given to the credit or just because it is an increase 
would not be riba [sic].This, applied to modem bank interest, would mean that not alI forms of interest are 
[prohibited] riba [sic], but only those forms which involve injustice to one of the contracting parties ... Similarly, a 
transaction, even though it may not involve an explicit interest component but leads to injustice to one party, may 
be regarded as a riba [sic] transaction. 
The point to be made here is that it is the circumstances of a particular transaction, the parties to such a 
transaction, the relative power of the parties vis-à-vis each other as weil as the economic and social environment 
within which the transaction takes place, which should determine whether a particular transaction should be 
prohibited as riba[sic].1519 
Juristic Invention and Widespread Use by Muslims of lfiyal (Stratagems): 
Resorted to in order to enable borrowing and lending for non-humanitarian purposes in any form at any rate and in 
any circumstances. 1520 
1512 al-Jazlrl, a/-Fiqh 'a/il a/-Madhiihib a/-Arba " Il, 245. 
1513 Chapra, Just Monetary System, 55-59. 
1514 Saccd, lslamie Banking, 3. 
1515 Razi, TafSJr, VII, 90. 
1516 Ibid. 
1517 Saccd, l"lamie Banking, 29. 
lm Ibid., 142. 
1519 Ibid., 146. 
1520 Ibid., 142-143. 
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JUSTICE MUFTI MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, Pakistani Shaii'a Scholar ofIslamic Financel521 
Coverage of Ribi: 
Includes ail interest/usury under the prohibition. 
Identification of 'iUa and lJikma of the prohibition: 
... After prohibiting the transaction of Riba [sic], the Holy Quran [sic] has mentioned the Zulm [sic] as a Hikmat 
[sic] or philosophy of the prohibition, ... The Illat [sic] (the basic feature) on which the prohibition is based is the 
excess claimed over and above the principal in a transaction of loan, ... 1522 '" Zulm [sic] translates as 
'injustice' .1523 
Lengthy Discourse, mostly quoting Western economists, on nature of money and perceived evil effects of interest 
on the global economy.1524 
KHURSHID AHMED, Pakistani Islamic Economist l525 
Textual Source of Prohibition: 
Ribi aJ-Nasi'a: Qur'anic 
Ribi a/-Falj1: Sunnaic 
Rationale (Ifikma) of Ribi -Prohibition: Exploitation, injustice and unearned nature of income: 
Distinction between Ribi a/-Nasi'a and Ribi a/-Falj1: 
Interest refers to what has been termed as riba al-nasj'ah [sic] or riba al-jali [sic] or riba al-duyun [sic] in the fiqh 
literature. This is the kind [italics mine] of riba [sic] that is directly [italics mine] covered by the Quranic [sic] 
injunctions. However, the Sunnah has also emphasized other aspects ofriba [italics mine] generally tenned as riba 
al-fadlor riba al-khafi or riba al-bu yu [sic]. This form of riba [sic] covers ail aspects of economic injustice, 
exploitation and unearned income. 1526 
ABDULKADER THOMAS, American Islamic Finance Consultant 
Linguistic Notion of R.B. W. : Concept of growing, exceeding, or self-generated expansion. 
Derivative Meaning of R.B. w.: Nurturing or teaching. 
CommerciallFinancial Meaning: Attribution of self-propelled or intrinsic value: 
R.B. W. applied to commerce or money is, in fact, the attribution of self-propelled or intrinsic value. This means 
that the mere passage oftime causes money ta gain value. This is unlike anything else created by Gad the Gracious, 
for He gives each creation its merits, and th en sorne efforts must be expended ta arrive at a greater value. Ta 
attribute intrinsÏc value to money is to declare that money do es not reguire Gad in order to increase its value. This 
borders on the elevation of money beyond its place as a medium of exchange or unit of account. Hence, those who 
grant money an intrinsic value are perilously close to shirkor idolatry in their concept of money.1527 
The Expanded Concept: 
Curiously, we modern Muslims have chosen to limit the translation of ribi to a one to one correspondence with the 
English word interest. Yet, the forbidden ribiis so much more than interest that it ev en borders on shirk or the 
association of a partner with GOd. 1528 
1521 Retiredjudge ofthe Sharl'a Appellatc Bench ofthe Supreme Court of Pakistan, Vice Chairman of the Fiqh Aeademy ofOIC, 
Jcddah, and a Sharl'a Advisor to many finaneial institutions intemationally. 
lm ln a 250-page section in the tex! of Sharl'a Appellate Bench ofthc Suprcmc Court of Pakistan, Judglllclll 01/ Ribii, Dcccmbcr 
23,1999 (Islamabad: Advanced Legal Studics Institute,www.nyazec.com" 2000), 429. 
1523 Ibid. 
1524 Sharl'a Appellate Beneh of the Suprcme Court of Pakistan, Judgmcnt on Ribii, Dcccmber 23,1999 (Islamabad: Advaneed Legal 
Studies Institute.www.nyazce.com .. 2000), 433-452 
1525 Pakistan Senator, Na'ib Amlr of the Jamii'at Islaml, Pakistan, founder of the Islamic Foundation, Leicester, England, and one of 
the ni ne 'Makers' in John L Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers ofContemporary lylam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
1526 Khurshid Ahmad, Toward;' The MOl/etary and Fiscal System of l~/am (Islamabad: Institute of Poliey Studies, 19R 1), 13. 
1527 Abdulkader Thomas, "What is ribii'!" in Abdulkader Thomas, cd., Interest in l;'lamic Economies (London; New York: Routlcdgc, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 127. 
1528 Ibid., 125-6. 
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